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In recent years, organisations, governments, and cities have taken advantage of the many benefits and 
automated processes Information and Communication Technology (ICT) offers, evolving their 
existing systems and infrastructures into highly connected and complex Systems-of-Systems (SoS). 
These infrastructures endeavour to increase robustness and offer some resilience against single points 
of failure. The Internet, Wireless Sensor Networks, the Internet of Things, critical infrastructures, the 
human body, etc., can all be broadly categorised as SoS, as they encompass a wide range of differing 
systems that collaborate to fulfil objectives that the distinct systems could not fulfil on their own.  
ICT constructed SoS face the same dangers, limitations, and challenges as those of traditional cyber 
based networks, and while monitoring the security of small networks can be difficult, the dynamic 
nature, size, and complexity of SoS makes securing these infrastructures more taxing. Solutions that 
attempt to identify risks, vulnerabilities, and model the topologies of SoS have failed to evolve at the 
same pace as SoS adoption. This has resulted in attacks against these infrastructures gaining 
prevalence, as unidentified vulnerabilities and exploits provide unguarded opportunities for attackers 
to exploit. In addition, the new collaborative relations introduce new cyber interdependencies, 
unforeseen cascading failures, and increase complexity.  
This thesis presents an innovative approach to identifying, mitigating risks, and securing SoS 
environments. Our security framework incorporates a number of novel techniques, which allows us to 
calculate the security level of the entire SoS infrastructure using vulnerability analysis, node property 
aspects, topology data, and other factors, and to improve and mitigate risks without adding additional 
resources into the SoS infrastructure. Other risk factors we examine include risks associated with 
different properties, and the likelihood of violating access control requirements. Extending the 
principals of the framework, we also apply the approach to multi-level SoS, in order to improve both 
SoS security and the overall robustness of the network. In addition, the identified risks, 
vulnerabilities, and interdependent links are modelled by extending network modelling and attack 
graph generation methods.  
The proposed SeCurity Risk Analysis and Mitigation Framework and principal techniques have been 
researched, developed, implemented, and then evaluated via numerous experiments and case studies. 
The subsequent results accomplished ascertain that the framework can successfully observe SoS and 
produce an accurate security level for the entire SoS in all instances, visualising identified 
vulnerabilities, interdependencies, high risk nodes, data access violations, and security grades in a 
series of reports and undirected graphs. The framework’s evolutionary approach to mitigating risks 
and the robustness function which can determine the appropriateness of the SoS, revealed promising 
 
 
results, with the framework and principal techniques identifying SoS topologies, and quantifying their 
associated security levels. Distinguishing SoS that are either optimally structured (in terms of 
communication security), or cannot be evolved as the applied processes would negatively impede the 
security and robustness of the SoS. Likewise, the framework is capable via evolvement methods of 
identifying SoS communication configurations that improve communication security and assure data 
as it traverses across an unsecure and unencrypted SoS. Reporting enhanced SoS configurations that 
mitigate risks in a series of undirected graphs and reports that visualise and detail the SoS topology 
and its vulnerabilities. These reported candidates and optimal solutions improve the security and SoS 
robustness, and will support the maintenance of acceptable and tolerable low centrality factors, should 
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Academics, organisations, governments, and cities have researched and heavily invested in 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in recent years, attempting to both understand and 
take advantage of the many benefits ICT platforms provide, amalgamating ICT with their existing 
infrastructures forming larger dynamic and complex Systems-of-Systems (SoS). In part, this is due to 
the growth of the Internet and ICT becoming cheaper to produce, thus widely available.  
We define Systems-of-Systems as ‘a collection of distinct systems, each capable of being operated 
and managed independently, that when integrated can collaborate together to form a much larger 
extended infrastructure that then functions on objectives that the distinct systems could not fulfil on 
their own’. These platforms allow for physical, cyber and human elements to be combined, and while 
SoS are formed by the integration of components they are only truly capable of collaborating upon 
objectives via the exchange of data.  
 
Figure 1.1 Schematic Representation of SoS and Multi-Level SoS Classifications 
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Furthermore, we consider multi-level Systems-of-Systems to be an assembly of SoS, reliant upon the 
unique assets or services provided by each of the distinct SoS in order to overcome the limitations of 
separate SoS, with the assembly of SoS performing as a single entity to meet the desired and often 
complex objectives of the multi-level SoS. Figure 1.1 provides a schematic representation of our 
perceived classifications of SoS and multi-level SoS.  
These collaborative infrastructures are comparable to other ICT based networks, fraught with issues 
such as scalability, trust and security,  with citizens and organisations increasingly finding themselves 
reliant upon the services and assets provided by these collaborating infrastructures, which have 
formed vast collective networks resembling ‘spider’s webs’ across towns and cities. 
Systems-of-Systems Example – BT Group plc developed one of the largest telecommunication 
networks in the UK, which has vastly increased its products and services,  by heavily investing in ICT 
to extend their communications network. The company has developed and is responsible for 
telephone exchanges, 28 million telephone lines, trunk network, local loop connections, broadband 
internet, Cloud computing, and other services. Countless external organisations and infrastructures 
deemed critical now depend on the physical and cyber assets provided by BT in order to collaborate 
with third parties and maintain control of their distributed systems, utilising BT’s infrastructure as 
their backbone. As BT’s communication network has grown across the UK, it has become 
increasingly difficult to effectively identify and manage risks within their infrastructure despite 
investment into network discovery and risk analysis methodologies, due to the sheer size, complexity, 
and dynamic nature of their infrastructures [1]. 
Features of Systems-of-Systems – The ad-hoc nature of SoS is to exploit interconnected services and 
infrastructures which are dispersed and interconnected via a variety of communication links, allowing 
for the distinct components to ‘pool resources’ and data, in order to fulfil identified objectives. Table 
1 summarises some of the main features, benefits and issues of four different types of SoS. 
Some of the main benefits of SoS is that they endeavour to deliver resilience against single points of 
failure (SPoF), increasing robustness, reliability, and performance, and can contribute to reductions in 
cost of operation.  These platforms can combine physical, cyber, and human elements together, along 
with both new and aging technology. In addition, distinct systems within the collaborative 
environment can maintain their individual operation and management, ensuring that distinct systems 
can function independently, as part of the SoS, or even collaborate with other external SoS. 
SoS allow for highly complex processes to be automated, that prior to developments within ICT and 
integration could not be achieved alone, and provide a means for processes to be continuously 
executed over long periods of time. 
 
  
Chapter 1- Introduction 
3 
 
Table 1.1. Systems-of-Systems Comparison 




 No fixed infrastructure. 
 Self-organisation. 
 Low cost. 
 Dynamic network topology. 
 Distributed sensing. 
 Distributed processing. 
 Deploy in remote areas. 
 Large scale deployment. 
 Non costly implementation. 
 No centralised monitor. 
 Resilient to node failure. 
 Integrate new devices 
easily. 
 Energy efficient. 
 Restricted computation. 
 Restricted power supply. 
 Restricted storage. 
 Less secure. 
 Complicated to configure. 
 Easily hacked/attacked. 
 Lower network speed. 
 Multi-hop communication. 
Critical 
Infrastructure 
 Integrate physical and cyber 
infrastructures. 
 Distinct systems can 
modify operation to meet 
objectives if malfunction 
occurs to support SoS. 
 Can co-ordinate planning 
across sectors. 
 Provide a restricted level of 
service in emergencies or 
during limited failures. 
 Increase robustness. 
 Automate processes. 
 Increase economic 
development. 
 Dynamic behaviour. 
 Allows systems to be 
geographically dispersed. 
 Delivers essential services. 
 In the event of failure can 
return to operation quickly. 
 Reliant on the assets of 
telecommunications. 
 Reliant on legacy systems. 
 Legacy systems no longer 
standalone or isolated. 
 Application dependent data. 
 Security is problematic. 
 Vigorous security testing 
cannot always be applied. 
 Failure can cause economic 
loss or catastrophic disaster. 
 Difficult to replace systems. 
 Introduces dependencies. 
Internet of 
Things 
 Integrates large numbers of 
devices or ‘things’. 
 Home and industrial 
automation. 
 Smart environments. 
 Machine-to-machine 
communication. 
 Allows for the automation 
of scheduled daily tasks. 
 Ability to monitor large 
numbers of sensors. 
 Ability to collate large 
amounts of data. 
 Can save time and money. 
 Allows for the automation 
of processes and control. 
 Increases complexity. 
 Increases incompatibilities 
between integrated devices. 
 Data security and privacy. 
 Easily hacked/attacked. 
 Scalability. 
 Large data sets. 
Cloud 
Computing 
 Provides Infrastructure as a 
Service. 
 Provides Platform as a 
Service. 
 Provides Software as a 
Service. 
 
 Reduce network costs. 
 Shared collaboration. 
 Reduces hardware and 
Support. 
 Distributed access. 
 Energy efficient. 
 Scalability 
 Reliant on transfer of data. 
 Security data breaches. 
 Data availability. 
 Dependent on third party 
services. 
 Dependent on Internet and 
network communications. 
 
1.1.1 General Issues Within Systems-of-Systems 
Due to the built-in redundancy and flexibility of systems, often failures are small and go relatively 
unnoticed as they have minor or no impact, while the more extreme failures are highly noticeable 
resulting in catastrophic consequences or can even cause the loss of human life.  
SoS have been rapidly developed and deployed into countless environments, and due to societal 
dependence upon the assets of these infrastructures, organisations have been forced to implement 
upgrades without taking systems off-line. Collaboration depends upon the transfer of data between 
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systems within the SoS, and while we can simply connect systems together, it does not mean that 
positive integration will be achieved. Data does not instinctively flow just because systems are 
connected together, and incompatibilities with software, firmware, configuration, etc., can impede the 
functionality of integrated devices or systems. If merged incorrectly these integrated systems could be 
combined with disastrous results. This could potentially lead to systems becoming insecure and 
vulnerable to attack, systems could become unstable resulting in system wide crashing, system 
performance could diminish, and systems might fail to meet required objectives. Data created, stored, 
and transmitted within SoS can contain control commands, operational states, and one component’s 
output can be another’s input in order to fulfil system objectives, any failures or delays which impede 
data or its transfer will have negative impact(s) upon the SoS services and assets [2] [3]. 
The danger of ‘bolting on’ systems or phasing out components and functions is that it can increase 
emergent behaviour within the collaborative infrastructure. Furthermore, due to managerial 
independence, operational independence, and evolutionary development, components and functions 
can be phased in and out while the SoS is operational, without notification or regards to the impact it 
might have on other distinct systems. These changes can impact both the device and SoS operations 
and objectives, could result in systems or the entire SoS being uncontrollable or unpredictable, and 
can negatively impede the security of the distinct systems and entire SoS leaving them vulnerable and 
open to security attacks. 
Another security challenge associated with these dynamic developments, is the fact that SoS are often 
deployed without being fully formed and will be forced to continually evolve as objectives are met 
and new objectives are identified.  
 
1.1.2 Security Issues Within Systems-of-Systems 
The collaborative environment of an SoS means the architecture of these networks is reliant upon 
changing, distributed, and diverse technologies, with varying components and software, and which 
each have conflicting configurations, security levels, and data access levels. This means assuring 
network and data security along with the quantification of vulnerabilities, risks, and security 
properties is immensely problematic. Unidentified vulnerabilities and risks between integrated 
components have the potential to leave all collaborative systems and components insecure, exposed, 
and vulnerable to attack vectors [2]. 
As organisations continue to integrate ICT within their infrastructures, SoS security will be further 
impeded by the added complexity and size of the networked infrastructure, and the SoS will be 
increasingly exposed to additional vulnerabilities and risks by their new collaborative relations. The 
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increased number of access points will provide new vantage points that can be exploited, and can 
assist in establishing new locations to launch both simple and sophisticated attacks from [2]. 
Maintaining operational relations on a daily basis between the distinct networked systems within the 
SoS is essential and an enormous challenge. It is vital that security does not negatively impede 
genuine and time critical communications during operations. Safeguarding data and maintaining an 
effective communication network is vital, and great consideration must be taken in how to safeguard 
secure routing within the topology between dissimilar devices. Securing an SoS under continuous 
evolvement which is fully operational is an immense challenge, as emergent behaviours will often 
manifest long after integration, and it will be unclear who is responsible for identifying and 
safeguarding issues, further exacerbated by the fact it will not be possible to simply turn systems off 
for additional testing. 
In future years we will also have to give greater consideration to security risks posed by collaborative 
systems being geographically distributed, and the impact that will be caused due to systems being 
governed by different laws and regulations. Geographically distributed SoS are critically reliant upon 
the transfer of data and networking capabilities, any interruption to data, including that caused due to 
local governance, between collaborative infrastructures, will result in the SoS failing to meet its 
objectives. As stated, data is a weak point and an SPoF, and as criminals and those with malicious 
intent realise the true value of data, it could become a potential target for malicious attacks; therefore 
increasing data security within SoS is of upmost importance.  
The anonymity and benefits cyberspace offers has also allowed attackers with malicious intent to 
move away from traditional crimes such as bank robbery, and instead launch sophisticated and 
directed attacks against various infrastructures, for both profit and amusement, allowing battles to be 
waged on untraditional battlefields, such as the attacks against infrastructures deemed critical. It is 
vital that we identify relationships and vulnerabilities that form due to integration, and the features, 
benefits, and issues associated with different SoS topologies (summary in Table 1.1), in order to 
identify and mitigate risk, and assure security within SoS environments. 
 
1.1.3 Risk Analysis Within Systems-of-Systems 
Risk analysis endeavours to support an organisation in identifying vulnerable assets within their 
infrastructure, the threats, risks, and vulnerabilities which expose the infrastructure, how and when 
they occur, estimation of their impact upon systems (i.e. damage caused, financial losses, system 
interruption or failure, etc.), and identify the processes that can be undertaken to manage or mitigate 
risks to improve security and system robustness, while minimising exposure or damage.  
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Identifying risks within SoS environments is critical, organisations who fail to perceive or identify 
associated risks leave their systems exposed and insecure, and any resulting failing due to unidentified 
vulnerabilities can cause huge financial loss or critical failure. The US Army recognised the 
limitations of solutions attempting to secure and identify risk within collaborative infrastructures, and 
developed a Laboratory Risk Reduction Method, to support network integration, design, and risk 
analysis [4]. While this solution has strengthened development and deployment stages, it is highly 
time consuming, expensive, and emergent behaviours and risks unimaginable at time of deployment, 
can manifest long after the SoS has been deployed. Therefore this solution cannot be considered an 
iterative risk analysis methodology. 
Risks that expose cyber SoS can include insecure or exposed ports, insufficient security policies, 
inadequate system hardening, use of vulnerable protocols, unencrypted communication, inadequate 
anti-virus, etc. Should vulnerabilities be ignored or remain unidentified, then these vulnerabilities can  
expose systems to application-level attacks, misconfiguration attacks, operating system attacks, 
password cracking, viruses and worms, and distributed denial of service attacks, etc. Cyber-attacks 
which exploit vulnerabilities are not the only risks that leave SoS exposed; human decisions and 
errors can result in increasing risks within SoS and contribute to failure, along with geographic 
changes and natural disasters, through to component and system misconfiguration, negative emergent 
behaviour evolvement, cascade failure, and reliance upon networking capabilities. These attacks, 
vulnerabilities, and risks, can directly result in critical failings and the loss of human life. 
Recent misfortunes such as the cascade failings that impeded the UK banking infrastructure [5], 
disruptions to several US airlines [6] [7], and the Japanese Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster [8], 
demonstrate the deficiencies and consequences that occur when risks remain unidentified and 
inadequate risk assessment and analysis has been conducted within SoS environments. Equally, 
attacks such as the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack against Domain Name System 
provider Dyn [9], the theft of 500 million account credentials from Yahoo [10], and the theft of 
money from approximately 20,000 Tesco Bank customers [11], prove that cyber-attacks against SoS 
are increasing and corroborate there are significant weaknesses in network security, and that existing 
theoretical and applied risk methodologies are inadequate and  leaving SoS exposed and vulnerable. 
Current risk solutions are inadequate and these real-world attacks and disasters demonstrate that 
current methods are failing to be successfully applied to these large dynamic and complex SoS. This 
is in part both due to the topology of the SoS and due to the risk methodologies being too 
complicated, too rigid, and broad in nature, so difficult to implement within heterogeneous SoS. The 
dynamic nature of SoS means it is problematic to identify and monitor vulnerabilities and risks that 
expose the SoS to potential attack vectors, to predict issues, potential failures, and the consequences 
of such failures, and identify who is responsible for monitoring systems, identifying issues that 
propagate, and who is accountable for initiating the appropriate resolutions.  
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These identified weaknesses and shortcomings that leave SoS security vulnerable and exposed, 
corroborate the need to develop an appropriate SoS security and risk analysis framework, that can 
overcome the limitations of other solutions and challenges posed by the topology and dynamic nature 
of SoS, and which provides the functionality to identify and visualise potential risk factors and model 
interdependent links between collaborative components. In this thesis the proposed SeCurity Risk 
Analysis and Mitigation Framework is presented, which aspires to address these issues. If risks can be 
identified and mitigated, we can increase SoS security and robustness, and limit the SoS exposure to 
failures and attack vectors. Risk is unavoidable and organisations will always have to contend with 
risk, but by identifying and understanding the risks which are both acceptable and unacceptable, 
measures can be undertaken in advance to mitigate or manage the risks effectively prior to failures or 
attacks. Meaning risk taking becomes a calculated intentional act. 
 
1.2 Motivation and Research Gaps 
The motivation for our research stems from the real-world SoS failures acknowledged in Section 1.1.3 
above, which confirms the need for continued research into identifying and mitigating risks within 
SoS, as their initial or exacerbated failures can all be directly attributed to unidentified risks. Had 
these vulnerabilities been identified prior, then the disasters could have been lessened or fully 
prevented. 
Similarly, having undertaken an in depth literature review, critically assessing current theoretical and 
applied solutions, and researching the challenges and risks that expose SoS to critical failings, we 
ascertained that currently there is no single solution that can adequately identify, map, and understand 
every critical link and vulnerability within SoS topologies for the life of the infrastructure [1] [4]. To 
some extent, this is attributed to the sheer number of components and the multiple networks which 
form the SoS infrastructures, the complexity of the topology, the decentralised nature of the 
environment, the ever evolving infrastructures and adaptions to system objectives, and due to a lack of 
ability to accurately perceive risk effectively [12], despite increased research and development. These 
difficulties prove problematic for the majority of solutions that attempt to secure large networks, with 
many methodologies struggling with the identification of issues, and failing to broadly apply their 
research [13]  or focusing on single vulnerabilities and attacks [14]. While other risk methods when 
applied, increase complexity within the topology [15]. 
The dynamic nature of SoS means the collaborative relations formed with other infrastructures will 
continually expose the entire SoS to additional risks, vulnerabilities, and potential cascade failures 
caused as a direct result of the tightly coupled links. Often network data is not encrypted and both the 
network and data is insecure, exposed via various vulnerabilities and risks. With no assurance for 
security, SoS are powerless against risks and with no central management, and systems continually 
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evolving, it can be difficult to detect and respond to failures when they occur. Considering the 
limitations of current solutions, it is vital that proposed techniques secure every component or identify 
their vulnerabilities, in order to mitigate risks, assure communication security, and increase robustness 
for the entire collaborative infrastructure. 
The work in this thesis is motivated by wanting to address the following main research challenges, 
which are: 
 Measuring Security between Interconnected Components and Systems: Due to the sheer 
complexity, size, and dynamic nature of SoS, the majority of developed solutions struggle to 
be applied and quantify communication security for these large multi-networked 
infrastructures. In general, this is directly attributed to the number of distinct networks within 
the SoS which are managerially independent, and the sheer number of components forming 
each network. Collaborative infrastructures are often widely dispersed, and are formed 
between a complex series of ICT communication links and connecting devices, forming vast 
and complex topologies that are difficult to understand and monitor. Retaining their 
independent management further complicates network security, as both assets and services 
can be added and removed without informing or seeking permission from their collaborative 
partners [16]. This means new security risks can be introduced without warning and remain 
undetected, due to the complexity of the infrastructure and limitations of security solutions 
that identify risks and report them. The motivation for overcoming this challenge is to 
improve upon existing methods and generate a solution that is both backward and forward 
compatible [4], not domain specific [17], and can be applied to the entire collaborative 
infrastructure, ensuring that techniques are compatible and dynamic to guarantee security can 
be accurately identified and quantified to protect systems against unperceived risks, along 
with potential future integration of components and networks, thus assuring the future 
security of the network for the life of the SoS.  
 Identification of Risks and Interdependencies: The dynamic and heterogeneous nature of 
SoS has heavily impacted organisations, specifically their ability to efficiently identify and 
measure risks that pose threats and leave systems exposed, and the interdependencies that 
form due to the tightly coupled bonds that form between collaborative systems [1]. The 
inability to accurately identify risks is often due to the organisation failing to perceive risk 
due to a lack of experience or training, and can be impacted due to personal bias [1] [18]. 
Often risk methodologies are highly complex, too broad, and domain specific, with 
organisations struggling to apply the methodologies to their systems or not being able to apply 
them fully to the entire SoS [13] [19]. With risks remaining unidentified SoS are further 
exposed due to the failure to identify interdependencies that form, attributed to the sheer size 
and complexity of these SoS. Current solutions do not have the capability to understand and 
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identify all interdependencies that form within these collaborative infrastructures [1]. The 
dependencies heavily impact SoS security as, should one system be insecure, then the level of 
risk for the other collaborative systems increases, while reducing the security in other 
dependent systems. The motivation for overcoming this challenge is to improve upon existing 
methods as security is a challenge for SoS infrastructures, and as organisations continue to 
integrate more systems and service, this will increase interdependencies and risks associated 
with security will become more complex. In addition, it is essential that solutions are not just 
backward compatible but forward as well, along with being dynamic to ensure that the 
automated solution can keep up with the speed of ICT advancement, and the dynamic nature 
and size of the SoS as they are continually developed during their life cycle. 
 Data Security in Unsecure and Unencrypted Networks: One of the benefits of SoS is their 
ability to form a collaborative environment for distinct devices to integrate and combine their 
resources or share their data in order to meet a shared objective. These collaborative relations 
are reliant upon the transfer of data in order for them to form relations and meet their 
objectives. These distinct devices can all be individually configured with varying security 
grades and solutions, and with differing data access requirements. In order to protect data 
various solutions have been utilised and proposed, but often these techniques are unsuitable or 
not appropriate for the SoS environment in which they are to be deployed [20] [21]. A simple 
solution is to encrypt data as it traverses across insecure networks, however, on SoS such as 
those formed using sensor nodes and other devices with limited computational power and 
memory, alternative techniques are more desirable. The motivation for overcoming this 
challenge is to develop a trustworthy technique that can be applied to diverse systems and 
their components in order to assure data as it traverses across unencrypted and insecure 
networks, in addition to the technique not impacting the limited processing resources of 
components within the topology of the SoS. 
 
1.3 Aims and Objectives 
The project aims considered are, to identify the limitations of existing solutions and techniques, which 
will be reflected upon to assist with the development of a solution capable of identifying and 
mitigating risks within SoS and multi-level SoS environments. Subsequently, we intend for the 
solution to measure the security of individual devices and the entire SoS topology, identifying risks 
and interdependencies that impact and form between collaborative components. In addition, the 
solution should quantify the robustness of the entire collaborative infrastructure, in order to evaluate 
the appropriateness of these environments. Ultimately, the proposed solution should resolve the 
failings of existing techniques that fail to assure data and quantify risk(s), and have the capacity to 
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secure the collaborative environment utilising only the existing networked resources. By increasing 
the cyber resilience of SoS and multi-level SoS, when networks or components are attacked or fail the 
impacts should be minimised due to the applied solution.   
The main objectives of this thesis which are necessary to resolve current inadequacies in SoS risk 
analysis and network security are: 
 Conduct detailed background literature research into the challenges and risks that expose SoS, 
the issues impacting the ability of current solutions to secure these dynamic networked 
infrastructures, and the methodologies that fail to identify and quantify risks within SoS.  
 Develop an SoS security risk analysis solution to calculate the security level of the entire SoS 
using vulnerability analysis, node property aspects, topology data, and other factors, to 
improve and mitigate risks without introducing additional resources into the SoS 
infrastructure. 
 Develop a solution that can analyse and quantify the robustness of the SoS environment based 
on the relevant data captured from the application of the security risks analysis solution. 
 Conduct a detailed investigation into optimisation techniques and algorithms in order to 
identify which solutions suit SoS to mitigate the risks. 
 Conduct a case study on a specific network type such as WSN, and expand the solution to 
encompass a different risk vector utilising the same developed risk analysis framework and 
robustness techniques. 
 Validate that the algorithms and principles are effective for identifying and mitigating risks 
within multi-level SoS, in order to increase multi-level SoS security and robustness. 
 
1.4 Novel Contributions 
The thesis presents a novel approach for SoS security and makes the following novel contributions: 
 An evolutionary SeCurity Risk Analysis and Mitigation Framework, which overcomes the 
inadequacies and limitations of existing solutions. The framework quantifies the security level 
of each device and the entire collaborative infrastructure. This solution is dynamic and 
supports the integration of multiple risk parameters, combining vulnerability scores collated 
via various sources such as parameters identified using vulnerability analysis, and calculated 
risks scores based on node property aspects, topology data, and other factors. The technique 
also assists with identifying and visualising vulnerabilities, data access violations, and 
interdependencies within the SoS infrastructure.  
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 A statistical robustness measurement technique that can quantify the robustness of the SoS 
environment. The technique combines five distinct parameters to quantify the suitability of 
the network configuration and security into a single comparable parameter, and when 
combined with the evolutionary risk mitigation algorithm, assists to identify topologies that 
increase and decrease security and risk. 
 An evolutionary risk mitigation technique that evolves the configuration of the network 
communication links between components within networks and collaborative networks, in 
order to identify the optimal SoS communication configuration. Unlike existing approaches, 
the proposed technique is automated, and does not require additional resources to be added to 
the SoS infrastructure in order to secure and mitigate risk factors. This technique also assisted 
with the study and implementation of other optimisation techniques within the SoS SeCurity 
Risk Analysis and Mitigation Framework, evaluating their usefulness, and identified that not 
all optimisation process can be applied to such large dynamic and complex SoS 
infrastructures.  
 An SoS SeCurity Risk Analysis and Mitigation Framework that adopts a hybrid and scalable 
approach to secure and mitigate risks in multi-level SoS, which are the amalgamation of large 
distinct SoS. This technique overcomes the limitations associated with complex SoS, 
providing an accurate means to measure, identify, and visualise security and vulnerabilities, to 
identify and quantify vulnerabilities and mitigate risks, and to measure the robustness of the 
entire multi-level SoS. This limits the multi-level SoS exposure to failures and attack vectors, 
with analysis undertaken on multi-level SoS that consist of up to twelve unique heterogeneous 
SoS. 
Aspects of the research undertaken and presented in this thesis have been published in eight academic 
research journals and conferences, with a comprehensive list of publications being provided at the 
beginning of the thesis. 
 
1.5 Research Findings 
Research outcomes – An in-depth review of existing research and development within the field of 
SoS has identified limitations with existing solutions. Inadequacies include their inability to identify 
and mitigate risk within dynamic and complex SoS, and difficulties quantifying security and the 
robustness of the entire infrastructure. The weaknesses identified are primarily attributed to the 
inadequacies of existing risk and vulnerability analysis techniques, which allow for vulnerabilities to 
remain unidentified, and their inability to quantify accurate security and robustness levels due to 
inaccurate vulnerability identification and risk assessment, and due to the inability of these techniques 
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to overcome the complexity, dynamic nature, and size of the SoS infrastructures. This allows 
vulnerabilities and risks within SoS to remain undetected; resulting in the security of SoS being 
exposed to attack vectors and allows for issues to propagate. 
Research observations – Addressing the aims set out in this thesis, our research identified the 
limitations of existing methodologies in order to ensure that the proposed techniques and framework 
do not experience the same issues. In general, the proposed research and solutions are highly 
theoretical or not applied to large distributed networks and SoS, meaning there is no assurance in 
regards to scalability, and their appropriateness when applied to multi-level SoS. Research identified 
that integration increases complexity, interdependencies, and the risk of SPoF evolving, and as 
societal dependence on the assets of SoS continues and development of these infrastructures 
increases, system complexity will correspondingly increase. Methods and visualisation techniques in 
regards to risk analysis, attack analysis, failure analysis, and approaches that focus on identifying 
complexity, cascading failure, and interdependencies, typically focus upon a specific area and type of 
infrastructure.  
Novel contribution outcomes – An in depth review of existing research and developments within the 
field of SoS has influenced our work and assisted us in developing a novel methodology and 
framework capable of identifying and mitigating risks within SoS without introducing additional 
resources into the infrastructure, and the capacity to accurately quantify the security and robustness 
levels of the entire collaborative multi-level SoS. During the development and implementation of our 
proposed methodology it became apparent that some of the applied algorithms and techniques were 
imprecise and unpredictable, therefore it became necessary to develop and implement improvements. 
 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
The research detailed in this thesis is arranged into seven subsequent chapters, with the following 
overview outlining the order and content of these chapters: 
Chapter 2: Background 
This chapter defines the types of infrastructures which can be categorised as Systems-of-Systems, the 
rewards and challenges associated with SoS, and identifies the main issues that expose networked 
systems leaving them insecure and vulnerable to attack vectors which are directly attributed to the 
SoS characteristics. Presenting this background information ensures that the reader can comprehend 
the challenges and inadequacies that currently exist within this area of research. In addition, this 
chapter also summarises methods that attempt to identify and quantify the risks associated with larger 
heterogeneous infrastructures, and those which model interdependencies and cascading failures such 
as attack graph generation methodologies. 
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Chapter 3: Related Work 
In this chapter we provide a critical review of research which relates to network and SoS risk analysis 
and assessment, vulnerability identification, including risk modelling, and network optimisation 
techniques. We review how these methodologies are applied in regards to network security, their 
effectiveness in identifying vulnerabilities and interdependencies in an attempt to mitigate risk(s), and 
how they can be improved to provide effective solutions to the challenges outlined. 
Chapter 4: SeCurity Risk Analysis and Mitigation (SCRAM) Framework 
This chapter presents the proposed SoS SeCurity Risk Analysis and Mitigation (SCRAM) framework 
design. Firstly, the section offers an analysis of the problems identified via the conducted research, 
followed by a comprehensive overview of the structure and design of the proposed SCRAM solution. 
This is followed with a detailed description of the framework’s processing stages, which are the Initial 
Operation Stage, Network Discovery Stage, Attack Graph Generation and Analysis, and Risk 
Mitigation Analysis. In addition, the theoretical principal algorithms and methods which are 
incorporated into SCRAM are discussed. These novel techniques assist us to effectively meet our 
identified aims and objectives, and we summarise how they support the framework’s ability to 
measure security between interconnected components and systems, quantify the robustness of the 
network, and identify and mitigate risks without utilising additional resources. 
Chapter 5: Implementation and Evaluation 
This chapter defines how the SCRAM solution was developed, and how the theoretical principles 
were implemented, discussing the configuration of the essential methods and simulated environment 
in order to evaluate them. This section describes initial evaluation of the SCRAM framework and 
applied techniques, evaluating the methodology against the fundamental design requirements. 
Corroborating the framework’s effectiveness to identify and mitigate risk, and ensure the aims and 
objectives established are accomplished. The chapter concludes with a case study that validates the 
appropriateness of the SCRAM solution and applied techniques, and corroborates the framework’s 
dynamic capabilities to adapt to additional risk factors within SoS environments.  
Chapter 6: Multi-Level SoS Security Analysis and Evaluation 
This chapter presents the experiments generated within SCRAM that have allowed us to analyse and 
evaluate both the proposed SCRAM solution and the integrated theoretical techniques when applied to 
multi-level SoS. Each generated multi-level SoS environment provides a rich topology, formed from 
multiple distinct SoS each constructed from differing devices, communication links, and 
vulnerabilities. By generating these multi-level SoS environments, a comprehensive data set is 
produced for analysis and evaluation. Assisting us to evaluate and determine the SCRAM solution 
principles’ and techniques’ functionality and its ability to adequately identify and mitigate risks within 
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multi-level SoS topologies, and corroborate the solution’s ability to quantify the security and 
robustness for the entire collaborative environment.  
Chapter 7: Conclusion and Future Work 
This chapter presents a summary of the work presented in this thesis and discusses the successful 
novel contributions achieved in order to overcome the limitations of existing solutions, and the 
challenges associated with SoS security and risk analysis. In this section we also summarise the 
limitations of our SCRAM framework, discuss future work that could be undertaken in order to 
extend our framework and develop it further to address other challenges, and the identified solution 
limitations. Finally, we conclude by summarising the presented work in this thesis and its novel 
contributions that have overcome the associated issues of multi-level SoS security, and risk 





Chapter 2  
Background 
 
Over recent years ICT has augmented interoperability, and assisted with the integration of both 
Physical and Cyber Assets. Numerous industries, organisations, and governments have been quick to 
take advantage of the many benefits these technologies offer. As ICT has  not only allowed complex 
objectives to be fulfilled and automated, it has also reduced financial cost of operation and 
maintenance, and increased the overall robustness, performance and reliability of these large 
networked systems.  Subsequently, vast complex heterogeneous networks have emerged in areas 
where the infrastructure’s operation is often deemed vital for society (i.e. critical infrastructure, 
disaster management, banking, etc.). These infrastructures are often independently operated and void 
of a central management structure, and can be further defined as Systems-of-Systems. Figure 2.1 
provides a high level representation of the interconnected relationships that can now form between 
cyber based infrastructures, which allow organisations to collaborate and form extended networked 





Trusted third party of 
Critical Infrastructure B
Critical Infrastructure C
Provides the communication backbone for all infrastructures
 
Figure 2.1. Cyber Systems-of-Systems Architecture 
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Nonetheless, these large networked infrastructures struggle and are affected by the demand for 
interoperability, performance, security, and usability. In addition, when integrating distributed 
technology formed from varying components, with differing security levels, performance, and 
dynamic in nature, it becomes challenging to predict how they will interact and be affected should 
failure occur or the exchange of critical communications stop. Unpredictable system and component 
performance means initiating failures can quickly develop and cascade to other systems with no 
warning. Environmental factors surrounding SoS can also profoundly impact systems and their 
functionality, exposing these structures to potential attack, failure, and risk vectors due to unidentified 
vulnerabilities. 
In this chapter we review the paradigm of SoS and the challenges which plague these infrastructures. 
Also examined are the elements of risk within SoS that jeopardise the security of the network and 
have the potential to be the source of SPoF. Network risk assessment is conveyed within this section, 
focusing on risk analysis, intrusion detection, and the methods that are utilised such as attack graphs 
that attempt to assist in risk identification, and security assessment and visualisation. 
 
2.1 Systems-of-Systems 
Academics and industry practitioners have remained divided upon a single definition to best describe 
all Systems-of-Systems. Jamshidi defined SoS as “large-scale integrated systems that are 
heterogeneous and independently operable on their own, but are networked together for a common 
goal” [22], and Kotov defines them as “large-scale concurrent and distributed systems the 
components of which are complex systems themselves” [23]. Maier [24] distinguished three separate 
types of SoS (directed, virtual and collaborative), basing each upon the actual relationships perceived 
between the distinct systems which formed each of the collaborative networks. While Dahmann and 
Baldwin [25] expanded upon this work and gave recognition to a fourth type of SoS (acknowledged), 
due to development and growth within the US Department of Defence systems. 
Boardman and Sauser [26] in an attempt to differentiate SoS from distinct systems, concentrated upon 
five distinguishing characteristics thus opting to ignore definitions, the characteristics they identified 
are Autonomy, Belonging, Connectivity, Diversity and Emergence. While Shenhar [27] back in 1994 
was one of the first to propose a systems classification matrix, and defined SoS as “A large 
widespread collection or network of systems functioning together to achieve a common purpose”. 
We define Systems-of-Systems as ‘a collection of distinct systems, each capable of being operated 
and managed independently, that when integrated can collaborate together to form a much larger 
extended infrastructure that then functions on objectives that the distinct systems could not fulfil on 
their own’. In addition, we consider multi-level SoS to be ‘an accumulation of SoS, which are reliant 
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upon the assets or services provided by each of the distinct SoS in order to overcome the limitations 
of separate SoS, with the assembly of SoS performing as a single entity to meet the desired and often 
complex objectives of the multi-level SoS’. 
These platforms allow for physical, cyber, and human elements to be combined, and while SoS are 
formed by the integration of components and multi-level SoS via the integration of SoS, they are only 
truly capable of collaborating upon objectives via the exchange of data.  This unavoidable reliance 
upon the transfer of data to ensure integration (i.e. one component’s or SoS output being another’s 
input), means the dependence upon data which previously did not exist introduces new cyber 
interdependencies and increases complexity within SoS and multi-level SoS, along with introducing 
the risk of cascading failures and impacting security. 
 
2.1.1 Systems-of-Systems Types 
The four main classifications for SoS are directed, virtual, collaborative, and acknowledged, and are 
based upon perceived relationships between the components and systems which form the SoS.  
 Directed Systems-of-Systems – These SoS are centrally managed to fulfil specific 
objectives, however, their distinct systems operate independently, thus remain subordinate to 
complete their managed objectives or new objectives defined by managers [24] [25]. An 
example is the Royal Naval collaboration between the ARTISAN 3D radar and Seawolf Mid-
Life Update program, which delivers an SoS in an attempt to increase ship survivability. Both 
the radar and missile system can function independently, and potentially can simultaneously 
collaborate with other distinct systems to achieve objectives outside the scope of this SoS 
[28]. 
 Virtual Systems-of-Systems – These SoS are neither centrally managed nor have a centrally 
agreed objective. Within these types of SoS large scale behaviours potentially can emerge, 
forcing the SoS to heavily rely upon invisible components to meet objectives [24] [25]. An 
example would be the World Wide Web, as it is physically and administratively distributed, 
and since its establishment no single organisation has directly controlled it [24]. 
 Collaborative Systems-of-Systems – These SoS do not have the ability to command systems 
directly to fulfil objectives from the central management, instead the distinct systems must 
volunteer to work in partnership to fulfil any agreed central requirement. An example would 
be the Internet; this began life as a directed SoS however is now defined as a collaborative 
SoS due to its continuous evolvement. This is because organisations like the Internet 
Engineering Task Force developed standards for the Internet, however, currently have no 
authority to enforce them [24] [25]. 
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 Acknowledged Systems-of-Systems – These SoS have defined management, resources, and 
established functions, though the collaborating systems each maintain their distinct functions, 
ownership, funding, and development. Should distinct systems evolve or require adaptation, 
both the SoS and the distinct systems must collaborate. An example is the Department of 
Defence when SoS managers have no direct control over the collaborating distinct systems, 
instead they only have the ability to advise and influence other managers as the SoS evolves 
and new objectives are identified [25]. 
Due to the broad definition of SoS, when we study real world SoS and their failings, these 
classifications act as low level subcategories, and as stated allow us to group together SoS based upon 
perceived relationships. Consequently, this has also allowed us to identify and investigate correlated 
failings and risks which directly impede and expose specific types of SoS, based upon infrastructure 
relationships. It was essential to understand the configured relationships forming SoS and the 
challenges that must be overcome, especially as we wish to apply our proposed framework and 
techniques to not only diverse SoS but also multi-level SoS which are an accumulation of divergent 
SoS, and could contain any number of differently classified SoS. Critical research of SoS classified in 
each of these areas allows us to develop a solution capable of considering these types of relationships, 
this will also ensure that classification types will not affect the results, validating the method’s 
appropriateness to be applied to diverse multi-level SoS 
 
2.1.2 Systems-of-Systems Examples 
SoS are not new developments, they have been heavily developed and researched for several decades 
after the realisation that single systems can no longer meet all required objectives. These 
infrastructures have developed and emerged in areas that include manufacturing, healthcare, 
transportation, telecommunication, banking, critical infrastructure, military applications, space 
research, and disaster management. It is irrelevant if the infrastructure has emerged in place, been 
long established, pre-planned, or created quickly in response to a critical incident, these 
infrastructures have formed intricate tightly coupled structures like ‘spiders’ webs’ which have 
manifested themselves and become so integrated within our daily lives, we don’t notice they are there 
until one fails. The scale and size of these varied SoS over the last few decades has surprised many 
industry practitioners, particularly how rapidly they have been developed and deployed within many 
infrastructures which are deemed critical. Three examples of SoS are critical infrastructures, Smart 
Cities, and the human body which we summarise. 
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2.1.2.1 Critical Infrastructures 
Critical Infrastructures (CI) can be defined as an SoS, due to the fact over the last few decades they 
have been quick to embrace new technology and merge it with aging legacy systems, due to the many 
advances within ICT. The industry has integrated physical and cyber assets with their existing 
infrastructures, meaning they no longer remain isolated and standalone systems. Instead they now rely 
on telecommunication assets as their backbone to provide the necessary links to allow for 
interconnectivity between their collaborative systems, which form large extended networks. 
Telecommunications are responsible for not only ensuring that the distinct systems collaborate by 
transferring data in a timely fashion and for data to be coordinated, but this infrastructure often is also 
responsible for connecting and controlling the operation of other CI [29] [30]. 
Systems controlling infrastructures deemed critical and the CI themselves have been forced to 
implement upgrades without taking systems off-line, due to societal dependence upon their services 
and assets. This means that as new requirements were identified, systems were merged on top of 
existing infrastructures like building blocks [31], and vigorous testing could not be applied to the 
network to ensure long term connectivity or functionality.  
While CI expansion has the potential to increase economic development, any direct failure to these 
infrastructures could result in huge economic loss or cause catastrophic consequences. CI cannot be 
simply turned off or replaced overnight, and updating or transferring the functionality of legacy 
systems to new modern cyber ICT systems certainly will take years, if it is both viable and possible. 
Assuring the security for these infrastructures is problematic leaving CI exposed, and it will cause 
short and long term challenges to system integration [12]. Furthermore, as organisations and 
governments become more integrated, attacks against these infrastructures will also inherently 
increase. 
The USA Patriot Act defines CI as “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the 
United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating 
impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination 
of those matters,” and categorise their critical infrastructures into thirteen sectors as shown in Table 
2.1 [32]. While the UK defines its CI as “certain ‘critical’ elements of infrastructure, the loss or 
compromise of which would have a major, detrimental impact on the availability or integrity of 
essential services, leading to severe economic or social consequences or to loss of life,” and 
categorise their critical infrastructures into nine sectors as shown in Table 2.1 [33]. 
  
Chapter 2 - Background 
20 
 





 Public Health 
 Emergency Services 
 Government 
 Defence Industrial Base 
 Information and Telecommunications 
 Energy 
 Transportation 
 Banking and Finance 
 Chemical Industry and Hazardous Materials 
 Postal and Shipping 
 Communications 
 Emergency Services 
 Energy 






Source: U.S. Government Publishing Office, Public Law 107-56-Oct.26, 2001 [32], The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, 
Foreign involvement in the Critical National Infrastructure: The implications for national security [33]. 
One of the main factors behind the integration of key systems within CI is to increase system 
robustness and to automate processes which are time critical and reliant upon being initiated in 
sequence, hence increase the lifespan and performance of these key systems. These infrastructures 
then have the built-in capacity to adapt to various unexpected situations, as it allows the distinct 
components and systems to modify their operation and adapt to fulfil objectives should malfunctions 
appear in other key components or systems. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Critical Infrastructure Example Architecture 
Source: Schematic representation of interdependent relations within the architecture of a critical infrastructure, Forester et al. [34]. 
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Figure 2.2 demonstrates how CI have become heavily integrated and reliant upon each other’s 
services and assets, and assists to visualise the complexity and introduction of interdependencies that 
previously did not exist, which have the potential to expose the distinct infrastructures to additional 
risks or can impact functionality in the event of partial or full cascade failure occurring. Alarmingly 
the majority of CI are owned and run by the private sector and can make changes without informing 
other infrastructures who are reliant upon their services and assets. 
In addition, there are few protection methods in place such as specific laws, practices, and regulations 
that operators must conform to, or minimum security standards that must be applied or upheld. 
Furthermore, as CI continue to integrate and form extended infrastructures, in the future they may be 
extensively geographically dispersed in different jurisdictions or countries, meaning in addition the 
local laws, governance and policies will be forced to be considered and applied. An excellent example 
of this is the USA which has 50 states, 4 territories, and has more than 87,000 jurisdictions of local 
governance, with many of the country’s CIs bordering a number of different national borders that 
inevitably require international cooperation [29]. 
 
2.1.2.2 Smart Cities 
Smart Cities are emerging globally in an attempt to manage urban population growth and the assets of 
cities. It is estimated that over half of the world’s population resides within an urban region. 
Increasing urban population growth is causing a significant number of difficulties, and cities globally 
find themselves struggling with inadequate and aging infrastructures, inadequate resource 
management (including power, water and waste), air pollution, traffic congestion, and issues with 
resource volume and allocation. This relatively new paradigm is generally formed via the integration 
of ICT, taking advantage of the benefits provided by platforms such as the Internet, IoT, and WSN, 
which are incorporated with new and existing infrastructures. These evolvements can provide new 
and improved services for its citizens, while reducing administration costs and improving the city’s 
management of its assets [35]. 
Again, there is no single accepted definition to best describe all Smart Cities, nor a unified frame for 
comparison. Harrison et al. [36] state Smart Cities are “connecting the physical infrastructure, the IT 
infrastructure, the social infrastructure, and the business infrastructure to leverage the collective 
intelligence of the city”, and  Hall [37] define Smart Cities as “A city that monitors and integrates 
conditions of all of its critical infrastructures, including roads, bridges, tunnels, rail/subways, 
airports, seaports, communications, water, power, even major buildings, can better optimize its 
resources, plan its preventive maintenance activities, and monitor security aspects while maximizing 
services to its citizens.” 
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Smart Cities allow distinct components and systems to ‘pool resources’ and data. These dynamic 
networks working in partnership will endeavour to provide vital services to accomplish both simple 
and complex tasks, which they individually could not achieve, relying upon data being transferred 
across a complex series of devices and a number of critical data communication links. Failures or 
delays which impede data transfer will have negative impacts upon the Smart City’s services and 
assets. 
The eight main critical factors that impede Smart Cities were highlighted in the work of Chourabi et 
al. [35], these internal and external challenges that must be addressed are categorised as management 
and organisation, technology, governance, policy context, people and communities, economy, built 
infrastructure, and the natural environment.  
When the paradigm of IoT is incorporated into Smart Cities, we have to consider that this 
infrastructure is comparable to other ICT based networks and is fraught with issues such as 
scalability, trust and security. IoT encompasses a variety of devices or ‘things’, such as physical 
components including sensors, actuators, surveillance cameras, home appliances, displays, vehicles, 
and mobile phones. These devices when utilised within a Smart City, are dispersed and interconnected 
via a variety of communication links, and with varying security and access policies [38]. 
 
Figure 2.3. Smart City Topology Schematic 
Likewise, the incorporation of WSN within Smart Cities is fraught with challenges, as WSN 
platforms connect objects to the Internet via a gateway. Typically the gateway forwards sensed data 
collected via the WSN across the Internet using a communication protocol. These protocols 
traditionally only communicated one-way, however, it is possible for two-way communication via the 
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WSN. This means that sensors are capable of both receiving and sending data such as temperature, 
pressure, motion, voltage/current, etc., and act upon commands received, which enhances both 
automation and user experience within the Smart City environment [39]. Figure 2.3 is a demonstrative 
example of such devices and connections. 
As Smart Cities continue to integrate IoT and WSN with their existing active infrastructures, exposure 
to attacks will inevitably increase. In part this is due to the increase in new access points, which 
provide new vantage points that can be exploited, and assist in establishing new locations to launch 
attacks from. In addition, these cities will be further impeded by the sheer size and complexity of the 
integrated components forming the topology, and networks will be increasingly exposed to additional 
vulnerabilities and risks by their new collaborative relations. 
When cities integrate changing distributed and diverse technologies, with varying components and 
software, and which each have dissimilar security levels, quantifying vulnerabilities, risks, and 
security properties is highly difficult. We consider this as one of the most important challenges which 
must be overcome to prevent serious flaws exposing entire cities. 
We surmise that all collaborative components which form Smart Cities, WSN, and IoT (e.g. actuators, 
sensors and smart devices), are systems in their own right. Subsequently, we consider all of these 
platforms both interconnected and individually as Systems-of-Systems. 
 
2.1.2.3 The Human Body 
 
Figure 2.4. Human Systems Topology 
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A more extreme example of SoS includes the human body, as it is also made up of collaborating 
systems each functioning together to fulfil the objective of life (Figure 2.4). These distinct systems 
include the skeletal system, muscular system, nervous system, cardiovascular and lymphatic system, 
integumentary system, respiratory system, sensory system, digestive system, genitourinary system, 
and endocrine system, summarised in Table 2.2 [40].  
Table 2.2. Collaborative Systems Within the Human Body 
Type Description 
Skeletal  The Skeletal structure consists of 206 bones. These bones form the human body’s internal 
framework, allowing for an upright posture and protection of all vital organs. The Skeletal structure 
functions include assistance with movement, storage, and maintenance of chemical level. Bones are 
also categorised as a living organ.  
Muscular  The largest system in the human body is the Muscular system. Muscles are essentially positioned 
throughout the human body, and are solely responsible for all human movement. Muscles are 
categorised into three different types: Skeletal muscle which is the only muscle tissue that is 
voluntary. Smooth muscle which is found typically in hollow organs, its main function is to propel 
objects. And Cardiac muscle which is found only in the heart, its function is involuntary and pumps 
blood throughout the heart. 
Nervous  The Nervous system is often considered as a master system, and is responsible for controlling and 
communicating thoughts, actions and emotions within the body. This system functions the fastest, 
in comparison to all other systems and is the most complex. This single system functions through 
intra-cellular communication via electrical signals. 
Cardiovascular 
and Lymphatic 
 The Cardiovascular systems is responsible for blood circulation within the human body.  
 The Lymphatic systems is comprised of moving fluid, vessels, lymph nodes, and organs. This 
system comprises of small ducts, minor glands, specialised cells, and organs throughout the body, 
and is capable of removing bacteria invasion and products of cellular breakdown. The lymphatic 
system can remove excess fluid. 
Integumentary  The Integumentary system, designated skin, is an ever changing organ that covers the entire body.  
This system acts as a protective barrier against the external envirnement and assists in maintaining 
the body’s temperature. The system can also gather sensory information from the environment and 
attmepts to protect against disease. 
Respiratory  The Respiratory system is responsible for supplying the body with oxygen, which is achieved by 
circulating air via the body’s systems. 
Sensory  The Sensory system ensures that the body survives, grows, develops, and is responsible for the body 
experiencing pleasure. This system is reliant upon sensory receptors that respond to a variety of 
stimuli. The general senses such as pain, touch, pressure, and proprioception are located in various 
locations around the body. Other sensors such as taste, smell, hearing, and sight are categorised as 
special senses and are located in specific areas of the body. 
Digestive  One of the most complex systems in the body is the Digestive system. This system prepares food 
for use by the body, acheived by modifying the food physically and chemically (i.e. transforms food 
to energy), then disposes the unusable waste. 
Genitourinary  The Genitourinary system encompasses the organs which are responsible for production, formation 
and release of urine. Systems include the kidneys, ureters, bladder, urethra, and all organs 
responsible for reproduction. 
Endocrine  The Endocrine system encompasses a small system of organs that control the release of hormones. 
This system assists with the regulation of metabolism, growth, development including puberty, 
tissue function, and mood. 
Source: Siu and Brodwin [40]. 
While these systems collaborate to sustain human life each system functions independently 
accomplishing their own unique objectives, and while an individual system can fail or be disrupted it 
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does not mean the entire SoS will fail resulting in the loss of life. While the human SoS is considered 
out of the scope of this research it is an excellent broad example of what can be defined as an SoS, in 
the sense that we aim to define a solution and algorithms that can be applied in the real world to 
varying types of SoS. We hope by quantifying the risks associated with distinct systems we can 
increase the SoS robustness for its entire lifespan. 
 
2.1.3 Systems-of-Systems Associated Rewards 
Various industries have been quick to integrate systems and develop SoS not only because of the 
advances within ICT, but also as SoS provide many benefits to organisations within varying 
industries. They not only allow for complex objectives to be fulfilled which the distinct systems could 
not fulfil on their own, they also allow for new and aging technology to be integrated thus can 
increase the lifespan of infrastructures. Another factor for their development was that SoS allow for 
processes to become automated, these process are highly complex, and could not be fulfilled by a 
single distinct system nor could they be processed via the human factor, and often are time critical.  
These types of infrastructures also allow distinct systems to be integrated forming larger extended 
system networks which not only have the capability to increase system robustness, performance, and 
reliability; they can also reduce the financial cost of operation and maintenance, as they provide a 
platform that allows physical, cyber, and human elements to be combined, alongside aging and new 
assets. Advantageously, all this can be achieved while each of the distinct systems maintains their 
independent operation and management, allowing for the distinct systems to not only function as part 
of the SoS; they can retain their independent operation, or could even collaborate with a differing 
unrelated SoS.  
Furthermore, SoS are highly beneficial as they provide the means for continuous execution over 
extremely long durations and via many evolutionary cycles, these infrastructures have the capacity to 
adapt to various unexpected situations making these types of infrastructures more robust than distinct 
systems. Unfortunately when integrating distinct systems, emergent behaviour can manifest and while 
its negative effects can be highly problematic, its positive influence can be highly beneficial to the 
robustness of the infrastructure, as it allows distinct systems to modify their operation and adapt to 
fulfil objectives should malfunctions appear in other systems, hence it prevents the entire SoS failing 
and allows for objectives to be met. This behaviour can also allow for systems to be dynamic and 
have the capacity to adapt to unexpected and unanticipated situations. 
The ad-hoc nature of SoS is to exploit interconnected services and infrastructures which are dispersed 
and interconnected via a variety of communication links, allowing for the distinct components to 
‘pool resources’ and data, in order to fulfil identified objectives. 
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Smart Cities for example, have formed and their services advanced via the adoption of the Internet of 
Things (IoT), Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), and other ICT solutions, which were amalgamated 
with their existing city infrastructures including those deemed critical. These heterogeneous networks 
encompass a variety of devices or ‘things’, all of which have varying computational power, energy 
supplies, and component and software configurations. Integration means collaborative devices are 
reliant upon the generation and distribution of data across the infrastructure for use by its assets and 
services, and data access control and data security has become one of the most fundamental 
challenges for Smart Cities, i.e. SoS [38]. 
 
2.2 Systems-of-Systems Challenges 
When combining distinct systems major challenges must be faced, if merged incorrectly then 
integrated systems could be combined with disastrous results, systems could be insecure, 
vulnerabilities could remain unidentified, and systems could be left vulnerable to security attacks. 
Similarly, systems could become unstable, system wide crashing could occur, systems performance 
could diminish, and systems might fail to meet required objectives [3].   
 
2.2.1 Systems-of-Systems Associated Characteristic Challenges   
Using the characteristics defined by Maier (operational independence, managerial independence, 
evolutionary development, emergent behaviour, and geographical dispersion) [16] [41], we categorise 
the challenges and potential vulnerabilities which impede and expose SoS, and provide real world 
examples of SoS which have failed to overcome the associated challenges. 
 
2.2.1.1 Operational Independence  
Challenges attributed to operational independence can include: 
 Distinct systems maintaining their independent operation. 
 Systems established with unique policies. 
 Systems are compiled using varying components, software, and security. 
 Systems can be obliged to simultaneously function on objectives outside of the SoS with 
which they have a collaborative relationship, and can form collaborative relations with other 
unrelated SoS. 
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These challenges if not addressed can cause incompatibilities to develop causing conflicts within 
protocols and technology, systems security, operations, and can impact the ability for systems to meet 
objectives. Considerations must also be given to the network’s security as the system with the weakest 
security can expose the entire SoS to potential attacks, due to varying security and components. In 
addition, should issues arise there can be difficulties with coordinating detection and response to 
issues [16].  
Real world example – The disaster of the Mars Climate Orbiter demonstrates failure due to 
operational independence. The structure was destroyed in the atmosphere of Mars, and its loss can be 
directly attributed to the sheer complexity of the integrated systems, its independent system 
development, and failings with collaborative testing, which did not identify a fatal flaw in regards to 
navigational measurement [42] [43]. Fortunately distinct systems are not affected by operational 
independence unless they have been integrated within an SoS [16]. 
 
2.2.1.2 Managerial Independence  
Challenges attributed to managerial independence can include: 
 Distinct systems can maintain and/or prioritise their own objectives. 
 Each collaborative system can be independently managed.  
 Distinct systems can be altered via the management of other systems. 
 Consultation is not required, meaning system management can add, remove, or update 
systems without consultation.  
 Difficult to detect and respond to issues and security. 
These challenges if not addressed can result in altered systems being unable to fulfil desired functions 
and objectives either independently or as part of the SoS. Should any alteration to security occur then 
systems can become vulnerable to attacks, and any alterations to systems or their security can cause 
conflicts to arise, thus impact or alter system operations. These issues can result in none of the 
collaborative organisations having the ability to control the SoS. Responding to these vulnerabilities 
and detecting them would be highly challenging, mainly due to the large number of collaborating 
systems which form each SoS [42] [44]. 
Real world example – The problematic open day of Heathrow Terminal T5 demonstrates failure due 
to managerial independence. The baggage handling systems failed and 68 flights had to be cancelled, 
which was directly attributed to one collaborative organisation delaying construction and providing 
equipment late, resulting in untrained staff and untested systems. Collaborative organisations also 
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failed to establish crisis management, consequently as the SoS failed, response was hampered as it 
could not be identified which systems were involved, what solutions should be implemented, nor 
which staff were responsible [44]. 
 
2.2.1.3 Evolutionary Development   
Challenges attributed to evolutionary development can include: 
 SoS can be deployed without being fully formed. 
 Continual evolvement of the SoS as new requirements identified and objectives are met. 
 Functions and components can be phased in and out while the SoS remains operational.  
These challenges if not addressed can cause an increase of emergent behaviour within the SoS 
environment. Systems are also more vulnerable to unknown and unpredicted security attacks, and 
during the operation of the SoS, changes could be made that impact collaborative systems’ objectives 
and their system components’ ability to function [16] [45].  
Real world example – The problems of the US Coast Guards acquisition program Deepwater is a 
good example of an SoS being impacted due to evolutionary development. After the tragic events of 
9/11 Deepwater was forced to re-evaluate its objectives and execute new requirements, forced partly 
due to new government legislation. Requirements included increasing security, incorporating 
chemical, radiological and biological defences, and increasing communication with external agencies. 
Because evolutionary development was thrust upon the project, Deepwater struggled with rising costs 
and delays, with the US Coast Guard eventually taking control of the program to salvage projects that 
still showed promise [45] [46]. 
 
2.2.1.4 Emergent Behaviour  
Challenges attributed to emergent behaviour can include: 
 Emergent behaviours surface after the SoS has been deployed. 
 Identifying the system(s) responsible can be challenging. 
 Identifying who should respond and who should find and implement a solution can be highly 
problematic. 
 Ensuring mechanisms are robust to monitor the entire SoS in near real-time to ensure security 
breaches, system misbehaviour, and emergent behaviour is identified and reported effectively 
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Should emergent behaviour develop within the SoS then systems can quickly become unpredictable, 
fail and repeatedly crash, severe disruptions can impact systems’ performance and their ability to 
fulfil objectives both inside and outside of the SoS, and severe security vulnerabilities could also arise 
[16].  While emergent behaviour is a major challenge to be faced, positive emergent behaviour can 
also occur within SoS. It can allow SoS to become more robust with systems altering their operations 
to ensure objectives are met should other systems become incapacitated. Research continues in this 
area to see if this behaviour can be identified and guided to harness its capabilities but is outside of the 
scope of our work [31] [47]. 
Real world example – The chaos caused by NatWest Bank, Ulster Bank and Royal Bank of Scotland 
is an example of emergent behaviour causing an SoS to fail. In the summer of 2012 these three banks 
rolled out a software upgrade resulting in unpredictable abnormal behaviour developing, when the 
SoS failed, customers were denied access to the entire bank’s resources, with many accounts 
inaccessible for several days [48].  
2.2.1.5 Geographic Behaviour  
Challenges attributed to geographic behaviour can include: 
 Systems can be governed by different laws and regulations. 
 Systems are reliant upon networking capabilities to allow data to transfer between systems. 
 Data security must be heavily considered between collaborative systems. 
 Language barriers and time zones can be a hurdle. 
When SoS are geographically dispersed with collaborating systems being located in different 
jurisdictions and countries, local laws and policies must be considered and applied. What is permitted 
in one country could be considered a crime in another, hence system location can directly impact how 
components function, security is applied and upheld, and can affect a system’s ability to meet 
objectives [16]. Collaborating globally means different languages, time zones, and jurisdictions can 
delay and hamper collaborating efforts between managers, delays can prevent objectives from being 
fulfilled, reduce system performance, and cause weaknesses in security. Language can also impact the 
ability of managers to learn collaborators’ systems, as often the complex manuals describing the 
systems are developed in their native language and use local dialect and slang terms [42]. A crucial 
challenge with geographical distribution is distinct systems’ heavy reliance upon networking 
capabilities, more accurately distinct systems only share data to collaborate and fulfil objectives. If 
data cannot be transmitted between components then the SoS could fail to meet its objectives. Hence, 
ensuring data flow is vital, or data flow is at risk of becoming a single point of failure.  
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Real world example – The disastrous rescue attempt of AirFlorida Flight 90 in 1982 is an example of 
an SoS failing due to geographical dispersion. Federal, State and local agencies struggled to 
communicate, as systems had been developed independently, also contacting and integrating systems 
between agencies within other jurisdictions proved difficult. The delays severely hampered the rescue 
attempt resulting in only 5 people surviving the crash [49]. 
 
2.2.2 Single Points of Failure Within Systems-of-Systems  
A Single Points of Failure (SPoF) is a component within a networked infrastructure, which in the 
event of its failure prevents large sections or the entire infrastructure from communicating. These 
SPoF can be responsible for additional failings rippling across the infrastructure causing both partial 





Figure 2.5. Schematic Representation of Single Points of Failure 
SPoF can also be attributed to improper systems configuration, poor design, and incorrect component 
and system implementation. Under all categories defined by Maier [24], a common element that 
exhibited problematic challenges and vulnerabilities was that of data. The uncertainty associated with 
this single element can be a significant cause of risk within SoS. For example, our research clearly 
identifies that data as a whole has the potential to be a SPoF. If data cannot be created, stored, or 
transmitted within the SoS environment, then the collaborative infrastructure has the potential to fail 
in its entirety. It could be described that data has a life cycle, it is created, stored, used, shared, 
archived, and then destroyed  [50]. Yet data does not instinctively flow between components forming 
the SoS, many challenges have to be overcome to allow systems to be integrated and collaborate upon 
objectives, many of which were described in Section 2.2.1. 
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With the advancement of ICT and the Internet, SoS organisations are no longer isolated, instead they 
have increased their connectivity to become dynamic, and become reliant upon the transmission of 
critical data over these links (i.e. communication assets have become the backbone to allow systems 
to collaborate and form SoS). This dependence creates cyber interdependencies within the 
infrastructure which increases elements of risk. Electronic information links also provide a new means 
of attack as they provide multiple access points (e.g. intranets, phone lines or Internet) that prior to 
system integration did not exist, which attackers with little knowledge or skill and using freely 
available tools can exploit. Malicious attackers take advantage of these new connections by launching 
attacks and eavesdropping upon data as it is transmitted between components. Information such as 
authentication credentials, credit card transactions, email content, and control commands, can easily 
be exposed by listening to transmissions. Once an attacker has access to data transmissions they can 
launch simple attacks directly against data such as altering, corrupting, destroying or injecting false 
data, or they could simply impede the flow of data. Any alteration to the transmitted data packets 
could impede an SoS from fulfilling its objectives, thus creating a single point of failure [20] [21]. 
Attacks can include access control, injection and execution of malicious software or data, object 
reusability, masquerading attacks, sniffing, snooping, and DDOS attacks. While managers can 
implement several solutions in conjunction in an attempt to secure systems and ensure data flow, 
integrity, security and availability, there is currently no single solution that guarantees total security. 
Incorporating security features within an SoS does not ensure that data communications will be 
secure. Features currently employed include intrusion detection and prevention systems, firewalls, 
virtual private networks, content filtering, antivirus solutions, access control, and cryptography and 
key management. Implementing such features can also be time consuming as not all security solutions 
are automated, instead hosts must be correctly configured, polices must be periodically updated, and 
every integrated system must be secure or has the potential to be a point of attack [20] [51] [52] [53]. 
While it could be perceived that data is at its most vulnerable state during its transmission across the 
SoS, we look at data in its entirety and recognise there are many weaknesses that can truly affect data 
within SoS. Data is not just at risk from malicious attacks by outsiders, data can be at risk from 
legitimate user error, components within the SoS, the physical structure of the networked systems and 
Internet, as well as natural disasters [54].  
For example, data can become corrupt via system components during its creation and processing; also 
malicious attackers from within the SoS can alter, corrupt or delete data just as easily as a legitimate 
user’s unintentional action(s) [55]. Data stored in components that are deployed in remote areas, 
unguarded and accessible by attackers, potentially can suffer power loss, be damaged by natural 
occurrences, have difficulty connecting to SoS due to loss of connectivity, and attackers can remove 
components or destroy them. This can affect the flow and availability of data. Malicious attackers can 
gain physical access to stored data within components, along with jeopardising its integrity, this 
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access also gives attackers the opportunity to inject false data into the SoS [20] [21]. Attackers also 
exploit highly publicised vulnerabilities associated with open standards, off the shelf hardware, and 
software, and use freely available tools to launch directed attacks, eavesdrop upon network traffic 
[20], and in the future could exploit gateways that were previously isolated and do not support 
security features such as authentication, confidentiality, integrity, and data privacy [56].  
Furthermore, as infrastructures are reliant upon data being transmitted across different types of 
communication links, this increases complexity within the infrastructure, and introduces the risk of 
cascading failures between collaborating systems. 
These are just a few of the challenges we have identified during our research that impact data directly, 
and have the potential to heavily impact the resilience and security of SoS. We also clearly identified  
the challenges (discussed in Section 2.2.1) associated with operational independence, managerial 
independence, evolutionary development, emergent behaviour, and geographical dispersion that can 
directly prevent data from being created, stored, or transmitted, thus can become SPoF and prevent 
SoS functionality and objective completion. 
To overcome some of the challenges which relate to SPoF many organisations are turning to third 
parties (e.g. migrating to the Cloud), in an attempt to circumvent some of the vulnerabilities and to 
assure data integrity, availability, and security. While third parties offer services as a low cost solution 
they unfortunately just provide a new platform for malicious attackers to exploit. More concerning is 
the fact that organisations once they have outsourced their services rely heavily upon data flow to 
function, and these operations become a weak link thus creating a new SPoF that can impact the 
organisation and its ability to function [20] [21] [57]. 
 
2.3 Systems-of-Systems Security Challenges  
Securing cyber networks is of vital concern, even in its infancy malicious attackers targeted ICT 
platforms. In 1988 one of the first distributed computer worms was identified and reported called the 
Morris Worm. Decades later new directed attacks are still being developed, impacting ICT based 
networks with differing levels of complexity and impacts. Table 2.3 presents a small example of 
known attacks that have occurred in each decade since 1988, demonstrating that attacks have 
increasingly become more targeted and sophisticated. 
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Table 2.3. Example Security Attacks 
Attack Impact Date 
Morris Worm 
 
Multi-platform worm that impacted approximately 6,000 devices, which 
relates to roughly 10% of the computer devices connected to the Internet 
[58].  
1998 
Melissa Virus Email worm impacted over 300 organisations and 100,000 computer 
devices connected to the Internet [59].  
May 1999 
MyDoom Worm Email worm infected 60,000 devices in less than 8 hours; at its peak the 
infected hosts attempted 30,000 queries per second [60]. 
January 2004 
Stuxnet Worm Worm targeting industrial control systems, impacting at least 14 




Ransomware virus software attacked over 200,000 victims encrypting 
their data and demanding a ransom payment, impacting hospitals, 
organisations (including government), and over 150 universities [62].  
May 2017 
 
Typically attacks exploit vulnerabilities within the networked infrastructures, taking advantage of 
both unknown (zero-day attacks) and known vulnerabilities. With the wide adoption of the Internet 
and ICT, organisations have been quick to take advantage of the interconnectivity and services they 
offer, extending their unconnected infrastructures into widely distributed collaborative systems. 
Increasing connectivity to systems means they provide new entry points to previously secure and 
inaccessible systems, and they have increased their attack surface and formed greater sized networked 
infrastructures via their adoption of ICT and having formed new collaborative relations with third 
parties. 
In the context of SoS, these infrastructures are exposed to the same dangers and risks as traditional 
cyber based networks, however, the complexity, dynamic nature, and size makes securing them more 
taxing. Traditional security methods are difficult to adapt and integrate within SoS, struggling to 
identify vulnerabilities that expose the entire SoS and leave systems insecure. Often employing 
countermeasures to systems after an attack has occurred and after there have been considerable 
delays. 
Traditionally it was easy to physically secure systems, but increased connectivity and deploying 
networked infrastructure across towns, cities, and globally (e.g. Smart Cities, IoT and WSN) means 
malicious attackers have opportunities to gain physical access to distributed devices, and remote 
access across the Internet. Therefore it is vital to secure SoS in order to restrict unauthorised access, 
without impacting the functionality of the systems or causing delays.  
Additionally, as integration continues and organisations continue to both form new collaborative 
relations and outsource their ICT to third parties, security challenges in regards to privacy will need to 
be considered, along with laws and legislation that must be upheld to geographically dispersed SoS. 
As adapting security requirements, and differences between the physical, software, and configurations 
will all unduly impact the application and effectiveness of applied security techniques, other factors 
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that can greatly impact the security of SoS include interdependency, complexity, and cascading 
failure. 
The challenges that impede SoS security are characteristically dissimilar to large enterprise ICT. For 
example, enterprise systems and large extended networked infrastructures typically have a distinct and 
identifiable management structure, responsible for managing the networked systems’ security with no 
competing interests, and typically maintain sole control of an organisation’s infrastructure, unlike 
SoS, that characteristically have no top layer management to oversee security, identify and evaluate 
risks and vulnerabilities associated with the collaborative environment, nor their consequences. As a 
result testing and evaluating enterprise systems would be more attainable under the control of a single 
management, unlike SoS which struggle to identify those responsible for the implementation, testing, 
and evaluation of the SoS security, along with the security of the distinct systems. 
Enterprise systems and processes are generally well established and are not under continuous 
evolvement and development, however, as required they can be easily adapted or deviate from 
requirements as an organisation identifies new needs, thus changing their functions and priorities. 
Whereas SoS would struggle to deviate due to their composure and reliance upon specific assets and 
service provided by distinct systems, and due to the collaborative systems remaining under control of 
their distinct management. Unlike large systems and enterprise ICT, SoS are further impeded as 
distinct collaborative system requirements can conflict with the objectives of the SoS. Similarly, SoS 
could struggle to meet objectives and remain operational while balancing the needs of these individual 
systems, and may encounter operational limitations and failings should distinct systems not be 
available due to their integration with unrelated SoS. In Section 2.3.1 below, we discuss factors which 
can impact SoS security, and in Section 2.4 we overview the limitations of SoS risk analysis. 
 
2.3.1 Factors Which Can Impact Security 
2.3.1.1 Interdependency 
Cyber assets allowed organisations to become automated, allowed new and aging technology to be 
integrated, provided powerful tools, a large adaptable platform, and improved efficiency. 
Unfortunately, this also led to the introduction of cyber interdependencies, and introduced new 
vulnerabilities into the majority of collaborative infrastructures impacting cyber security [63].  It must 
be stated though, that while distinct systems are highly complex and suffer with varying challenges 
and vulnerabilities, the risks associated with interdependency only arise when distinct infrastructures 
collaborate. “An interdependency is a bidirectional relationship between infrastructures through 
which the state of each infrastructure is influenced by or correlated to the state of the other”, as 
defined by Rinaldi [64]. 
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Rinaldi and Peerenboom surmise that “interdependencies can cause risk in one infrastructure to be a 
function of risk in another. If infrastructure i depends on infrastructure j, and j has a high risk of 
failure, then the likelihood of i being disrupted or failing is correspondingly higher than if i were 
independent of j” [63]. These interdependencies can be categorised under four distinct types based 
upon their linkages, which are physical interdependency, cyber interdependency, geographic 
interdependency, and organisational interdependency as shown in Table 2.4, while Lee et al. [65] 
acknowledge five types of interrelationship which are input dependence, mutual dependence, shared 
dependence, exclusive or dependence, and co-located dependence, summarised in Table 2.5. 




 Infrastructures which rely upon the physical transfer of resources between each other, 
specifically one element relies upon the output of another as its input to fulfil its own 
objectives.  
 Infrastructures are classed as physically interdependent if they cannot function without these 
physical resources. 
 These infrastructures directly influence each other, hence these organisations are physically 
interdependent and should an issue arise in either infrastructure then the failure could rapidly 
ripple across and impact heavily upon the other. 
Cyber 
Interdependency 
 Infrastructures transmit often critical data over electronic information links, thus one 
infrastructure is reliant upon the electronic output of another infrastructure as its own input in 
order to fulfil its objectives. 
 Infrastructures are classed as cyber interdependent if they cannot function without these digital 
links. 
 Organisations which have embraced and incorporated cyber assets into their infrastructures 
have become heavily reliant upon those cyber systems, more specifically they have become 
reliant upon the data which is created, stored or transmitted by these assets. 
Geographic 
Interdependency 
 Organisations that are situated in the same close proximity should an incident occur such as an 
explosion, can be heavily impacted due to the events and influences caused by the disturbance 
resulting in abnormal operations.  
 However they are only geographically interdependent should that incident impact or cause 
abnormal operations in each of them simultaneously because of that initial specific incident. 
 This type of interdependency is not physical or cyber interdependent, it is solely down to the 
infrastructures being geographically located within the same proximity. 
Logical 
Interdependency 
 Infrastructures which are interdependent yet these dependencies are not physical, cyber, or 
geographically interdependent are classed as logically interdependent. 
Source: Rinaldi et al. [63], Rinaldi [64], Engineering the Future, The Royal Academy of Engineering, Infrastructure Interdependencies 
Timelines Report [66]. 
Research determines that interdependency between systems adds to external risk, and due to the sheer 
size and complexity of these SoS at this current time it is not possible to gain a complete overview of 
these infrastructures. Consequently, those in industry do not have the capability to understand or 
identify every interdependency and dependency within these large complex infrastructures [1]. This 
only reinforces the need for continued research and development.  
BT is an excellent example of this. BT developed site recovery plans (over 5,500), invested in mobile 
exchange recovery units (over 100), and developed emergency operations management centres and 
mirrored sites within the UK. These assets and responses were developed in an attempt to manage 
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risks within their network, as it is not currently possible to map or understand every critical link that is 
vulnerable due to the sheer size and complexity of their infrastructure [1]. Despite this substantial 
investment they still struggle to manage risk resulting in critical failures still occurring. Unfortunately, 
many external organisations depend on infrastructures such as BT’s communication assets to provide 
the backbone for their infrastructure to allow for collaboration and control of their systems. 
Table 2.5. Types of Interrelationships Between Collaborative Infrastructure Systems 
Type Description 
Input Dependence  Infrastructures are reliant upon at least one output from another 
distinct system or its services in order to meet either their own 
objectives or to provide additional services. 
Mutual Dependence  Systems within a collaborative relationship are dependent upon each 
system with which it has been integrated in order to meet at least one 
of its objectives. 
 For example, if there are two systems within the collaborative 
relationship. Mutual dependence is when system A is reliant upon the 
output from system B for its own input, while system B is reliant upon 
the output from A for its input. 
Shared Dependence  Physical components or processing is shared by several systems 
within the collaborative environment in order to provide services. 
Exclusive Or Dependence  Only a single service out of two or more services can be provided by 
an infrastructure. 
 Exclusive Or can potentially occur within a distinct system or via two 
or more systems. 
Co-located Dependence  Modules within two or more systems are geographically located 
within the same region. 
Source: Lee et al. [65]. 
Interdependency also heavily impacts security within interdependent cyber infrastructures. Should 
security be weak in one infrastructure then the level of risk in the other collaborative infrastructure 
increases, while it reduces the level of security in other dependent systems [63]. This means cyber 
security becomes a particular challenge for these types of infrastructure, and as society integrates 
more systems making them even more interdependent, the risks associated with security will also 
increase and become more complex.  
What must also be considered is that in the future these challenges may have to be considered and 
overcome on a global level, as organisations are becoming more geographically dispersed with assets 
being located in different jurisdictions and countries which have differing laws and regulations. 
Generating more interdependencies might allow for increased interconnection and improve reliability; 
however, it develops and increases both complexity and risks associated with interconnection. 
Figure 2.6 depicts the interdependent links that can form between essential infrastructures within a 
Smart City environment, their reliance upon services and assets by others, and the Smart City’s 
dependence upon communication assets in order for it to establish and form a collaborative 
environment. 




Figure 2.6. Schematic Representation of Interdependent Relations in a Smart City 
 
2.3.1.2 Complexity 
There is no consensus regarding a definition for complexity. In 1983 the IEEE Standard 729-1983 
[67] defined complexity as “The degree of complication of a system or system component, determined 
by such factors as the number and intricacy of interfaces, the number and intricacy of conditional 
branches, the degree of nesting, the types of data structures, and other system characteristics.” By 
2010 IEEE amended their definition to keep up with new technology and research, and because of a 
deeper understanding in regards to complexity. Thus, IEEE Standard 610.12 [68] defines complexity 
as “1. The degree to which a system’s design or code is difficult to understand because of numerous 
components or relationships among components 2. Pertaining to any of a set of structure-based 
metrics that measure the attribute in (1) 3. The degree to which a system or component has a design 
or implementation that is difficult to understand and verify.”  
Kopetz [69] classifies complexity under two distinct categories which are Complexity as a Property of 
a scenario and Complexity as a Relation. Complexity as a Property of a scenario consists of Structural 
Complexity which focuses upon the actual topology of components and also the links between 
components, and Dynamic Complexity which focuses upon the behaviour of the components and their 
dynamic interactions. Complexity as a Relation consists of Cognitive Complexity which is the 
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relation between the scenario and an observer, and Socio Political Complexity which is the relation 
between a scenario and society [69]. While Asprou et al. [70] confer in regards to modelling, there are 
two distinguishable main interdependent complexity components which are Structural Complexity, 
and Dynamic/Operational Complexity. 
As defined by Dr Kaplan SoS are “Uncertainly unbounded”, there is a distinct lack of control, as it 
cannot be realistically defined as to when the SoS will no longer be developed further and grow in 
size. Even at the time of development and deployment SoS objectives have not been fully defined, 
meaning often they become operational without knowing their true purpose or lifespan. Complexity is 
further increased when we have to consider that these infrastructures will be not only be continually 
evolving and perhaps in constant operation, but also functions will be phased in and out, new polices 
and standards will be forced upon the systems forming the infrastructures, software and hardware 
upgrades will periodically occur, and systems will be required to not only be backward compatible but 
they must also be forward compatible to allow for integration between aging legacy systems and 
emerging new technology [71]. 
 
Figure 2.7.  Complex Multi-Level Systems-of-Systems 
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Integrating systems is highly complex especially as there are often technical issues to overcome. 
Figure 2.7 depicts the complexity of a multi-level SoS, providing a schematic representation of the 
complexity associated with a distinct component, and the complex relationships that form due to their 
integration into larger extended networks and SoS. 
Legacy systems emerged in varying industries, often unplanned and many developed as single 
standalone systems. As industry pushed the boundaries of legacy systems, new complex requirements 
were demanded from them. At the time of their conception, it was never conceived that legacy 
systems would be integrated or used for roles outside of their remit. Furthermore, the security of these 
systems was not fully investigated to ensure issues would not develop after amalgamation [72].  
While some systems have the ability to share data and functionality, this was often overlooked or 
never considered important. Legacy systems which were not initially designed to fulfil many of the 
requirements now demanded from them, struggle and are affected by the demand for interoperability, 
performance, security and usability. These infrastructures are often heavily reliant upon the transfer of 
data between systems, however, data is critical to these infrastructures, plus often application 
dependent and not suitable nor designed to be shared collaboratively [72]. 
Furthermore, SoS are integrated using varying distinct systems that retain their unique management. 
Managers are not required to inform other collaborating parties when upgrades, modifications or 
repairs take place. Meaning modifications within interdependent systems often are implemented 
without being synchronised and without suitable analysis, consequently complexity significantly 
increases. Vendors producing products and applications are not currently required to inform other 
vendors of specific operations, configurations, non-compatible standards or conflicts. Meaning when 
organisations use assets produced by two or more vendors, there is a significantly high probability 
that incompatibilities will form between the collaborating systems. Thus, interoperability issues arise 
causing a higher degree of system integration complexity [71]. As complexity derives from the 
number and type of relationships between the collaborating systems and components, and also 
originates between the actual systems and their environments, complexity makes it difficult for 
research and industry to design and model the architecture and security of these infrastructures [73]. 
 
2.3.1.3 Cascading Failure 
While interconnection has the ability to improve reliability and regrettably increase complexity, it also 
allows for emergent behaviours to arise which can result in both positive and negative influences upon 
collaborative systems. As society is reliant upon SoS, should negative emergent behaviour arise to the 
point that it is directly responsible for an incident occurring, then its effects have the potential to result 
in catastrophic consequences. Additionally, due to the tightly coupled bonds between interdependent 
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systems which restrict links and reduce flexibility between these systems, it means in the event of 
failure there are no alternatives.  
Therefore, these incidents have the capacity to ripple from one infrastructure to another resulting in 
both direct and indirect effects, with the capacity to disrupt the SoS ability to fulfil objectives (see 
Figure 2.8). This cascading effect can impact both locally and on a larger geographical scale, even 
having the capacity to impact on a global level. Cascading failures have the capability to directly 
influence or hinder organisations, governments, and society, and when systems are restricted and 
inflexible then these cascading failures have the potential to exacerbate incidents further and can even 
loop back to the originating disruptive system [63]. 
 
Figure 2.8. Schematic Representation of Cascading Failures 
Interdependencies increase the risk of vulnerabilities, disruptions, and failures, meaning feedback 
loops and the complex architectures which form SoS, initiate and propagate issues that are unusual 
and difficult to predict. If SoS can be designed to be more robust and secure in the event of failure the 
risks will be mitigated and consequences lessened.  Rinaldi et al. [63] summarised interdependence-
related disruptions as cascading, escalating, and common cause failures, outlined in Table 2.6. 
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Table 2.6. Types of Interdependence Related Disruptions 
Type Description 
Cascading Failure  This is when a significant failure occurs within an infrastructure, this 
failure is then directly responsible for causing a failure or disruption to a 
component within a second infrastructure, and consequently this effects 
the normal operation of the second infrastructure. 
Escalating Failure  This is when a significant failure occurs within an infrastructure which 
causes disruption, this then exacerbates an independent disruption of a 
second infrastructure. Exacerbated disruption typically increases the 
severity of the failure in the second infrastructure or severely hampers 
and delays recovery from the disruption. 
Common Cause Failure  This is when two or more infrastructures are disrupted or experience 
failures at the exact same time, these types of failure occur due to the 
infrastructures simultaneously being impacted by a common cause. 
Common causes can include infrastructures being directly impacted by 
the same natural disaster as they are located in the same locality or the 
root cause is widespread. 
Source: Rinaldi et al. [63]. 
A case study that accurately demonstrates the severity and long term effects of cascade failure is that 
of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, that remains an active risk to society. The disaster occurred 
on the 11
th
 March 2011, when a massive earthquake struck Japan, which was followed by a tsunami 
which caused water to penetrate the nuclear plant.  As water penetrated the site it caused power loss to 
many of the systems within the site, as a direct result this caused the cooling systems to fail resulting 
in explosions. These explosions caused further damage to systems, then the nuclear meltdown of three 
reactors. This allowed for radioactive materials to leak into the immediate area, and the cascade 
failings and radiological contamination hampered emergency workers [8] [74] [75]. 
While this is a natural disaster the effects caused by the cascading failures resulted in the not only the 
plant’s destruction, but will continue to impact society for several more decades. In 2013, radioactive 
material continued to escape into the locality and Pacific Ocean at a rate of 300 tons each day. The 
surrounding area has been declared as too radioactive for human habitation, causing entire towns, 
agricultural lands, businesses, and homes to be abandoned, resulting in an estimated economic loss of 
approximately $250-$500 billion US. Contamination to food has heavily impacted the agricultural and 
food industry with fishing in the area being banned, and public health and safety has been heavily 
impacted with many children being diagnosed with thyroid cancer [8] [74] [75]. 
Japan has also been forced to implement stricter seismic safety because of the crisis, directly resulting 
in several nuclear power plants remaining closed as they cannot meet the standards that were 
established. The continued loss of power production is also heavily impacting manufacturing, 
security, government, and the national economy to name but a few. More alarming is the fact there are 
currently 23 nuclear reactors located in the US with the exact same design as the Fukushima site, and 
unfortunately the pools in the US contain more spent fuel rods than then pools in Fukushima. As 
shown by this disaster in Japan these types of nuclear infrastructures are vulnerable to cascading 
Chapter 2 - Background 
42 
 
failures caused by a loss-of-coolant and have the potential to cause a catastrophic disaster, and thus far 
the associated risks have not been resolved [8] [74] [75]. 
 
2.3.1.4 Identified Systems-of-Systems Risks and Attacks 
Based on the identified security challenges, we can see that attack vectors are more prominent in SoS. 
If these risks remain unresolved and unprotected then SoS could fail with dire consequences. Having 
analysed network risk and the awareness that the more interconnected an SoS becomes the more 
susceptible it becomes to network vulnerabilities and threats, from our extensive review network 
vulnerabilities can be summarised as [12] [76] [77] [78] [79]: 
 Insecure or exposed ports. 
 Unnecessary and indiscriminate enabling of services and applications. 
 Improper system configuration. 
 No formal configuration management. 
 Inadequate anti-virus. 
 Inadequate application whitelisting. 
 Inadequate intrusion detection systems. 
 Insufficient password and security policies. 
 Insufficient account management. 
 Failure to encrypt passwords. 
 Indefinite passwords or shared passwords on network devices. 
 Unrestricted and improper access control. 
 Unrestricted or unmonitored downloads from untrusted sites. 
 Ill-configured applications and programs. 
 Application backdoors. 
 Insufficient security policies. 
 Failure to monitor logs and warning messages. 
 Disgruntled employees. 
 Corporate espionage. 
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 Inadequate training. 
 Unrestricted or inappropriate security levels for legitimate users. 
 Inadequate physical protection and security for components and systems. 
 Inadequate authentication for internal and remote access. 
 Wireless Local Area Network (LAN) technology is often used to connect devices. 
 Unpatched software. 
 Inadequate patch management. 
 Inconsistent documentation. 
 Use of vulnerable protocols. 
 Redundant and inadequate firewall rules. 
 Inadequate system hardening. 
 Inadequate testing prior to application integration. 
If the above summarised network vulnerabilities are left unprotected or are exposed by malicious 
attackers, our review of the associated literature indicates that the following summarised attacks can 
be launched [12] [76] [77] [78] [79]: 
 Application-Level Attacks occur when attackers exploit insecure computer operating 
systems or applications, which have failed to be secured prior to their release. In general the 
complex features and functionality of the application along with the failure to incorporate 
security measures into the application at time of development, allow the attackers to take 
advantage of the insecure application, and thus evade access controls gaining control over the 
application or system.   
 Misconfiguration Attacks occur when network administrators fail to adequately secure and 
configure their networked systems; this can be as a direct result of their inexperience and 
training, or due to the complexity of the networked systems, etc. Attackers can easily take 
advantage of misconfigurations via default accounts, unpatched applications, web pages, 
unprotected files, insecure directories, etc. 
 Operating System Attacks occur when attackers exploit operating system vulnerabilities 
such as running services, open ports, default, settings and user accounts, etc. As networked 
systems continue to be developed and expanded, operating systems will only become more 
complex, and their services and communication access will only grow, increasing the demand 
and functionality of the operating system and its associated vulnerabilities. 
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 DDoS is a coordinated attack against the services and resources of a targeted system or 
systems. Typically these attacks are as a direct result of compromised secondary systems (e.g. 
botnets) that are controlled by the attacker, which prevents legitimate users from accessing the 
available resources and services of an organisation, by repeatedly sending identical requests 
which exceed the organisations available resources. 
 SQL Injection can occur by attackers exploiting the security of a web application that allows 
for non-validated SQL input commands to be executed. The attacker can input SQL code via 
the web form input box, allowing them to gain access to the backend databases or provide 
them the ability to corrupt, alter or delete data. 
 Social Engineering exposes networked systems to vulnerabilities and attacks as a direct 
result of the human element. Attackers will target the employees of an organisation in an 
attempt to retrieve sensitive information or access details. Social engineering is considered 
one of the most difficult types of attack to defend against, as it is impossible to place physical 
or software based security measures to defend against such attacks, and it requires strict 
policies to be in place and education for employees. Using tactics such as fear, trust, or 
assistance, attackers will attempt to extract information via email, phone calls, or talking in 
informal environments, etc., attempting to extract confidential information from naïve 
individuals so that they can gain unauthorised access and exploit systems.  
 Sniffers are a program or device that allows attackers to capture data from the network’s 
traffic. Network traffic can allow attackers to retrieve unencrypted passwords and user names, 
emails, files, etc., and protocols which are susceptible to sniffers include HTTP, FTP, SMTP, 
and POP. 
 Buffer Overflow occurs when an attacker exploits an application that is waiting for a user’s 
input, the attacker generates data to be inserted into the application, and this data is larger than 
the temporary data storage assigned and overflows into other buffers. This type of attack can 
escalate an attacker’s privileges, or could corrupt or overwrite data that was stored within the 
buffer. These attacks can be categorised into two different types of attack which are Heap-
based which are difficult to execute, and Stack-based which are more commonly conducted. 
 Password Cracking can be a simple attack where an attacker finds a username and password 
written underneath a keyboard, to simple attempts to find information by searching through a 
user’s rubbish to find suggestions of usernames and passwords. More sophisticated attacks 
can use techniques such as brute force, dictionary, word list substitution, pattern checking, 
and hybrid attacks, which allow attackers to retrieve the relevant data from computer devices’ 
memory for example, or to decrypt passwords allowing attackers to gain unauthorised access 
to systems with authorised credentials. 
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 Phishing Attacks occur when attackers seek to gain information from victims by 
impersonating trustworthy individuals or organisations. Typically these types of attack are 
attempting to obtain user credentials, bank details or credit card details, and will be conducted 
via emails or instant messages that direct individuals to fake websites that have the 
appearance of genuine sites. 
 Viruses and Worms are malicious software programs developed by attackers. A computer 
virus can reside in the memory of a computer device and replicate its own code and attach 
copies of itself into other executable code, without being identified by the computer and 
unknowing user. Viruses can also alter their code to remain unidentifiable, and can encrypt 
themselves and alter disk directories in an attempt to conceal themselves. A computer worm 
does not require human assistance to propagate and infect other computers. Unlike viruses 
worms can replicate themselves and spread in order to infect entire networked systems, but do 
not have the ability to attach to other programs. 
 Trojan is a malicious program that has the appearance of a legitimate application. When 
executed, Trojans perform malicious activities on the computer device, and can allow 
attackers to disable software and security, provide remote access to the device, send data, etc. 
Trojans can be introduced into a computer device via physical access, applications, emails, 
untrusted web sites, fake programs, email attachments, etc. 
 Spamming is when attackers gain access to a large numbers of email addresses and send the 
same message to all of them. While spamming can have legitimate use in cases such as 
organisations advertising, spam emails can also contain malicious viruses and Trojans, 
allowing them to gain access to the devices as the malicious code infects and alters systems.  
The effects of such attacks could result in the following consequences [12] [76] [77] [78] [79]: 
 Loss of human life. 
 Result in widespread panic. 
 Economic impact, with local, national, or global effect. 
 Impact to the reputation of organisations attacked. 
 Catastrophic system failures. 
 Impact on the quantity and quality of services and production of goods. 
 Loss of intellectual property. 
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These vulnerable network issues are just one categorised example of vulnerabilities, which can 
drastically impede SoS causing exploits and failings within these types of infrastructure. We have 
considerably condensed our findings and provided these examples to highlight the scale of our 
research area and the difficulties, which must be overcome to increase SoS security and robustness. 
Vulnerabilities cannot just be simply categorised as either technical issues with software or physical 
components, procedural and engineering errors can also contribute to vulnerabilities forming within 
the SoS [12]. 
 
2.4 Systems-of-Systems Risk Analysis  
The International Standards Organisation (ISO) standard 31000:2009 [80] defines risk as the “effect of 
uncertainty on objectives” regardless of circumstances or domain. However, a hazard or an event 
should not truly be described as a risk; instead risk can be better defined as the combination or the 
likelihood of an internal or external factor or influence, which directly has the potential to impact or 
cause consequences to occur, while the organisation attempts to fulfil their objectives against an 
uncertain environment [19] [81].  
Risk is unavoidable. Organisations will always be forced to contend with risk due to either creating or 
altering risk during all decision making processes or when phasing functions and assets in and out of 
SoS. It is vital for organisations to perceive risk during all stages of the SoS life cycle, and regrettably 
there will always be uncertainty involved, consequently risk can never be eliminated. Nevertheless, 
via a better understanding of risk and potential consequences associated with collaborating systems, 
risk taking could become a calculated intentional act rather than a ‘blind stab in the dark’ with a lack 
of perceived ideas or poor understanding [19].  
Risk methodologies and assessment methods aid organisations in quantifying any identified risk and 
assigning it a numerical metric. This figure can then be associated with a monetary value to support 
decision making processes, and predicting the likelihood of a specific attack. Security risk assessment 
methods are categorised as either qualitative or quantitative. 
 Qualitative Risk Assessments deliver a descriptive estimate of the risks which are identified 
by the method, such as assigning low or high as a value. These risks are often assigned based 
upon a traditional collective method such as interviews or questionnaires. These methods tend 
to be used by organisations who fail to perceive the risks which are associated with their 
specific systems, and do not have the aptitude to estimate the likelihood or impact of potential 
threats. Qualitative assessment methods would be highly impractical for large heterogeneous 
SoS. 
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 Quantitative Risk Assessments deliver a numerical estimate of the risks which are 
identified. Estimates are produced using a predefined formula or mathematical expressions, 
and are ideal for organisations that have the capability to provide estimates for their system’s 
identified vulnerabilities. This could be achieved via risk assessment and analysis through 
population based attack graph modelling for example. 
 
2.4.1 Risk Assessment and Management 
According to ISO 31004 [19] risk management is “coordinated activities to direct and control an 
organisation with regard to risk”. Risk assessment has become a fundamental requirement for 
network security over the past several decades, as the size of networks and their connected 
components vastly increased along with the number of vulnerabilities. As a consequence of the 
increased value of digital data, criminals are utilising ICT platforms to perform sophisticated and 
targeted attacks to retrieve sensitive data, cause service interruptions, or cause complete unavailability 
to services and data. As a direct result of these attacks and potential threats, organisations have been 
forced to evaluate their infrastructures, specifically security requirements for the protection of their 
systems, services, and data. When attempting to secure their systems, organisations have a propensity 
to over compensate with regards to their security defence, or undercompensate, overlooking potential 
risks or trust issues [82].  
This irregularity in judgement is due to the decision makers’ (i.e. those responsible for the network’s 
security and management) failure to understand associated risks to the organisation’s systems and 
surrounding area, or the resulting consequences that can potentially occur on a daily basis. Similarly, 
they fail to recognise the vast financial losses with regards to associated risks and potential networked 
vulnerabilities. This inability to accurately perceive risk could also be due to a lack of experience or 
deficient training. Risk methodologies and assessment methods aim to assist decision makers in 
identifying an organisation's vulnerabilities within the networked systems. Methods to quantify 
identified risks and assign them with numerical metrics that can be associated with a monetary value 
are used. This will support decision making processes, along with predicting the likelihood of specific 
attacks; nonetheless these methods have limitations and are often too complex.  
Previously, network administrators or ‘red teams’ were given the task of ensuring the topology of the 
network and its security. These individuals would be responsible for mapping and understanding the 
links between components forming the network, including the identification and documentation of 
potential failures, conflicts, and vulnerabilities. Modelling and understanding the links between 
components, their environments, and penetration testing were further responsibilities. ‘Red teams’ 
would manually draw out these relations in an attempt to identify and visualise possible 
vulnerabilities which expose the security of the network. This task was time consuming and often 
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inaccurate even on small to medium size networks. Manual assessment of dynamic SoS today would 
be impractical and very likely impossible, due to the sheer number and diversity of integrated 
components which form these extended multi-networks and due to the complexity of systems  [82] 
[83]. 
Risk management frameworks often include policies, objectives, mandates, and a continuous 
commitment to manage risk, they can also include overall strategic and operational policies and 
practices. Risk management is part of the decision making process, which allows organisations to 
make informed choices, allows for actions to be prioritised, and can assist in identifying alternative 
actions. It also takes account of uncertainty, the nature of uncertainty, and how to address it. 
Therefore, it is vital for risk management to be dynamic, iterative, and responsive to change, 
constantly adapting and updating, and thus have the capacity to sense and respond to changes within 
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Figure 2.9. ISO 31000:2009 Risk Management Principles, Framework, and Processes 
Source: Schematic representation of ISO 31000:2009 risk management policy, International Standards Organisation [80].  
ISO 31000 [80] is an example that demonstrates the limitations of the existing standards and methods 
which aim to assist industry to identify risks within their structure’s systems. Figure 2.9 simplifies the 
process yet shows the relationships between the risk management principles, framework, and 
processes of ISO 31000. The standard identifies eleven principles to ensure risks are managed, and 
within the risk management process two processes are identified that continually act [80] [81].  
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ISO 31000 [80] was developed to present principles and generic guidelines on risk management 
which were non-specific to any industry or organisation, thus could be broadly applied to varying 
situations and industries. The risk management framework provides a set of components which allow 
for continuous design, implementation, monitoring, reviewing and thus allows for continuous 
improvement of risk management during an organisation’s lifecycle. 
However, these principles would need to be greatly adapted to meet the requirements of a specific 
SoS in regards to their distinct systems, objectives, and varying needs (i.e. context, structure, 
operations, processes, functions, projects, products, services, assets and specific practices). Due to the 
complexity of ISO 31000, organisations failed to implement the principles and guidelines. Risk 
management ISO 31004 [19] was developed to review and form a new guide. In an effort to assist 
organisations implementing ISO 31000, the standard adopted the same broad process as AS/NZS 
4360:2004 for managing risk. Inefficiently, the principles defined by this standard required heavy 
adaptation to meet the requirements for specific collaborative infrastructures. As a result, the risk 
management methods generated are non-transferable and are organisation specific, based on the 
infrastructure’s unique composition.  
Table 2.7. Risk Management and Assessment Methods 







Developed in the USA, this method assists 
with the identification of risks and provides 
guidance for those responsible for the security 
of networked systems. It helps the decision 
maker recognise what to consider when 
implementing their Risk Management and 
Risk Assessment processes. 
 Risk Assessment 
 Risk Treatment 
 Risk Acceptance 
 Risk Identification 
 Risk Analysis 





Developed in the UK, this method assists with 
the identification of risks via Cloud based 
software. Its risk assessment methods support 
the identification of threats and vulnerabilities, 
including assessing the level of risk, and can 
conduct business impact assessment. 
 Risk Assessment 
 Risk Treatment 
 Risk Acceptance 
 Risk Communication 
 Risk Identification 
 Risk Analysis 
 Risk Evaluation 
A&K analysis 
[86] 
Developed in the Netherlands by Dutch public 
company RCC, and completed by the Dutch 
ministry of internal affairs. A handbook was 
produced describing a risk analysis method 
which allowed for threat identification and 
characterisation to be conducted, along with 
risk characterisation and exposure assessment. 
  Risk Identification 
 Risk Analysis 
 Risk Evaluation 
Mehari 
[87] 
Developed in France, this method presents a 
complete risk management schema which 
includes asset classification, security service 
audits, risk identification, and situation 
analysis. Along with its ability to be used by 
decisions makers to assist with the 
implementation of ISO 27005. 
 Risk Assessment 
 Risk Treatment 
 Risk Acceptance 
 Risk Communication 
 Context 
Establishment 
 Stakes Analysis 
 Risk Identification 
 Risk Analysis 
 Risk Evaluation 
 
As stated, principles are bound to an organisation’s specific objective, varying need and distinct 
topology (i.e., context, structure, operations, processes, functions, projects, products, services, assets 
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and practices). Table 2.7 conveys other risk management and assessment methods which are 
important to note. These methods suffer with similar limitations as ISO 31000 and ISO 31004, 
resulting in organisations struggling to implement the principles and guidelines which they define [19] 
[80]. 
To manage risks effectively we must consider shifting from past preoccupations with emphasis upon 
risk as the possibility of an event occurring, to the possibility of consequences of an effect upon 
objectives. It allows for consideration that risks are not simply events or just consequences, but 
instead can be descriptions of what has the potential to happen and how objectives could fail or be 
disrupted [81]. 
Current assessment methods are often too broad and require heavy adaptation, to allow for 
implementation. However, having such a metric specifically dealing with the complexity of SoS, and 
the ability to tailor standards to SoS would be beneficial. SoS can vary in size, complexity, and nature, 
but still have the same underlying processes, this is why these risk management and risk assessment 
methods are broadly developed and require heavy adaptation. Currently we feel that these broad 
generic methods are hindering the overall advancement of protecting SoS environments, as even 
though there is continuous development and remediation within the area, our research corroborates 
that SoS are still failing. As collaborative infrastructures become more interconnected, and as ICT 
trends seem to be moving towards the integration of Cloud computing, we need to resolve these 
complex problems before we open up SoS to an even bigger vulnerability, threat or critical risk. 
We must also consider that it is no longer viable to just ensure that methods are backward compatible 
to allow for the integration of legacy systems with today’s technology. It is essential methods are 
forward compatible and will continue to have the capability to identify risk far in to the future 
ensuring SoS are monitored for risk(s) for their entire lifecycle. Moreover, if methods are too rigid 
they will fail to keep up with the speed of technological advancement, which in our opinion is what 
appears to be happening with current risk and security solutions. 
 
2.5 Systems-of-Systems Vulnerability Analysis  
SoS security is in part determined by the vulnerabilities that expose the infrastructure to risk(s). It is 
vital that vulnerabilities can be identified and mitigated in order to improve the robustness of the SoS 
and security in order to defend against attacks or limit the impacts of failures. It is also essential to 
understand the vulnerabilities identified, the consequences of their failure or exploitation, and how 
multiple vulnerabilities can be combined by malicious attackers to increase their attacks or strengthen 
their footholds.  
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2.5.1 Network Vulnerabilities 
In relation to cyber networks, a vulnerability is a weakness or fault that exposes and reduces the 
networked system’s security. SoS are composed of a combination of physical, cyber, and human 
elements, and each element can be susceptible to differing vulnerabilities. Table 2.8 provides a broad 
summary of vulnerabilities that can reduce security within SoS and expose them to attack vectors, 
including categorised elements that are susceptible within an organisation’s networked infrastructure, 
the types of attack that can be instigated, the effects of such attacks, and the requirements an attacker 
would utilise in order to exploit a vulnerability.  
Table 2.8. Summary of Network Vulnerabilities and Attack Factors 











 Data Mechanisms. 
 Disaster Recovery. 
 Insecure ports. 
 Misconfigured systems 
and software. 




 Inadequate password 
and account policy. 
 Inadequate use of 
cryptography. 
 Inadequate access 
control. 
 Application backdoors. 
 Human error and 
intentional acts. 
 Inadequate physical 
security. 
 Inadequate firewall 
rules. 
 Unnecessary enabled 
services and 
applications. 
 Unauthorised software. 
 Inadequate staff 
training. 
 Network congestion. 
 Cache holding user ids. 
 Directories not secured. 
 No assets to protect 
against power loss. 
 Inadequate data back-
up and storage. 
 Inadequate disaster 
recovery plan. 










 Malware, viruses, 
and worms. 
 SQL injection. 
 Control hijacking. 
 Injecting false data. 
 Compromised-key. 
 Data modification. 
 Buffer overflow. 
 Cross-site 
Scripting. 










 Quality of 
service. 
 Loss of 
intellectual 
property. 
 Data leakage. 
 Reputation loss. 
 Financial loss. 




 System damage. 
 Internet Remote 
Attack, attacker 
with Internet 
access can discover 
and send messages 
to device via the 
network with no 
access privileges. 
 Local or Remote 
Access, the 
attacker connects 
via local or Internet 
access to the 
device, and must 
have some type of 
privileged access. 
 Physical Proximity 
attack, the attacker 
is in close 
proximity but does 
not need physical 
access; generally 
these attacks are 
conducted against 
wireless nodes. 
 Direct Physical 
Attacks, the 
attackers have 
access to the 
physical device, 
and privileges 
might not be 
required to access 
data or system. 
Source: Knapp and Langill [12], Awodele et al. [76], Stamp et al. [77], Wu et al. [79], Kumar et al. [88], Papp et al. [89], Myerson [90]. 




Figure 2.10.  Cross-Site Scripting Attack 
Source: Schematic representation of a simple XSS attack, acunetix.com [91]. 
One example is Cross-site Scripting (XSS); this type of attack is the submission of a malicious script 
into a web application or website by a malicious attacker. This critical attack uses known 
vulnerabilities in web applications, web servers, or web plug-in systems, and is considered one of the 
most utilised attacks against website security. This attack impacts both the security of the 
website/application and the victim’s device [91]. 
Attacks are not directly made against the victim, instead a malicious script is injected into a web page 
or application that will be accessed by the individual, i.e. the website/application is a ‘Trojan Horse’ 
which delivers the malicious script within the victim’s browser. This attack is only achieved if the 
webpage allows for direct user input to its pages, allowing for an attacker to insert code that will be 
incorporated into the web page and executed by the victim’s web browser. Once the victim’s browser 
innocently executes the code, in general they are unable to prevent the attack or realise the attack has 
occurred [91].  
Recently, the National Vulnerability Database had recorded over 10,600 identified Cross-Site 
Scripting vulnerabilities. Table 2.9 presents six of these reported vulnerabilities, providing a detailed 
description of the exploitable vulnerability, its access vector and impact type, and reports if the 
attacker would require authentication to take advantage of the vulnerability. XSS is on occasions 
confused with SQL injection attacks, malicious attackers use SQL injection to enter code within a 
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browser’s search field for example, impacting the executed query and gaining access within the 
database to results that would normally be inaccessible. The following solutions discussed in the 
remainder of this section, such as network vulnerability scanners, vulnerability analysis, scoring and 
exploit databases, attack graphs, and network intrusion detection systems and analysers, can assist to 
identify and evaluate these vulnerabilities. 
Table 2.9. Identified Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities 
CVE-ID Description Access Vector Authentication Impact Type 
CVE-2017-
3133 
A Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability in 
Fortinet FortiOS versions 5.6.0 and earlier 
allows attackers to execute unauthorized 
code or commands via the Replacement 
Message HTML for SSL-VPN. 
Network exploitable. 
Victim must voluntarily 
interact with attack 
mechanism. 




Wolf CMS 0.8.3.1 allows Cross-Site 
Scripting (XSS) attacks. The vulnerability 
exists due to insufficient sanitization of the 
file name in a "create-file-popup" action, 
and the directory name in a "create-
directory-popup" action, in the HTTP POST 




Victim must voluntarily 
interact with attack 
mechanism. 




TelescopeJS before 0.15 leaks user bcrypt 
password hashes in websocket messages, 
which might allow remote attackers to 
obtain password hashes via a cross-site 
scripting attack. 





Multiple JasperReports Server components 
contain vulnerabilities which may allow 
authorized users to perform cross-site 
scripting (XSS) and cross-site request 
forgery (CSRF) attacks. The impact of this 
vulnerability includes the theoretical 
disclosure of sensitive information. Affects 
TIBCO JasperReports Server (versions 6.1.1 
and below, 6.2.0, 6.2.1, and 6.3.0), TIBCO 
JasperReports Server Community Edition 
(versions 6.3.0 and below), TIBCO 
JasperReports Server for ActiveMatrix BPM 
(versions 6.2.0 and below), TIBCO 
Jaspersoft for AWS with Multi-Tenancy 
(versions 6.2.0 and below), and TIBCO 
Jaspersoft Reporting and Analytics for AWS 
(versions 6.2.0 and below). 
Network exploitable. 
Victim must voluntarily 
interact with attack 
mechanism. 





disruption of service. 
CVE-2017-
2683 
The NVIDIA profiler in Android before 
2016-10-05 on Nexus 9 devices allows 
attackers to obtain sensitive information via 
a crafted application, aka internal bug 
30162222. 
Network exploitable. 
Victim must voluntarily 
interact with attack 
mechanism. 




An issue was discovered in Kabona AB 
WebDatorCentral (WDC) application prior 
to Version 3.4.0. The web server URL 
inputs are not sanitized correctly, which 
may allow cross-site scripting 
vulnerabilities. 
Network exploitable. 
Victim must voluntarily 
interact with attack 
mechanism. 
Not required. Allows unauthorized 
modification. 
Source: NVD.nist.gov [92]. 
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2.5.2 Network Vulnerability Scanners 
Vulnerability scanning is “the process of methodically reviewing the configuration of a set of hosts by 
attempting to discover previously identified vulnerabilities that may be present” [12].  A network 
vulnerability scanner allows vulnerabilities within both the network’s topology and its hosts to be 
scanned. These tools have become highly popular both with organisations who implement them as 
part of an automated risk strategy and malicious attackers who seek to gain unauthorised access to 
infrastructures. As a result, vulnerability scanners provide specifics on weaknesses such as open ports, 
network configurations, system components, operating systems (OS), software applications and 
services, logons, and active IP addresses, etc. Network vulnerability scanners can also assist in 
prioritising the implementation of solutions, and commonly have the capacity to detect malicious 
services such as Trojans. 
In general a network based vulnerability scanner would be located on a single device, and be 
responsible for network discovery and analyses of target hosts, collating results, comparative analysis 
of results against vulnerability database, and the presentation of results. Figure 2.11 presents a high 
level overview of a network vulnerability scanner.  
 
Figure 2.11.  Overview of Required Network Based Vulnerability Scanner Components 
These tools are efficient when monitoring for known vulnerabilities and signatures, however struggle 
with the identification of new vulnerabilities, with false-positive warnings requiring administrative 
intervention. When scanners fail to perceive the associated risks to systems and components and if a 
system is reported with no known vulnerabilities, it does not mean that the system is secure, 
unidentified and unknown vulnerabilities leave systems within the collaborative infrastructure 
unprotected and exposed, and susceptible to zero-day attacks. 
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Scan results do not determine relationships between any identified vulnerabilities, or ascertain how 
they can be combined by attackers attempting to penetrate the network. Systems could also have been 
misconfigured, software might be improperly installed, and networks might have been hardened 
incorrectly. Network vulnerability scanners fail to provide a complete view of the network and the 
associated risks, and are reliant upon external data and regular updates to maintain their own local 
vulnerability database [12]. 
Unlike firewalls, anti-virus, and IDS, network vulnerability scanners provide a proactive approach to 
security within ICT rather than focusing upon defending against attacks. These schemas endeavour to 
deliver automated platforms that identify vulnerabilities and analyse network states. Developed 
network vulnerability scanners include: 
 Nessus [93]. 
 Retina [94]. 
 Nmap [95]. 
 MaxPatrol [96]. 
 Nexpose [97]. 
 OpenVAS [98]. 
 Saint 8 [99]. 
Website based network vulnerability scanners include: 
 Pentest-Tools.com [100]. 
 Acunetix [91]. 
 Qualys [101]. 
The popular vulnerability scanner Nmap for example, has been widely adopted within industry, as it 
evolved as an open source platform that could be applied to the majority of common OS. When 
compared to other similar tools we note that there is great variance between their functionality, and no 
distinct database which is utilised by them all. While these vulnerability scanners prove effective 
within distinct networked infrastructures, there are no guarantees of their suitability when applied 
against SoS, as typically these infrastructures only share collaborative relations and do not always 
divulge or allow access to their entire network of systems. This means that vulnerability scanners will 
not have access or generate a complete overview of the networked systems with which they share a 
collaborative relationship. Therefore it is ineffective to apply these tools if we cannot evaluate every 
component and link which is connected via a collaborative relationship.  
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Vulnerability scanners only protect against known vulnerabilities that have been identified and logged 
within a database, which it evaluates the network against. Both open source and commercial 
vulnerability scanning tools can negatively impact networked infrastructures when applied, therefore 
extra care must be taken when applying these methods to SoS as negative impacts could be further 
exacerbated and potentially cause cascading failures. Therefore, to deploy a vulnerability scanner 
within an SoS environment considerable testing would be required, however, as stated with many 
critical SoS it is impossible to simply shut them down and run vigorous testing against them. In these 
instances simulated environments are the most effective means to ensure issues do not arise. 
Characteristically vulnerability scanners are automated, and scanners that inject data into a network 
topology are considered to be highly dangerous and only suitable for networked infrastructures within 
SoS that are non-operational and offline. The use of passive tools is more dependable and less 
dangerous for collaborative infrastructures. There have been incidents that have been directly 
attributed to automated tools which have shutdown networked systems. These disruptions can result 
in huge financial losses and can impact the reputation of organisations. Similarly, these failings can 
also affect the credibility of the security firms who develop the systems and who have implemented 
them. 
Additionally, it must be stated that not all vulnerabilities are exploitable. It is also essential that any 
detected vulnerability is not only identified precisely but managed effectively. Quantitative methods 
assist in quantifying if the risk could be exploited immediately or in the future. Solutions or corrective 
measures that can be applied to secure the vulnerability need to be weighed against the potential 
benefits of modification and the costs that would occur.  
Ranking and prioritising vulnerabilities and solutions can assist in identifying the risks that pose the 
biggest threats that need immediate attention and those that have no immediate impact and pose no 
threat and risk. The cost of inflation will also play a part when prioritising remedies, as while a risk 
might pose only a small threat, the cost to secure it in the future might increase and be more costly 
later. Ranking vulnerabilities will shift the analysis of scans away from how vulnerabilities will 
impact a component, system, or network to the overall impact to the SoS [12], i.e. will rank the 
vulnerabilities with a focus of the consequences of the risk posed to the entire SoS which can have 
local, regional, or even global impact. 
 
2.5.3 Vulnerability Analysis, Scoring, and Exploit Databases 
A number of organisations have been established in order to assess the severity of cyber based 
security vulnerabilities and to develop industry standards, to assist with the assignment of numerical 
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values to represent the severity of the vulnerability and exploitability. Vulnerability scoring and 
exploit databases developed over the last couple of decades include: 
 Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [102]. 
 National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [92]. 
 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [103]. 
 Bugtraq security database [104]. 
 SecurityFocus Forum [104]. 
 Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) [105]. 
Each schema identifies and measures vulnerabilities in a variety of ways, with differing focuses. 
Some of the schemas provide threat warning systems, whereas others provide vulnerability databases. 
Several vulnerability scoring methods also have the capability to assist with vulnerability 
identification. Vulnerabilities can be tracked and cross referenced between databases. But due to the 
size of the repositories it can be time consuming, therefore automated processes tend to be applied to 
simplify and speed up the process [12]. 
While there are other methods, research ascertains that CVSS and NDV have been increasingly 
integrated into several research methodologies, which aim to resolve issues associated with assigning 
risk values to collaborative network vulnerabilities.  We have also utilised these two vulnerability 
scoring and exploit databases within our implemented solution, outlining the industry established 
metrics for generating the quantitative risk values in Section 4.6.1, and discuss how the methods assist 
in the assignment of risk, and show the complexity of automating the risk assessment process. 
 
2.6 Network Security Systems 
In order to protect against the risks and challenges discussed in this paper, and identify vulnerabilities 
that expose systems and increase security, there has been considerable research into attack graph 
generation methods and intrusion detection systems, allowing for administrators to analyse and 
evaluate the security of their networked cyber systems, and identify security needs. 
 
2.6.1 Attack Graph Generation 
While initially perceived in 1998, it was not until 2001 that attack graphs were developed further 
encompassing an automated process. Attack graph generation has gained prevalence over recent years 
and has long been associated with network security. This method is increasingly used to determine 
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and visualise how multiple vulnerabilities can be combined to penetrate a network by a malicious 
attacker. Traditionally, attack graphs relied upon the manual entry of data (often drawn by hand) that 
had been deposited within databases containing known exploits and vulnerabilities. In contrast, the 
size and complexity of infrastructures today means this is no longer a viable option and is a highly 
unrealistic approach as part of risk assessment practice [82] [83]. 
Attack graphs generally represent an attack at an initial starting node attempting to reach a particular 
goal state and define possible sequences and routes (attack paths) an attacker could exploit to reach 
the desired state. Generally, nodes and edges represent vulnerabilities that can be exploited and 
alterations caused by the attacker penetrating the network. These graphs identify and visualise 
potential threats that if exploited and combined form a possible attack path to goal state(s). It is 
possible to predict attacks by providing these details of known vulnerabilities throughout the 
topology. Network hardening techniques can be applied to mitigate impact and increase security 
within the infrastructure. 
 
Figure 2.12.  An Overview of the Identified Risks Visualised in Graph Form 
The role of these graphs is to identify and detail all known vulnerabilities within an infrastructure 
along with detailing connectivity. Because of this, attack graphs quickly become highly complex and 
large in size often resulting in state explosion. Even when executed on small networks formed 
between small numbers of connected devices, graphs which display every possible scenario are 
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incomprehensible and impractical. This is due to the sheer volume of identified paths. It is unlikely 
that an administrator or decision maker could make sense of these graphs intuitively, or determine 
which route is the most prominent route of attack. Figure 2.12 demonstrates these limitations and 
depicts vulnerabilities which impact the security of a single networked device. 
Likewise, dependency attack graphs model dependencies, relationships, and transition states with 
regards to network configurations. Additionally, they model the vulnerabilities within the network and 
the potential exploits which are then represented as attack paths. Rather than assuming attackers will 
comprise all states in an attack graph, dependency graphs concede attackers will not necessarily 
exploit all vulnerabilities within each component. Graphs visualise attack scenarios and paths between 
source state and target, calculating a range of attack graphs and paths that expose the network to risk 
[106]. 
Dependency graphs focus on identifying multiple paths which are likely to be exploited, rather than 
focusing on the most or least likely attack path, or the path that poses the highest risk. Potentially, this 
solution could conceal exploitable paths and leave the network exposed. Often the vertex represents 
the condition state of system settings, while the edge represents casual relations between each 
condition. Multiple paths are available for further analysis, with each state assigned a numerical value, 
representing the expected loss or likelihood of the state being achieved [106]. 
Advances within ICT allowed automated processes and algorithms to be applied to attack graph 
methodologies, allowing for precise graphs to be generated on the condition that accurate source data 
is provided. These schemas are being heavily applied to a variety of security areas including Security 
Risk Assessment, Intrusion Detection and Prediction, and Digital Forensics. 
Attack graphs are indispensable for administrators as they provide a platform that can assist them in 
identifying potential exploitable vulnerabilities within their network. They also offer insight into what 
security measures should be deployed, assist with prioritisation of planning and implementation for 
network hardening. In addition, attack graphs can facilitate the understanding of the network, network 
topology, and the impact of potential actions. 
Several schemas have been developed over the last couple of decades that assist with attack graph 
generation. Each schema has a variety of tools integrated within them, as well as the functionality to 
model different interactions, exploits, and varying simulation types. The schemas process a variety of 
data sources and are based on a variety of platforms. Several popular schemas are summarised below. 
 
2.6.1.1 Multi-Host Multi-Stage Vulnerability Analysis 
Multi-host Multi-stage Vulnerability Analysis (MulVAL) is an automated schema that uses Datalog 
for element analysis. MulVAL models interactions of software bugs along with network data, system 
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configuration data, and other relevant data as required. The schema leverages existing vulnerability 
databases and scanning tools such as OVAL (Open Vulnerability Assessment Language) and ICAT 
(Internet Catalog). Each host within the network is scanned asynchronously; outputs are then encoded 
as Datalog facts prior to being fed into the MulVAL reasoning engine. The reasoning engine is 
composed of a series of DataLog rules, capturing operating system behaviour and interactions 
between components [107]. 
...
...
Host 1 Host 1














Figure 2.13.  MulVAL Framework 
Source: Schematic representation of the MulVAL architecture, Ou et al. [107]. 
MulVAL analysis inputs include advisories, host configuration, principles, interaction, and policy, 
this framework is outlined in Figure 2.13. Although, the MulVAL framework aims to identify 
potential vulnerabilities prior to an attack being launched against the network, while complementing 
IDS. This schema struggles, scaling as O(N2)~O(N3), as the number of hosts increases within the 
monitored network [107]. 
 
2.6.1.2 Network Security Planning Architecture 
Network Security Planning Architecture (NetSPA) has the functionality to build network based attack 
graphs, using a graph structure called multiple-perquisite graph. Leveraging OVAL, NetSPA uses 
firewall rules, network vulnerability scans (Nessus), and vulnerability databases (NVD), to model 
potential attack paths of known vulnerabilities and computes network reachability. The schema can 
model server-side, client-side, credential-based, and trust based attacks. This is achieved by NetSPA 
capturing data from the input sources and forming the data into a network model which is converted 
into a binary file. NetSPA’s computation engine reads the binary file and computes reachability; this 
then forms the generation of an attack graph which is analysed. Recommendations and the 
computation of security metrics can then be generated from these results [108] [109]. 
























Figure 2.14. NetSPA Framework. 
Source: Schematic representation of the NetSPA architecture, Ingles et al.  [108], Chu et al.  [109]. 
NetSPA has reachability systems that can emulate network firewalls and compute reachability 
between hosts. Consequently, NetSPA can pose as an attacker and determine vulnerabilities within 
firewall rule sets, which previously had been overlooked. Subsequently, GARNET (Graphical Attack 
graph and Reachability Network Evaluation Tool) and NAVIGATOR (Network Asset Visualization: 
Graphs, ATtacks, Operational Recommendations) have been developed building upon the 
functionality of NetSPA, which is used as their backend engine (these schemas are discussed below). 
The framework for NetSPA is outlined in Figure 2.14, and it has also been integrated with the OVAL-
based scanner. The schema struggles with complexity, scaling as O(n log n) as numbers of hosts 
increase within the monitored network [108] [109]. 
 
2.6.1.3 Topological Analysis of Network Attack Vulnerability 
Topological Analysis of Network Attack Vulnerability (TVA) is a method that can be applied for the 
use of attack graph generation. The approach analyses vulnerability dependencies and identifies each 
potential attack path within the monitored network. These graphs then assist in computing network 
hardening, recommendations, intrusion detection deployment, and alarm correlation. The method can 
assist with identification of optimal attack response. This method has the capability to be integrated 
with Nessus, Retina, and FoundScan, and can process data from a wide number of differing 
vulnerability databases, including NVD, Bugtraq, OSVDB, and CVE [110] [111]. 
 






























Figure 2.15. TVA Framework 
Source: Schematic representation of the TVA architecture, Jajodia et al. [110], Jajodia and Noel [111].                                                                                       
The framework for TVA is outlined in Figure 2.15. The method states it employs efficient algorithms 
with worst-case quadratic complexity, and the protection domain abstraction is reduced to linear 
within each domain. This method scales to on O(n2) for each domain for n hosts worse-case 
complexity. While grouping hosts into protection domains allows the complexity to be further 
reduced to O(n), and the complexity is O(e) for e exploits [110] [111]. 
While considerable research has been conducted into the field of attack graph generation, existing 
schemas still fail to overcome attack graph generation complexity and scalability issues. The tools 
summarised in this section have also been heavily incorporated into the frameworks of other proposed 
attack graph generation methodologies, which are summarised in Section 5. 
 
2.6.2 Network Intrusion Detection Systems and Analysers 
When highly sophisticated devices are integrated with complex functionality, a higher degree of 
complexity and vulnerabilities is introduced. The more interconnected these systems become the more 
susceptible they become to network vulnerabilities and threats. The most common protection 
measures are Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), which can 
also monitor data transmission between integrated systems. 
IDS have the functionality to gather and analyse data from multiple sources within a network or from 
a distinct device, identifying potential security breaches from both within the network and externally. 
IDS are generally categorised under two different types, which are Network Intrusion Detection 
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Systems (NIDS) or Host-Based Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDS). NIDS endeavour to identify 
malicious attacks or behaviour such as eavesdropping, port scanning, and DDoS attacks. This is 
achieved by monitoring all inbound or outbound traffic that traverses between all devices on the 
network. HIDS endeavour to monitor the distinct devices within a network, monitoring and analysing 
inbound and outbound traffic to ensure aspects such as host configuration are not modified or deleted 
[112]. 
One characteristic of IDS are their reliance upon signatures of known attacks. This requires an in-
depth knowledge of the vulnerabilities associated with the protocols which are to be monitored. IDS 
struggle to monitor several protocols which are heavily relied upon by collaborative infrastructures, 
such as Distributed Network Protocol Version 3 (DNP3) and Modbus. These protocols are often relied 
upon in smart grid and critical infrastructure environments, where Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) controls are necessary for the functioning of these systems [20] [21]. 
Commercial IDS can be a significant investment for organisations that wish to implement them within 
their networked systems, and are generally an unattainable option for organisations with small 
networks due to cost. Open source IDS have become a suitable alternative, with vast developments 
being conducted in this area. Developed IDS-based platforms include: 
 Snort [113]. 
 Bro [114]. 
 tcpdump [115]. 
 Shadow (Secondary Heuristic Analysis for Defensive Online Warfare) [116]. 
 M-Ice [117]. 
 Shoki [118]. 
 Spade [119]. 
 Firestorm [120]. 
 
2.7 Summary  
This chapter provides essential background information in order to understand the principal concepts 
for this research. In this chapter we review the associated challenges with risk and vulnerability 
identification, specifically focusing on SoS environments. We identified that the main issues that 
leave systems insecure and vulnerable to attack vectors can be directly attributed to the SoS 
characteristics associated with operational independence, managerial independence, evolutionary 
development, emergent behaviour, and geographic behaviour. While the dynamic nature of SoS can 
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be rewarding, the associated challenges caused by these characteristics can result in issues arising 
which directly cause additional independencies, increase the complexity of networked systems, and 
can intensify cascade failures. 
The methods that attempt to identify and quantify the risks associated with large heterogeneous 
systems such as network risks assessment methods, and those which model interdependencies and 
cascading failures such as attack graph generation methodologies, struggle with the dynamic nature, 
sheer size, and complexity of these SoS, and evident weaknesses have been identified.  The 
limitations of existing frameworks and solutions that attempt to overcome the challenges discussed in 




Chapter 3  
Related Work 
 
In this chapter we focus on critically analysing existing research solutions, highlighting their benefits 
and weaknesses. This is to convey the inadequacies of existing approaches and will provide validation 
that the motivation for this research is essential. The research focuses on risk analysis as we need to 
develop a solution capable of identifying vulnerabilities within multi-level SoS in order to quantify 
the security for the entire SoS, and to increase security and mitigate risks without the introduction of 
additional resources. To achieve this it was vital to understand general security in regards to SoS and 
risk analysis, to understand what risk analysis is and how others have developed and applied it, and 
how SPoF theoretical and applied solutions work and how we can embed similar techniques into our 
solution to assist with mitigating risks. In addition, we need to comprehend how cascading failure 
solutions work, as we need to explore interconnected networks, as there will be an increased chance 
of SPoF developing and resulting in cascading effects. Complexity is another issue we need to address 
as we focus on multi-level SoS that introduce additional complexity into the process, and emerging 
behaviour techniques require examination in order for our solution to have the capacity to be dynamic 
and mitigate risks within deployed evolving SoS. Similarly, we also need to have a deep understand 
of existing solutions that model network risk, in order to determine how these techniques can be 
embedded within our solution to support the visualisation of risks, and assist to measure the security 
of critical resources and the robustness of the SoS, how data assurance techniques are utilised as we 
need to explore methods to secure data and mitigate risks to data as it traverses and is created and 
stored within an unencrypted and insecure network, and how optimisation techniques are applied in 
order to establish their usefulness in supporting SoS communication configuration in order to prevent 
additional resources being required to increase SoS security.   
 
3.1 Systems-of-Systems Security 
The aim of our research is to mitigate risks and increase security within SoS, without adding 
additional resources into the collaborative infrastructure. In the previous chapter (Section 2) we 
defined different problems that impede SoS security, and in order to facilitate our objectives it is 
essential that we consider and understand the identified security issues, but more importantly the 
methods and solutions that are currently utilised within the field of network security, moreover, 
determine their inadequacies and limitations when applied to multi-level SoS. 
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Security solutions and tools have been focusing on specific security issues in SoS or attack, and 
security tools are part of SoS. This section evaluates security solutions that endeavour to increase 
security and improve upon security techniques, and those that attempt to secure systems against 
specific attacks. 
 
3.1.1 Securing SoS Against Malicious Attacks 
Systems-of-Systems are impacted and exposed by comparable limitations and challenges associated 
with security as those of traditional cyber networks. Considerable research has been conducted into 
defending cyber networks against malicious attacks such as DDoS, the following research focuses on 
DDoS security in cyber networks, with a summary of the methods provided in Table 3.1: 
Aroura and Zouari [121] propose a theoretical framework for detecting and responding to DDoS 
attacks, extending the Saher Architecture, and analysing the alert level in Internet Service Providers. 
Developing a first round of defence, that is adapted from an existing consensus algorithm, in an 
endeavour to alert the entire cyberspace if under attack. This then allows nodes in the environment to 
run a reactive mechanism, depending on the type of attack. 
Singh et al. [122] provide a comprehensive insight into DDoS classifications and defence methods, 
which are based on deployment types (centralised and distributed). Identifying that distributed 
defence systems are marginally more effective than centralised DDoS defence solutions, but failing to 
determine the researched solution’s efficiency. 
Pacheco et al. [14] focus their research on ascertaining the viability of an amplified reflection DDoS 
attack within IoT topologies. Ascertaining how IoT environments can become targets due to their 
limited processing and energy resources, and exploring IoT security vulnerabilities, by applying a 
DDoS attack against the topology. 
In the work of Naseer et al. [123], they endeavour to secure cyber networks against DDoS flood by 
proposing a multi-agent DDoS Mechanism, to distinguish traffic characteristics by probing traffic and 
classifying flash crowd traffic event and DDoS attack threat. 
To protect cyber networks against jamming attacks, the following research presents solutions that 
attempt to defend against such attacks, with a summary of the methods provided in Table 3.1: 
Houssaini et al. [124] propose a novel detection method for jamming attacks based on the application 
of a statistical process control, applied on the packet drop ration. 
In the work of Sharah et al. [125], the authors present a reputation-based collation game to detect and 
mitigate insider jamming attacks within mobile ad-hoc networks.  The method uses a modified 
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security characteristic function to enter nodes into a coalition, which makes strategic security defence 
decisions to exclude malicious nodes based on reputation value. 
Yalu et al. [126] having conducted an in depth review of existing methodologies that endeavour to 
prevent jamming attacks, proposes an easy to implement protocol to increase wireless sensor network 
security. 
Table 3.1. DDoS and Jamming Attack Detection Methods Summary 
Method Basic Concept Pros Cons 
Aroura and 
Zouari [121]. 
DDoS attack detection and 
response, to enhance the 
security level of Saher’s 
architecture. 
 Different alert levels. 
 Coordinates Internet Service 
Providers to detect attacks. 
 Theoretical. 
 Inadequate distributed 
authentication mechanisms. 
 Requires national 
collaboration between all 
Internet Service providers. 
Singh et al. 
[122]. 
Comprehensive insight into 
DDoS classification and 
defence methods. 
 In depth review of existing DDoS 
defence methods and classification. 
 Comparison of DDoS defence 
methods against performance 
metrics. 
 Determines that distributed defence 
systems are more effective.  
 No proposed solution. 
Pacheco  et al. 
[14]. 
Ascertain the viability of 
utilising an amplified 
reflection DDoS attack in 
IoT topologies. 
 Evaluates the efficiency of a DDoS 
attack in IoT. 
 Explores IoT security 
vulnerabilities. 
 Examines network protocol stack 
IEEE 802.15.4, 6LoWPAN, UDP, 
and CoAP. 
 Failed to determine 
compromise scale. 
 Does not explore other risks 
associated with distributed 
IoT. 
 
Naseer et al. 
[123]. 
DDoS attack detection 
using an agent based DDoS 
Mechanism. 
 Distinguish attack and valid 
requestors during overload. 
 Multi-agents activated on demand. 
 Subsidiary Agents automated and 
assist with the mechanisms 
scalability. 
 Further investigation 
required into false rate 
analysis.  





Detection method for 
jamming attacks based on 
the application of a 
statistical process control. 
 Apply the identification scheme at 
any diffusing nodes. 
 Identifies identical attacks in real 
time. 
 Does not require IEEE 802.11 
protocol to be modified. 
 Limited as it only measures 
against a single parameter. 
 Requires evaluation against 
other network topologies. 
Sharah et al. 
[125]. 
A reputation-based 
collation game to detect and 
mitigate insider jamming 
attacks within mobile ad-
hoc networks. 
 Prevent insider attacks in mobile 
ad-hoc networks. 
 Monitors transmission rates and 
reputation of individual nodes.  
 Failed to determine coalition 
scale. 
 Does not protect against 
cooperative attacks. 
Yalu et al. 
[126]. 
Jamming attack prevention 
within WSN utilising a 
proposed protocol. 
 Security in insecure channel. 
 The security does not rely on PHY-
layer parameters. 
 Theoretical. 
 High in computational 
overhead. 
 Does not consider other 
methods to counter selective 
jamming attacks. 
 Low throughput. 
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In addition, significant research has been conducted into eavesdropping, masquerading, and snooping 
attacks. The following research presents solutions that attempt to defend against such attacks or gain 
an insight into them, with a summary of the methods provided in Table 3.2: 
Zou et al. [127] present an optimal antenna selection scheme for physical-layer security to defend 
against eavesdropping attacks, and examine the intercept probability performance of their proposed 
solution against both the single-input, single-output, and space-time-coded transmission. 
In the work of Ma et al. [128], the authors focus on defending against eavesdropping attacks, and 
present a Moving Target Defence method that takes advantage of the Protocol-Oblivious Forwarding 
customisation capability. They endeavour to randomise message packets and routing paths in order to 
protect the communication process. 
Li et al. [129] examine channel condition including path loss, the shadow fading effect, and Rayleigh 
fading effect, in an attempt to defend against eavesdropping attacks in Wireless Net of Things. The 
authors present an analytical model that investigates these attacks considering the various channel 
conditions, and considers attackers with resources that include omnidirectional or directional 
antennas.  
To identify masquerading attacks in healthcare information systems, Gander et al. [130] proposed a 
conceptual masquerade detection framework specifically for Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise 
environments. They develop a two-step detection method that monitors signatures and statistical 
aberrations via pluggable algorithms. 
Kholidy et al. [131] present a Data-Driven Semi-Global Alignment (DDSGA) framework to improve 
the effectiveness and performance of the semi-global alignment algorithm, which is used to detect 
masquerading attacks. The DDSGA endeavours to improve the scoring systems by utilising distinct 
alignment parameters for users, and tolerate small mutations in user command sequences to improve 
security. 
Pratik and Madhu [132] focus on intrusion detection and propose a Cloud Intrusion Detection System 
for Cloud Intrusion Detection Datasets, to assist with detecting attacks and masquerades that exist 
within the dataset, and improve the network’s security. 
To better understand snooping attacks, Marques et al. [133] undertake a comprehensive survey to 
determine the level of success in conducting snooping attacks by malicious individuals, in an attempt 
to understand the current levels of security and their ability to defend against such attacks. 
Gao et al. [134] propose a privacy-preserving solution to defend cache privacy from snooping attacks 
in Named Data Networking. Focusing on breaches of privacy that occur when malicious attackers 
measure the time difference between responses, and address the issue via the use of assigning credit 
scores to users based on their behaviours. 
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Table 3.2. Eavesdropping, Masquerading, and Snooping Detection Methods Summary 
Method Basic Concept Pros Cons 
Zou et al. 
[127]. 
Examine the physical-
layer security against 
eavesdropping attack, 
utilising multiple antennas 
at source. 
 Multiple antennas at source 
and destination improve both 
space-time-coded 
transmission and optimal 
antenna selection. 
 Theoretical. 
Ma et al. 
[128]. 
Randomise message 
packet and routing path, 
to protect against 
eavesdropping attacks. 
 Increases max shifting space 
size up to 12000bits, 
increasing difficulty of brute 
force attack.  
 While solution increases difficulty, 
attackers who capture all session 
packets and parse the protocols of the 
packets could recover the message 
content. 
Li et al. 
[129]. 
Investigate eavesdropping 
probability in Wireless 
Net of Things. 
 High accuracy for detecting 
eavesdropping attacks. 
 Ignores the impact of interference. 
 Results targeted to support future 
development of anti-eavesdropping 
solutions in Wireless Net of Things. 
Gander et 
al. [130]. 
Monitor access to patient 
data, to protect against 
masquerade attacks in 
Integrating the Healthcare 
Enterprise environments. 
 Identifies malicious activity 
patterns. 
 Identifies hidden activities. 
 Not evaluated against real distributed 
clinical information systems data. 
 Models can increase false-positive 
rates. 
 Solution is learner-based, thus could 
be trained by the attacker and ignore 
suspicious behaviour. 
 Solution could require extensive 
domain knowledge and struggle with 






computation efficiency of 
the enhanced semi-global 
alignment algorithm, to 
protect against 
masquerade attacks. 
 DDSGA models user 
behaviour with an increased 
accuracy rate. 
 Reduces false positive rates. 
 Detection and update 
processes can be parallelised 
without impacting accuracy. 
 Requires evaluation against network 






Develop an intrusion 
detection solution which 
contains a set of complete 
audit parameters to assist 
in detecting attacks and 
masquerades. 
 Integration of individual 
components. 
 High availability. 
 Scalable.  
 Audit parameters can detect 
over a hundred instances of 
attack and masquerades. 
 Centralised view of data. 





Comprehensive survey to 
determine the level of 
success in conducting 
snooping attacks. 
 Identified predictors of the 
likelihood of engaging in 
snooping attacks. 
 Qualitative assessment not 
quantitative. 
 Not evaluated the severity of the 
snooping attacks.  
 No proposed solution. 
Gao et al. 
[134]. 
Defend cache privacy 
from snooping attacks in 
Named Data Networking. 
 Utilises the signatures of 
abnormal events to detect 
abnormal user behaviour. 
 Maintains high system 
performance. 
 Reliant on the signatures of known 
abnormal events to detect 
misbehaviour. 
 Only consider privacy of users 
connected to same router. 
 Requires evaluation against other 
network topologies. 
 Evaluate solution against alternative 
credit score thresholds. 
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A common feature amongst all of the researched solutions that attempt to defend systems against 
these varying attacks is that they all focus on a single type of attack against a very specific network or 
data type. Meaning that their effectiveness to be applied against heterogeneous SoS cannot be 
ascertained, and the methods could require considerable modifications. These attacks exploit cyber 
vulnerabilities and risks discussed in Section 2, therefore if our proposed solution can successfully 
mitigate risk(s) within multi-level SoS, we can defend against these types of attack or lessen and 
manage the consequences of them. 
 
3.1.2 Intrusion Detection and Prevention Methods 
In an attempt to secure networks and prevent malicious attacks and unauthorised access, there has 
been considerable research conducted which specifically concentrates upon intrusion detection and 
prevention. Unfortunately many of these methods only identify existing known attacks, and while 
other methods have been proposed they can be costly, time consuming, and require high processing 
capabilities. Furthermore, anomaly based detection systems tend to identify a high number of false 
positives. The following research presents solutions that attempt to defend and prevent malicious 
intrusions, with a summary of the methods provided in Table 3.3: 
One example of the limitations of current methods is the proposed solution of Chung et al. [135]. 
They outline a Network Intrusion detection and Countermeasure Selection (NICE) for detecting 
intrusions in virtual environments. This is achieved by incorporating analytical procedures used for 
the generation of attack graphs with intrusion detection methods. Chung et al. focus upon network 
intrusion detection caused by a single type of attack, failing to include other intrusion detection 
solutions and attacks within their virtual environment, which limits its accuracy and its potential 
usefulness. 
Sheikhan and Bostani [136] propose a hybrid intrusion detection framework based on MapReduce to 
be applied within IoT topologies for distributed detection. This uses supervised and unsupervised 
optimum-path forest to develop a real-time framework, to detect insider attacks. The authors focus 
their solution to detect sinkhole and selective-forwarding attacks in IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless 
Personal Area Networks. 
Gai et al. [137] propose a high-level solution for secure mobile Cloud computing, and adopt intrusion 
detection techniques to apply the mobile Cloud-based techniques into 5G environments (future 
networks).  
In order to detect known and unknown attacks within Cloud computing, Zhao and Zhang [138] 
propose a distributed hybrid intrusion detection framework, which endeavours to obtain the value of 
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initial cluster centre and generate a cluster centre table of intrusion detection, and reduce false positive 
and negative rates. 
Xing et al. [139] extend the work of NICE, and propose a new framework to support flexible intrusion 
prevention in Xen-based Cloud environments, which integrates Snort and OpenFlow. 
Table 3.3. Intrusion Detection and Intrusion Prevention Methods Summary 
Method Basic Concept Pros Cons 
Chung et al. 
[135]. 
Network Intrusion detection 
and Countermeasure 
Selection (NICE) for 
detecting intrusions in virtual 
environments. 
 Reduces the risk of external 
and internal attacks within 
Cloud systems. 
 Ignores other attack types 
and intrusion detection 
solutions. 
 Focuses on zombie 
explorative attacks in virtual 
environments. 
 Fails to evaluate scalability 




Intrusion detection framework 
to detect sinkhole and 
selective-forwarding attacks 
in IPv6 over Low-Power 
Wireless Personal Area 
Networks. 
 Detects insider and external 
attacks in IoT. 
 Offers real-time anomaly 
detection. 
 Requires adaptation to detect 
other malicious behaviours. 
Gai et al. 
[137]. 
 
High-level solution for 
implementing intrusion 
detection techniques in 5G 
networks. 
 Support future 5G 
developers to secure mobile 
Cloud computing when 






Improve bisecting K-means 
intrusion detection method, 
and develop a distributed 
intrusion detection method for 
Cloud computing. 
 Improves bisecting K-means 
method. 
 Improves detection 
efficiency of attack data. 
 Failed to distinguish features 
of high-dimensional data, 
impacting detection rate and 
false alarm rate. 
Xing et al. 
[139]. 
Intrusion prevention in Xen-
based Cloud environments, 
which expands the work of 
NICE and integrates Snort 
and OpenFlow 
 Detect intrusions and deploy 
countermeasures. 
 Does not control multiple 
OpenFlow switches or Open 
vSwitches. 
 Reliant upon a single Snort 
detection agent. 
 Further analysis required into 
optimisation solutions to 
support reconfiguration of 
the network and to correlate 
alerts. 
 Requires evaluation on a 
complex testing 
environment. 
Rodas et al. 
[140]. 
Intrusion prevention, and risk 
detection and mitigation 
within Wireless Mesh 
Networks. 
 Robust and scalable 
architecture, achieved 
through the integration of 
layered redundancies. 
 Analyses large data sets in 
real time. 
 Supports self-healing. 
 Does not unduly impact 
system resources. 
 Distributed approach. 
 Requires evaluation against 
other types of attack. 
 Requires evaluation against 
other protocols. 
 Requires evaluation against 
other network types. 
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In the work of Rodas et al. [140], an Intrusion Blocking for Wireless Framework is proposed, the 
framework aims to prevent, detect, and mitigate risks in Wireless Mesh Networks (WMN). This is 
achieved by means of non-relational databases for both data correlation and dissemination of intrusion 
information throughout the Wireless Mesh Network, to mitigate identified attacks quickly. 
 
3.1.3 Securing SoS During the Development Life Cycle  
Securing SoS is a complex undertaking, exceptional consideration, expertise, and knowledge is 
required to assure these types of collaborative networks. SoS can span multiple different domains, and 
in some instances even jurisdictions. Threats and security challenges can remain application, system, 
or domain specific, and have the potential to expose any collaborative network with which the system 
has a relationship. Hence, considerable research and development has been conducted into solutions 
for securing SoS, including securing during development stages and those which can be applied to 
existing developed or deployed infrastructures. The following research presents some example 
solutions that attempt to secure cyber networks during these stages, with a summary of the methods 
provided in Table 3.4: 
Sanjab and Walid [141] critically reflect on smart grid security, and propose a cyber-physical system 
security framework, demonstrating how attacks propagate from cyber to physical systems utilising a 
game-theoretical model, presenting a bounded rationality solution, that was inspired by cognitive 
hierarchy theory, to model attacker thinking levels. The framework endeavours to increase network 
security by having a greater insight into the bounded rationality of the attacker and defender. 
In order to support the development of resilient and secure SoS, Ruiz et al. [142] propose a security 
engineering process, utilising security artefacts that contain domain-specific security information and 
offer security solutions in the form of security patterns, allowing engineers to integrate security 
intuitively, ensuring that domain specific security knowledge can be used to meet requirements. 
Mori et al. [143] implement a System Modelling Language profile to support a viewpoint-driven 
approach for designing SoS, having identified limitations with Architectural Description Language 
that was deemed essential for understanding SoS.  
Trivellato et al. [144] propose a security framework that endeavours to address security challenges of 
future cyber based systems. This method would be employed by each collaborative party within the 
SoS in order to protect the local systems. Utilising a policy enforcement point that acts as an interface 
between parties, intercepting requests from external and local resources and contacts the appropriate 
policy decision point to evaluate those requests, then enforces the decision of the policy enforcement 
point. 
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To address the limitation of existing solutions Brunner et al. [145] propose a domain agnostic 
approach in order to model security and safety requirements across the domain, supporting 
certification processes in accordance with safety and security standards during the design and runtime 
of operations. 
Having conducted an in depth review of security solutions that attempt to secure cyber networks and 
SoS during the security development lifecycle, we have ascertained that many of the solutions 
proposed are domain specific, thus cannot be applied to other SoS and infrastructures. It is essential 
that security methodologies are compatible and can be applied to the entire SoS, i.e. the proposed 
security solution can be applied to all networked systems with which they have been integrated or 
share collaborative relations with. Security solutions are also required to be both backward compatible 
to help secure aging legacy systems or existing developed SoS, and forward compatible to protect 
against future integration and unperceived risks and threats to assure the future security of the SoS. 
Table 3.4. Security Methods Summary 




security framework for 
identifying the propagation 
of attacks from the cyber 
layer to the physical system. 
 Models levels of attacker 
thinking. 
 Generated a security model to 
demonstrate how attacks can 
propagate from cyber to 
physical systems. 
 Computes optimal strategies to 
defend against attacker type 
and the response of the 
defender. 
 Requires evaluation against a 
broader range of SoS, as smart 
grids are being incorporated into 
larger extended collaborative 
networks. 
 Only considers cyber-attacks, 
does not consider insider attacks. 
Ruiz et al. 
[142]. 
Security engineering 
process for creating secure 
SoS. 
 Security artifacts detail 
security properties of specific 
domains, utilised during 
modelling stages. 
 Does not secure SoS or mitigate 
the risks of emergent behaviour. 
 Only strengthens and increases 
security for the initial 
development stage of the SoS. 
 Cannot be considered an 
iterative security solution. 
Mori et al. 
[143]. 
Support designers to 
develop SoS. 
Provides a conceptual model of 
SoS, capturing SoS concepts and 
interrelationships. 
 Does not secure SoS or mitigate 
the risks of emergent behaviour. 
 Only strengthens and increases 
security for the initial 
development stage of the SoS. 
 Cannot be considered an 
iterative security solution. 
Trivellato et 
al. [144]. 
Security framework to 
support integration of 
additional resources and 
components within SoS. 
 Provides confidentiality of 
data, interoperability, and 
autonomy. 
 Requires evaluation against other 
network topologies. 
 Focuses on access control, does 
not consider other security risks. 
Brunner et al. 
[145]. 
Inspect safety and security 
requirements within cyber-
physical systems during 
their development and 
operation. 
 Considers both cross-domain 
documentation for safety, and 
security requirements. 
 Unifies design and run-time 
phases. 
 Requires evaluation against 
larger network topologies. 
 Limited knowledge base in 
regards to risks. 
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3.1.4 Securing SoS Using Network Security Solutions 
The most prominent method for securing cyber based networks and SoS includes the use of solutions 
such as firewalls, anti-virus solutions, antispyware techniques, patch management solutions, and 
virtual private networks. The following researched solutions attempt to apply and improve these 
existing solutions, with a summary of the methods provided in Table 3.5:  
Focusing upon Cloud-based firewalls, Salah et al. [146] present an analytical model to design efficient 
and elastic scaling firewalls, based upon the principles of Markov chains and queueing theory.  
Chomsiri et al. [147] extend their previous work and present an improved Tree-Rule firewall model, 
utilising IN and OUT interfaces to separate rules. 
Cheminod et al. [148] focus their research on industrial firewalls for networked control systems. The 
authors propose a simplistic approach utilising off-the-shelf hardware and open source software, and 
evaluate their solution to determine safe operating margins and thresholds, and establish the impact 
that an industrial firewall can have when integrated within a control system in order to increase 
security requirements. 
Cohen et al. [149] propose a novel solution for detecting infected machines in big data Security 
Information and Event Management systems, utilising anti-virus labels for supervised classification. 
The solution generates a labelled training set to assist with the identification of malware, which can be 
used to detect complex and dynamic patterns of machine behaviour and generate security alerts. 
In the work of Dev et al. [150], the authors propose the use of a two-way caching solution, which 
utilises a local-cache on client system, which is used to detect the virus or other malware while in an 
offline state, and a Cloud-cache on the Cloud, which utilises the Artificial Intelligence Techniques to 
provide an optimal search rate for virus and malware definitions. 
Sheta et al. [151] propose an anti-spyware solution that integrates data mining and design patterns, in 
order to create security patterns capable of detecting and classifying spyware.  
Nunez et al. [152] present a distributed patch management solution, quantifying the security benefits 
of a distributed methodology compared to a centralised approach. The proposed solution assists to 
secure computing environments by increasing the effectiveness of patch management, and increases 
the organisation’s security posture by defending the systems against the spread of malicious code due 
to the removal of underlying root causes. 
Kim et al. [153] propose a patch management solution that engages with vulnerability patch sites to 
verify vulnerability patch integrity. The automated solution endeavours to improve security of 
systems and provide an efficient approach to patch collection. 
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 Table 3.5. Network Security Methods Summary 
Method Basic Concept Pros Cons 
Salah et 
al. [146]. 
Determine the minimum 
number of virtual firewalls 
required to meet 
requirements. 
 Determines the number of required 
virtual firewalls to meet 
requirements. 
 Assumes measurement fluctuations 
are attributed to the overhead of 
virtualization and sharing the 
physical infrastructure elements and 




Reduce the size of firewall 
rules, by separating rules 
into sets. 
 Divide a big rule tree into smaller 
independent rule trees. 
 Often results in slower analysis. 





Determine safe operating 
margins when applying off-
the-shelf industrial firewalls 
within control systems. 
 Establishes operating margins and 
communication performance when 
an industrial firewall is integrated 
within a networked control system. 
 Fails to evaluate the solution against 
different traffic loads and differing 
characteristics. 
 Does not evaluate internal latency, 




Utilise anti-virus labels for 
detecting infected machines 
in big data Security 
Information and Event 
Management systems. 
 Identifies security incidents that 
trigger anti-virus alerts accurately. 
 Identifies suspicious behaviour 
ignored by comparative anti-virus 
solution. 
 Requires evaluation against other 
network topologies. 
 Requires evaluation against other 
types of network risk. 
 Need to establish if the training set 
could be trained by the attacker to 
ignore suspicious behaviour. 
 Solution could require extensive 
domain knowledge and struggle 
with unexpected distributions and 
low sample sizes. 
Dev et al. 
[150]. 
Improve the performance of 
Cloud Anti-virus 
Architecture. 
 Provides quick access to malware 
and behaviour definitions. 
 Improves performance of Cloud 
Anti-virus Architecture. 
 Reliant on secure communication 
between the client and Cloud-cache. 
 
Sheta et 
al. [151].  
Detect and classify 
spyware. 
 Can modify itself to detect both 
known and unknown spyware. 
 Reusable solution. 
 Solution is in part learner-based, 
thus could be trained by the attacker 




environments by increasing 
the effectiveness of patch 
management, and mitigate 
the spread of malicious 
code.  
 Mitigates risk and eliminates 
vulnerabilities. 
 
 Difficult to predict how applying 
patches will impact integrated 
systems, and fails to consider the 
introduction of risk factors, i.e. 
could patches introduce emergent 
behaviour or cascading failures. 
Kim et al. 
[153]. 
Secure computing 
environments by increasing 
the effectiveness of patch 
management, and mitigate 
risks. 
 Mitigates risk and eliminates 
vulnerabilities. 
 Difficult to predict how applying 
patches will impact integrated 
systems, and fails to consider the 
introduction of risk factors, i.e. 
could patches introduce emergent 





Reduce handoff delay and 
minimise packet loss when 
using virtual private 
networks in WMN. 
 Reduces handoff delay. 
 Improved network quality of 
service. 
 Requires further analysis into power 
consumption. 
Bhat et al. 
[155]. 
Establish the need for 
virtual private networks to 
be offered as a service in 
Cloud computing. 
 Could reduce organisation 
overheads and costs, and increase 
security. 
 An in depth review of current 
service architectures and missing 
features is required. 
 Would require discrete Cloud 
service architecture to successfully 
deploy virtual private networks. 
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Wireless Mesh Network security can be enhanced via the use of virtual private networks; to address 
integration issues between the distinct infrastructures Benzid and Kadoch [154] propose a Seamless 
Handoff Virtual Private Network solution. In an attempt to reduce handoff delay and packet loss rate, 
and is based on optimal path, Customer Edge based on Virtual Routing and Forwarding, and virtual 
private network static address. 
Bhat et al. [155] provides an informative and compressive insight into virtual private networks and 
Cloud computing, and introduce a novel Cloud architecture Virtual Private Network as a Service. 
Discussing the limitations and security failings of Cloud computing, the authors establish the need for 
preventing data loss, data breaching and traffic hijacking via the use of virtual private networks within 
the Cloud. 
 
3.2 Risk Analysis 
With SoS still failing and organisations and society continually demanding more from these 
infrastructures and their assets and services, it is imperative that those responsible for managing SoS 
security identify and understand both the risks and vulnerabilities that are associated with their 
infrastructures, and the consequences of those risks if left to advance. When organisations fail to 
perceive risk or their system’s tolerance to risk, then any methodology applied to their infrastructure 
could potentially be redundant and ineffective [12]. 
Risks which leave systems vulnerable and exposed are continually changing, this is because SoS are 
characteristically dynamic, independently managed, with systems and functions continually being 
phased in and out as requirements are fulfilled and new objectives identified. Previously, unknown 
and unimaginable risks can develop within hours, days or even years. Hence risk analysis is a 
continual process which is relied upon within SoS to identify and assess systems for risks, and a 
process that cannot be ignored, conducted once or not initiated for long periods of time. Risk analysis 
is merely a snapshot in time, and will only reflect the risks and vulnerabilities identified at the time 
the analysis is conducted. In addition, as suppliers and third parties develop new software and 
firmware for integration, it is vital that analysis and assessment is conducted to safeguard insecure 
coding techniques and software development during their lifecycles, so not to introduce new 
vulnerabilities exposing the SoS to additional risks [12].  
 
3.2.1 Risk Analysis Based Techniques  
In order to mitigate risks within SoS, during our extensive research it has become evident that it is not 
plausible to focus upon a single type of vulnerability, risk, or infrastructure. The following researched 
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solutions all perform risk analysis with specific agendas, a summary of the methods is provided in 
Table 3.6: 
Yang et al. [156] investigate the methods that are exposed to JavaScript in hybrid applications, and 
propose a hybrid solution containing static and dynamic analysis modules. The static module detects 
potential vulnerable applications and collates data to act as a guide for the dynamic analysis. The 
dynamic analysis executes the application to verify its vulnerability status.  
Peikert et al. [157] propose a procedural method to analyse an infrastructure’s susceptibility to 
intentional electromagnetic interferences, based upon fuzzy logic and set theory. The authors extend 
statistical-based models fault tree analysis, electromagnetic topology, and Bayesian networks with 
imprecise data, uncertainness with linguistic terms, along with experts’ opinions. This assists to 
identify elements and locations that increase risk, thus the method can contribute to increasing the 
protection level of the infrastructure. 
The work of Liu et al. [158] focuses on cyber-attacks that relate to microgrid control systems, and 
consider the role of solar photovoltaic and energy storage systems control systems. The authors 
propose a risk assessment method for evaluating the security of the microgrid, and explore the use of 
the Monte-Carlo simulation to calculate monitory risk index, which assesses the topology risks when 
photovoltaic and energy storage systems are hacked. 
In the work of Ketabdar et al. [159], the research focuses on attacker’s behaviour and motivation, this 
is then incorporated into the risk analysis process in order to ascertain security risks more precisely. 
Three main parameters are incorporated into the risk process including vulnerability damage impact, 
breach cost, and success probability, allowing administrators to analyse the security risks factors from 
the perspective of the potential attackers. In addition, the administrators will consider the attackers 
motivation, estimate risks for identified vulnerabilities and attack paths based on the motivation, and 
identify paths that pose the highest risks. 
Zahra and Abdelhamid [17] propose a risk analysis solution based on EBIOS methodology in order to 
identify the most significant weaknesses and vulnerabilities within IoT infrastructures. The authors 
aim to identify the most significant risk in regard to an IoT application, to ensure that developers can 
concentrate their efforts in order to build secure applications.  
When conducting risk analysis a broad view of the entire infrastructure is required, this allows for 
vulnerabilities to be identified along with the risks which they pose, in an attempt to reduce SPoF and 
the effects of negative emergent behaviour, along with increasing the security of the networked 
systems. When conducting risk analysis, it is important to recognise that vulnerabilities that expose 
systems can be both internal within the confinements of the SoS, and environmental which are 
external and generally out of the SoS manager’s control [12].   
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Table 3.6. Singular Risk Analysis Methods Summary 
Method Basic Concept Pros Cons 
Yang et 
al. [156]. 
Study a JavaScript 
vulnerability that exposes 
hybrid applications. 
 Automatic detection method to 
assist with the identification of 
Man-in-the-Middle attacks and 
remote command execution. 
 Can fail to identify some 
vulnerabilities and produces 
false alarms in some instances. 
 Analysis module only works 
for HTTP traffic and fails to 
prevent Man-in-the-Middle 




Procedural method to support 
the analyses of infrastructures 
susceptibility to intentional 
electromagnetic interference. 
 Identifies both the elements 
and locations that contribute to 
the risk. 
 Incorporates subjective 
information and assessments of 
risks based on the opinion of 
experts. 
 Theoretical, requires analysis 
against differing topology 
types and locations. 
Liu et al. 
[158]. 
Risk assessment methodology 
for microgrid topologies 
based on the physical system 
behaviour. 
 Considers multiple differing 
attack types, including 
syntactic attacks and semantic 
attacks. 
 Evaluated against a single 
microgrid. 
 Requires evaluation against a 
broader set of impact factors 
such as attacker’s capability, 
risks in microgrid after attack, 
existing operation status, cyber 
security detection ability of 





Incorporate the behaviour of 
an attacker, to compute an 
attacker’s motivation and the 
risks of existing 
vulnerabilities and attack 
paths.  
 Classifies attackers into four 
groups. 
 Computes attacker motivation. 
 Reliant on the perspective and 
knowledge of administrators, 
results could be biased and 
unreliable. 
 Requires evaluation against 
differing topology types and 




Determine the most important 
security risk within IoT 
applications. 
 Customizable, can place 
importance on specific 
applications and security 
service. 
 Requires evaluation against 
differing topology types and on 
a larger scale. 
 Limitations with vulnerability 
identification and securing 
potential risks. 
 
Due to the dynamic nature of SoS, risk analysis as stated must be continuously conducted due to the 
frequent changes within the collaborative infrastructures. Therefore, vulnerability analysis must be 
repetitive and frequently scheduled or triggered by events which would emulate all system 
developments or changes [12]. Vulnerability identification can be conducted by either assessing the 
networked systems or via penetration testing and ethical hacking. The following researched solutions 
all conduct risk analysis on networked infrastructures or include solutions that utilise hacking and 
penetration techniques to identify risks, a summary of the methods is provided in Table 3.7: 
Vegendla et al. [160] extend the Hacker Attack Representation Method in order to identify 
vulnerabilities within software, and develop a more systematic penetration testing approach. 
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Kadam et al. [161] convert Kali Linux and pentoo into a single automated tool for assessing Wi-Fi 
security. The developed tool is a distinct mobile toolkit application, which can be utilised by security 
experts to perform network security assessments form a mobile device. 
Berger and Jones [162] focus on the benefits of ethical hacking such as open source penetration 
testing tools, when utilised by small and medium sized enterprises to protect network services and 
operations. Via the use of Nmap, Google Hacking, Nessus, and Brutus the authors identify 
vulnerabilities, and identify measures that can be applied to resolve these risks and prevent their case 
studies data from future cyber threats.  
In the work of Guarda et al. [163], the authors propose a set of guidelines for conducting penetration 
testing within virtual environments. Guarda et al. believe that penetration testing is a vital service to 
systematically identify system vulnerabilities and weaknesses, analysing breaches, and mapping 
solutions, which allows for risks to be mitigated effectively. The framework is structured in six 
phases, first is to identify system vulnerabilities, and second is testing the effectiveness of security 
defences and resilience to attack. Third stage is the creation of malicious code exploiting specific 
vulnerabilities, fourth stage is a systematic system evaluation, stage five is the removal of traces and 
to restore system settings, followed by the final stage which produces a specialised report. 
In the work of Wang et al. [15] the authors propose a new method in the area of risk analysis utilising 
modified Attack-Defence Trees. This approach provides the means to reconstruct attack profiles and 
allows for the evaluation of countermeasures in regards to security management in the Cloud. It not 
only considers interactive scenarios of attacks and defences, the method also takes into consideration 
the cost, and thus allows for analysis to consider risk regarding specific threats. The method allows 
for the estimation of threat probability to be considered in the event that there is an absence of 
adequate information. This is achieved via the use of Bayesian Network analysis. 
Using complex networks theory which allows for directed and undirected graphs to be formed, and 
large systems with complex topologies and hidden interdependencies to be analysed, Sanchez et al. 
[13] propose a topologic-driven approach to model complex collaborative infrastructure 
interdependencies, and by proposing two new indices (Betweenness Centrality and Efficiency) the 
framework has the capability to identify critical edges and nodes in the infrastructure and form a 
topological point of view. Directing their attention to the interactions between system components, 
and via the development of a risk analysis technique to identify methods to reduce vulnerabilities 
associated with interdependency. Sanchez et al. ensure their method is not reliant upon power flow 
computations unlike older methods, and increase the robustness of platforms along with applying the 
proposed methods to other differing heterogeneous networks. While the authors endeavour to apply 
this solution to other properties within complex networks such as centrality indexes, path length, 
clustering coefficient, or to assist in modelling cyber-attacks and their consequences. The proposed 
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approach was not scalable and had not been applied to networks which had been formed between 
more than two infrastructures. 
Table 3.7. Risk Analysis Methods Summary 




Extend Hacker Attack 
Representation Method to 
attain a structured approach 
to bridge penetration test 
development and security 
requirements.  
 Penetration tests can be 
developed from models of 
possible attacks. 
 Requires evaluation against 
differing real-world topology 
types and on larger scale. 
 Does not establish if bottom-
up or top-down process to 
attack brainstorming is the 
most effective, as well as if it 
should be conducted 
individually or in groups. 
Kadam et 
al. [161]. 
Automate a Wi-Fi 
penetration testing tool to 
be implemented as an 
android application.  
 Does not require expert 
knowledge to conduct network 
and security analysis. 
 Powerful tool that can be run 
from a small inconspicuous 
device. 
 User interface has simple one-
click commands, tester is not 
required to memorise long 
commands. 
 Theoretical, requires analysis 
against differing topology 




Utilise open source hacking 
tools to identify 
vulnerabilities within small 
and medium enterprises to 
improve security and 
prevent unauthorised access 
to data. 
 Identified 232 network 
vulnerabilities, and allowed 
measures to be put in place to 
prevent sensitive data from being 
compromised. 
 Requires evaluation against 
differing topology types and 
on larger scale. 
 Limited by the open source 




Guidelines for conducting 
penetration testing within 
virtual environments 
 Penetration testing offers 
valuable support for improving 
security and mitigating risk in 
virtual environments. 
 Theoretical. 
 Security solutions need to 
transfer with the virtual 
machines. 
 If failure occurs to security 
solution within the virtual 




Proposed an enhanced 
Attack-Defence Trees 
method for risk analysis of 
Cloud security. 
 Considers interactive scenarios 
of attacks and defences, 
estimates required cost, in an 
endeavour to analyse the risk of 
specific threats. 
 Compared to other solutions 







 Not reliant upon power flow 
computations. 
 Increases platform robustness. 
 Identifies critical edges and 
nodes, and forms a topological 
point of view. 
 Limited by its inability to be 
applied to multiple networked 
infrastructures, not scalable. 
 
What also must be considered while conducting risk analysis is decision makers’ cognitive and 
motivational biases which can impact the effectiveness of decision making. Analysts are relied upon 
to provide accurate assessments in regards to risk and their skills to develop decision models, yet their 
biases could potentially be overconfident and misjudge the seriousness of the risk they are analysing. 
Chapter 3 - Related Work 
81 
 
Similarly, when analysts have a stake in the outcome of the analysis, their bias and self-interest could 
lead them to overestimate the potential consequences of the analysed risk. Should bias impact the 
validity of the risk analysis process, then the potential consequences of ignoring or over compensating 
the risks might be irreversible and difficult to correct later down the line.  
While there has not been considerable published work undertaken in this area, Montibeller and 
Winterfeldt [18] summarise the effects bias can play when analysing and conducting decision making 
processes, and outline techniques which potentially could reduce the effect of bias. Even though bias 
can result in negative effects and result in serious consequences, some bias based on the experience 
and knowledge of individuals will strengthen the risk analysis process and have a positive influence 
on securing SoS. 
 
3.2.2 Risk Analysis: Lab Based Risk Reduction 
The US Army recognised the limitations of theoretical solutions to secure SoS, and struggled to 
mitigate the risks associated with their infrastructures to be deployed within the field. Instead they 
engaged in the use of Network Integration Events to test emerging technologies in a controlled lab 
based military environment. This process allows for new technology to be integrated into a physical 
network and operated by soldiers, in relevant military environments, ensuring that vigorous testing 
and analysis of the network was undertaken under operational conditions, prior to the networked 
systems being deployed, thus rectifying issues to prevent deployed troops from being impacted [4]. 
Endeavouring to strengthen the development and deployment process, the US Army developed the 
Laboratory Based Risk Reduction method. This solution supports network integration, design, and 
provides an automated analysis of systems. In addition, the method also has the capacity for issues to 
be detected, systems to be debugged, can detect misconfigurations, and allows upfront analysis of 
performance for the network [4]. 
The Thread-based laboratory testing means networks are built utilising the physical components that 
will be deployed and are integrated to form extended SoS based on the Army’s deployed architecture, 
forming a fully-equipped brigade skeleton. Equipment could include for example, radios, routers, 
cross domain solutions, SATCOM, soldier handheld devices, the systems that are being tested and 
evaluated, etc. In addition, other applications will be incorporated on top of the framework that 
include call for fire, position location information using fielded mission command application 
systems, etc. Unified Offered Load will also ensure that systems are provided with an accurate traffic 
load, replicating the load for the brigade size. The Communications Effect Server-Plus emulates real-
time communication effects into the networked system under analysis, can simulate complex 
networks, and supports integration of real networks to generate hybrid test-beds. Whereas the 
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Automated Performance Analysis Framework Innovation, assesses the large scale network operations 
in real-time, utilising compound end-to-end performance metrics, automated requirements 
verification, and Adaptive Learning Systems for automated determination of the Operational 
Effectiveness [4]. 
While the US army’s method provides numerous benefits, and provides integration, design validation, 
and analysis, it is highly time consuming and expensive to implement. The process combines both live 
and virtualised capabilities encompassing integration and thread testing, unified offered load, 
emulation of communication effects, and framework analysis. The method has successfully identified 
numerous flaws and vulnerabilities within the systems under analysis, had the method not been used 
and issues occurred in the field, then systems would have been severely impacted and identifying the 
problems and producing solutions would be highly difficult [4].  
While this solution is more effective than using modelling and simulation alone, as often these 
methods hide issues that later manifest once deployed and in use, and small scales of networks can be 
inaccurate. Network loading, performance, and dynamics tend to not scale, and issues resulting from 
interoperability and loading which pose significant risks to SoS, tend to manifest after deployment. 
The method they propose does not increase the resilience of any SoS they develop, as abnormal 
behaviour will often manifest long after an SoS has been operational for numerous years, and security 
vulnerabilities can be unknown and unimaginable at the moment an SoS is deployed. This approach 
truly only strengthens the development and initial deployment stages, highlighting the importance of 
continued research into security and risks which have the potential to expose SoS throughout the 
infrastructure’s lifecycle. Table 3.8 provides a summary of the method. 
Table 3.8. Laboratory Based Risk Reduction Summary 









preparation for them 
to be deployed by 
the US Army.   
 Successfully performs integration 
testing in controlled laboratory of 
the physical systems, to mitigate 
risk when systems are deployed in 
the field. 
 Can perform analysis on different 
scales of the system networks, 
form Platoon size to Brigade size. 
 Injects realistic traffic load into the 
framework so the systems can be 
evaluated under realistic loading 
levels. 
 Can evaluate the systems under 
different operational scenarios, and 
perform ‘what-if’ analysis. 
 Time consuming and expensive to 
implement. 
 Issues resulting from interoperability and 
loading tend to manifest after deployment. 
 Abnormal/emergent behaviour will in 
general manifest long after deployment, 
solution only mitigates risks for initial 
deployment. 
 Security vulnerabilities are often unknown 
and unimaginable at time of development 
and deployment; i.e. method cannot defend 
against zero-day attacks. 
 Does not perform iterative risk analysis for 
the life time of the SoS. 
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3.2.3 Prevention and Detection of Single Points of Failure  
The complexity and size of SoS means while generally they assist in increasing the overall robustness 
of these infrastructures, their tightly coupled links and collaborative relations mean they often become 
reliant upon the transfer of critical data across essential communication links. There are evident 
weaknesses for example with current software based applications, security solutions, and physical 
hardware components and their configurations. Any single component failure/interruption or software 
failure/issue that prevents the transmission of critical data across the collaborative network can 
become an SPoF. It is essential that we identify vulnerabilities within SoS prior to their failing or 
exposure, to ensure that SPoF do not develop into critical failings or prevent SoS from meeting 
objectives.  
The use of redundant systems [164], fail-safes [165], and back up equipment and software [166] is 
often used within SoS, in an attempt to strengthen networked systems and eliminate or lesson the 
impacts of SPoF. Considerable research and development has been conducted in the area of software-
based fault handling and error detection [167] [168] [169] in order to protect and extend the 
robustness of systems. Problems associated with software based methods include scalability, and that 
methods generally focus upon the application of a single technique, vulnerability or network type. The 
following researched solutions all attempt to eliminate the impacts of SPoF, and protect and improve 
the robustness of the networked systems, a summary of the methods is provided in Table 3.9: 
Ageneau et al. [164] examine the trade-off between application tolerated loss rate and network 
overhead introduced by network coding redundancy in wireless mesh networks. Ageneau et al. 
propose a deployable distributed redundancy algorithm for wireless meshes, in an endeavour to assure 
minimum decoding ration at destination, which maintains a low overhead.  
Goswami et al. [165] presents a centralised framework to monitor different hardware and software 
statistics in multiprocessor system-on-a-chip, for fail-safes in advanced driver assistance systems. The 
solution identifies multiprocessor system-on-chip application behaviour and hidden overheads during 
run time, and monitors error counts, buffer statistics, processing latencies, bandwidth, CPU load, and 
low power time collection. 
Savas et al. [166] focus on the issues that can arise due to disasters, and propose a Backup 
Reprovisioning with Partial Protection framework. This method adapts protection paths by exploiting 
the degraded-service tolerance of connections, in order to manage systems during large disasters.  
FlipSpehere developed by Fiala et al. [167], is a software based silent detection corruption solution 
and correction library. The method utilises hashing, erasure codes, and hardware acceleration, striving 
to increase application resilience for high performance computing applications. Implementing on-
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demand page integrity verification combined with a software-based error correcting code, allowing 
for automated error recovery. 
Focusing on the risk of high energy particles traversing through a digital circuit, this can cause 
permanent damage to semiconductor structures or cause issues with transient voltage pulse, leading to 
soft errors within avionics.  Aydos and Fey [168] propose an error detection solution for field-
programmable gate arrays, evaluating partially-based error detection against software-based retry.  
Borchert et al. [169] apply an aspect-oriented programing solution to facilitate application-specific 
tailoring of dependable measures. The generic software-based fault-tolerance framework, reduces the 
runtime overhead and code size, and recovers software-based memory errors in object-oriented 
program data structures, that are used concurrently by multiple threads of control. The solution 
exploits application knowledge about memory access, analysed at compile time and hardened by 
compiler-generated runtime checks. 
In the work of Ulbrich et al. [170], the authors focus on eliminating SPoF within safety-critical 
systems at the application level and propose a software based redundancy approach named CoRed. In 
this solution a combination of Triple Modula Redundancy, data encoding and control flow encoding 
techniques are used in conjunction, to assist with eliminating input and output vulnerabilities and to 
ensure data integrity in real-time. The solution was initially applied to an I4Copter as it was an 
appropriate example of a mixed-criticality multi-application real-time system. Fault detection and 
fault tolerance errors were introduced to test against, due to soft-errors being rare under the system’s 
normal operating conditions.  
Ulbrich et al. [170] assume that the acquired results are representative for other real world 
applications, nonetheless with the method not being applied to any alternative structures its 
appropriateness for other real world devices and systems are unproven. The outlined technique 
increases overhead when compared to similar techniques, which the authors consider tolerable due to 
its functionality in eliminating silent data corruptions and SPoF. 
To prevent shut off and deletion of virtual machines and host issues within OpenStack caused by 
SPoF, a method utilising ceilometer and Senlin is proposed by Wang and Li [171] to achieve fast 
restoration and reduce complete virtual machine failure. The method relies upon specific restoration 
data being passed between Nova and ceilometer, which passes the time critical information across to 
Senlin, which relies upon a HAPolicy. However, this solution itself could be a source of SPoF as it is 
reliant upon the cluster being bound with HAPolicy, and time critical data transferring between 
multiple elements. 
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Table 3.9. Eliminating SPoF and Improving Network Robustness Methods Summary 





algorithm for wireless mesh 
networks to assure 
minimum decoding ration at 
destination, and maintain 
low overhead. 
 Process is more efficient than 
static, average, and CodeMP-like 
schemes.  
 Requires evaluation against 
differing topology types and under 





Assistance systems runtime 
application to monitor 
application statistics in 
multi-processor system-on-
a-chip fail safe systems. 
 Identifies multiprocessor system-
on-chip application behaviour and 
hidden overheads during run time.  
 Powerful tool that can be run from 
small inconspicuous devices. 
 Requires evaluation against 
differing topology types and under 




protection paths by 
exploiting degraded-service 
tolerance of connections, to 
manage large disasters. 
 Increase system flexibility by 
incorporating degraded service in 
backup provisioning. 
 Can provision and restore 
connections with extra capacity by 
degrading backup paths, and better 
utilising network resources. 
 Requires evaluation against 
differing topology types, and under 
different network conditions and 
disaster levels. 
Fiala et al. 
[167]. 
Software based silent 
detection corruption 
solution and correction 
library, for high 
performance computing 
applications, to increase 
application resilience. 
 Provides protection for kernels. 
 Does not require algorithmic 
changes. 
 90% error detection and 
correction. 
 40% runtime overhead for the 
majority of applications analysed. 
 Fails to protect OS heap, Block 
Started by Symbol, and data 
sections. 
 Does not protect the stack or code 
in the implementation, despite 
being applied to process sections. 
Aydos and 
Fey [168]. 
Error detection solution for 
field-programmable gate 
arrays, evaluating partially-
based error detection 
against software-based retry 
 Solutions error detection uses 29% 
to 36% less overhead than the 
comparable local triple modular 
redundancy.  
 Focuses on single event upset that 
occurs inside the flip-flop, does not 
consider shared nets that can cause 
multiple bitflips. 
 If single event upset occurs during 
a clock cycle, the error is 
unobservable till the next clock 
cycle of subsequent cycles. 





error recovery solution, 
which exploits application 
knowledge about memory 
access, analysis of errors 
occurs at compile time and 
hardened by complier-
generated checks. 
 Not reliant upon power flow 
computations. 
 Increases platform robustness. 
 Identifies critical edges and nodes, 
and forms a topological point of 
view. 
 Only object oriented software is 
addressed. 
 Solution can only be implemented 
on OS implemented in C++. 
 In some instances the fault 
resilience gains were minimal, and 
the increased attack surface 
increased the fault susceptibility. 
Ulbrich et 
al. [170]. 
Eliminate SPoF within 
safety-critical systems at the 
application level. 
 Considers input data acquisition, 
output data distribution, and can 
extend the fault detection solution 
to the communication. 
 Enables selective and application 
specific soft error tolerance, 
combining the encoding of data 
and redundant execution. 
 Assumes that results are 
representative for other real world 
applications. Requires evaluation 
against differing topology types 
and network conditions. 
 Increase overhead when compared 
to similar techniques. 
Wang and 
Li [171]. 
Prevent shut off and 
deletion of virtual machines 
and host issues caused by 
SPoF. 
 Recovery includes virtual machine 
restart, creation, and migration to 
other available hosts. 
 Reliant on HAPolicy and time 
critical data being transferred 
between elements, potential SPoF. 
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Rapid development within ICT and the low cost of wireless technology, means small to large sensor 
networks can be established using little infrastructure to collect data from a variety of environments. 
In WSN environments tree routing algorithms for example can cause significant SPoF. The following 
researched solutions propose new algorithms to overcome the limitations of existing applied methods, 
a summary of the methods is provided in Table 3.10: 
The proposed algorithm named Relieving SPOF Tree Routing (R-SPOFTR) proposed by Lin et al. 
[172], reduces the average hop count and shortens end-to-end delay, while increasing throughput and 
the lifetime of the WSN in comparison to other approaches such as Tree Routing protocol and 
Shortcut Tree Routing protocol.  
Other approaches include T-ROME [173], which is a cross-layer routing protocol for wireless sensor 
nodes utilising wake-up receivers, in an attempt to increase energy consumption and latency. Taking 
advantage of different transmission ranges of wake-up and main radios, the protocol skips nodes 
during data transfer in order to save energy. Using a set of specific parameters to optimise the relaying 
process, the method ensures that the most appropriate stopover nodes are chosen in case sink nodes 
are more than a single communication hop away. 
EFMMRP [174] which is an efficient fuzzy based multi-constraint multicast routing protocol for use 
within wireless mobile ad-hoc networks, focuses on resolving uncertainty issues, allowing for 
multicast routes to be selected based on minimum fuzzy cost value increasing the network 
performance. Fuzzy cost is established via the conversion of quality of service, performance 
constraints in terms of end-to-end delay, channel bandwidth, and energy. 
Pham et al. [175] propose Geographical awareness Zone Routing Protocol (GeoZRP) to mitigate 
routing overhead and end-to-end delay within Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANET). This is achieved 
by introducing a geographical awareness approach into the principles of the Zone Routing Protocol 
(ZRP), to limit the discovered route area.  
The proposed Topology Sense and Graph-based protocol proposed by Rahem et al. [176], is designed 
to be applied within wireless ad-hoc networks and is dependent upon Triangular Matrix Table and 
Spanning Tree algorithm. The protocol is designed to reduce the topology information in the memory, 
reduce control overhead by only updating routing if topology changes and ensure that every node gets 
the update message, and to reduce discovery time for backup routes. 
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Table 3.10. Algorithms that Overcome the Limitations of Existing Methods Summary 
Method Basic Concept Pros Cons 
Lin et al. 
[172]. 
Reduces average hop 
count, shortening end-to-
end delay, and increases 
throughput, this prolongs 
the network lifetime and 
reduces SPoF. 
 Reduces average hop count by 
26%, end-to-end delay by 25%, 
and increases throughput by 
42%, relieving congestion. 
 Network life is extended by over 
20%.  
 Requires evaluation against 
physical topology types and 
under different network 




layer routing protocol for 
wireless sensor nodes, 
increasing energy 
consumption and latency. 
 When sending several packets T-
Rome performs better than its 
comparable protocols. 
 Requires further analysis in 
regards to false discovery 
rates. 
 Does not consider 
opportunistic routing 
approaches and route 





issues in order to conserve 
network resources. 
 Reduces packet delivery delay.  Requires evaluation against 
physical topology types and 
using different parameters, 
different network conditions, 
and sizes. 
Pham et al. 
[175]. 
Improve Zone Routing 
Protocol by introducing 
geographic routing, to 
limit the discovery area, 
and improve routing 
overhead and end-to-end 
delay. 
 Improves overhead and end-to-
end delay. 
 Only marginally decreases 
packet delivery ratio. 
 Does not consider the impact 
of location errors in regards to 
the performance of the 
approach. 
Rahem et al. 
[176]. 
Propose an efficient 
routing protocol using 
Graph theory. 
 Increased performance compared 
to conventional routing 
protocols. Improved throughput 
delay time, packet loss, and 
overhead.  
 Reduced bandwidth. 
 Poor scalability. Maximum 
number of nodes is 255, due to 
the limitations of using 
adjacency matrix. 
 
3.2.4 Prevention and Detection of Cascading Failures 
The impact that cascade failures can have upon the reliability and functionality of SoS is of great 
concern. Critical systems are heavily relied upon by both society and other networks that are also 
deemed as critical infrastructures. Should issues propagate within a single networked system which 
quickly cascades to other collaborative networked systems, then the SoS could fail in its entirety, 
resulting in both direct and indirect fallings, along with short devastating and long lasting critical 
consequences. 
Cascading failures can be difficult to predict due to the dynamic nature, diversity of systems, and the 
size of the large integrated networks which form SoS, in addition generally as size increases so does 
system complexity. Research has been undertaken to identify cascade failures which are directly 
attributed to the complexity of networked systems and tightly coupled links for example, in order to 
mitigate risks associated with cascading failures and strengthen the security and robustness of cyber 
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infrastructures. The following researched solutions all endeavour to increase system reliability and 
mitigate potential cascade failures, a summary of the methods is provided in Table 3.11: 
Cadini et al. [177] propose a modelling and simulation framework, in order to quantify the reliability 
and availability of power transmission grid indexes, including depicting cascade failure dynamics 
initiated by weather events. Combing stochastic models to define uncertain weather conditions, a 
cascading failure model based on DC approximation of the power flows and a proportional re-
dispatch strategy, and an evaluation method utilising a customised sequential time Monte Carlo 
simulation scheme. The method achieves a flexible restoration model, which allows for uncertainties 
regarding repair process to be captured. 
Probabilistic cascade failure models attempt to determine cascade failures and predict potential 
damage; Zhang et al. [178] consider mean field theory and apply equal load redistribution law to 
determine cascade failures.   
A link cascade model proposed by Feng et al. [179] incorporates strong nodes via an optimisation 
process, which utilises an annealing algorithm to improve network robustness. While methods often 
improve the overall robustness of networks, in general they are inadequate and struggle to prevent 
cascade failures in their entirety from occurring. 
It is difficult to analyse and predict how emergent behaviour within independently managed networks 
will develop and propagate across the collaborative systems. Also it can be challenging to identify 
components which are relied upon or are so vital to the collaborative relationship, that should that 
component fail or data transfer between the component and other systems be interrupted or prevented, 
then the effects will ripple across the entire SoS, directly causing mass failings to the point that the 
SoS will fail to meet its objectives, or potentially could result in critical consequences. 
Applying an extended version of a classic betweenness method, it is possible to determine the load of 
an edge considering node and edge weight. Wang et al. [180] propose a cascading model which 
incorporates four unique metrics which quantify the robustness of the network against potential 
cascade failures. The model can be broadly applied to differing network types as the method’s 
principles focus on the cascading dynamics brought on by the removal of edges with the highest 
weight, its application was applied to a simple network which consisted of four sub-networks. 
Over recent years considerable research has been undertaken to quantify the load on nodes and edges, 
as this issue has been identified as a significant problem associated with cascade failure. Brummitt et 
al. [181] integrate a mathematical framework for multitype networks with models of sandpiles on 
isolated networks, in an endeavour to generate a multitype branching process approximation, capable 
of identifying cascades of load between simple networks and between power grids. 
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Table 3.11. Cascading Failure Methods Summary 
Method Basic Concept Pros Cons 
Cadini et 
al. [177]. 
Quantify the reliability and 
availability of power 
transmission grid indexes, 
and represent cascade 
failure dynamics. 
 Determines grid reliability and 
availability levels compared to 
regulatory constraints. 
 Supports decision making in 
regards to grid improvements and 
different maintenance and 
restoration strategies, by 
comparing rankings of alterative 
options.  
 Only grid line failures are 
considered. 
 Large processing times. 
Zhang et 
al. [178]. 
Examine the impact of 
initial load and tolerance 
parameter distribution on 
cascade failure, using mean 
field theory. 
 Determines Weibull distribution is 
superior to other distribution types, 
and allows for the network to 
sustain larger attack size and initial 
load and tolerance parameter. 
 Assumes load distribution is 
fixed, requires evaluation 
against physical topology types 
and using different parameters. 
Feng et 
al. [179]. 
Develop a link cascade 
model for complex 
networks. 
 Determines that a small fraction  of 
lost links can cause the 
disappearance of a large number of 
links, thus link cascades can be 
stopped by integrating strong 
nodes within the topology that are 
less susceptible to link removal. 




Quantify initial edge load, 
considering node weight 
and edges, and model and 
quantify network robustness 
against cascading failures. 
 Step by step analysis of cascading 
propagation. 
 Investigates the parameter of the 
node weight on the network’s 
robustness against cascading 
failure. 
 Only evaluates solution against 
four sub-networks, requires 
analysis against different 
topologies and network sizes. 
Brummitt 
et al.  
[181]. 
Use multitype branching 
process approximation and 
simulations to determine 
how interdependence 
affects cascades of load. 
 Corroborates through analysis that 
some independence is beneficial to 
networks, and every 
interconnection can significantly 
amplify cascades. 
 Solution can facilitate better 
prediction of cascading processes 
on modular random graphs and for 
multiple networks. 
 Does not integrate economic 
and physical consideration of 
electrical grid with costs of 
building connections, meaning 
other methods are more 
detailed as they combine results 
and provide more realistic 
estimates of optimal 
interconnectivity levels. 
Cai et al.  
[182]. 
Model interactions between 
power systems and 
dispatching data networks, 
to increase security, 
reliability, and to gain a 
deeper understanding of 
complexity. 
 Considers topological and partial 
transmission characteristics.  
 Determines the double star 
topology is better than mesh for 
power grids. 
 Only replicates intentional 
attacks on power grids, does 
not consider other risk factors 
that expose systems and can 
cause cascade failures. 
Xue et al. 
[183]. 
Identify interrelation 
between network structure 
and operational states 
during cascading failure. 
 Identifies dangerous cascading 
paths within the topology prior to 
failure, and cascading failures 
established via those 
vulnerabilities can be assessed by 
monitoring the loading level of the 
cascading paths. 
 To be effective solution needs 
to consider improved metrics 
and better algorithms to assist 
with detecting critical cascade 
paths more efficiently. 
 Does not analyse interrelation 
of structure and operational 
states. 
Zhu et al. 
[184]. 
Investigate cascading 
failure and identify attack 
strategies that select target 
nodes. 
 Despite analysing cascading 
failures from the attack 
perspective, results can be used to 
research defence strategies. 
 Fails to accurately define 
relationships between groups of 
nodes.  
 Needs to evaluate on larger 
networked systems, and 
consider more than two-node 
combinations. 




Cascading failure is one of the most critical issues that impacts power systems. Research has been 
conducted into modelling the interactions between power systems and dispatching data networks 
based on dynamic power flow models. To achieve this Cai et al. [182] propose an approximation to 
detail the interdependence based on the dynamic power flow model, as they believe that model 
interactions is the ideal means to improve security, reliability, and understand the complexity of the 
entire infrastructure.  
Xue et al. [183] propose a framework to examine cascading failure in an attempt to differentiate and 
assess relationships between structure and operational states, and define two metrics to indicate the 
cascading tendency and triggering force in the infrastructure, which can be used to quantitatively 
assess cascading risk. 
Zhu et al. [184] focus upon identifying cascading failures within power grids. They propose a new 
metric called risk graph, a new search based node attack strategy called reduced search space node 
attack strategy, and a practical node attack strategy called risk graph-based node attack strategy. The 
methodology aims to reduce complexity when conducting extensive search node attack strategies and 
allows them to analyse large networks and define hidden relationships between nodes in the network 
that have the potential to cause cascading failure. Focusing upon identifying cascading failures which 
are a direct result of attacks, the technique fails to accurately define relationships between groups of 
nodes. The schema at time of publication had not been widely implemented on large extended 
networks; therefore it was difficult to determine its effectiveness as a solution. 
While these models assist on providing vital information on the system’s vulnerability in regards to 
cascading failure, and can provide assistance in identifying cascade-safe areas, further development is 
essential as these models require further analysis to evaluate cascade-safe operating margins.  
 
3.2.5 Detecting Interdependence 
The broad adoption and integration of ICT due to its advances and numerous benefits, introduced a 
large variety of cyber interdependencies and vulnerabilities as new collaborative relations were 
fashioned and as organisations merged their networks forming SoS. As a result, considerable research 
has been undertaken in order to identify and visualise the dependent links and relationships which 
form within large collaborative networks due to their integration, which we discuss below, with a 
summary of the methods provided in Table 3.12: 
Sanchez et al. [13] having reviewed and compared methods which model interdependent 
infrastructures including Agent-based modelling, Petri Networks, Co-simulation, and Complex 
Networks Theory, focused their work on Complex Networks Theory. This theory allows large 
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systems with complex topologies and hidden interdependences to be analysed. Utilising a topologic-
driven approach to model complex collaborative infrastructure interdependencies, and by proposing 
two new indices (Betweenness Centrality and Efficiency), the method identifies critical nodes and 
edges in large networked systems from a topological point of view. The proposed method aims at 
providing a platform for an increased understanding of the interactions between different systems 
components, and assists in identifying methods to reduce vulnerabilities associated with 
interdependency. However, the method has failed to be applied to networks which have been formed 
between more than two infrastructures, and no scalability evaluation has been undertaken. 
Society has become heavily reliant upon numerous infrastructures which are deemed critical for the 
welfare and security of its citizens. Many of these critical infrastructures such as power and water 
distribution struggle to effectively manage and identify interdependencies that develop within their 
integrated systems, nor do they have the ability to map and understand critical dependent links that 
form due to integration. When interdependencies exist between components within a collaborative 
relationship then disruption or failure can result in significant consequences.  
Many interdependency modelling approaches have been proposed, one such approach outlined by 
Heracleous [185] includes the use of open hybrid automata for generating models when systems are 
formed from a variety of diverse components.  The method examines identified cascade faults caused 
due to interdependent relationships, and has the functionality to determine under what circumstances 
the dependent components fault will ripple and cascade across to other systems. Heracleous applies 
this method to the Micropolis virtual city, and focuses on modelling interdependencies between three 
critical infrastructures as a case study, which are power, water, and communication systems. As cities 
become smart and with the number of connections and new relationships forming, other external 
factors within the wider environment must also be considered along with the new interdependencies 
between other infrastructures such as transportation, banking and finance, emergency services, oil and 
gas, and government services. Issues could also arise due to dependent relationships for example, with 
smart grids being reliant upon information. Smart meters for example connected via the internet have 
the potential to expose power systems and create new links and platforms for malicious attack, and 
therefore these types of connections and devices also require serious consideration. 
Complex Network Theory has also been extended in an attempt to model interdependencies. Zhu and 
Milanović [186] propose a three-dimensional weighted Complex Network Theory model, allowing for 
dependencies and interdependencies to be examined within cyber-physical systems. The framework 
also incorporates system characteristics, ensuring that diverse structures can be studied without 
modifying the topological model. By identifying critical and vulnerable components, it is possible to 
evaluate each physical or cyber node within its own system and other systems with which it shares 
links, and thus categorise weak areas. The methodology provides initial analysis of smart grids and 
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provides a starting point, allowing for further security, risk assessment, risk management, and defence 
methods to be further developed. 
Tøndel et al. [187] provide a comprehensive insight into interdependencies, both the methods used for 
identifying and analysing interdependencies within ICT systems, and categorising them as hazard 
identification, causal analysis, consequence analysis, topological analysis, and dynamic analysis 
methods. The review focuses on cascading and escalating interdependencies, interdependency types, 
and their impact on power system reliability. 
Table 3.12. Interdependency Methods Summary 







graphs to ascertain 
topological indices. 
 Using Complex network theory 
quantifies the importance of 
components in coupled 
infrastructures. 
 Proposed indices for undirected 
graphs assist to identify critical 
nodes and edges from a 
topological point of view. 
 Only evaluates interactions 
between two infrastructures. 
 Requires evaluation against 
larger differing SoS in order to 





between infrastructures, to 
examine the cascade 
effects between the 
systems. 
 Developed a hybrid automata 
model that can be utilised to 
study cascading failure within 
the Micropolis virtual city. 
 Method can assist to determine 
the conditions responsible for 
vulnerabilities in one 
component cascading to others. 
 Needs to consider wider 
environmental factors, along 
with new interdependencies 
between other infrastructures. 
 As infrastructures become 
more integrated, new 
dependencies and 
communication links will be 
established, and the solution 
needs to consider these new 







Complex Network Theory 
framework to model 
dependencies and 
interdependencies within 
cyber-physical systems, in 
order to identify the most 
vulnerable components. 
 Can evaluate different 
topologies without modifying 
the proposed model. 
 Is not a complete risk analysis 
method, and requires additional 
assessment to manage and 
deploy risk mitigation 
measures. 
Tøndel et al. 
[187]. 
Comprehensive insight 
into the methods for 
identifying and analysing 
interdependencies. 
 In-depth review of existing 
interdependency methods. 
 No proposed solution. 
Heracleous 
et al. [188]. 
Model infrastructure 
components based on 
identified dependencies, in 
an endeavour to generate 
large complex models that 
can be used for 
interdependency analysis.   
 Large generated complex 




 Does not integrate geographical 
and logical interdependencies. 
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Heracleous et al. [188] propose a modelling and simulation framework based on open hybrid 
automata, in an endeavour to analyse interdependencies within critical infrastructure systems. 
Modelling accurate infrastructure components and interlinking them based on their dependencies, 
which creates a complex model that incorporates interdependencies. 
 
3.2.6 Detecting Complexity 
The term complexity cannot simply be defined in regards to SoS, and depends on the researcher’s 
perspective and the circumstances of the analysis. To broadly categorise proposed solutions into two 
main types, research generally focuses on complexity which is associated with the physical topology 
of the network and the links between components, and complexity which is associated with the 
dynamic behaviour and operational functions of the network. The following researched solutions all 
endeavour to model complex networks, a summary of the methods is provided in Table 3.13: 
Mane et al. [189] motivated by the PageRank algorithm and Markov analysis, propose a methodology 
which measures the complexity of networks during initial development. By modelling development 
disruption propagation as a Markov chain, they define states as the constituent systems and transition 
probabilities as system interdependency characteristics. Via the application of their schema, the 
authors have the capability to distinguish between alternate networks, demonstrating its 
appropriateness to manage risks during design and development of interdependent systems. While the 
authors provide a method to aggregate interdependent features, they fail to identify how features will 
be quantified and provided no guidance. 
The work by Liu et al. [190] outlines a technique for generating attack graphs within complex 
networks. The proposed method first analyses and searches for key nodes, and examines the 
framework using loophole scanning, Then, via the amalgamation of forward and backward searching 
combined with the greedy policy generates an attack graph. This method uses Nessus to scan the 
network, hence, is limited by the tool’s functionality and failings. Scanning tools can be inaccurate 
due to their inability to identify vulnerabilities associated with remote services and network 
connectivity.  These elements are only identifiable via the examination of the host’s configuration. 
While the method claims to reduce complexity, the proposed technique could be considered simplistic 
and it is uncertain of its true effectiveness. The method perceives many paths as useless and simply 
ignores them, yet these paths could potentially expose the network and can’t simply be just ignored. It 
is unclear how accurate the algorithm is in regards to ignoring so called ‘false paths’. 
As the popularity of social networks continues to increase and these platforms grow in size, research 
has been conducted into processing these complex networks. Graph partitions have struggled to 
partition complex networks; Meyerhenke et al. [191] present an approach which aims to overcome the 
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limitations of graph clustering by parallelizing and adapting a label propagation technique, in an 
attempt to facilitate a trade-off between solution quantity and processing time. Their proposed 
framework effectively utilises hundreds of cores, but as the size and complexity of networks increases 
and as super computers currently use the processing power of millions of cores, the technique will 
need to incorporate other methods rather than rely upon the application of 1D partitioning. 
Ranking nodes and edges in complex network is a challenge that must be overcome to ensure that data 
and services can be sufficiently accessed via the internet for example. Liao et al. [192] provide a 
comprehensive examination of existing ranking algorithms performance, and any biases that affect 
their effectiveness. Their work explores static and time-aware algorithms, and highlights the impact of 
network evolution on static algorithms and the benefits of temporal dimension for predicting network 
traffic, future links, and significant nodes in complex networks. 
The work of Li et al. [193] analyses the state estimation problem for stochastic complex networks 
with switching topology, and proposes a recursive estimator developed by using the extended Kalman 
filter. 
Table 3.13. Complexity Methods Summary 
Method Basic Concept Pros Cons 
Mane et al. 
[189]. 
Measure the complexity of 
networks in the context of 
system development time. 
 Can distinguish between 
alternate networks, 
managing risks during 
design and development. 
 Do not clearly state how 
features will be quantified and 
provide no guidance. 
 Assumes that the solution can 
be applied to SoS. 
Liu et al. 
[190]. 
Reduce the complexity of 
attack graphs, by combining 
greedy policy, forward 
exploration, and backward 
searching, allowing the 
algorithm to be applied to 
complex networks. 
 Complexity of attack graph 
is reduced, allowing for 
complex network security 
and network attack analysis 
to be undertaken. 
 Simplistic method that assumes 
some attack paths are useless, 
thus ignores them. Therefore 
the accuracy of the algorithm is 
unclear in regards to positive 
and negative rates of these 
ignored paths. 
Meyerhenke 
et al. [191]. 
Develop scalable 
parallelisation of the size-
constrained label propagation 
algorithm and combined into 
a multilevel solution to enable 
the partition of large complex 
networks. 
 Can evaluate different 
topologies without 
modifying the proposed 
model. 
 Bottlenecks introduced by 
nodes with high degree, cannot 
be eliminated by the methods 
use of 1D partitioning of the 
adjacency matrix. 
 System cannot use more than 
1000 cores. 
Liao et al. 
[192]. 
Comprehensive insight into 
ranking methods in complex 
networks. 
 In depth review of existing 
ranking algorithms, both 
static and time-aware, 
including evaluating their 
applications to evolving 
complex networks.  
 No proposed solution. 
Li et al. 
[193]. 
Develop a recursive estimator 
for stochastic complex 
coupling networks with 
switching topology. 
 Stochastic analysis methods 
ensure there are adequate 
conditions to guarantee the 
boundedness of the 
estimation errors.  
 Highly theoretical, evaluated by 
a numerical study. 
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3.2.7 Detecting Emergent Behaviour 
The security of SoS which are operational and continually evolving is problematic, negative emergent 
behaviour evolvement can develop at any time after integration has occurred. Emergent Behaviour 
can also propagate and cause cascading failures to ripple across systems and entire infrastructures. 
When detecting emergent behaviour within SoS current solutions struggle due to the size and 
complexity of these infrastructures, and most methods fail to identify abnormal emergent behaviour 
and cascade failures. The following researched solutions all endeavour to detect and analyse emergent 
behaviour, a summary of the methods is provided in Table 3.14: 
The timing and consequences of emergent behaviour can be unpredictable and damaging, in an 
attempt to meet the associated challenges O’Toole et al. [194] present a novel distributed algorithm 
allowing for agents to collaboratively identify emergent events within complex adaptive systems. The 
decentralised emergence detection technique proposed relies on feedback that occurs as emergent 
behaviour appears from the component level to the system level. There are evident limitations with 
this technique and O’Toole et al. acknowledge that they need to extend this framework further by 
applying the method to a broader range of systems and devices, including differing sizes, and simulate 
a greater number of diverse types of emergence.  
Anomaly detection is also an abstraction of emergent behaviour monitoring. Research is being 
undertaken to link types of anomalies with known emerging behaviour, in order to gain a better 
understanding of the impacts and consequences of these anomalies. By improving the categorisation 
of the identified emergent behaviours, anomalies, and their consequences, it will advance anomaly 
detection techniques and increase SoS security. Zoppi et al. [195] consider these themes and define a 
monitoring and anomaly detection framework for SoS. The proposed framework will need to be 
expanded further to ensure that as systems are phased in and out, the anomaly detection system can 
adapt. 
Khan and Wang [196] examine emergent behaviours in multi-agent systems, which are restricted due 
to limitations caused by communications and environmental factors. The authors summarise formal 
specification as it supports system validation and can be utilised within multi-agent systems to 
describe and implement the manifestation of emergence and temporal logic, allowing the solution to 
establish properties for formal verification and capture current and future behaviour of a system. The 
solution presented is a principal method which will be further enhanced to capture collective motion 
in multi-agent systems.  
The work by Shi et al. [197] considers emergent behaviour including swarming, clustering, and 
consensus, and surveys collaborative and non-collaborative node interactions by means of consensus 
dynamics. They extend existing research by exploring a relative-state-flipping model for consensus 
dynamics over signed random networks. 
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Singh et al. [198] propose a framework for analysing and simulating emergent behaviours in multi-
agent systems, and classify identified emergent behaviour into different types based on Fromm’s 
taxonomy, in an endeavour to eventually facilitate the governing of negative emergent behaviour. 
Table 3.14. Emergent Behaviour Methods Summary 




Develop a distributed 
algorithm for agents 
within complex 
adaptive systems to 
collaboratively detect 
emergent events. 
 Identified requirements 
necessary for emergence 
detection, and developed a 
DETect algorithm. This 
algorithm allows distributed 
agents to collaboratively detect 
emergent events. 
 Relies on feedback that occurs as 
emergent behaviour appears from the 
component level to the system level 
Assumes that the solution can be 
applied to SoS. 
 Requires evaluation against differing 
topology types and systems, and 
differing types of emergence. 
Zoppi et 
al. [195]. 
Developed a set of 
guidelines to assist 
when designing SoS. 
 In-depth review of issues that 
impact the design of 
monitoring and anomaly 
detection frameworks for SoS. 
 Established a set of ‘best 
practices’ as guidelines to be 
utilised when designing SoS. 
 Does not evaluate or understand which 
anomalies in general are generated by 
emergent behaviour, or their 
consequences. 
 Does not consider system evolvement, 
and needs to establish how anomaly 
detection will be maintained as 







agent systems, restricted 
due to communication 
and environmental 
constraints. 
 Formalised the multi-agent 
model and provided a platform 
to facilitate accessibility and 
understanding of emergence. 
 Reduces complexity and eased 
system validation.  
 Does not fully ascertain collective 
motion in multi-agent systems.  
Shi et al. 
[197]. 
Study asymptotic 
dynamical patterns that 
emerge among nodes 
interacting in a 
dynamically evolving 
signed random network. 
 Investigates a relative-state-
flipping framework for 
consensus dynamics in signed 
random networks.  




Provide a structured 
approach for analysing 
and simulating 
emergent behaviour in 
multi-agent systems. 
 Classifies emergent behaviour.   Needs to consider a larger number of 
different types of emergent behaviour. 
 Requires further development, solution 
limited and does not automate mapping 
from finite state machine to simulation 
objects. 
 
3.3 Risk Management and Assessment 
Risk is unavoidable; organisations will always have to contend with risk, therefore it is vital that 
security managers understand their networked systems and establish a risk tolerance level. To manage 
risk effectively and limit its consequences, vulnerabilities must first be identified and risks which have 
the potential to be exploited must be managed, reduced or eliminated. Failing to identify and manage 
systems which pose risks to collaborative infrastructures, means it is highly difficult to accurately 
assess and measure the security of the SoS, and it becomes problematic to ascertain the methods that 
should be implemented to assure secure and robust systems.  
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Differing from risk analysis, risk management and assessment is about having identified 
vulnerabilities within a networked system, how those risks are effectively managed and assessed in 
order to mitigate the risks that they pose in order to increase the overall security of the infrastructure. 
The following researched solutions all endeavour to analyse and manage identified vulnerabilities and 
risks, a summary of the methods is provided in Table 3.15:  
If vulnerabilities are identified, a common practice to eliminate them is via the use of patch 
management, summarised in Section 3.1.4. Kim et al. [153] propose a patch management solution that 
engages with vulnerability patch sites to verify vulnerability patch integrity, supporting increased 
security, patch collection capability, and reinforced patch verification.  
Other methods include the use of vulnerability containment, in order to limit its effects on the 
integrated systems. Ahmad et al [199] propose a countermeasure framework to protect networks 
against fast scanning network worms. The method combined a network layer detection system and a 
containment system at the data-link layer, which is capable of identifying and containing worm 
infections with minimal false positives.  
Risk containment is a technique which is often overlooked by security managers, and in some 
instances this solution can be the cheapest and most effective approach to initiate and manage, in 
comparison to other risk management solutions. Alternatively, reducing the attack surface of the SoS 
will assist in managing risk further, which can be achieved by removing and blocking unnecessary 
communication links and disabling unused ports etc., prior to their compromise. 
Organisations globally have been forced to develop various risk methodology standards and practices 
in an attempt to manage risk. These proposed methods are typically comparable in nature, and utilise 
similar techniques and sequences to both identify and manage risks. Organisations that have 
developed risk methodologies include the British Standards Institute (BSI), Computer Emergency 
Readiness Team (CERT), the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security 
(ENISA), International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), and the US National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST). In Section 2.4.1, we critically reviewed several risk management 
and assessment methods. These methodologies require heavy adaptation for them to be applied 
against specific SoS, as the principles defined are too broad and non-specific. Our research determines 
that there is no unique documented risk methodology that can be intuitively applied to any SoS that is 
currently fully developed and operational without adaptation. 
Conducting risk assessment on SoS is highly problematic, great consideration must be undertaken 
when applying assessment methods directly to systems which are deemed critical, especially if 
assessment methods have the capacity to impact the collaborative systems’ components or affect their 
ability to meet objectives. In these instances theoretical assessment methodologies are suitable 
alternatives for conducting risk assessment, and can be the only viable option in some instances. 
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Ordinarily, theoretical network risk assessments are conducted via questionnaires, and rely upon the 
expert knowledge and experience of the infrastructure’s security managers. Accurate assessment 
using this technique is not guaranteed or precise, as it is reliant upon the experts’ knowledge, 
experience, and ability to be unbiased. To be successful and increase the accuracy of the method 
multiple experts representing multiple fields of expertise on the systems, including for example 
security managers, engineers, health and safety officers, operations, and maintenance, etc., are 
required as part of the analysis process. Offline assessment often does not reflect the security of the 
entire SoS, nor does it typically deliver a complete view of the collaborative infrastructure. This 
method commonly fails to identify communication links with third party systems and applications, 
sub-systems, and vital components. 
Offline assessment is outside the scope of our current research, but it must be noted that there are 
instances where security managers are forced to use this method due to the assessment processes 
posing too big a risk, making offline analysis the only viable solution to provide realistic assessment 
results. As well as considering the direct impact a risk assessment might pose to a network, we also 
must consider the cost of implementing assessment methods versus any benefit. 
When conducting risk assessment it is generally an automated process that utilises software 
applications, however, to assure network security and identify all risks, the physical components and 
systems, security controls, documentation, including application, host, and network configuration files 
will also need to be analysed [12]. 
The Cyber Security Evaluation Tool (CSET) [200] developed by the US Department of Homeland 
Security’s Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT), is a free 
software tool to assist security managers in assessing their industrial control systems and ICT 
networks and practices. CSET is an offline assessment method reliant on security managers selecting 
one or more cybersecurity standards, which generates questions based on those requirements. Once 
detailed questions have been completed, a series of reports are generated identifying the strengths and 
weaknesses of the infrastructure. Again this method relies upon the expertise of security managers and 
their understanding of risk and their systems, in addition to their ability to make strong unbiased 
assessments.  Figure 3.1 visualises the assessment process of CSET. 
Yao et al. [201] analyse topological vulnerabilities of advanced metering infrastructures, with a 
special interest in risks which could be utilised by malicious attackers to steal electricity by directly 
targeting smart meters. They propose a risk assessment protocol to identify nodes which are 
vulnerable to modification and exploitation, utilising known information regarding the network and 
further data which is obtained via existing monitoring solutions. Hence, the method is limited by the 
functionality and failings of the monitoring tools used to gather accurate network data. 


















Figure 3.1. Cyber Security Evaluation Tool Assessment Process 
Source: Schematic representation of Cyber Security Evaluation Tool Assessment Process, US Department of Homeland Security [200].  
The paper by Tanimoto et al. [202] outlines the challenges of assessing and securing MANET, 
particularly when these networks are formed using personal mobile and smart phone devices. 
Tanimoto et al. look at the risks which directly expose the personal data on the device to ensure that 
the MANET is secure in regards to the personal user. This work identified and analysed nineteen risk 
factors, and the solutions to assist in securing the devices, and future work will examine how to 
quantitatively assess countermeasures. 
Loutchkina et al. [203] outline a System Integration Technical Risk Assessment Model (SITRAM), 
based upon Bayesian belief networks combined with parametric models. The method was designed to 
be used during the initial development stages, as research showed limitations for models which 
examined systems integration technical risks. While system integration provides significant 
challenges, using hierarchical holographic modelling it was possible for initial factors associated with 
risk integration to be identified; furthermore it was possible to identify relations between risk factors 
and risk factor taxonomy. Using the hybrid of Bayesian belief networks and parametric models to 
represent relations between risk contributing factors and provide input data, a suitable modelling tool 
was presented along with corresponding software support tools. 
The paper by Guzman et al. [204] critically examines Artificial Intelligence algorithms for risk 
assessment related to safety critical infrastructures. Algorithms were generally categorised into three 
classifications which were Expert Systems, Artificial Neural Networks, and Hybrid Intelligent 
Systems, and the authors conducted a comparative analysis of techniques which included Fuzzy-
Expert System, Neural Networks, and Adaptive Neuro Fuzzy Inference System. 
Cheng et al. [205] provide a comprehensive insight into quantitative risk assessment, and adopt a 
region based method to assist in quantifying the probability of a target being directly attacked.  A 
clustering method is then applied to generate a region graph, which they consider is superior to the 
belief propagation method.  
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Table 3.15. Risk Management and Assessment Methods Summary 
Method Basic Concept Pros Cons 





effectiveness of patch 
management, and mitigate 
risks. 
 Mitigates risk and eliminates 
vulnerabilities. 
 Difficult to predict how 
applying patches will 
impact integrated systems, 
and fails to consider the 
introduction of risk factors, 
i.e. could patches introduce 
emergent behaviour or 
cascading failures. 
Ahmad et al 
[199]. 
Countermeasure solution, 
which has the capability 
to detect and contain 
identified worm 
infections. 
 Detects and contains identified worm 
infections. 
 Requires evaluation 
against differing 
infrastructures, background 
traffic, and other types of 
vulnerabilities. 
 Further investigation 







Systematic and repeatable 
set of principles for 
evaluating industrial 
control systems and 
cyber-network security 
practices. 
 Offline assessment method that will not be 
applied directly to the infrastructure, 
therefore will not introduce vulnerabilities 
or impact system performance.  
 Assess systems based on step by step 
questions regarding the infrastructure 
based on industry standards, and presents 
detailed charts showing strengths and 
weaknesses, along with a prioritised list of 
recommendations to increase security. 
 Reliant on the knowledge, 
expertise, and 
understanding of risk by 
security management, 
along with their ability to 
make strong unbiased 
assessments.  
Yao et al. 
[201]. 
Risk assessment protocol 
to identify communication 
networks infrastructure 
targets within advanced 
metering infrastructures. 
 Compatible with existing system 
monitoring technologies. 
 Identifies vulnerable infrastructure targets 
that could be exploited to steal electricity. 
 Limited by the 
functionality and failings 
of the monitoring tools 




Assess mobile ad-hoc 
network risks and propose 
countermeasures, in order 
to establish a mobile ad-
hoc network that is secure 
from an individual user’s 
standpoint. 
 Identified nineteen risk factors and 
proposed countermeasures.  
 Does not quantitatively 
evaluate countermeasures. 
Loutchkina 
et al. [203]. 
Provide a modelling 
framework and support 
software for system 
integration risk 
assessment. 
 Parametric models deliver project-specific 
data to Bayesian belief network models. 
 Interfaces between parametric and 
Bayesian belief network models, ensures 
model integration into the risks 
management processes is simplified. 
 Requires model validation 
and sensitivity assessment. 
Guzman et 
al. [204]. 
Investigate and compare 
artificial intelligence 
algorithms for risk 
assessment. 
 In-depth review of existing artificial 
intelligence methods that improve the 
accuracy of risks assessment of 
infrastructures deemed critical. 
 Performs a comparative analysis of three 
distinct techniques, which are Fuzzy-
Expert System, Neural Networks, and 
Adaptive Neuro Fuzzy Inference System. 
 No proposed solution. 
Cheng et al. 
[205] 
Implementation of a 
region based method to 
estimate the likelihood of 
a target being 
compromised. 
 Methods performance of region based 
approximation is more effective than the 
belief propagation methods. 
 Fails to evaluate the 
algorithm properties and 
its run time application. 
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3.4 Risk Modelling 
3.4.1 Network Modelling 
Due to the sheer complexity of these large heterogeneous SoS and because of society’s dependence 
upon the infrastructure, a wide majority of research is purely theoretical. This is because academics 
and industry practitioners do not have the required resources available to them, to test and implement 
their procedures, as recognised by the US army which developed a Laboratory Based Risk Reduction 
method [4], in an attempt to strengthen the development and deployment process summarised in 
Section 3.2.2. The following researched solutions all endeavour to model networks and their 
associated risks, a summary of the methods is provided in Table 3.16: 
To defend critical systems Wang et al. [206] propose an attack graph-based probabilistic metric for 
measuring network security, in an attempt to prevent sophisticated malicious attacks that combine 
multiple vulnerabilities to reach a specific target state. The method relies upon the assumption that 
individual scores based on expert knowledge in regards to exploits is accurate, and despite other 
probabilities existing only consider a fixed probability for measuring vulnerabilities. Reliance upon 
the human element to assign scores means the method potentially could be highly inefficient and 
inaccurate, as scores will be influenced by the skill level and training of the individual assigning the 
score, along with their pre-conceived perception in regards to risk. The authors base scores on the 
level of difficulty for a vulnerability to be exploited; failing to consider the level and skill of the 
attacker or how much finance and resources the attacker has access to. Yet, we must admit that these 
elements are difficult to predict and identify, but are valid points to raise and be aware of. 
Feng and Jin-Shu [207] propose a flexible approach using attack graphs to measure the security of the 
critical resources within the monitored network. A backward iterative algorithm is presented to solve 
the issues associated with cyclic attack paths within attack graphs. The proposed method does not 
require a complete input probabilities dataset. While the method is effective at measuring security, the 
greater the source input the more precise the result of measure. The accuracy of the method is not 
fully identified when results are generated on scarce input data, and the technique seems to have not 
been compared to other similar solutions to ascertain its true effectiveness. 
A comprehensive insight is provided by Kecskemeti et al. [208] into modelling and simulation 
challenges faced when attempting to design and deploy IoT systems.  Kecskemeti et al. identify that 
99% of IoT data is either not collected or not analysed, and as IoT popularity and integration increases 
so will the size of these data sets and complex heterogeneous networks. Data sources that are not 
being used for their full potential and sources that are used in real-time control and anomaly detection 
are failing to be adequately utilised and analysed, therefore can leave systems vulnerable.   
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The work by Sarigiannidis et al. [209] provides an insight into multiplicative networks specifically 
focusing on their use in applications for modelling networked systems, in order to defend IoT systems 
against various security issues. The paper introduces key performance metrics, and presents a security 
threat model capable of estimating data losses within IoT systems, and quantifies the intensity of 
attacks in the application domain. 
Milanović and Zhu [210] critically examine multiple Complex Network Theory based methodologies 
which have been developed to model and analyse interconnected networks. The authors present a 
three-dimensional holistic model based on Complex Network Theory, in an attempt to analyse 
interdependencies and interactions of the integrated systems. 
Table 3.16. Network Modelling Methods Summary 
Method Basic Concept Pros Cons 
Wang et al. 
[206]. 
Attack graph-based 
probabilistic metric to 
understand and measure 
the likelihood of 
vulnerabilities being 
combined to reach a 
goal state. 
 Metric for measuring security to 
prevent sophisticated attacks 
combining multiple vulnerabilities. 
 Reliant on security managers to 
assign scores, therefore influenced 
by their expertise, understanding 
of risk, and their ability to make 
strong unbiased assessments. 
 Does not consider the attacker’s 
level, skill, and financial resources. 
 Not capable of measuring the 




based approach to 
measure the security of 
the critical resources 
within the monitored 
network. 
 Does not require a complete input 
probabilities dataset. 
 Backward iterative algorithm to 
overcome issues associated with 
cyclic attack paths in attack graphs. 
 Requires evaluation against 
differing techniques. 
 Further evaluation required to 
determine the accuracy of the 
method when results are generated 
using scarce input data. 
Kecskemeti et 
al. [208]. 
Review of modelling 
and simulation 
challenges that impede 
the design and 
development IoT.  
 In-depth review of existing 
modelling and simulation challenges 
within the field of IoT. 
 No proposed solution. 
Sarigiannidis et 
al. [209]. 




 Adopts G-network concept as it 
allows for negative arrivals to be 
considered when modelling security 
attacks. 
 Identifies operation characteristics of 
the principal IoT systems under both 
light and heavy attack. 
 Requires evaluation against other 
types of attack and infrastructure. 




Based on complex 
network theory, a three-
dimensional model to 
study interdependencies 
and interaction of 
interconnected systems 
is developed. 
 Establishes the integration of 
different topological patterns within 
the three-dimensional model, 
produces accurate modelling of 
interconnected systems with differing 
behaviours. 
 The framework’s ability to capture 
different engineering structures 
enables criticality variation analysis 
of system components. 
 Does not consider functional level 
modelling. 
 Requires further development of 
the control theory.  
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3.4.2 Attack Graph Generation  
While many of the attack graph generation methods state they have been applied in a distributed 
approach, they tend to only be distributed in the sense that the components are distributed within a 
networked infrastructure. In general the methods have never been applied to multiple distinct 
distributed systems that are integrated solely to fulfil an objective, yet remain standalone or perhaps 
even collaborate via other SoS. We know of no automated method to date that does not use a 
centralised approach or a method which does not rely upon specific standalone resources (e.g. 
vulnerability database). Should the centralised management point or those specific resources be 
targeted, attacked, interrupted or corrupted, then the centralised point and those resources become a 
SPoF for the method, which will result in CI and SoS defence becoming vulnerable or exposed to 
potential vectors. The following researched solutions all endeavour to analyse and develop attack 
graph methods that are capable of demonstrating how vulnerabilities can be combined to reach a goal 
state and for the steps an attacker needs to take in order penetrate the security and gain access into the 
infrastructure, a summary of the methods is provided in Table 3.17: 
Kaynar and Sivrikaya [211] propose a distributed attack graph generation approach. They focus upon 
defining a new distributed search-based algorithm, which is implemented across a multi-agent 
platform using a virtual shared memory abstraction. The method relies upon data from the National 
Vulnerability Database and Common Weakness Enumeration database, and relies upon the manual 
generation of pre and post conditions for weaknesses. This indicates that the process is not fully 
automated. Once all search agents finish their partial graphs, these attack graphs are sent to a pre-
assigned leader agent. This agent is responsible for merging all the graphs into a single generated 
attack graph, meaning the final processing is constructed within a centralised point. 
The work of Li et al. [212] presents a searching forward attack graph generation algorithm based on 
hypergraph partitioning. The framework is applied to large scale complex networks, in an attempt to 
improve the efficiency and load balancing on each node, devise new attack templates, and to improve 
attack graph generation. In addition, they explore the use of reversing attack graph generation by 
generating graphs from the vulnerabilities to the attacker, in an effort to reduce required computing 
resources. 
It is vital that methods for testing network security continue to advance, Nichols et al. [213] focus on 
the addition of priorities into exploit models of hybrid attack graphs. The method aims to reduce the 
state explosion problem, while sustaining an adequate amount of relevant data to ensure vital 
information is not omitted and maintain security. 
Chejara et al. [214] base their methodology on conditional probability methods. The proposed schema 
allocates scores to identified paths within the attack graphs to assist with analysis, identifying the 
most critical paths. Conditional probability allows them to calculate scores for multiple devices rather 
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than rely upon the scores assigned by CVSS, which provides scores for individual devices and 
vulnerabilities, aiming to assist administrators to identify potential risks, and prioritise network 
hardening. The method is limited in the identification of vulnerabilities and cannot be considered a 
complete security solution. It also ignores CVSS temporal and environmental metrics (summarised in 
Section 4.6.1.2), consequently disregarding potential threats or influences by external factors which 
could impede or expose key systems and their security. 
Table 3.17. Attack Graph Methods Summary 





Parallel and distributed 
memory-based algorithm, to 
generate vulnerability-based 
attack graphs. 
 Full attack graph generation on 
multi-agent systems. 
 Distributed computation 
overcomes the state space 
explosion problem during graph 
generation when components and 
system sizes increase. 
 Will not protect against zero-day 
attacks, as method is reliant on 
identified vulnerabilities and 
utilises the NVD and CWE 
databases.  
 Leader agent is solely responsible 
for merging all partial graphs. 
Li et al. 
[212]. 
Searching forward complete 
attack graph generation 
algorithm based on 
hypergraph portioning, for 
large complex systems. 
 Improves efficiency and load 
balancing on computing agents, 
by dividing subtasks 
 Generate attack graphs from 
vulnerabilities to attacker, based 
on vulnerabilities exploited 
assumption, therefore do not need 
to store states of the attacker on 
nodes. 
 Requires evaluation and expansion 
of vulnerability knowledge, and 
improve attack templates. 
 Further evaluation required to 
determine the influence on graph 
generation and merging of attack 
graphs, due to subtasks division 
and the different partitioning 
results and load balancing 
parameters, and different networks. 
Nichols et 
al. [213]. 
Reduce the state explosion 
problem by the addition of 
priorities into exploit models 
of hybrid attack graphs. 
 Reduces graph generation time 
without losing important data. 
 Advances hybrid attack graphs in 
regards to modelling reactive 
behaviour and exploits over 
multiple time-steps. 
 Further research required to 
evaluate exploits occurring at any 
time with no time-step. 
 Requires further research into 
prioritising exploits, to determine 
the likelihood, difficulty, or time it 




Based on conditional 
probability, the method 
assigns each possible attack 
path within the attack graph 
an attack path score.  
 Assigns attack paths with scores 
to assist with graph analysis, 
identifying the most critical 
paths. 
 Requires evaluation against other 
types of vulnerabilities and attacks. 
 Data set is not automated to keep 




Introduce fake vulnerabilities 
into a system, in order to 
force an attacker to invest 
additional resources to reach 
a goal sate. 
 Establishes a stronger defence 
mechanism, and forces attackers 
to expend resources. 
 Requires further development to 
establish the strongest nodes and 





threat modelling technique 
for automated risk 
identification and 
quantification. 
 In-built threat analysis. 
 Quantified attack graphs are 
populated with probability 
distributions and time to 
compromise for each attack step.  
 Requires further development to 
establish the method’s accuracy, 
and implementation against real 
world systems. 
Sun et al. 
[217]. 
Graphical model to 
interconnect mission 
dependency and Cloud-level 
attack graphs. 
 Increases cyber resilience 
analysis of mission critical 
systems. 
 Extends the attack graph generation 
MulVal tool, which struggles and is 
limited by its ability to scale. 
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Polad et al. [215] utilising an attack graph model, examine the use of injecting false vulnerabilities 
into a network in order to establish if the process can distract a malicious attacker and increase the 
resources an attacker would require in order to penetrate the network.  
The paper by Johnson et al. [216] outline a technique called pwnPr3d, which is a risk analysis method 
combining network architecture modelling language and an automated probabilistic inference engine 
to generate attack graphs. It also provides details on a quantitative estimation method utilised for 
information security risk. 
The work by Sun et al. [217] examines impact assessment and cyber resilience, and proposes a novel 
mission impact graph model for Cloud environments. The attack graph model extends the MulVal 
tool and combines mission dependency graphs and Cloud-level attack graphs, in order to increase the 
resilience of critical systems.  
The failings of these existing schemas include the inability to accurately identify the relationships and 
interdependencies between the risks and the reduction of attack graph size and generation complexity. 
Many existing methods also fail due to the heavy reliance upon the input, identification of 
vulnerabilities, and analysis of results by human intervention. When we consider the dynamic nature, 
size, and complexity of SoS it is unclear if these methods could be applied effectively to secure these 
infrastructures. 
3.5 Information Assurance 
Organisations, governments, and individuals have become heavily dependent on ICT, and are reliant 
on the processing and storage of confidential and critical information on these systems, which in turn 
has become a target for cyber-attacks. We have critically reviewed information assurance solutions to 
gain a better understanding of the methods utilised to protect data in both secure and insecure 
infrastructures, and establish the limitations of solutions that leave data insecure and exposed to risk 
vectors as data is created, stored, and transmitted within SoS. The following researched 
methodologies all endeavour to analyse and develop methods that attempt to assure cyber data, a 
summary of the methods is provided in Table 3.18: 
One of the most common protection measures for network security is intrusion detection and 
prevention systems, which have been increasingly studied and can monitor data being transmitted 
between integrated systems. These systems are heavily reliant upon the signatures of known attacks, 
and require an in-depth knowledge of the vulnerabilities associated with the protocols which are to be 
monitored. Intrusion detection systems also struggle to monitor some protocols, for example protocols 
such as DNP3 and Modbus which can be relied upon within smart grids and critical infrastructure 
using SCADA controls [20] [21].  
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Ashfaq et al. [218] propose a fuzziness based semi-supervised learning algorithm, to improve 
classifier performance on intrusion detection datasets. This is achieved by applying unlabelled 
samples assisted by a supervised learning algorithm, in an attempt to increase intrusion detection 
systems classifier performance. 
Cryptography and key management also continue to be heavily researched, as it can assist in 
overcoming many of the challenges associated with ensuring data integrity. However while many SoS 
use open standards such as Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) and Secure Socket Layer (SSL) which 
are compatible with encryption, there are still many protocols and legacy systems currently in use that 
do not support such features. For example DNP3 does not support authentication or encryption [20]. 
Won et al. [219] present a rule management protocol for assured mission delivery networks, which is 
based upon certificateless cryptography. The method endeavours to support authenticated rule 
registration, update, and deregistration via a one-way transfer message. 
Hong and Sun [220] present an approach to guarantee adaptable and secure data sharing in mobile 
multimedia sensor networks. The attribute-based encryption technique developed utilises a novel 
efficient key updating mechanism that reduces impact on computational resources during attribute 
revocation and key exposure.  
Understanding how legitimate users can access and control data and components within SoS is vital, 
insider threats at times can be considered more dangerous than external threats, as insiders with 
malicious intent will have a greater understanding of, and access to, key systems. Subsequently 
malicious attacks by insiders will potentially result in deeper impacts due to their knowledge and 
authorised access [12] [221]. In order to secure networks, data access controls are put in place in order 
to ensure that access to sensitive data and systems is restricted. The work of Li et al. [222] presents a 
data access control scheme for multi-authority Cloud storage systems, providing a two-factor 
protection to ensure the privacy of outsourced data. 
Fugkeaw and Sato [223] discuss methods that utilise ciphertext update and proxy re-encryption 
techniques, then introduce a novel policy updating algorithm and proxy re-encryption method for 
secure access control in big data environments. 
Data flow analysis has also been heavily researched as it is essential that organisations understand the 
flow of data as it traverses across systems and programs. The work of Sampaio and Garcia [224] 
provides a comprehensive insight into techniques for detecting security vulnerabilities within software 
programs, and review late detection and early detection techniques in order to improve secure 
programming. Exploring context-sensitive data flow analysis which can reduce the restrictions of 
pattern matching and improve vulnerability detection, the authors focus on early detection and 
develop a vulnerability detection method applying an abstraction of data flow analysis. 
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Szabó et al. [225] present a method called MPS-DF, which is an abstraction of the Meta Programming 
System (MPS) language component which supports data flow analysis. By defining data-flow builders 
for the analysed language, the builders generate subgraphs which assist with the development of data-
flow graphs; these represent the data flow of the program which has been analysed. The MPS-DF 
methodology then analyses the data-flow graph and computes data-flow specific knowledge in 
regards to the program, the generated knowledge can then be utilised by existing MPS components. 
Maintaining operational relations on a daily basis between distinct systems within SoS is essential. 
Ensuring security does not negatively impede genuine and time critical communications during 
operations, as safeguarding data and maintaining an effective communication network is vital. We 
must also consider how to safeguard these diverse collaborative networked cities, especially in 
regards to IoT and WSN, along with securing routing within the topology between dissimilar devices. 
Numerous approaches for secure routing within these types of networks have been researched and 
proposed. These include developments for WSN within smart grids to support secure 
communications.  
Yan et al. [226] focus on the security requirements of smart grid communications, and present a light-
weight and low cost solution, as cryptographic solutions impact sensor nodes limited resources. The 
methods presented include a digital watermarking algorithm which is an abstraction of alternating 
electric current, a digital watermarking algorithm which is an abstraction of time window, and a 
digital watermarking secure framework.  
Glissa et al. [227] focus upon data transfer and routing within IoT, and propose a new secure protocol 
based upon Routing Protocol for Lowpower and Lossy Networks (RPL). Their protocol Secure-RPL 
attempts to prevent rank manipulation by generating a rank threshold and adopting a hash chain 
authentication method, limiting the decrease and increase of rank values and impeding malicious 
nodes from exploiting rank modifications.  
A novel approach is also proposed by Wang et al. [228] outlining an addressing-based routing 
optimisation scheme to be applied to WSN which use IPv6, applying their method within a vehicular 
scenario.  
Farooqi and Khan [229] adapt the low-energy adaptive clustering hierarchy (LEACH) protocol, to 
include intrusion detection principles in an attempt to protect WSNs from sinkhole, black hole, and 
selective forwarding attacks. 
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Table 3.18. Data Assurance Methods Summary 




Improve intrusion detection 
systems classifier performance. 
 Improves classification accuracy.  Requires further development in 
order to efficiently detect multiple 




Rule based management 
protocol established via the 
principals of certificateless 
cryptography. 
 Supports authenticated rule 
registrations and updates with non-
repudiation. 
 Avoids the need for certificates. 
 Private keys are generated by a key 
generation centre, which is not the 
owner of the key yet it can decrypt 





solution to support flexible and 
secure data sharing in mobile 
multimedia sensor networks. 
 Only authorised users can access 
the encrypted multimedia data. 
 Reduces computation cost and 
energy consumption. 
 Requires further development to 
establish the methods efficiency and 
operation against physical systems. 
Li et al. 
[222] 
Data access control scheme for 
multi-authority Cloud storage 
systems. 
 Users are required to hold sufficient 
attribute secret keys to access 
policy and authorisation key for the 
outsourced data. 






Policy updating algorithm and 
proxy re-encryption solution 
secures and supports access 
policy evolution in big data 
Cloud environments. 
 Reduces computational cost.  Requires evaluation against larger 
physical topologies, with increased 
number of attributes and transactions. 
 Requires additional analyses of 
decryption performance in regards to 





Improve vulnerability detection 
and mitigate the limitations of 
pattern matching. 
 Identifies eleven security 
vulnerabilities that stem from input 
and output not being cleaned. 
 Heuristics can be added or removed 
without interfering with the other 
heuristics, and heuristics can be 
adapted and implemented to other 
programing languages. 
 Solution has high memory usage. 
 Does not consider containers, 
reflection, and InnerClasses, thus 




Analyses data-flow graphs and 
computes data-flow specific 
knowledge in regards to the 
program, generated knowledge 
can be utilised by existing meta 
programming components. 
 Can be used with several open-
source and commercial projects 
based on domain-specific languages 
for embedded systems, insurance, 
and high performance computing. 
 The inter analysis is eleven times 





Light-weight and low-cost 
security solution based on 
digital watermarking for home 
area networks and WSN in 
smart grids. 
 Algorithmic security is better than 
that based on alternating electric 
current. 
 Compared to similar solution 
computational complexity increased  
 Fails to determine the optimal 
number of watermark digits for the 





Routing Protocol, which 
introduces hash chain 
authentication and rank 
threshold to limit the effect of 
rank manipulation. 
 Mitigates the gravity of attacks in 
terms of resource depletion, node 
saturation, topology disruption, and 
network unreliability. 
 Leaves systems vulnerable to attacks 




Addressing based routing 
optimisation method for Low-
Power Wireless Personal Area 
Networks. 
 Utilising one addressing process, 
each nodes can be configured with 
an address, thus addressing cost and 
latency are reduced. 
 Expands IEEE 802.15.4 command 
frames, requires additional analysis 





Adaption of the low-energy 
adaptive clustering hierarchy 
protocol, to assist with intrusion 
detection. 
 Detect sinkhole, black hole, and 
selective forwarding attacks in 
WSN. 
 Increases throughput, further analysis 
should be undertaken to determine its 
impact on system resources. 
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3.6 Network Optimisation 
As ICT continues to be rapidly deployed and utilised, network optimisation approaches have been 
heavily researched in an attempt to assure network enhancement. Optimisation methodologies can be 
beneficial for large infrastructures and systems as they can be utilised for example to identify 
alternative network configurations. The following researched methodologies all endeavour to analyse 
and develop optimisation methods that attempt to improve communications within cyber networks, a 
summary of the methods is provided in Table 3.19: 
Kumrai et al. [230] focus on the development of a multi-objective particle swarm optimisation 
(MOPSO) method to assist with Cloud brokering. The method identifies appropriate links between 
clients and service providers, this optimisation provides a solution for Cloud brokering by assisting to 
find solutions that lower the energy consumption of the service provider and response time requests, 
in addition to optimising profit for the Cloud broker. 
In an endeavour to identify defective wireless access points and optimise interference within wireless 
local area networks, Yao et al. [231] propose a self-organising feature map (SOM) neural network 
model, using simulation techniques to generate results and evaluate their methods against nineteen 
access points. 
The work of Rullo et al. [232] focuses on the security of IoT networks and the allocation of security 
resources. Using an abstraction of game theory they propose a Pareto-optimal solution, endeavouring 
to reduce the cost of infrastructure security, energy consumption, and probability of attack. 
Zhao et al. [233] explain their interpretation of service risk assessment, and examine external risk 
factors which can impede communication links and nodes. They explain how they use services, link, 
and nodes to generate a risk model for key services, and then present their optimisation techniques 
which are an abstraction of Dijkstra algorithms, with different weights to reduce key service and 
network risks. In this method Zhao et al. do not analyse risk equalisation between link risk and node 
risk. 
Yun et al. [234] discuss high performance networks which have been specifically developed to 
overcome the associated issues with the transfer of big data. They develop a cohesive framework to 
identify systems and network resources, and generate end-to-end paths for big data to traverse. The 
developed optimisation algorithms are evaluated by simulating and comparing them against a greedy 
approach, with several experiments being conducted against specific sections of a physical network. 
The work by Alfarhan and Alsohaily [235] critically analyses self-organising wireless networks, they 
consider long-term evolution systems, and identify several network parameter optimisation challenges 
associated with the development of these types of network. Alfarhan and Alsohaily propose a Mixed 
Integer Quadratic Program optimisation technique for each of the identified challenges (optimisation 
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of frequency channel assignments, tracking area codes, physical cell identifiers, and long-term 
evolution). 
Li et al. [236] outline the importance of complex network clustering, and present a novel quantum-
behaved discrete multi-objective particle swarm optimization (QDM-PSO) algorithm. The aim of this 
research is to improve the performance of parallelisation for discrete particle swarm optimisation, 
then apply the improved technique to assist with complex network clustering in large scale networks. 
Table 3.19. Network Optimisation Methods Summary 
Method Basic Concept Pros Cons 
Kumrai et 
al. [230]. 
Ascertain the appropriate connections 
between clients and service providers, in 
order to improve service provider’s 
energy consumption, Cloud broker’s 
profit, and client request response times. 
 Reduces the response time 
and energy systems energy 
consumption. 
 Requires evaluation against 
larger networked systems.  
Yao et al. 
[231]. 
Self-configuring based method, utilising 
self-organising feature map neural 
network model, which trains the model in 
order to optimally solve interference in 
wireless local area networks. 
 Quickly identifies faulty 
access points in different 
conditions. 
 Only configures nineteen 
access points for evaluation. 
Requires evaluation against 
larger networked systems. 
Rullo et 
al. [232]. 
Game-theoretical model to minimise 
security cost, energy consumption, and 
the probability of attack. 
 Computes best defender 
strategy, allowing for 
requirements to be met in 
regards to resource 
allocation. 
 Assumes the attacker will 
compromise at least one 
security resource, is aware of 
the defence strategy, and 
targets the most critical 
security resource. 
Zhao et al. 
[233]. 
Reduce service risk in smart grid 
communication network. 
 Reduces both service risks 
and network risk. 
 Optimised paths meet the 
time delayed standard. 
 Does not consider risk 
equalisation between link 
risks and node risk. 
Yun et al. 
[234]. 
Supports big data transfer in large-scale 
scientific applications within wide-area 
networks. 
 Generates an optimal end 
to end data transfer path 
for user requests, 
accurately modelling 
existing services, and 
improves big data transfer. 
 Does not consider multiple 
conflicting user requests. 
 Requires further evaluation 






Identify network parameter optimisation 
issues within Long-Term Evolution 
systems, and develop Mixed Integer 
Quadratic Program optimisation models 
for identified issue. 
 Reduces optimisation cost, 
best lower bounds, and 
relative gaps. 
 Some tracking area codes 
remained unassigned to cells 
during the optimisation 
process.  
Li et al. 
[236]. 
Extend MapReduce, integrating quantum-
behaved particle swarm optimisation, to 
achieve parallel and distributed quantum-
behaved particle swarm optimization. 
 Increased solution 
performance, and reduced 
running time cost. 
 Requires further evaluation 
against larger networks, and 
constructed using additional 
servers. 
 
3.7 Summary of Existing Methodologies 
Table 3.20 provides a comparison of the theoretical and applied solutions analysed and presented in 
this section against notable criteria in the aims, objectives, and challenges discussed in Sections 1.2 
and 1.3. A summary of the current theoretical and applied solutions critically analysed in this section 
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is provided in Table 3.21, highlighting the main advantages and disadvantages of their application 
within SoS environments. 
Table 3.20. Comparison of Analysed Methods Against Solution Requirements 
















































































































































































































































































Accurate.                    
Assures data.                    
Automated process.                    
Considers multiple attack vectors.                    
Considers wider environmental 
factors. 
                   
Defines relationships.                    
Does not increase computational 
complexity. 
                   
Does not impact systems when 
applied. 
                   
Does not introduce or expose systems 
to additional risk. 
                   
Easy to implement.                    
Evaluated within large SoS 
environments. 
                   
Expandable solution.                    
Identifies interdependencies.                    
Mitigates risk.                    
Non-domain specific.                    
Non-reliance upon expert knowledge 
or perspective. 
                   
Non-reliance upon external methods.                    
Non-reliance upon single agents for 
graph generation. 
                   
Protection against zero-day attacks.                    
Quantify security for entire 
collaborative infrastructure. 
                   
Quantify security using multiple 
methods & factors. 
                   
Secures infrastructure utilising 
existing resources & systems only. 
                   
Requirement to some extent met or technique capable = , requirement not adequately met or technique not capable = .   
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Table 3.21. Summary of Reviewed Theoretical and Applied Solutions 
Method Description Subcategories Generalised Pros Generalised Cons 
Security Defends cyber based 
networks against 











 Development life 
cycle security. 
 Network security. 
 Different alert levels. 
 Real time analysis. 
 Accurately detects specific 
attack types. 
 Can maintain high system 
performance. 
 Can reduce false positive 
rates. 
 Reduces internal and 
external attacks. 
 Theoretical. 
 Requires evaluation against different 
configurations, topologies, and SoS. 
 Fails to consider other types of attack. 
 High computational overhead. 
 Domain specific. 
 Learner based solutions can be trained by 
attackers to ignore behaviour. 




Process to identify 
and assess systems 
for risk. 
 Risk analysis 
based techniques. 
 SPoF prevention 
and detection. 










 Automated detection. 
 Considers different attack 
types. 
 Can classify attackers. 
 Customisable analysis. 
 Penetration testing methods 
provide support for 
improved security. 
 Supports decision making. 
 Limitations with vulnerability identification 
and securing risks. 
 High false positive rate. 
 Reliant on perspective and knowledge of 
administrators. 
 Requires evaluation against different 
topologies and SoS environments. 
 Theoretical. 
 Limited by reliance on external methods 
and databases and their associated 
limitations and failings. 
 Can negatively impact analysed systems. 
 Struggles to define relationships. 
 Difficult to implement, time consuming, 
and can be expensive 
 Fails to consider wider environmental 








the process is 
responsible for how 
risks are efficiently 
managed and 
assessed, in order to 
mitigate those risks 
and increase system 
security. 
  Offline assessment methods. 
 Compatible with existing 
monitoring technologies. 
 Endeavours to mitigate risk 
and eliminate 
vulnerabilities. 
 Quantitative and qualitative 
network assessment. 
 Theoretical. 
 When managing risks, difficult to predict 
how solutions will impact systems. 
 Reliant on human assigned vulnerability 
scores, limited by the perspective, bias, and 
knowledge of experts. 
 Limited by the functionality of the systems 
monitoring tools. 
 High false positive rates. 
 Requires evaluation against different 




networked systems to 
be represented as a 
network model, and 
can assist to quantify 






 Attack graph 
generation. 
 Generate attack graphs from 
vulnerability to attacker, 
based on exploitable 
vulnerabilities. 
 Assigns paths with scores to 
assist with analysis. 
 Assists to establish stronger 
defence and force attackers 
to expand resources. 
 
 Reliant on external vulnerability databases. 
 Does not protect against zero-day attacks. 
 Requires further evaluation against other 
types of vulnerabilities and attacks. 
 Requires further evaluation regarding 
merging of graphs, often single agents are 
responsible for graph generation. 
 Reliant on human assigned vulnerability 
scores, limited by the perspective, bias, and 
knowledge of experts. 
Information 
Assurance 
Process secures and 
mitigates risks that 
pose a threat  to data 
as it is created, 
stored, processed and 
transmitted. 
  Reduce computation, cost, 
and energy consumption. 
 Mitigate attacks. 
 Theoretical 
 Requires development in order to detect and 
protect against multiple attacks. 
 Not applied to SoS. 
 High memory usage and increases 
computation complexity. 
 Can leave systems vulnerable to attack. 




  Reduce network risk. 
 Reduce computation. 
 Increase solution/system 
performance 
 Not applied to large SoS environments. 
 Theoretical. 
 Focuses on specific resources and risks, and 
ignores multiple risk vectors. 
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Reflecting on the work we critically analysed against our solutions criteria and its suitability to be 
applied within large multi-level SoS environments, it is evident that there are significant limitations 
with existing methods and techniques. Tables 3.20 and 3.21 determine these limitations and failings, 
and identify that no single method or technique is capable of identifying vulnerabilities and mitigating 
risks within multi-level SoS in order to increase communication security and robustness.   
 
3.8 Summary 
This chapter provides a critical review of related work that has been researched and developed in 
order to improve the security and robustness of SoS. In this chapter we have reviewed the 
methodologies developed to secure and defend cyber networks from internal and external risks, and 
provide an overview of the limitations and challenges that impact the methods when considering their 
application within SoS environments. It has also examined a variety of approaches that can be utilised 
to identify and quantify a variety of risk factors within SoS. These approaches were examined closely 
to identify their effectiveness to ensure that organisations applying these techniques can identify 
vulnerabilities that expose systems and understand the risks and potential consequences that can 
occur.  
This chapter also reviewed risk management, assessment and modelling techniques, identifying the 
scope of current research and assessing the problematic application and limitations of these 
frameworks. It also analysed the concept of information assurance, and existing methods that have 
been researched and developed to ensure that access to sensitive data and systems is restricted within 
SoS. Lastly, the chapter summarised the field of network optimisation and relevant methodologies 
that attempt to identify alternative network configurations and enhance network security and 
robustness.  
A common recurring issue in all the areas critically assessed in this chapter is that current approaches 
tend to be highly theoretical or implemented on small to medium standalone networks, failing to be 
applied to large dynamic SoS that have been formed using a varied combination of devices with 
varying security levels, multiple access points, and are geographically dispersed. We perceive that all 
unidentified cyber vulnerabilities and risk between integrated components which form part of an SoS 
have the potential to leave all collaborative systems and devices exposed and vulnerable to attack 
vectors.  
In general, proposed research and solutions attempt to rectify and overcome a single specific 
challenge, but are ineffective due to their limitations, and the challenges and complexity of the 
environment in which they are applied. Having conducted an in-depth literature review, we conclude 
that there is no single solution or method that can conduct risk analysis and calculate the security level 
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for the entire multi-level SoS environment, utilising vulnerability analysis, node property aspects, 
topology data, and other factors, in order to mitigate risks without introducing additional resources 
into the multi-level SoS infrastructure 
This chapter corroborates why a novel approach to optimise the level of security risk and mitigate 
risks within multi-level SoS is vital, and the deficiencies of existing methodologies form the 





Chapter 4  
SeCurity Risk Analysis and Mitigation 
(SCRAM) Framework  
 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) advancements have assisted distinct organisations 
to ‘pool resources’ during crisis situations, and these dynamic ad-hoc communication networks are 
abstractions of Systems-of-Systems. Working in partnership, diverse organisations have endeavoured 
to provide vital services to accomplish complex tasks that they could not individually achieve, often 
in challenging conditions and environments. In these crisis situations, organisations that typically do 
not interact on a daily basis such as emergency services (i.e. police, fire, and ambulance services), 
hospitals, voluntary groups, military, government, and non-government organisations, can find that 
they are heavily reliant upon communications and the exchange of information in regards to events, 
hazards, and even the locations of citizens, for example. 
While the paradigm of the Internet of Things, Smart Cities, social media, and a variety of diverse SoS 
in coming years will assist the effectiveness of responders, when dissimilar technologies are 
combined during crisis management operations, access safeguards between these systems will be 
crucial, as any failure or delay which impedes communication can result in severe consequences. 
When integrating technologies which are distributed, formed from varying components, with differing 
security levels, it is vital that we consider how new polices and standards will be forced upon the 
systems forming the collaborative infrastructure. As insufficient or conflicting security polices, and 
unrestricted or inappropriate security levels for legitimate users, could expose the entire SoS, 
measuring the security properties of these types of infrastructures is highly difficult, and it is one of 
the most important challenges which must be overcome to prevent serious flaws exposing entire 
infrastructures, organisations, governments, or even towns and cities [237] [238]. 
Existing security and risk methodologies fail to adequately protect all components and networked 
systems which have been integrated together to form the SoS [5] [239], leaving the entire 
collaborative infrastructure exposed to vulnerabilities, failings, and potential attack vectors. The 
research presented in the previous chapters corroborates that existing research and developments fail 
to overcome the many challenges which impact SoS, and supports the need for a new novel solution 
that is capable of identifying risks and vulnerabilities within multi-level SoS, along with quantifying 
the security of the entire multi-level SoS, which in addition has the ability to overcome the challenges 
previously discussed, such as system complexity and evolutionary development. 
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Having critically reviewed existing solutions, and discussed the failings and limitations of developed 
techniques currently utilised to secure networked systems and identify risks within collaborative 
environments, to advance this research, we propose in this chapter a novel framework for measuring 
and optimising security, and mitigating risk within SoS environments, without introducing additional 
resources into the infrastructure, overcoming the associated challenges of measuring security between 
interconnected components and systems, the identification of risks and interdependencies within 
dynamic SoS, and data assurance within insecure networked environments.  
The chapter contents are as follows. Section 4.1 presents a problem analysis that synthesises the 
limitations and issues identified from the conducted review of existing research methods and 
developed techniques. In Section 4.2 a high-level overview of the SCRAM framework discussed, 
whereas Section 4.3 provides an in-depth overview of the proposed solution’s design. In Section 4.4 a 
detailed explanation of the SCRAM framework’s runtime operation is provided. Section 4.5 
summarises the data access control problem and management, whilst Section 4.6 discusses network 
centralities and the algorithms used to create the graph centralities within the framework. In Section 
4.7 we outline the risk mitigation process, and provide a detailed description of node security grade 
assignment, including vulnerability analysis and scoring, the robustness function algorithm, and the 
evolutionary risk mitigation algorithm and comparative algorithms. Finally, in Section 4.8 a summary 
of the proposed SCRAM framework is given. 
 
4.1 Problem Analysis 
Due to the real-world failings of SoS we conducted numerous case studies in an attempt to identify 
the prominent issues impacting collaborative infrastructures. Reviewing not only issues associated 
with SoS, but also environmental impacts that can impede cyber systems. Through critical evaluation 
of these case studies, we ascertained that the majority of failings could be directly attributed to 
organisations failing to perceive or identify risk(s) which leave their networked systems exposed and 
vulnerable (as discussed in Section 2). Research corroborated that the theoretical and applied methods 
that attempt to overcome and assure systems against such issues are inadequate (discussed in Sections 
2 and 3). We ascertained that organisations struggle to implement these solutions in complex 
collaborative environments, with methods being vague and generalised, domain specific, and often 
unsuitable or incapable of being applied to entire infrastructures or all collaborative networked 
systems which are often managerially independent. 
Organisations find it problematic to manage their own security and risk effectively, never mind that of 
their collaborative partners. They can also be limited by financial restrictions, and can be forced to 
conduct expensive and vigorous testing prior to implementing risk and security solutions to prevent 
negative impacts occurring. The use of network and risk assessment methods can be just as hazardous 
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as the introduction or removal of key systems, as both can easily introduce additional risks that expose 
the infrastructure and any collaborative systems to unknown vulnerabilities and potential SPoF. The 
complexity and size of SoS means it is also difficult to quantify if the SoS is optimally configured in 
terms of its communication security, i.e. difficult to quantify if the SoS is as secure as it can be. 
Meaning it is difficult to ascertain if the security of data is being assured as it traverses across the 
collaborative environment. 
Within our undertaken research we have found no single solution that is capable of successfully 
securing a complex multi-level SoS for its entire life cycle, and which is broad enough to be applied 
to dissimilar and dynamic environments and be non-specific to a particular vulnerability or attack. 
These rigid and unsuitable methods have directly resulted in SoS being susceptible to zero-day attacks 
and failings, with critical vulnerabilities remaining unidentified and system security not reflecting the 
SoS true status. Similarly, solutions are also failing to mitigate risks, organisations find it problematic 
to identify their own vulnerabilities accurately and eliminate them, and it becomes a bigger challenge 
to identify risks associated with the systems of their collaborative partners; who is responsible for 
monitoring and manging those risks; and who is accountable for identifying and applying the relevant 
resolutions. 
As risk is unavoidable, there will always be risk factors to contend with, though if risk can clearly and 
precisely be identified prior to failings or attacks occurring, then this early identification would ensure 
that we can both secure and manage risk more effectively. This in turn would increase the robustness 
of the SoS and allow for risks to be mitigated prior to their exploitation or failure. Additionally, if the 
risk or vulnerability could not be mitigated then early identification ensures that the vulnerability can 
be monitored and managed more effectively, so in a worst case scenario the appropriate strategy plans 
are in place to limit its impact. 
The work in this thesis is motivated by wanting to address what we perceive to be the three most 
problematic challenges, which are measuring security between interconnected components and 
systems, the identification of risks and interdependencies and their mitigation, and data security in 
unsecure and unencrypted networks (detailed in Section 1.2).  
 
4.1.1 Aims Analysis 
It is evident from the sections previously presented that there are significant limitations and failings 
associated with SoS risk identification, mitigation, and security. These problematic issues summarised 
in Table 3.21 demonstrate the need for a new novel approach, additionally, the critical review of 
existing methods and techniques summarised in Table 3.20 corroborate that currently there are no 
distinct viable solutions capable of identifying and mitigating security risks in large complex SoS. 
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The purpose of this broad and in-depth review of literature was to assist us in discovering the 
associated inadequacies of techniques, and support the development of a new solution based on the 
identified research gaps and the weaknesses that require significant enhancement in order for them to 
be more appropriate in their application within large SoS environments (i.e. multi-level SoS). Our 
methodology was also required to observe the aims summarised in Section 1.3, which were 
determined after reflecting upon this review and identifying the main problematic challenges. 
Security – The problematic issues associated with SoS security, lead to our initial aim of developing a 
solution capable of measuring the security of individual devices and the entire SoS topology. Current 
techniques cannot state with certainty that communication security for the distinct components, 
systems, and the entire SoS is secure, and to what level vulnerable nodes weaken security exposing 
systems to potential attacks and failure. SoS security techniques are generally theoretical, have not 
been evaluated within these environments, have not been applied to dissimilar systems and are 
domain specific, focus on specific attacks or vulnerabilities, and signature based security solutions fail 
to protect against zero-day attacks. Through conducted case studies we have corroborated that if 
systems have unidentified vulnerabilities, then these insecure nodes have the potential to expose the 
entire SoS resulting in various consequences, including SPoF, negative emergent behaviour, 
cascading failure, and entry points for malicious attackers. 
Risk and Interdependencies – Our goal is to identify risks and interdependencies that impact and 
form between collaborative components, this is motivated by both the problematic challenge of 
measuring security between interconnected components and systems, and in order to improve the 
problematic issues associated with quantifying SoS security. Current vulnerability, risk, and 
interdependency identification methods are theoretical, reliant on the perspective and knowledge of 
administrators, suffer with high false positive rates, can impact analysed systems, are difficult to 
implement, time consuming, expensive, have not been evaluated against large complex SoS, struggle 
to define relationships, are reliant on external methods and databases and are therefore impacted by 
their associated failings, and often are domain or vulnerability specific with the methods requiring 
heavy adaptation to be applied to differing factors. Improved risk and interdependency identification 
would increase the accuracy of communication security measurements for both devices and systems 
collaborating within the SoS, could reduce false positive rates, would assist to support the 
maintenance of high system performance, and the identification of interdependencies would assist to 
reduce SPoF and could reduce potential partial and full cascading failures. 
Risk Mitigation – Similarly, there have been issues with the mitigation of identified risks and 
interdependencies. In order to improve the security of multi-level SoS and reduce risk vectors we aim 
to mitigate risks motivated by the limitations of risk management and assessment methods, which fail 
to efficiently manage and assess risks which in turn decreases communication security. Existing risk 
mitigation methods are generally theoretical, domain specific, do not consider the ramifications of 
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changes to systems, can be influenced negatively due to human bias, perspective, and knowledge, and 
typically focus on specific resources and risk, ignoring multiple risk vectors. Mitigating risks would 
improve the security of both the distinct device and systems within the SoS environment, and enhance 
the overall multi-level SoS security and robustness. Developing a solution that mitigated risks 
utilising the existing topological systems means that we could increase the security of the 
collaborative environment utilising only the existing networked resources. This means not only will 
vulnerabilities and the risks that they pose to the infrastructure decrease, but we can assure that the 
collaborative environment is as secure as it possibly can be. 
Robustness – As stated, security and risk management and assessment methods have limitations, and 
struggle to identify the security of communication and provide an appropriate assessment of the 
network’s systems in terms of the risks which expose the infrastructure. In order to improve security 
and mitigate risk effectively we endeavour to measure the robustness of the environment. Having the 
capability to quantify the robustness level of a networked infrastructure is important, this measure 
could help to ascertain in the event of failure or attack, how well the infrastructure will stand, i.e. will 
the dynamic nature and built-in redundancy of the SoS support the infrastructure’s ability to meet 
objectives, or are there significant risks, potential SPoF, and dependencies within the SoS that will 
reduce the SoS capability to maintain operation in worst case scenarios. When mitigating risk this 
robustness level would also allow for the evaluation of the appropriateness of the changes that are 
applied to the infrastructure. 
Data Assurance – SoS are reliant upon the transfer of data in order for them to maintain 
collaboration; as SoS can be formed from numerous dissimilar systems with conflicting data access 
requirements, securing data as it traverses across insecure and unencrypted networks is problematic. 
Therefore, we aim to develop a solution that overcomes the limitations of existing solutions that fail to 
assure data, to reduce potential risks that expose this element. Current solutions are in general 
theoretical, have high computational overhead, leave systems vulnerable to attack, are developed to 
protect against specific attacks and require development in order to detect other assaults, and have not 
been evaluated or applied to large complex SoS. Assuring data is of upmost importance within SoS, 
we consider data to be the biggest SPoF within these environments, as, if data cannot be created, 
stored, or transmitted within the SoS then systems could fail and full or partial failings could ripple 
across the entire collaborative environment.  
By increasing communication security, accurately identifying risks and interdependencies that expose 
systems, quantifying infrastructure robustness levels, mitigating risks, and improving data assurance, 
we would have the capacity to secure the collaborative environment utilising only the existing 
networked resources and increase the cyber resilience of the SoS infrastructure. Which would mean in 
the event of component failure or network attack, impacts should be minimised due to the applied 
solution, or the solution can provide an early warning mechanism which would allow for unmitigated 
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risks to be clearly identified allowing for them to be managed more effectively thus reducing their 
impact. 
 
4.1.2 Objectives Analysis 
The objectives presented in Section 1.3 heavily contribute to solving the problematic challenges 
associated with measuring security between interconnected ‘things’, the identification and mitigation 
of risks and interdependencies, and data security in insecure and unencrypted networks, in addition 
the objectives assist us in adhering to the established aims of the research presented in Section 1.3 and 
discussed above in Section 4.1.1. 
 
4.1.2.1 Background Literature Research 
 Our primary objective was to conduct detailed background literature research into the challenges and 
risks that expose SoS, the issues impacting the ability for current solutions to secure these dynamic 
networked infrastructures, and the methodologies that fail to identify and quantify risks within SoS. 
In order to solve the problematic challenges associated with the measurement of security within SoS, 
it was imperative that the review of literature and case studies into real-world failings covered a 
diverse range of security aspects, risk factors, risk methodologies, and network topologies, including 
cyber issues and wider environmental factors which can impede SoS security and functionality. 
For instance, when reviewing the issues that had caused critical failings within numerous UK banking 
infrastructures, we were able to determine that the problematic issues and cascading failures that had 
ensued could be attributed to varying risks and attacks, yet each of the separate issues had all resulted 
in similar consequences and loss of service, and each of the organisations had failed to identify the 
vulnerabilities in advance and could not guarantee that these risks had been effectively managed and 
would not occur again. After identifying the types of risks and attacks that had exposed these 
infrastructures, we reviewed the current methods and theoretical techniques that endeavour to secure 
these SoS against such vulnerabilities, which included risk identification, risk assessment, risk 
management, vulnerability analysis, vulnerability assessment, vulnerability scoring methods, exploit 
databases, attack graphs, intrusion detection systems, etc. In addition, we also investigated previous 
enquires that had been undertaken that questioned the financial institutes and banks, which allowed us 
to gain a better understanding of how previous banking failures had been managed and weakness that 
these institutes are still struggling to manage effectively. 
This objective assists to ascertain the risks that expose SoS, issues impacting the functionality of 
current solutions to secure SoS, and weaknesses that prevent solutions from accurately identifying and 
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quantifying risks within SoS. This in turn, corroborates the difficulty in measuring the security 
between interconnected components and systems, assists to determine flaws with existing 
methodologies, and assists to identify promising techniques that could be useful if developed to 
process multiple risk vectors or function in SoS environments. In addition, our primary objective 
validates the need for the development of a solution to identify and mitigate security risks within SoS 
and multi-level SoS. 
 
4.1.2.2 Security Risk Analysis 
Our second objective was to develop an SoS security risk analysis solution to calculate the security 
level of the entire SoS using vulnerability analysis, node property aspects, topology data, and other 
factors, to improve and mitigate risks without introducing additional resources into the SoS 
infrastructure. This objective contributes to solving issues associated with measuring security between 
interconnected components and systems, the identification of risks and interdependencies and their 
mitigation, and data security in insecure and unencrypted networks.  
Risk and vulnerability identification, assessment, and management methods are in general component, 
domain type, and risk specific, depending on a single specific methodology or vulnerability database, 
and  are typically  theoretical or not applied and evaluated within large complex SoS and multi-level 
SoS. The real-world case studies clearly establish that vulnerabilities remain unidentified, and 
organisations are failing to competently analyse their networked infrastructures and accurately 
quantify their communication security. Therefore, by organisations failing to accurately identify 
vulnerabilities, security scores do not reflect the true level of how secure their systems are.  
This objective contributes to solving the problematic issues associated with the quantification of 
accurate security levels, achieved by implementing better identification, analysis, and reporting of 
risks. This is attained through the incorporation of numerous network and vulnerability analysis 
methods, including collating data in regards to node property aspects, topological vulnerabilities, and 
other factors which can be categorised as a risk as they pose a threat to data, devices, systems, or the 
entire SoS. By developing an adaptable solution that can combine a wide number of security risks 
from dissimilar methods and systems, we can gain a more realistic overview of the vulnerabilities 
which expose systems, this in turn will support their management and mitigation, i.e. the more sources 
we include identifying risks the more accurate scores will be, and we can be confident that they reflect 
the true security state of both the distinct nodes and the SoS. 
A broader view of what is categorised as a risk within these large complex infrastructures, extending 
the number of risk parameters to be analysed (i.e. not focusing on a single type of attack or 
vulnerability), and improving the accuracy of risk identification, also supports improvements to risk 
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mitigation and securing the infrastructure without introducing additional resources into these SoS. 
Improvements to risk identification assist to quantify more accurate communication security scores 
that reflect the true status of the topology, meaning as changes are made to communication links in 
order to mitigate risks between insecure and vulnerable devices, reassessment of the network utilising 
the same methods will quantify if modifications have negatively or positively impacted the overall 
security of the infrastructure. 
Furthermore, by quantifying and analysing topological vulnerabilities such as high connectivity 
vulnerabilities, shortest path vulnerabilities, SPoF, weighted high connectivity, and dependent 
communication vulnerabilities (discussed in Section 4.5), when we analyse the topology and attempt 
to mitigate risks within the SoS, we will be able to identify important relationships between nodes that 
expose the SoS and ascertain network behaviour characteristics. This objective assists to overcome 
the problematic challenges associated with risk identification and mitigation, and in part assist to 
support data security in insecure and unencrypted networks, by ensuring that the SoS being evaluated 
can be accurately measured in terms of its communication security. 
 
4.1.2.3 Robustness Analysis 
Our third objective was to develop a solution that can analyse and quantify the robustness of the SoS 
environment based on the relevant data captured from the application of the security risks analysis 
solution.  
In order to overcome the problematic challenges associated with mitigating risk and increasing 
communication security, it was imperative to establish a means to determine if networked 
infrastructures were optimally configured. Robustness scores can be quantified utilising key criteria 
identified during the risk analysis process, and can assist to determine the network’s appropriateness. 
This is important as SoS with inadequate topology configurations can expose data to differing risk 
vectors as data traverses across the infrastructure, and can increase topological vulnerabilities 
including SPoF and interdependencies, for example. 
As risk mitigation methods are applied to the SoS under evaluation, the robustness level can also act 
as a comparable vector demonstrating the appropriateness of the overall infrastructure’s security and 
network security configuration. Robustness scores can also assist to produce the next generation of 
improved solutions, and can be used in comparison to monitor modification impacts. It is vital to have 
the capability to evaluate how alterations negatively and positively impact the overall suitability of the 
infrastructure, to ensure that topology and security enhancement is achieved while preventing reverse 
evolvement.  
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In addition, risk is unavoidable therefore it is important to have the capability to know in the event of 
failure or attack how robust and secure systems truly are, thus the robustness level can be used in  
conjunction with security reports during decision making processes and when establishing 
management plans when risks cannot be effectively mitigated further. 
 
4.1.2.4 Optimisation Evaluation 
Our fourth objective was to conduct a detailed investigation into optimisation techniques and 
algorithms in order to identify which solutions suit SoS to mitigate the risks. 
In order to solve the problematic challenges associated with mitigating interdependencies and risks, 
and securing data in insecure and unencrypted networks, it was necessary to implement different 
optimisation techniques and algorithms into the developed framework in order to evaluate both the 
solution itself in regards to mitigating risks and quantifying SoS topology robustness levels and 
security scores, and in order to evaluate the difference in risk mitigation methods suitability and 
functionality when being applied into large complex SoS environments. 
For instance, not all optimisation methods can be applied to large complex SoS, as they can struggle 
with complexity, scaling, require heavy adaptation, increase computational overhead, and can be too 
rigid for the dynamic environment, restricting the process and limiting end results. This objective 
corroborated the difficulty in evaluating the effectiveness of optimisation techniques within complex 
SoS environments, and assisted us to determine those methods that when combined into the risk 
mitigation function showed promise in enhancing networked infrastructures, mitigating associated 
risks, and increasing the overall security and robustness level of the topology, as well as 
demonstrating the methods that are adequately capable of generating and reporting new enhanced SoS 
topologies that were secure and more appropriate. 
In addition, not only did this objective assist us in identifying the limitations of existing optimisation 
methods and the areas that require improvement, it supported the identification of the most effective 
techniques and algorithms applied against SoS, and corroborated the need for the development of a 
solution to mitigate risks and increase the robustness and security of the SoS utilising only the 
existing infrastructure’s resources. For instance, WSN can be deployed in remote areas and can be 
inaccessible, if we evaluated this SoS and determined that the security and the robustness level was 
inadequate, then our proposed methods could be a suitable, inexpensive, and realistic approach to 
improving the appropriateness of the WSN without having to physically access the devices or deploy 
further infrastructure. Thus, the objective would solve the issue of ascertaining the best solution to 
mitigate risks to ensure that SoS are optimally configured and secure, which is vital to guarantee 
functionality is maintained, data is assured, and the infrastructure’s robustness is increased. 
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4.1.2.5 Case Study 
Our fifth objective was to conduct a case study on a specific network type such as WSN, and expand 
the solution to encompass a different risk vector utilising the same developed risk analysis framework 
and robustness techniques. 
This objective contributes heavily to solving the issues that impact the ability of existing solutions to 
secure dynamic SoS, and the methodologies that fail to identify and quantify risks within SoS, as it 
supports the evaluation of our proposed methods, corroborates their capabilities, and ascertains the 
appropriateness of applying them within SoS environments. It was imperative to validate not only the 
proposed solutions, but our decision to use simulation rather than applying the methods directly to a 
physical SoS. The case studies conducted to meet this objective allowed us to experiment and enhance 
the techniques and algorithms that are integrated within the solutions framework without introducing 
vulnerabilities into the SoS being evaluated or cause critical consequences to occur. Instead the 
framework and proposed algorithms could be adequately tested and evaluated, and potential issues 
associated with the application of the framework could be monitored and assessed within the 
simulation environment. 
These case studies also allowed us to run the same experiments against different optimisation 
methods, and enhanced techniques against the same topologies. This ensured that the results that were 
attained were accurate and a true reflection of the SoS topology (i.e. we could repeat the test multiple 
times and the end results would be consistent). This objective in turn corroborates the difficulty in 
measuring security, identifying vulnerabilities, quantifying the robustness of the entire topology, and 
mitigating risks within SoS, and validates that our solution can be an effective and appropriate 
methodology for mitigating risks and improving communication security within SoS environments. 
In order to establish the effectiveness of the proposed solution’s ability to incorporate different risk 
vectors and its usefulness, this objective aims to expand the solution to encompass a different risk 
vector. This will assist to determine the dynamic nature of the proposed solution, and corroborate the 
framework’s ability to effectively function when new risk parameters are identified then incorporated 
into the solution, ensuring that the security, risk, and mitigation methods continue to accurately 
quantify scores and mitigate risks. The objective to encompass a different risk vector within the 
framework overcomes the problematic issues of other methods and techniques that fail to consider 
alterative vulnerabilities or are too rigid and require heavy adaptation. An adaptable solution will 
ensure that as new vulnerabilities are identified the method will be able to incorporate them, along 
with the solution being forward compatible allowing for new risks that are unimaginable now to be 
incorporated in the future. 
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4.1.2.6 Multi-Level SoS Analysis 
Our final objective was to validate that the algorithms and principles are effective for identifying and 
mitigating risks within multi-level SoS, in order to increase multi-level SoS security and robustness. 
This objective heavily contributes to solving the problematic challenges of measuring the security 
between interconnected components and systems, identifying risks and their mitigation, and data 
security in insecure and unencrypted networks. SoS are highly complex and difficult to accurately 
evaluate and secure; when we begin to consider multi-level SoS which are an accumulation of SoS, 
these infrastructures will be just as problematic and more complex.  
From our case studies and review of associated literature we have identified problematic issues that 
struggle to identify vulnerabilities within distinct systems and secure them within distinct SoS. Our 
literature review also corroborated that many of the proposed solutions not only have severe 
limitations and require adaptation, but have never been applied to SoS that contain a significant 
number of distinct networked systems. 
Evaluating the proposed framework against multi-level SoS will corroborate the usefulness of the 
techniques to measure the security of distinct devices, and the entire collaborative environment. In 
addition, it will provide the means to evaluate security grades and ascertain the security impacts that 
occur, when SoS are forced to collaborate with external SoS under independent management. This 
objective will also allow us to assess the suitability of the proposed algorithms when applied to multi-
level SoS, specifically their ability to manage with the complexity and size of multi-level SoS 
topologies, their accuracy to quantify the security and robustness levels of the entire collaborative 
infrastructure, and corroborate their effectiveness to identify risks and mitigate them when 
considering the accumulation of SoS as a single entity. 
 
4.1.3 Methodology 
SoS failure is problematic despite great investment, research, and development. The purpose of this 
research is to develop a methodology that overcomes the limitations of existing solutions and advance 
the identification and mitigation of security risks in multi-level SoS environments, to achieve this we 
present in this section the methods adopted in order to undertake this research. Discussing in detail the 
research method chosen, followed by the research design, the data collection method, and conclude by 
providing a detailed explanation of the data analysis method selected. 
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4.1.3.1 Research Method 
To achieve our objectives the research in this thesis uses a quantitative approach. In contrast to 
qualitative research, quantitative research allows for the generation of numerical data in order to 
statistically analyse results and quantify the problem. For example, in this instance the quantitative 
method will support the analysis of identified vulnerabilities and provide a numerical estimate of the 
risks they pose, achieved using predefined mathematical formula. 
Whereas qualitative research would deliver a descriptive estimate of the risk that the identified 
vulnerability would pose to the device or infrastructure. While qualitative assessment is often utilised 
by risk assessment methods in order to limit the potential impact that the methods can have upon the 
physical infrastructure, and will assign risks based upon traditional collective measures such as 
questionnaires, this type of assessment can fail to perceive risks and produce poor estimates, as 
numerical evaluations would be based on the expert’s skill level, training, and their ability to not 
influence scores and to remove their own bias.  
Overestimated expert scores would result in vulnerabilities being identified as insecure due to analysts 
being overcautious, this would not reflect the true status of the infrastructure’s security as it would 
appear weaker, and organisations could waste resources and time safeguarding vulnerabilities that do 
not pose such a threat. Alternatively, experts’ underestimation of scores would result in vulnerabilities 
being identified as secure due to analysts’ poor comprehension of threat severity, this would reflect an 
inaccurate level of high security, and organisations would fail to take action against vulnerabilities 
leaving their devices and systems exposed to potential failings and points of attack. This in turn could 
expose the entire collaborative infrastructure. 
Research corroborated that experts’ opinions can greatly differ, with vulnerability identification and 
assessment methods in recent years struggling with discrepancies to assigned vulnerabilities. In order 
for results to be accurate we feel a quantitative approach to be more suitable to limit the reliance on 
expert opinion and scoring. Computational techniques ensure that the assignment of numerical values 
to identified vulnerabilities, the quantification of the risk which is posed to the infrastructure, and the 
measurement of the devices and infrastructures is quantified in a scientific means and one that can be 
repeated. 
Undertaking a quantitative method will allow us to implement and automate processes, which include 
the collection of data, algorithms to quantify node vulnerabilities, topological vulnerabilities, security 
grades, robustness scores, minimum path average, and cost in terms of the distance between nodes, 
etc., and the modelling and analysis of data, including the assessment and management of risk 
mitigation. Manual assessment, analysis, and management strategy for this research would most likely 
be impossible to conduct due to the complexity, size, and number of distinct systems that form the 
collaborative environments that we are going to apply the methods against. 
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4.1.3.2 Research Design 
The primary objective of this thesis was to develop a solution to calculate the security level of SoS 
using varying vulnerability factors in order to mitigate risks without introducing additional resources 
into the infrastructure. To achieve this we will design and implement a new risk analysis and 
mitigation framework using a simulated environment.  
Our decision to use simulation is motivated by wanting to develop a solution that can be applied in the 
future to differing infrastructures and topologies. Had we implemented our solution against a specific 
physical SoS we would not be able to evaluate the method’s suitability to be applied against a range 
of dissimilar SoS or within multi-level SoS. Simulation provides us the means to replicate a diverse 
number of different components, system configurations, and SoS topologies, allowing us to quickly 
generate new environments and run experiments on different adaptable topologies and on different 
scales, which we could not physically construct due to project limitations and the varied components 
required. 
Besides, we would not be able to apply the experimental and untested solution against a large 
operational SoS due to societal dependence on the assets of these infrastructures, and to prevent risks 
being introduced into the networked environment which could have the potential to cause operational 
failures. We feel this would be irresponsible and unnecessary at this stage of development, simulation 
is an acceptable and widely adopted method for testing hypotheses in this area of research, and can 
generate accurate results which our evaluation of the conducted experiment will validate. 
Having ascertained the limitations of existing techniques we chose to take a broader view in regards 
to the types of risk that can expose SoS, choosing to integrate multiple different risk vectors into our 
solution including node property aspects, topological vulnerabilities, and other factors. This is to 
ensure that node security grades and SoS communication scores are accurate and a true reflection of 
the node’s and networked system’s secure status, and to support the measurement of the 
infrastructure’s robustness. Rigid methods that focus on specific vulnerabilities or attack types are 
leaving SoS exposed, by collating data on different types of risk not only can we improve 
vulnerability identification and increase security scores, we can also in the same solution identify 
topological vulnerabilities which can indicate high connectivity, shortest path, SPoF, weighted high 
connectivity, and dependent communication vulnerability, and identify nodes that are in breach of 
data access violations which can expose data, and thus, have a greater understanding of the risks that 
expose data as it traverses across the infrastructures to maintain collaboration between systems. 
To ensure our simulated vulnerabilities are a true reflection of real-world risks, we incorporated 
vulnerabilities directly reported via NVD applying the published CVSS v3 base scores assigned to 
each of the vulnerabilities within our method. CVSS and NVD procedures have been widely used in 
this field, with CVSS providing a standardised vulnerability scoring method and NVD providing an 
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open repository of analysed vulnerabilities. NVD details security-related software flaws, security 
check lists, impact metrics, product names, and misconfigurations that can be scanned for against 
physical cyber networks, for this reason we believe this database will assist to simulate real-world 
vulnerabilities and validate the method’s accuracy for the identification of risks and security analysis. 
As a result of this research we will have a framework that can accurately simulate all nodes and 
systems which form both SoS and multi-level SoS, and will have the capability to produce graphs that 
represent the SoS topology. Discovered risks and vulnerabilities will be reported within the 
framework and detailed reports will be constructed and stored, allowing for the infrastructures to be 
analysed prior to any risk mitigation process being applied against them. To ensure that graphs that 
represent the topology of the infrastructure can be analysed intuitively we have limited the number of 
risks that are visualised on the graph. Selected risks visualised include node bridging centrality score, 
vulnerability scan status, security status and grade, and data access levels and violations. All other 
risks, including topological vulnerabilities, minimum path average, and SoS communication security, 
are placed into the reports, with the robustness levels being reported separately in both its own graph 
and report. 
In order to mitigate risks, increase communication security for the entire SoS, and assure data as it 
traverses across an insecure and unencrypted network without introducing additional resources into 
the infrastructure, we have implemented a method that reconfigures the network’s communication 
paths using optimisation techniques, and considers node security status, data access violations, and 
high centrality node risk, choosing to utilise optimisation techniques as they overcome many of the 
limitations associated with local search techniques.  
While our work was influenced by genetic algorithms which replicate the changes made in nature 
through evolvement, to validate the methods and determine the most suited solutions for SoS risk 
mitigation we implemented two additional optimisation techniques (ant colony optimisation combined 
with local search and tabu search). The implementation of additional algorithms into the risks 
mitigation method also assisted in establishing the effectiveness of the applied methods and 
techniques, as they can validate that the risk identification, analysis, and scoring measurements are not 
erroneous, achieved by running differing experiments in regards to risk mitigation against the same 
topologies.   
During the risk mitigation process enhancements are made to the topologies evaluated, and random 
configurations are generated and evaluated, meaning even when applying the same algorithm to the 
same topology different end configurations can be presented. We have to reflect on results and take a 
broader view of the analysis, as results will not be perfectly identical, i.e. if the methods are behaving 
similarly and tracked alterations during the mitigation process are consistent we can validate that the 
methods are functioning correctly. The robustness level graph and reports are an excellent indicator 
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for monitoring the effectiveness of our methods as when the risk mitigation technique is applied and 
enhancements are made to the SoS, they not only log every improved candidate, they report every 
candidate generated including those rejected. 
Through the risk mitigation process the framework monitors the other risks that expose the 
infrastructure, by tracking node security grades, data access levels, and topological vulnerabilities, 
etc., if changes were made to the variables that should be static an error would be immediately 
identifiable and a good indicator that results were invalid. Furthermore, to ensure that methods are 
generating factual and valid measurements, we manually checked and quantified all factors and scores 
in regards to both the original SoS topology and the enhanced reported candidates to ensure that the 
results manually quantified are identical to those generated within the simulated framework 
 
4.1.3.3 Data Collection Considerations 
For the purpose of this research, we wanted to examine both distinct SoS and multi-level SoS that are 
an accumulation of SoS.  To ensure that we could manually analyse vulnerabilities, and quantify 
measurements and scores for every distinct device, system, and infrastructure, we limited initial 
simulations to no more than 12 devices for SoS experiments, and 12 devices and 12 SoS for multi-
level SoS experiments. When we apply the methods to large complex infrastructures that cannot be 
manually assessed we can be confident that quantified factors and scores are valid, due to our critical 
evaluation and comparison of manual and framework generated results. 
While environmental factors can impede SoS and increase risk factors, we have omitted these types of 
risks at this stage of our research. Though it must be noted, to fulfil our objectives we have expanded 
our solution to incorporate a different risk vector in the form of a case study. This establishes while 
we have chosen to focus on cyber vulnerabilities and risks, the methods are not limited and could 
easily encompass other identifiable risks and produce more detailed and accurate security scores and 
assessments. We have chosen a range of risks to incorporate into the framework which assist to 
identify the security of the individual devices, the security of the entire infrastructure, and support the 
identification of devices which expose the infrastructures and risks which form between collaborative 
components. 
The simulated framework can generate a range of devices and SoS topologies, the risk factors we 
chose to simulate and collate as part of the simulated network assessment and risk identification 
include connections, path lengths, data access levels, and if applicable operating system, firewall 
status, IDS, encryption details, associated staff levels, system update status, antivirus and security, if 
the device is connected to the internet, vulnerability scan conducted status, and whether the device has 
identified vulnerabilities.  
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We desire to simulate a diverse number of components and differing topologies, therefore not every 
node will be assigned vulnerabilities as part of the simulation, instead nodes are randomly assigned to 
have either been scanned with no vulnerabilities, scanned with identified vulnerabilities, or 
unscanned. Nodes that are identified as having been scanned with identified vulnerabilities are 
assigned a random number, this figure becomes the number of vulnerabilities that are then assigned to 
the node based upon what type of device it is and its operating system. These vulnerabilities are real-
world vulnerabilities that have been imported into the simulated environment, which were reported on 
the NVD website in June 2016. This enables more accurate topologies to be generated, and supports 
the validation of the method’s ability to incorporate different vulnerabilities into the quantification of 
node security grades, and its ability to compute more reflective infrastructure security scores and 
robustness levels.  
These risk variables are then used for several purposes; firstly they are used to quantify node security 
grades, SoS communication security scores, the robustness level, topological vulnerabilities, 
minimum path average, and cost in terms of distance between nodes. Once we have a complete 
overview of the topology, undirected graphs can be generated to provide visual representation of the 
environment and the relevant risks as required.  
Details are also reported into two different records for analysis and use, this includes the generation of 
a configuration file containing topological details such as node coordinates, connections, path lengths, 
data access levels, security grades, etc. The configuration files can be used to analyse the topology 
changes between the original network and the optimum reported enhanced candidate, but more 
importantly it can be used to restore the original network in order to evaluate different methods and 
validate the effectiveness of alternative risk mitigation techniques. Secondly, topology data, variables, 
and quantified results can be presented within the framework’s report window for immediate analysis, 
reporting key risks and measurements to the individual nodes and entire infrastructure. All topological 
data, variables, quantified risk and security factors are stored within security reports; if the risk 
mitigation process is applied to the network then these reports are extended with the enhanced 
candidate details. This allows for a comparative analysis from the original network through the 
evolvement of the topology, which demonstrates how the reconfiguration of the communication paths 
impacts not only the topology but each distinct node, and quantifies risk and security measurements. 
When the risk mitigation method is applied to the original infrastructure topology, the process begins 
to enhance the infrastructure’s security and reduce risks by reconfiguring the communication links 
between nodes. At this stage we decided not to keep detailed reports of every generated candidate, as 
data sets would quickly increase in size, especially as each risk mitigation process will generate 
20,000 candidates for compression. Instead, full topology data, risk factors, and quantified results are 
added to the security reports for each of the reported enhanced candidates only, allowing for quick 
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comparative analysis to be undertaken while still providing enough details for critical evaluation of 
risk mitigation and any negative impacts to devices or the topology. 
The generated robustness score graph produced by the framework similarly only shows the robustness 
scores quantified by the method for each of the reported enhanced candidates, this allows for intuitive 
evaluation of the appropriateness of the reported candidates. This graph excludes the negative 
evolvements that are rejected during the risk mitigation process; however, we do collate every 
robustness score for all generated candidates. This report ensures that we can evaluate the risk 
mitigation process itself. The method generates 20,000 network configurations, continually evolving 
the communication paths and carrying the best reported candidate of each round into the next stage 
for enhancement. Negative evolvements should be rejected and only the best solution carried forward, 
the robustness log allows us to evaluate the method by validating that the best candidate is correctly 
passed into rounds until a more appropriate generation is produced, and that the method does not have 
limitations with high numbers of false positives and negatives. 
 
4.1.3.4 Data Analysis 
The analysis of risks and the appropriateness of the risk mitigation process are conducted by the 
methods within the framework itself. We then manually replicate the calculations and evaluate both 
sets against each other, this is to determine the efficiency and accuracy of the application’s ability to 
produce and analyse results, and to validate the effectiveness of the methods themselves to mitigate 
risks and secure the complex SoS and multi-level SoS environments. 
In order to establish the optimum enhanced candidate, the risk mitigation and security enhancement 
method analyses every generated solution, as when the process adds and removes communication 
links between devices it must balance connectivity with improvements to the topology’s robustness 
level and security without impacting centrality factors that can introduce additional risks to the 
network, and must consider the maintenance of a secure route between nodes that are not in violation 
of data access levels to assure data. The distinct optimisation methods when applied ensure that 
negative evolvement is eliminated, achieved by comparative analysis of the quantified robustness 
level and, when applicable, comparative risk parameters.  Again the methods can be assessed and 
validated by analysing the chosen optimum solution and reported enhanced candidates. 
Similarly, it is important to continuously analyse communication security throughout security 
enhancement and risk mitigation, as we are endeavouring to improve the overall topology’s security 
or where applicable maintain the high level of security already achieved. 
The security enhancement and risk mitigation process is also analysing the topology of the 
collaborative infrastructure, ensuring that nodes do not become isolated due to communication links 
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being removed and added. In addition, the process is analysing the communication links to ensure that 
paths are maintained between secure nodes and those that do not violate data access requirements. 
This analysis ensures that a secure path is maintained allowing for data to traverse securely across the 
networked infrastructure. The method can be manually validated by analysing the configuration file 
and the undirected graphs generated and reported by the framework. 
It must be noted that while the framework analyses all enhanced candidates and reports the optimum 
solution, we conduct manual analysis against all of the reported candidates to establish their 
usefulness. For example, are there reported enhanced candidates that, while not considered the 
optimum solution, assure security and improve the robustness of the infrastructure that could be 
adequate and should be considered during decision making processes, as they are cheaper to 
implement and should be considered as an alternative solution if budget restrictions are necessary. 
We are also highly interested in analysing the topological vulnerabilities that can be introduced or 
altered due to reconfiguration of the infrastructure. By examining the quantified centrality values for 
each node and the aggregated centrality scores for each of the reported enhanced candidates, we can 
understand the impacts that occur and identify risks that expose the infrastructure as configurations 
are altered and new relationships are established. 
All topology data, variables, and quantified results for both the original collaborative infrastructure 
and reported candidates, and the robustness scores and relevant data for 20,000 generated solutions 
are all stored in relevant log files. This allows for data to be filtered as required and presented in the 
format of tables and graphs. These findings and experiments will be discussed in the remaining 
sections and chapters of this thesis. 
 
4.1.3.5 Problems and Limitations 
As we have been conducting quantitative analysis to ascertain the effectiveness of our prosed methods 
against the generated results produced without our simulated framework, we have not required the 
inclusion of human participants for our research. By analysing the results generated by the automated 
processes of risk identification and security enhancement, we have omitted the opinions of experts 
(human participants), therefore we did not have to seek ethical approval for our research. However, 
we understand the ethical issues associated with research and the principles that would need to be 
adhered to. 
Our research has been restricted by time constraints and cost limits, but in the determination to 
achieve our goals, simulation was the most viable option and most efficient method to produce 
diverse topologies and generate appropriate data sets for us to experiment upon and analyse. This 
ensured that the aims and objectives established were accomplished. 
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The framework incorporates vulnerabilities from multiple sources in order to simulate adequate 
network discovery and vulnerability analysis, and robustness function constraints appropriate for our 
environments, meaning the framework and applied methods are reliant upon standardised 
vulnerability scoring metrics and databases, and our requirements. Meaning accurate vulnerability 
scoring, node security grades, and infrastructure communication security scores, can be impacted by 
the associated issues of external techniques and our expertise in establishing the topologies. This is 
something we could examine as part of our future work in order to advance further the robustness of 
collaborative infrastructures and protect against zero-day attacks. 
In order to mitigate risk and secure the topology we alter communication paths between components 
forming the SoS and the SoS within multi-level SoS environments. While we have the capability to 
quantify centralities which are indicators of topological risks, at this stage we do not have the means 
to identify the consequences or resulting negative behaviour that could arise. At this stage to prove the 
appropriateness of the methods, resulting consequences or emergent behaviour was not a major factor, 
but is noteworthy as an issue to consider in the future. 
To analyse the methods and validate the effectiveness of the framework we used simulation and 
experimented on topologies that were suitable in size allowing for risks to be manually quantified and 
the results physically analysed. Therefore we require further evaluation against larger multi-level SoS 
and against physical environments in order to validate the framework’s ability to apply assessment 
methods and security risk mitigation techniques on such environments, and to ensure that results do 
not just reflect our experiments. 
 
4.1.3.6 Method Summary 
This section aims to outline and justify the research methodology that we have implemented as part of 
this thesis in order to meet our outlined aims and objectives. In the following sections within this 
chapter we discuss in detail the SeCurity Risk Analysis and Mitigation Framework and the methods 
applied for data access control management, measurements of topological vulnerabilities, and the 
security enhancement and risk mitigation techniques. This is followed in Chapters 5 and 6 with an 
outline of the implementation of these methods and their critical evaluations. 
 
4.2 SeCurity Risk Analysis and Mitigation Framework 
Maintaining a balance during a crisis situation, to ensure security does not negatively impede genuine 
and time critical communication during operations, for example, is essential to protect data and 
maintain an effective communication network. In previous work, researchers studying network 
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security and network optimisation have focused upon numerous diverse areas and specific challenges. 
These include endeavours to optimise and analyse the effectiveness of network security hardening 
[240], network security situation prediction [241], traffic optimisation [242], optimising task 
scheduling within distributed real-time systems [243], how to optimally deploy security measures 
[232], and network path optimisation [244].   
Having critically reviewed the limitations of existing research and developments within this thesis, 
including the challenges and risks which impede and expose SoS and their security, reflecting on how 
an evolutionary algorithm can be applied to optimise the level of security risk in a SoS and mitigate 
risks, and by considering a number of critical factors in order to determine the security between 
interconnected components and systems, which include the likelihood of violating access control 
requirements, risks associated with high-centrality nodes, and the overall cost of the network in terms 
of distance between nodes, an appropriate SeCurity Risk Analysis and Mitigation Framework has 
been devised, which incorporates a number of novel techniques, allowing for us to optimise 
communication security, mitigate security risks, and improve data flow security for SoS 
infrastructures without introducing additional resources.  
When developing SCRAM we had to envision a framework that would be applied to a broad range of 
ICT components and technologies, and that the SoS could potentially encompass a range of 
networked systems which could include Local Area Networks (LAN), WSN, remote networks, IoT, 
modems, firewalls, and networked systems that could be geographically dispersed. In addition, we 
perceived that the information gained from the analysis of the SoS must be accurate, as the data will 
be used to quantify the security and robustness of the entire multi-level SoS infrastructure, thus, will 
assist in identifying dependencies and risks within the topology, and prove the appropriateness of the 
reconfigured network infrastructure and its security. 
SCRAM has been developed to analyse large, complex, distributed, and dynamic SoS and multi-level 
SoS infrastructures, identifying risks and vulnerabilities which expose each node within the 
collaborative environment and that leave networked systems vulnerable to failures and potential 
attack vectors. Unidentified risks pose a great threat to SoS as both the individual systems and the 
entire collaborative infrastructure could be prevented from meeting their objectives, i.e. risks can 
directly impact the integrity and availability of components and systems within the SoS if left 
unidentified and unregulated. Detected and analysed risks, along with risks associated with important 
nodes, can then be utilised in part to evaluate the security of the networked systems, and can be 
incorporated into the evolutionary evolvement process to ensure that networks are not negatively 
mutated during the risk mitigation process. 
The proposed SCRAM framework is directly connected to the networked infrastructure in which it is 
to analyse and measure the security between the interconnected components and systems. The 
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framework has been developed to be non-intrusive and independent in order to assure that it does not 
impact the processing resources of the devices it resides upon or monitors, and to assure that it does 
not introduce additional vulnerabilities into the SoS which could expose the collaborative 
infrastructure to risk or impede the functionality of the independent systems. It has been developed to 
overcome the identified challenges and limitations of existing solutions, and achieve the aims and 
objectives presented in Section 1.3. Figure 4.1 is a representation of an SoS environment with the 
addition of the SeCurity Risk Analysis and Mitigation Framework. 
The proposed SCRAM framework measures the security between interconnected components and 
systems, achieved by identifying the composition of the SoS and conducting risk analysis and 
assessment in order to establish vulnerabilities that could expose the SoS and reduce secure 
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Figure 4.1.  SeCurity Risk Analysis and Mitigation Framework Positioning 
Identified vulnerabilities with their associated CVSS v3 base scores, and risks associated with a 
device’s software, hardware, firmware, configuration, and communication connections which have 
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been assigned the relevant security parameter scores, are utilised by SCRAM to quantify individual 
node security grades for each networked device. The method for calculating these grades is discussed 
in Section 4.7.1.4; these generated security grades identify nodes that are secure and insecure, by 
comparing them against a threshold profile, or identify devices that have not been vulnerability 
assessed. The grade can be further incorporated within the framework to assist with visualising the 
node’s security status in the undirected graphs, can assist to ascertain the overall communication 
security level, and is utilised by the proposed robustness function. 
The SCRAM framework currently simulates the SoS environments, and can either generate an SoS 
for analysis or have an existing SoS topology imported into the framework for evaluation. When an 
SoS is imported or generated within the SCRAM framework, the robustness function quantifies the 
robustness of the entire SoS topology, by first quantifying the robustness of each node within the SoS 
based on key parameters generated during the risk analysis process, then generating an overall 
robustness level for the entire collaborative infrastructure, which represents the appropriateness of the 
network as described in Section 4.7.3. The robustness level of the network represented in a single 
parameter means it can be used for decision making processes as a standalone factor, and incorporated 
into the evolutionary risk mitigation process, as a comparative evaluation number to demonstrate 
network improvement and evolvement as the network is reconfigured into a series of new solutions, in 
order to mitigate risk and increase SoS security.  
In addition, as the SoS are generated or imported, the framework not only performs the initial network 
discovery and risk assessment, it also visualises each device within the SoS and all communication 
links between the nodes in an undirected graph. During this import and generation stage, the network 
and node centralities are quantified by the framework and represent security levels of each system as 
discussed in Section 4.6, and node data access grades are compared against the data access policy 
requirements, establishing nodes that are in violation as discussed in Section 4.5. Data access grades 
and violations are also correspondingly visualised within the generated undirected graph, and these 
grades will be observed as the network is reconfigured during the risk mitigation process. The risks 
associated with data access violations will be also represented in the security score of those nodes, as 
they could introduce additional risks into the SoS by exposing data.  
During the risk mitigation process, the SoS will be reconfigured and the framework will re-quantify 
the network and node centralities, associated costs, communication security, and the robustness level 
of the SoS for each evolved candidate. The novel evolutionary process will compare the robustness 
level of reported candidates to ensure that the network does not negatively evolve, and only improved 
candidates are passed for further evolvement, with the best reported individual considered as the 
optimal reconfigured security solution. This process overcomes many of the limitations associated 
with local search, and is described in detail in Section 4.7.4.1. 




4.3 SeCurity Risk Analysis and Mitigation Framework Design 
Overview 
In this section we provide a comprehensive overview of the structure and design of the proposed 














































Figure 4.2.  Illustrated Overview of the SCRAM Framework 
User Interface Module 
The User Interface Module allows security managers to utilise the Network Import Module to either 
import an existing network into the framework for vulnerability analysis and risk mitigation, or allows 
for a network to be simulated based on the selected parameters. This can assist with the design and 
development of ICT infrastructures by simulating networked systems then analysing and 
reconfiguring the networks to mitigate risks and increase security. The interface allows for a single 
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SoS infrastructure to be selected and developed for analysis or can initiate multi-level SoS 
infrastructures for evaluation, via the Network Import Module. 
The Graph Structure Module within the interface allows security managers to select the graph 
structure type for security optimisation and risk mitigation, including the parameters for prioritisation 
during the risk mitigation process. For instance, if managers wish to improve security and mitigate 
risks focusing on the SoS node security grades and robustness, they will not wish to select the graph 
structure which prioritises and visualises node energy efficiency during the risk mitigation process.  
Within the interface window, detailed reports are generated for the SoS and after the collaborative 
infrastructure has been processed and analysed in regards to risk reduction and security enhancement, 
the interface window will visualise all generated improved optimal candidates in the form of 
undirected graphs. In addition, the interface will display detailed reports based on the evolutionary 
risk mitigation process for all improved optimal networks, including providing details of all node 
centralities for each evolved candidate. 
Network Discovery Module 
This Network Discovery Module is an automated process that systematically discovers networked 
devices and assists to map devices identified and their communication links within the Physical 
Network infrastructure, including devices and systems which share a collaborative relationship. 
Producing a detailed inventory which includes device type, operating system, whether encryption, 
firewalls, and intrusion detection systems are utilised, if anti-virus and security software is installed 
on the nodes, if the device has internet access, and the assigned data access for the node, etc. This 
information is stored within the Topology Data database, which can both be accessed by the 
Vulnerability Analysis Module and utilised by the Risk Analysis Module. An automated process is 
essential as manual network mapping would be almost impossible due to the dynamic nature, sheer 
size, and complexity of the SoS and multi-level SoS environments. 
Physical Network 
The Physical Network infrastructure is the SoS or multi-level SoS that is to be assessed for risks, and 
if required processed and analysed in regards to risk reduction and security enhancement. 
Vulnerability Analysis Module 
The Vulnerability Analysis Module accesses the Topology Data database via the Vulnerability Data 
Processing unit, which is responsible for determining the appropriate vulnerability scans for each 
node, those that have been identified as unscanned, or if the scan is considered outdated. Once the 
necessary scans have been conducted utilising the Scan Engine unit, Vulnerability Data database, and 
utilising the topology data, the Vulnerability Data Processing unit will assess the network’s nodes and 
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evaluate the risks recording the findings and updating information as necessary in the Vulnerability 
Data and Security Data databases. 
Risk assessment methodologies when applied to networks directly, can impact the functionality of 
some systems and their components. Therefore, the Vulnerability Analysis Module will identify the 
nodes which are unable to be scanned for vulnerabilities, and the risk that these unscanned nodes pose 
to the SoS will be quantified as part of the vulnerability analysis. 
The vulnerability scoring and exploit databases currently incorporated into the SCRAM frameworks 
Vulnerability Analysis Module are examined in detail in Sections 4.7.1.2 and 4.7.1.3. 
Risk Analysis Module 
This module serves several purposes; firstly the security data for each node is passed from the 
Security Data database to the Security Grade Processing unit. This unit is responsible for quantifying 
each node’s security grade based on the findings of the vulnerability analysis, these grades will then 
be compared to the relevant thresholds as part of the risk analysis process, and will be utilised as part 
of the attack graph generation method to assist with visualising node status. Security grade assignment 
is discussed in detail in Section 4.7.1. 
The Attack Graph Generation unit within this module utilises the updated topology data stored in the 
Topology Data database, threshold analysis data stored in the Threshold Data database, and the 
quantified security grades to generate an attack graph which will help establish a visualised 
representation of the network’s topology, security status, and data access violations, or can visualise 
nodes based on energy efficiency levels depending on the graph structure selected. After the 
evolutionary risk mitigation process has been implemented, the Attack Graph Generation Module will 
also be used to generate the improved optimal candidate graphs. 
The Attack Graph Analysis Engine evaluates each graph that has been generated, quantifying both 
network centralities and node centralities, with the results being stored within the Graph Centralities 
database. The importance of network centralities and associated risks are discussed in Section 4.6. In 
addition, the engine also evaluates other graph parameters such as minimum path average, network 
communication security, and cost of network communications, these parameters are stored within the 
Graph Parameters database. These parameters are stored as detailed reports that can be accessed via 
the User Interface Module, allowing security managers to analyse the entire SoS in detail. 
Threshold Analysis Module 
This module contains the Threshold Data database, and is primarily used by the Threshold Processing 
unit to identify data access violations and node security status. Thresholds will be established by the 
network security managers and these profiles will be stored within the Threshold Data database. 
During the risk analysis stage, as security grades are assigned to each node for example, the Risk 
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Analysis Module will pass these grades onto the Threshold Analysis Module for assessment, with 
results being stored within the Threshold Data database. The Security Grade Processing unit will then 
pass on the assessed results to the Attack Graph Generation unit which incorporates these results into 
the graph to ensure that insecure nodes and data access violations can be intuitively identified. The 
same method is used for storing, quantifying, and visualising node energy efficiency levels. 
Robustness Module 
This module is responsible for measuring each node within the network by means of a robustness 
function after an attack graph has been generated and analysed. During the risk mitigation process the 
Robustness Module will quantify the robustness of each node based on five key parameters which 
have been generated by the Risk Analysis Module; this method is described in detail in Section 4.7.3. 
An overall robustness level is then quantified for the network, and during the risk mitigation process 
this level assists the evolutionary algorithm to produce a new generation of improved solutions. The 
robustness score of the network also is of great benefit as it provides an assigned numerical value to 
the entire network to establish its appropriateness, and can be used as a comparative evaluation 
number as enhancements are made to the security of the SoS. 
Risk Mitigation Module 
This module contains an Evolutionary Algorithm, to overcome the limitations of local search 
techniques in large complex networks. Utilising key parameters generated by both the Risk Analysis 
Module and Robustness Module, this process generates a new set of potential solutions which are then 
evolved for comparison to find a set of best solutions, inadequate solutions die out as they are 
replaced with new better identified solutions. Each solution is fully analysed via the Risk Analysis 
Module and Robustness Module to ensure that only the best individuals are directly passed to the next 
generation of solutions until the end criterion is met. Improved solutions are stored within the Optimal 
Candidates database, and will be passed to the User Interface Module to allow for the generated 
undirected graphs, combined with the reports generated by the Risk Analysis Module to be critically 
assessed by the security managers and decision makers. In Section 4.7.4.1 the evolutionary risk 
mitigation process is described in detail. 
 
4.4 SeCurity Risk Analysis and Mitigation Framework Operation 
In this section we describe in detail the four main process stages of the SCRAM framework that 
function during its execution. The flowchart in Figure 4.3 visualises these four operational stages 
during optimal execution only, and does not represent failures occurring during runtime. 
Prior to the SCRAM framework being triggered, thresholds will have to be established based on 
analysis of an organisation’s network or default values would be utilised. These constant values will 
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include security level (i.e. anything below the threshold is considered insecure), highest bridging 
centrality, centrality degree, minimum path average, and associated network cost in terms of distance 
between nodes. These values will depend on the importance of the concerned factor and the 

















































































Figure 4.3.  SeCurity Risk Analysis and Mitigation Framework Execution Flowchart 
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While we have programmed SCRAM to simulate several different types of ICT devices, it could be 
easily extended further based on the requirements of an organisation, prior to the framework being 
triggered. 
Initial Operation Stage (Green) 
The initial stage will first require the type of graph structure to be selected, as in this thesis we have 
implemented two distinct types of monitoring and evaluation, as proof of concept. SCRAM can 
switch the framework to focus on risk reduction and security enhancement based on security and data 
access, or can prioritise energy efficiency (i.e. incorporate and focus on different risk vectors) with 
minimal importance placed on security and data access. Once the graph structure has been established 
security managers can chose to either import an existing network profile into the framework, or they 
can input network parameters directly into SCRAM which will assign the relevant attributes to the 
network which will be simulated and analysed by the system. 
Network Discovery Stage (Red) 
The relevant network data is collated in order to establish the full SoS environment, including 
identifying essential communication links between devices and data access grades. It will also 
establish if nodes within the SoS have recently had a vulnerability scan run against them, require a 
vulnerability scan to be conducted, cannot be scanned due to the potential negative impact a live scan 
could cause, or have not been scanned and are outside of the managerial remit so one cannot be 
conducted. Once the vulnerability scan status has been identified for each node, the relevant 
vulnerability scans if required can be conducted within the networked environments. In this instance 
vulnerability scans are simulated within SCRAM against each of the simulated infrastructures. 
After all vulnerability scans have been completed, SCRAM conducts a full vulnerability analysis of 
the results for the entire SoS. Identified vulnerabilities will be assessed and compared against 
vulnerability databases and assigned risk scores using vulnerability scoring techniques outlined in 
Sections 4.7.1.2 and 4.7.1.3. Utilising these scores, each node will be graded with an individual 
security score based on the results from both its identified topology data and the vulnerability analysis 
results defined in Section 4.7.1.  
Each individual node’s data access level and security grade will be compared as part of the threshold 
analysis. This is to identify nodes that should be blocked and not allowed to have unsecure data 
traverse via the communication paths with other secure nodes, as the node has a lower data access 
level than the network’s assigned level thus violates data access control requirements. Threshold 
analysis will also identify nodes that have been quantified as insecure, i.e. the assigned score is lower 
than the permitted minimum security grade assigned and agreed by security managers. This means 
that critical data will only be allowed to traverse along communication paths via secure nodes that are 
not in breach of data access policies, with nodes’ statuses being documented and reported.  
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Attack Graph Generation and Analysis (Grey) 
The framework will generate an attack graph based upon the analysis of the network’s topology, risk 
assessment, and security analysis. The attack graph will assist to intuitively identify communication 
links between nodes within the collaborative environment, and will visualise node security status, data 
access violations, and security grades. Once the graph has been established, SCRAM will quantify the 






These centralities are quantified using mathematical formulas, which provide numerical values to 
assist in the identification of risks, important relationships between nodes, and behavioural 
characteristics. SCRAM will also then quantify the minimum path average and associated network 
costs (in terms of the distance between nodes), provide numerical values for these parameters which 
can help assist in the decision making process when analysing a network, and can reflect both 
improvements and financial consequences. Finally, SCRAM quantifies the overall network 
communication security status; this score is a direct reflection of the number of secure routes for 
encrypted data to traverse. 
The undirected graph is further modified to visualise the bridging centrality of each node, achieved by 
increasing or decreasing node size which is directly correlated to the quantified bridging centrality 
score. SCRAM will also analyse the attack graph further and produce a series of reports based on the 
network’s topology, risks, and will also include centralities, minimum path average, network cost, and 
communication security.  
The final analysis stage measures each node via the robustness function, this assists in determining the 
optimal robustness and security level of the network. To quantify the network’s robustness the 
following five criteria are used as part of the robustness function (discussed in Section 4.7.3): 
 Communication Security Level. 
 Highest Bridging Centrality Score. 
 Degree Centrality of the Network. 
 Average Minimum Path Length. 
 Total Cost (in terms of distance between nodes). 
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Once completed the undirected graph and reports are sent to the user interface for analysis, prior to 
any risk mitigation process being applied to the SoS. 
Security Risk Mitigation Analysis (Blue) 
The framework does not automatically optimise the network’s security; this ensures that the original 
SoS can be reviewed by analysts prior to the collaborative infrastructure’s evolvement. Instead once 
the original network has been simulated, analysed, and reported, the process can be discontinued or at 
this point the security risk mitigation process can be initiated from the user interface. In order to 
successfully reconfigure the network and determine its optimal security configuration, ensuring that 
risks are mitigated and the security is enhanced without introducing additional resources into the 
infrastructure, first the original network is passed into the security risk mitigation process, and then 
the evolutionary risk mitigation algorithm which is described in detail in Section 4.7.4.1 is applied. 
Simplified, the security risk mitigation process evolves the network searching for an optimal 
reconfigured solution, and this evolutionary algorithm measures the appropriateness of each evolved 
network utilising the robustness function. 
If the end criterion is not met, the risk mitigation process is applied to the set of best candidates that 
are generated via the risk mitigation algorithm. Once the end criterion has been met, the improved 
evolved candidates are returned to the undirected graph generation process in order for them to be 
visualised as both graphs and reports in the user interface. At this stage the network could be 
enhanced again by applying the risk mitigation algorithm if required, or the process can be 
disconnected.  
 
4.5 Data Access Control Problem and Management 
Through surveying the associated literature, we perceive that access safeguards are of vital 
importance from a security standpoint, and an important challenge that requires further advancement 
due to the reliance on data transfer during crisis operations, recognising the significance of the data 
access control problem as surveyed in [237] which outlines a principal model of access control 
(MATTS), demonstrating data flow between collaborative infrastructures and establishing potential 
access issues. Using these principal concepts and building upon previous solutions using the MATTS 
tool to identify such vulnerabilities within crisis management scenarios, we propose a novel solution 
that identifies and mitigates different types of risks, and enhances both data security and improves 
data flow security of the overall network. 
Smart Cities and crisis operations rely upon the generation and distribution of data, the security of this 
data and access control is problematic. We use the scenario of a crisis situation occurring within a 
Smart City to explain the challenges and requirements of access control.  




Figure 4.4.  Composed Data Access Control Scenario of a Smart City 
An easy solution to protect the data would be via the use of traditional cryptographic methods, which 
secures the data at the cost of increasing computational overhead. As sensors have restricted 
computational power and memory, these cryptography methods would require heavy adaptation for 
this environment, and alternative solutions are more desirable [245] [226] [246]. 
A demonstrative example scenario is provided in Figure 4.4, depicting communications between 
emergency services (mobile devices), transportation (sensor), and the local government (server) in 
response to a crisis within a Smart City. Collaborative nodes are connected via varying 
communication links that include smart devices and a static sensor, with differing security levels. 
Unencrypted data with a security level of 3 is being forwarded across the collaborative network, 
between nodes A and F. Figure 4.4 visualises every possible secure and insecure connection in which 
data with the appropriate security level can traverse between the two nodes, with thick red lines 
indicating data access violations. 
Access control between organisations is demonstrated in Equations 4.1 through to 4.10, where A is the 
created data set, n is the number organisations, a is the organisation, d is the piece of data (i.e. the data 
which is to be forwarded), 𝐴′ is the subset of the created data set A, r is the access rule, D is the piece 
of data people are entitled to access, P is the people entitled to access data D, m is the mapping of an 
organisation to its members, u is the user, σ(d) is the data sensitivity level, α(u) is the assigned 
authorisation level for the user, and c represents the complement of the set. 
Organisations within the city can be split into sub-units, i.e. the situation involves a set A of n 
organisations, where A = {α1, α2, …, αn}, for example police operators are represented by more than 
one element from A. While in general, access control procedures would be operational within 
organisations, in this crisis scenario, members within each organisation can access all data within their 
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own organisation. However, should organisations be split into multiple sub-units with individual data 
scores assigned, it would be possible to model the majority of applied access control procedures 
[237]. 
Assume an organisation αi and piece of data d. The organisation αi forms part of a network which is 
made up from a number of elements from A. Let 𝐴′ ⊆ 𝐴 be all organisations downstream from αi for 
data item d, which is, all these organisations are reachable within the network from αi and permitted 
to access d [237]. 
Let 
 
 𝑟: 𝐷 ⟶ 𝑃 (4.1) 
 
represent the access rules that map a piece of data to the people entitled to access it, and 
 
 𝑚: 𝐴 ⟶ 𝑃  (4.2) 
 
represent the mapping of an organisation to its members. Then the general form of the access policy 
we aim to ensure is that: 
 




where c  represents the complement of the set. 
Using naïve set theory, this is equivalent to saying that: 
 




People with access to the downstream nodes from αi are within the user set who are entitled to access 
data d. In distributed environments this requirement can be of high importance [237]. 
We assume that node A is corresponding with node F, as demonstrated in Figure 4.4, and forwards 
unencrypted data with a sensitivity level of 3 across the communications network. Conveying our 
scenario as, every element of data is assigned a sensitivity level between 1 (the most sensitive) and 10 
(the least sensitive), with each organisation being assigned an access level from 1 (the greatest access) 
to 10 (minimum access). Organisation members are authorised to access data of that level or higher. 
We infer a user u has authorisation level α(u) and an element of data d has a sensitivity level σ(d), 
hence, u can access d if α(u) ≤ σ(d) [237]. 
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We can derive this scheme from the general case by stating that, for an element of data d has 
sensitivity level σ(d), we define: 
 
 𝑟(𝑑) = {𝑝 ∈ 𝑃: 𝜎(𝑝) ≤ 𝜎(𝑑)} (4.5) 
 
and for an organisation α with authorisation level α(a) we define: 
 
 𝑚(𝑎) ⊆ {𝑝 ∈ 𝑃: 𝛼(𝑝) ≤ 𝛼(𝑎)} (4.6) 
 
Given the above definitions, we note that: 
 
 𝑟(𝑑)c = {𝑝 ∈ 𝑃: 𝜎(𝑝) > 𝜎(𝑑)}, (4.7) 
 
and so using these interpretations, our earlier access rule becomes: 
 




which we can guarantee if: 
 




which is equivalent to saying that: 
 
 𝛼(𝑎) ≤ 𝜎(𝑑) for all 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴′. (4.10) 
 
As a result, each downstream node’s authorisation level is less than or equal to the sensitivity level of 
the data d (i.e. the low number represents higher access). 
We must also consider that Smart Cities typically contain a series of sensor networks and IoT. When 
we can overview the topology of such collaborative networks we see that they are a combination of 
diverse devices that sense data or control and interact with other systems and objects. This type of 
topology could form a complex series of differing communication links across a city, with devices 
connecting and transferring different types of data, in a variety of formats, and via various protocols. 
The scenario in Figure 4.5 is a demonstrative example of such devices and connections. Each device 
that is connected to the IoT and sensor network within the city has different security grades based on 
the level of risk it poses to the network, and each device has an assigned data access level. Devices 
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that can make up such a varied network can include cars, CCTV, transportation, telephones, weather 
sensors, and smart devices for example. 
 
Figure 4.5.  Composed Smart City Consisting of Sensitivity Levels and Data Flow Risk 
The motivation behind the development of IoT is its potential to connect diverse ‘things’ together, 
meaning that devices can be accessed or controlled remotely across the communication infrastructure. 
In this scenario we cannot simply block and reroute data via different communication paths to 
devices, as the objects that they are connecting with are meant to be accessed or controlled, i.e. 
devices with lower security and data access levels may be required to interact with devices that have 
higher security and data access levels within the city. 
 
4.6 Topological Vulnerabilities  
In addition to the data access control problem we also consider the problematic relational states 
between the nodes, in an attempt to identify vulnerabilities and critical risks which have the ability to 
expose the collaborating systems. Realised through the use of mathematical formulas and the 
assignment of numeric numbers to risks, which allows for risks to be quantified and network 
topologies to be visualised. With advancement in the fields of graph theory, network theory, and 
social network analysis, there has been considerable progress with mathematical and computational 
tools. This allows for important relationships between nodes to be conveyed, and can assist with 
ascertaining network behaviour characteristics. For instance, centrality indicators (degree, 
betweenness, closeness, eigenvector, and bridging) help to assist us with ascertaining a node’s 
(vertices) importance within a network and identify vulnerabilities associated with connectivity [247] 
[248]. 




4.6.1 High Connectivity Vulnerability 
Nodes that are highly connected, if attacked or disconnected from the network, can leave low 
connected nodes isolated and cut off from the remainder of the network and can reduce the number of 
secure routes available for data transfer. In addition, the removal of highly connected nodes within a 
Smart City environment could disconnect and split the networked infrastructure into isolated networks 
and prevent the SoS from meeting objectives, and reduce the number of paths data can traverse. In the 
worst case scenario, this vulnerability could cause major disruptions and cascade failures as the 
infrastructure fails to communicate and meet objectives. High connectivity can be identified by the 
quantification of a node’s degree centrality. 
 
Figure 4.6.  Schematic Representation of Degree Centrality 
Degree centrality assists with the identification of how popular or active a node is within a network, 
for example, a high degree value indicates the node’s dominance within the network. This is 
accomplished by quantifying the number of connections (edges) each node has, for a node u is the 









where deg(u) is the number of node u’s edges and V  is the set of nodes in the network [247]. 
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4.6.2 Shortest Path Vulnerability 
Nodes that are centrally located based on the high number of shortest paths that pass through the 
node, are more influential than other nodes. Should a Smart City device located on a high degree of 
shortest paths be attacked or disconnected from the network, then these influential nodes can cause 
failures to occur across the entire city due to the node being responsible for the transfer of essential 
data across the networked infrastructure. Failings could cause both minor and major disruptions to the 
Smart City’s services and assets, and could result in economic loss both locally and globally, etc. A 
node’s degree of shortest paths can be identified by the quantification of a node’s betweenness 
centrality. 
 
Figure 4.7.  Schematic Representation of Betweenness Centrality 
Betweenness centrality conveys a node’s centrality; the nodes situated on the shortest path route are in 
a unique position within the network as they are often the nodes most relied upon to transfer data as it 
navigates across the network. A higher betweenness value indicates the node’s importance in regards 
to data flow, yet also determines its potential to be a single point of failure within the environment.  
Accomplished by quantifying the number of shortest path connections that traverse through a node, 
for a node u is the proportional number of shortest paths between all node pairs in the network that 












where σs,t  is the total number of shortest paths from source node s  to destination node t, and 𝜎𝑠,𝑡(𝑢) 
is the number of shortest paths from source node s to destination node t which actually pass through 
node u  [247]. 
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4.6.3 Single Points of Failure 
Nodes that are potential SPoF, if attacked or disconnected from the network, can prevent data from 
traversing across the networked systems, causing large sections of the network to become fragmented 
or could incapacitate an entire infrastructure. In addition, SPoF can cause partial or full cascading 
failures to quickly ripple across the infrastructure. Should SPoF occur within a Smart City, then 
critical failings could occur across the city, directly resulting in economic loss, damage to systems, 
prevent access to vital services provided by the city’s assets, or could result in the loss of human life, 
etc. It is essential to identify these interdependent nodes to ensure Smart Cities remain robust.  Nodes 
at risk of becoming SPoF can be identified by the quantification of a node’s closeness centrality. 
 
Figure 4.8.  Schematic Representation of Closeness Centrality 
Closeness centrality assists with the identification of nodes with the shortest paths, and those nodes 
which are uniquely situated with access to all nodes within the structure either directly or indirectly. 
Highly centralised networks are in general greatly unstable, should node failures or disconnections 
occur then the network can quickly become fragmented and failure could ensue. However, low 
centralised networks in general are not prone to SPoF, meaning in the event of node disablement the 
network tends to remain functional via the use of alternative edges. This centrality is accomplished by 
quantifying the node’s distance to all other nodes, for a node u is the average inverse shortest path 








where dist(u,v) is the length of the shortest path from node u to node v [247]. 
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4.6.4 Weighted High Connectivity  
Nodes that are highly connected to other highly connected nodes within the network have an 
increased influence over the entire infrastructure. High connectivity also increases complexity and 
introduces additional vulnerabilities to the node increasing associated risk. These nodes if 
disconnected or attacked within a Smart City environment would quickly result in the network 
becoming fragmented, and prevent the transfer of communication across the city, resulting in both 
direct and indirect system failures. SPoF could also arise, with the potential for cascading failures to 
ripple across the city. Weighted high connectivity can be identified by quantifying a node’s 
eigenvector centrality. 
 
Figure 4.9.  Schematic Representation of Eigenvector Centrality 
Eigenvector centrality assists with the identification of those nodes which play a more prominent role 
within the network. This type of centrality is considered to be more advanced than degree centrality, 
as it differentiates links that are not equal to each other. Eigenvector centrality is accomplished by 
quantifying and assigning values to nodes based not only on the number of links but also if those links 
establish a connection to other prominent nodes within a network, for the prominence of a node u is 












where N(u) is the set of nodes reachable directly from u and λ is a constant. With vector–matrix 
notation, this equation can be rewritten as λ ∙Ceig = W ∙Ceig where Ceig – (Ceig(v))v∈V and W – (Wu,v)u,v∈V. 
Therefore Ceig is an eigenvector of the weighted adjacency matrix W with eigenvalue λ [247]. 
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4.6.5 Dependent Communication Vulnerability  
Nodes that are depended upon to maintain communications within a network, if attacked or 
disconnected can fragment the network and leave nodes isolated. The removal or failure of nodes 
which are highly depended upon to maintain communications within a Smart City can prevent 
objectives from being met as critical data cannot be accessed or transferred. Any interruption to 
critical data transfer or creation could prevent SoS collaboration, and result in SPoF and cascading 
failures. Nodes which are highly depended upon can be identified by the quantification of a node’s 
bridging centrality. 
 
Figure 4.10.  Schematic Representation of Bridging Centrality 
Bridging centrality conveys whether a node is densely connecting other nodes within a network, and 
whether the node’s topological location and data flow are relied upon by those various connected 
regions, i.e. identifies nodes within a graph which are positioned between regions, and which are most 
critical and could interrupt data flow within the network in the event of failure. Identifying nodes with 
high bridging centrality can assist with network protection and help administrators to improve the 
overall robustness of the network. Bridging centrality is accomplished by quantifying the network’s 
betweenness centrality CB and the bridging coefficient BC, thus measures a node’s global and local 
features. The bridging centrality CR(v) for v  of interest is defined by [249]: 
 
 𝐶𝑅(𝑣)  =  𝐵𝐶(𝑣)  × 𝐶𝐵(𝑣) (4.15) 
 
4.7 Security Enhancement and Risk Mitigation Techniques 
We consider high risk nodes in the network throughout the security enhancement and risk mitigation 
process, focusing upon nodes with a high degree of connectivity, i.e. nodes measured through 
bridging centrality. Nodes with high bridging centrality pose a greater threat to networks, as should 
these nodes be compromised or a failure occur, the impact caused to these critical points has the 
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capacity to interrupt data flow. To minimise these risks, we mitigate risk and increase security by 
reconfiguring the network connectivity, achieved by changing connections among the nodes in order 
to determine the most secure combination of links. In addition to security factors (degree centrality, 
bridging centrality, and communication security level), we examine two natural factors during the risk 
mitigation process. These are the average minimum path length, which takes the average of all 
shortest paths between pairs of nodes within the network, and the cost of communications. This is the 
sum of all link weights, and is calculated as the geodesic distance between connected nodes. 
 
4.7.1 Node Security Grade Assignment 
In order to overcome the limitations of existing solutions it is vital that the SCRAM framework can 
efficiently quantity an accurate security grade for all nodes within the SoS.  This section presents a 
detailed insight into SoS vulnerability analysis, CVSS scoring system, and NVD vulnerability 
database, which have advanced the functionality of the framework. Then finally outlines the method 
for measuring and assigning node security grades. 
 
4.7.1.1 Vulnerability Analysis 
Typically, vulnerabilities would be initially identified using a network vulnerability scanner, which 
allows hosts to be scanned along with the topology of the network. These tools identify and provide 
specifics on vulnerabilities within the network’s topology and hosts, generating details on weaknesses 
such as open ports, network configurations, system components, operating systems, software 
applications and services, log-ons, and active IP addresses, etc. 
They can also assist in prioritising the implementation of solutions, and have the capability to detect 
malicious services such as Trojans. Vulnerability scanners though, must be used as part of a risk 
assessment strategy and not as a full standalone security solution, as they can struggle to identify 
vulnerabilities resulting in false positives. Unlike firewalls, anti-virus, and intrusion detection 
systems, vulnerability scanners provide a proactive approach to ICT security rather than purely 
endeavouring to defend against attacks. Providing an automated platform that identifies vulnerabilities 
and analysis of network states [250], popular scanners that can be utilised include Nessus [93], Retina 
[94], Nmap [95], Nespose [97], and MaxPatrol [96]. 
In addition to network vulnerability scanners, vulnerability scoring and exploit databases can also be 
incorporated into the risk assessment strategy for the identification and quantification of 
vulnerabilities. The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [251], National Vulnerability 
Database (NVD) [92], Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [103], SecurityFocus Forum 
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[104], Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) [105], and Bugtraq Security Database [104], 
for example, have been developed over the last couple of decades to identify and measure 
vulnerabilities in a variety of ways with differing focuses. Some of the schemas provide threat 
warning systems, whereas others provide vulnerability databases, while several vulnerability scoring 
methods assist directly with vulnerability identification [250].  
CVSS has heavily influenced our research and the development and implementation of our SCRAM 
framework, as the algorithms within the methodology [251] have been widely incorporated into many 
vulnerability applications as they have the capacity to assist with assigning numerical values to risks 
and vulnerabilities. Scores are composed based on three metric groups (base, temporal, and 
environmental), and are summarised in Section 4.7.1.2 below. We also incorporate the principles of 
NVD [92] into SCRAM, as it supports the automation of vulnerability management and security. 
NVD is an open repository of vulnerabilities, and is summarised in Section 4.7.1.3. 
 
4.7.1.2 Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) 
 
Figure 4.11. Overview of the CVSS v3.0 Metric Groups 
Source: Schematic representation of CVSS v3.0 Specification [251]. 
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) provides standardised vulnerability scoring, an 
open framework, and contextual scoring, as shown in Figure 4.11. Scores are composed based on 
three metric groups (base, temporal and environmental). Providing a platform that assigns risk in a 
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standardised manner, including a schema that has the functionality to accommodate industry specifics 
[251]. 
The base equation score is considered the foundation of the scoring schema. Once a base metric has 
been assigned to a distinct vulnerability, the base equation will calculate a risk score ranging from 0 to 
10. Base scores can be advanced by assigning values to the temporal and/or environmental metrics, 
providing a more accurate score for the vulnerability within its environment. This is not essential as 
the schema can still quantify the base score vector [251] defined as, 
 
 If (Impact sub score <=  0 else, 0) 
Scope Unchanged Roundup(Minimum[(Impact = Exploitability),  10]) 
(4.16) 
 
And the Impact sub score (ICS) defined as, 
 
 Scope Unchanged  6.42 x ISCBase       







 𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 = 1 − [(1 − 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓) × (1 − 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔) × (1 − 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙)] (4.18) 
 
And the Exploitability sub score is,  
 




Temporal score is defined as, 
 




The environmental score is defined as, 
 
 If (Modified Impact 0 else, 
Sub score <= 0) 
(4.21) 
 
 If Modified Scope is  Round up(Round up (Minimum [ 
Unchanged    (M.Impact + M.Exploitability) , 10]) 
     x Exploit Code Maturity 
(4.22) 
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     x Remediation Level 
     x Report Confidence) 
 
 If Modified Scope is Round up(Round up(Minimum [1.08                
Changed    x (M.Impact + M.Exploitability) , 10] 
     x Exploit Code Maturity 
     x Remediation Level 
    x Report Confidence) 
 
(4.23) 
And the modified Impact sub score is defined as, 
 










 𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 [[1 − (1 − 𝑀. 𝐼𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓 × 𝐶𝑅) × (1 − 𝑀. 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔 × 𝐼𝑅) × 
(1 − 𝑀. 𝐼𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙 × 𝐴𝑅)], 0.915] 
(4.26) 
 
The Modified Exploitability sub score is, 
 
 8.22 × 𝑀. 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑉𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 × 𝑀. 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦 × 𝑀. 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 
 × 𝑀. 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜n 
(4.27) 
 
4.7.1.3 National Vulnerability Database (NVD) 
NVD is an open repository of vulnerabilities, including essential details in regards to security-related 
software flaws, security check lists, impact metrics, product names, and misconfigurations. This 
database is also reliant upon the CVE repository; nonetheless, NVD augments additional analysis and 
thus can be considered its superior. While NVD is synchronised to automatically update when new 
vulnerabilities are identified and published by CVE, it cannot be categorised as a real-time 
vulnerability and reporting mechanism. This is due to the fact that  NVD analysts can take as long as 
two full working days to analyse the vulnerabilities and augment the vulnerability attributes [92] 
[250].  
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Table 4.1 National Vulnerability Database Scoring Methodology Overview 
Stage Process 
NVD receives vulnerability 
information via CVE. 
 CVE dictionary feeds include: 
a) The unique CVE identifier. 
b) Description of the vulnerability. 
c) Links to websites and other references (related to vulnerability). 
NVD vulnerability analysts 
process the information. 
 Link availability and applicability (verify link publically available and related to 
vulnerability). 
 Link verification contains specific data relating to one of the following: 
a) US government resource. 
b) Advisory notice or bulletin. 
c) Patch or update for vulnerability. 
d) Proof of concept or exploit. 
 CWE identification (determine if the vulnerability description associates with a CWE 
weakness). 
 Assign CVSS metrics (assign CVSS base metric values, using scoring templates to 
ensure consistency among vulnerability analysts). 
Source: NVD.nist.gov [92] and CVE.mitre.org [103]. 
Via third-parties, data is collected in regards to issues; attributes are then assigned to a specific 
vulnerability. The CVE website provides details in regards to analysis of the vulnerability, and then 
CVSS metrics are applied to determine the vulnerabilities impact metrics. Common Weakness 
Enumeration (CWE) determines software weaknesses in a unified measurable format, and Common 
Platform Enumeration (CPE) ensures applicable statements are included, along with other relevant 
metadata.  
A summary of the scoring methodology used by NVD to identify, analyse, and score vulnerabilities is 
outlined in Table 4.1. Once vulnerabilities are assigned metrics, they are made available to 
organisations via XML Data Feeds, with no restrictions placed upon its use [92] [250]. Table 4.2 
provides an example summary of vulnerability CVE-2016-7211 which was identified by CVE and has 
been assigned impact metrics by NVD [92]. Using NVD, these vulnerabilities can be scanned for and 
identified within the simulation, then quantified into the solution’s security grade assignment, thus 
improve network security and network reconfiguration. 
When we review the CVSS severity scores in Table 4.2, we note a marginal difference between the 
scores, with CVSS version 3 scoring vulnerability CVE-2016-7211 0.1 higher than version 2. This 
was a notable factor that influenced the development of the SCRAM framework, choosing to utilise 
CVSS v3 scores over its predecessor. As CVSS v3 has increased the accuracy of its scoring technique 
by incorporating additional solutions, and having incorporated new metrics which are Scope and User 
Interaction within the Base Metric group. Additionally, the Authentication metric was replaced with 
Privileges Required. The Environmental Metrics group was also updated with a new Modified Base 
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Metrics which supports analysts to customise host scores that have been affected within the 
organisation. These Metrics and Metrics Groups are visualised in Figure 4.11. 




The kernel-mode drivers in Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, 
Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, and Windows 10 
Gold, 1511, and 1607 allow local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka "Win32k 
Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability." a different vulnerability than CVE-2016-3266, CVE-2016-3376, 
and CVE-2016-7185. 
Impact 
CVSS Severity (version 3.0): CVSS Severity (version 2.0): 
CVSS v3 Base 
Score: 






Impact Score: 5.9 Impact Subscore: 10.0 
Exploitability 
Score: 
1.3 Exploitability Score: 3.9 
CVSS Version 3 
Metrics: 
 CVSS Version 2 Metrics:  
Attack Vector 
(AV): 




Low Access Complexity: Low 
Privileges 
Required (PR): 




















Source: NVD.nist.gov [92]. 
 
4.7.1.4 Calculating Node Security Grades 
Using the metrics within CVSS along with scoring systems and vulnerability data bases, in addition to 
the data security level and energy efficiency grade, we can quantify a security grade for each node 
based upon the node’s individual software, hardware, and firmware. Security is graded on a scale of 0 
to 10, with a security grade of 0 being considered the most secure and 10 least secure. Data types 
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retrieved for each node include firewall status, intrusion detection system status, encryption status and 
if used type, operating system, staff skill level, system update status, anti-virus/security, internet 
access, data security level, etc., with each data type being assigned its related risk probability score.  
Table 4.3. Example Parameters and Their Associated Risk Probability Scores 
 
Risk Type 
Risk Probability Score 
Low Risk                  High Risk 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Firewall Status True         False 
IDS True         False 
Encryption 
Status 
True         False 
Encryption 
Type 
AES - 256 TDES - 168   RC2 - 128  WEP - 114    
Operating 
System 












High    Medium     Low 
System 
Updated 
True         False 
Anti-
Virus/Security 
True         False 
Internet 
Access 
False         True 
Data Security 
Level 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Table 4.3 demonstrates example parameters and their associated risk probability scores; values are 
assigned based on the specific domain security requirements and expertise of the security managers 
and administration. In this example scenario we assigned these constants to reflect our initial network 
environment, and values are assigned depending on the importance of the concerned factor and their 
magnitude. 
We consider the data security level as a risk, therefore it contributes to the quantification of the final 
security grade for the node. These grades are then incorporated into the risk mitigation process. All 
parameters used to quantify and assess the appropriateness of the reconfigured network are shown in 
Table 4.4. 
The quantification of each node’s security grade is shown in Equations 4.28 and 4.29, where A is the 
security grade arithmetic mean, n is the number of node vulnerabilities, v is the value of the identified 
vulnerabilities, ?̅?  is the weighted security grade arithmetic mean, and w is the weight of the 
vulnerabilities data source. 
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Table 4.4. Simulated Risk Parameters and Associated Risk Probability Scores 
Centralities Risk Type  and Probability Score Other 
Degree (0 – 1) Firewall Status (0 or 10) Robustness 
Betweenness (0 – 1) IDS (0 or 10) Energy Level (0 – 10) 
Closeness (0 – 1) Encryption Status (0 or 10) Cost 
Eigenvector Encryption Method (0 – 10) Minimum Path Average 
Bridging (0 – 1) Operating System (0 – 10) Security Grade (0 – 10) 
 Staff Skill Level (0 – 10)  
 System updated (0 or 10)  
 Anti-Virus/Security (0 or 10)  
 Internet Access (0 or 10)  
 Data Security Level (0 – 10)  
 Identified Vulnerabilities (CVSS v3 Base Score)  
 
In order to establish a single security grade using the scores assigned by the identified risks, as we 
know the source and reliability of each score there is no need to use a weighted average, instead we 
can apply arithmetic mean. To determine the security grade arithmetic mean A, assume each node will 
have n vulnerabilities collated based on its risk assessment.  Denote the values of the n vulnerabilities 
by v1, v2, …, vn,  which are the assigned values of the identified vulnerabilities [252], defined as:  
 
 
𝐴 =  




Should we be forced to incorporate sources of data that are unreliable or should the data’s weight not 
be equal, then we can quantify a single security grade using weighted arithmetic mean. This would 
assist to determine the security grade’s weighted arithmetic mean ?̅? assuming that each node has a set 
of vulnerabilities V1, V2, …, Vn, which have respective weights of w1, w2, …, wn, defined as:  
 
 
?̅? =  
𝑤1𝑉1 +  𝑤2𝑉2  +  …  +  𝑤𝑛𝑉𝑛  




4.7.2 Network Data Flow Security Level  
The quantification of the networks data flow security is shown in Equation 4.30, where S(N) is the 
security level, G is the set of potential grades, N is the Network, Vg is the set of nodes with the 
required authorisation level, g is the given data sensitivity level, 𝛿𝑠,𝑡(𝑔) is the step function, and s and  
t are the nodes between secure paths. 
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To determine the data security level of a network, we assume that the nodes which form the network 
are static, yet have dynamic connectivity (i.e. nodes can change communication links). Each node 
within the network will be assigned an authorisation level, as discussed in Section 4.5. In terms of 
security, it is vital that elements of data are only passed via nodes along communication links with 




𝑆(𝑁) =  
∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑠,𝑡(𝑔)𝑠,𝑡∈𝑉𝑔,𝑠≠𝑡∀𝑔∈𝐺
∑ |𝑉𝑔| × (|𝑉𝑔| − 1)∀𝑔∈𝐺
 (4.30) 
 
In this equation G is the set of different grades that nodes inside the network N might have assigned, 
Vg is the set of nodes inside the network that reach the required authorisation level to access the given 
data at level g, δs,t(g) is a step function taking the value 1 if it’s possible to find a secure path 
between s and t, given the sensitivity level g and 0 otherwise; and n=|N| is the number of nodes 
within the network. In essence S(N) represents the proportion of secure paths between pairs of nodes 
that are entitled to communicate. 
 
4.6.3 Robustness Function 
Once a network has either been simulated or imported into the SCRAM framework, each node is 
measured by the means of a robustness function (Equation 4.31). To determine the optimal configured 
network that mitigates risks and increases the overall SoS security, five main criteria are used as a 
guide. These are the communication security level S(N), highest bridging centrality score 𝐶𝑅(𝑣 ∗), 
degree centrality of the network 𝐶𝐷(𝐺), average minimum path length 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛, and total cost C. The 
robustness function is defined as: 
 
 ∅(𝑖) = [𝑎1𝐶𝑅(𝑣 ∗) + 𝑎2𝐶𝐷(𝐺)  +  𝑎3𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛 +  𝑎4𝐶]/𝑆(𝑁) (4.31) 
   
Here 𝑣 ∗ is the node with the highest bridging centrality. As the robustness function shows, the main 
factor is the communications security level achieved. Values for the constants are as follows:  
  a1 = 50000, 
a2 = 4000, 
a3 = 60, 
a4 = 10.5 
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Constant values are determined by analysis of an organisation’s network and would be assigned by 
the security experts and administration. In this example scenario, we assigned these constants to 
reflect our networks environments, a1 represents the highest bridging centrality, a2 is assigned the 
centrality degree, a3 minimum path average, and a4 associated network cost in terms of distance 
between nodes. The values assigned to these constants not only depend on the importance of the 
concerned factor, but also on the magnitude. For example, while centralities generate low numbers, 
the cost tends to be significantly higher. The lower the robustness score, the more appropriate the 
individual evaluated. It has been ascertained that the robustness increase is inversely proportional to 
S(N), and that as the other factors increase so does the robustness. The motive being, that we require 
S(N) to be maximised and all other factors to be minimised,  as searching for a lower robustness level, 
means instigating higher communication security, while preserving low cost, degree centrality, 
bridging centrality, and average minimum path length.  
 
4.7.4 Risk Mitigation 
In order to enhance the level of security risk within SoS environments, we outline an evolutionary 
algorithm and probabilistic technique that can be applied to the collaborative infrastructure, that 
reconfigures communication links between networked devices into an optimal configuration. In order 
to assure data as it traverses across the collaborative infrastructure, mitigate risks, and enhance 
network security, while observing access control requirements, high centrality node risk, and insecure 
vulnerable devices, this process overcomes many of the limitations associated with local search 
techniques.  
To evaluate and ascertain the effectiveness of our proposed solution we implemented two additional 
algorithms into SCRAM (Ant Colony Optimisation combined with Local Search and Tabu Search) 
discussed below in Sections 4.7.4.2 and 4.7.4.3, allowing us to critically evaluate the technique’s 
efficiency and suitability. 
 
4.7.4.1 Genetic Algorithm 
Influenced by nature’s capacity to overcome adversity and ability to manage and sense risk, we 
researched and developed an evolutionary technique in order to establish an effective security 
enhancement and risk mitigation solution. For a living organism to survive in the depths of the ocean, 
they must overcome adversity with the capacity to survive countless life threatening risks. 
Furthermore, light fails to penetrate the largest depths of the ocean, meaning the life that lives close to 
the bottom of the sea bed is encompassed in darkness. To survive, predators such as deep sea jelly fish 
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have evolved to be energy efficient due to long periods without being able to feed, and they must also 
be capable on a different level of sensing the environment, navigating risks effectively, and signalling 
threats. Through evolvement they have adapted to identify risks without the ability to see them or 
their entire surroundings, which has inspired our research and proposed solution [253]. 
Genetic Algorithms are based on natural selection, imitating biological evolution. These algorithms 
overcome many of the limitations associated with local search techniques, when applied to large 
complex networks. The basis of the algorithm is to take an initial set of potential solutions, then 
evolve the set to become a set of best solutions. Through the evolutionary process, inadequate 
solutions die out, whereas the qualities of the superior solutions are amalgamated and disseminated 
through to new solutions, which are added to the set. Set size remains constant, so as new better 
solutions are identified they replace the older inadequate solutions. Random mutations are applied to 
the new generated solutions, ensuring that the new set of best solutions does not evolve into a set of 
duplicated solutions. The evolutionary process continues until a predetermined end criterion is met 
[254] [255] [256].  
The initial population of individuals used by the Genetic Algorithm (GA) is the original network 
(encoded as an individual), along with a collection of randomly generated alternatives. For the 
purpose of our work, the population size is constant and set to be 10 individuals (i.e. the original 
network plus 9 random networks). Once a population has been generated, every individual is 
measured by means of the robustness function (described in Section 4.7.3). 
After evaluating every individual within the population, the best individual is directly passed to the 
next generation. Three individuals in the new generation are chosen by contest from the previous 
generation, the contest passes the best one from these three to the new population. Four individuals in 
the new generation are chosen by crossing over two different individuals, which have been randomly 
chosen. Finally, new random individuals are generated and added to the new population, so that the 
next generation has 10 new populations in total. After running the cross over and random generation 
processes, the feasibility of the new individual is checked. Unconnected nodes are prohibited, so if 
any node is identified as isolated, the new individual is mutated until it is feasible. 
New generations are built consecutively. At this point we run the evolutionary process for 2,000 
rounds, after which we discontinue the application for the GA and the best individual amongst the 
remaining solutions is selected as the optimal candidate. An outline of the algorithm’s pseudo-code is 
as follows: 
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Algorithm 1 Pseudo-Code for Genetic Algorithm 
1: Initialise population with original network (encoded as an individual) Norig  
2: Next generation array NGen[10] equals Norig plus nine randomly generated populations 
3: while stopping criteria is not reached do 
4: for generations g do 
5: Calculate the robustness of NGen [g] 
6: end for 
7: for generations g do 
8: if Rbest = 0 or NGen [g](robustness) < Rbest then 
9: Rbest  ←  NGen [g](robustness) 
10: end if 
11: end for 
12: NGen[0]  ← Rbest  (next population) 
13: Select three random individuals from previous generation, put in random contest with best 
individual passed to next generation (next population) 
14: Four individuals from new generation  are chosen by crossing over two different individuals 
which have been randomly chosen, then passed to next population 
15: Generate new random individuals and add to the new generation until next population equals 
10 individuals  
16: end while 
17: return best individual from improved solutions 
 
4.7.4.2 Ant Colony Optimisation Combined with Local Search 
The ant colony optimisation algorithm is based on the natural foraging behaviour of ants. While the 
algorithm can assist greatly when applied as part of an optimisation process, it does have limitations 
and commonly has to be combined with an alternative algorithm. The basis of the ant colony 
optimisation algorithm is to initiate a solution and then update the pheromone trails (i.e. update the 
comparison parameters). Throughout all iterations, as a new solution is constructed, the pheromone 
trails are compared (i.e. checking for the optimum secure path). After the improved solution is 
identified the pheromone trail (comparison parameters) is updated with the enhanced parameters. For 
example, for ants this would be based on the quantity and quality of the food found, trails with a high 
pheromone would guide ants to a better source. In this scenario, increasing comparison scores would 
signify that the new solution is impacting comparative centralities and increasing associated risk 
within the mutated infrastructure. The algorithm continues processes until the predetermined end 
criterion is met [254] [257]. 
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The local search method is a simplistic algorithm. The basis of the algorithm is to initiate a solution; 
the solution is then iteratively evolved, i.e. throughout all iterations the algorithm searches for a better 
solution, until the predetermined end criterion is met [254]. An outline of the algorithm’s pseudo-code 
based on a combination of ant colony optimisation and local search is as follows: 
Algorithm 2 Pseudo-Code for Ant Colony Optimisation combined with Local Search 
1: Initialise population with original network (encoded as an individual)  
2: Calculate original populations Robustness Rold 
3: Initialise parameters  
4: Initialise solution trails 
5: while stopping criteria is not reached do 
6: Generate a new random solution  
7: Calculate new solutions Robustness Rnew 
8: Calculate parameters 
9: if Rnew  <  Rold  then 
10: Rold  ←  Rnew   
11: Update solution trails with parameters 
12: end if 
13: Compare all solutions sort into descending order 
14: end while 
15: return five improved solutions and identify solutions with their respective costs 
 
The initial population of individuals used by this algorithm is the original network (encoded as an 
individual), along with a collection of randomly generated alternatives. For the purpose of our work, 
we generate and compare 10 individuals for each cycle of the security process. Once the population 
has been generated, the solution trail (pheromone trail) is assigned the original network’s comparison 
parameters (i.e. this is the best solution we begin with hence these are the parameters that need to be 
compared and improved). Every individual is then measured by means of the robustness function 
(described in Section 4.7.3). 
After evaluating every individual within the population, each solution is compared against the best 
robustness score, in an attempt to find an improved generation. Should the cycle produce a better 
solution, then the solution trail is updated with the new solution’s comparison parameters. After each 
cycle we compare each improved generation’s parameters in the solution trail, placing them into 
descending order, ensuring that we only keep the 5 most improved solutions. New generations are 
built consecutively, and the process is run for 2,000 rounds. We discontinue the application of the 
algorithm and the best individual amongst the remaining solutions is selected, along with reporting the 
5 most improved solutions and identifying the solutions with their respective costs. 
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4.7.4.3 Tabu Search 
Tabu search is a meta-heuristic search method, which uses local search methods for optimisation, 
along with adaptive memory to explore beyond local optimality and to generate dynamic search 
method performance. The basis of the search is to prevent the method from re-examining solutions 
that have already been considered, and to ensure that inadequate solutions are not advanced instead 
only improvements are developed further. Parameters of preference can also be introduced, so that the 
search can be influenced into producing a more favourable solution. Tabus tend to be only stored with 
a limited quantity, as typically there are several possibilities and tabu lists can quickly grow in size, 
making storage of these parameters and comparison expensive, i.e. restricting the tabu list to only 
recent improvements and preventing reverse evolvement to ensure quick and non-costly processing.  
The security enhancement and risk mitigation process continues until the predetermined end criterion 
is met [254] [258]. An outline of the search method’s pseudo-code is as follows: 
Algorithm 3 Pseudo-Code for Tabu Search 
1: Initialise population with original network (encoded as an individual) 
2: Calculate original populations robustness Rold 
3: Initialise parameters Pbest 
4: Generate tabu list ← Pbest 
5: while stopping criteria is not reached do 
6: for generations g  do 
7: Let g  construct new random solution  
8: Calculate parameters Pnew 
9: if  Pnew  not tabu  then 
10: Calculate new solutions robustness Rnew 
11: if  Rnew  <  Rold  then 
12: Rold  ←  Rnew 
13: end if 
14: end if 
15: Update tabu list  
16: end for 
17: end while 
18: return best solution Pbest 
 
Initial population used by the security enhancement and risk mitigation process is the initial 
population (encoded as an individual), along with nine randomly generated alternatives, as we 
compare ten individuals for each cycle of the process for the purpose of our work. Once the 
population has been generated, the tabu list is assigned our predefined comparison parameters from 
the original network, as at this stage this is the best solution and we aim to prevent inferior solutions 
from being generated and considered. Each solution’s predefined parameters are then compared 
against the tabu list, if parameters match the tabu list they are dropped. Else, if parameters are not 
tabu, then we calculate the solution’s robustness by means of the robustness function (described in 
Section 4.7.3). 
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We then compare the solution’s robustness against the best robustness, to ensure that the generation is 
improved. Should the cycle produce a better solution, then the robustness score of the new solution 
replaces the best solution robustness score, and at the end of the cycle the tabu list is updated ensuring 
that only improved solutions are considered. New generations are built consecutively, and the search 
is run for 2,000 cycles. The search application is then discontinued, and the best individual amongst 
any remaining solutions is presented as the optimal candidate. 
 
4.8 Summary 
This chapter provides a high-level overview of the SeCurity Risk Analysis and Mitigation Framework 
(Section 4.2), and includes a comprehensive review of the framework’s design (Section 4.3) and 
runtime operation (Section 4.4). In these sections we discuss the challenges that must be overcome in 
order to implement our theoretical solution, and disclose operational specifics and the reasoning in 
regards to the design and composition of the framework.  
Additionally, the chapter outlines the data access control problem and management (Section 4.5), and 
discusses the principal model for access control within SoS. In Section 4.6 Topological 
Vulnerabilities, the algorithms used to calculate degree centrality, betweenness centrality, closeness 
centrality, eigenvector centrality, and bridging centrality are presented, these centrality indicators are 
important as they assist in ascertaining a node’s importance within the SoS and underlining risks the 
nodes pose. 
In Section 4.7.1 Node Security Grade Assignment, we discuss the vital techniques used to identify 
vulnerabilities within the topology of the SoS, and the metrics used to assign numerical numbers to 
those risks identified. The integral principles used to calculate the security grade of all nodes within 
the SoS are also outlined in detail, the security parameters used to calculate the security grade are also 
presented, justifying the choice of algorithm used and discussing an alternative algorithm that could 
be incorporated into the framework if data sources were deemed unreliable. The algorithm used to 
quantify the data security level for the entire SoS is presented in Section 4.7.2 Network Data Security 
Level Quantification. 
The robustness function algorithm used to quantify the appropriateness of the SoS environment is 
outlined in Section 4.7.3, the algorithm uses five main criteria in order to determine the optimal 
network. It combines the security level of the network, highest bridging centrality score, degree 
centrality of the network, the average minimum path length, and total cost of the communication 
network in terms of distance between nodes. This section also summarised how the algorithm’s 
constant values are assigned, which depend on the importance of factors and their magnitude. 
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This chapter also presents the integral security risk mitigation algorithms (Section 4.7.4) used to 
increase the security of the SoS environment, which evolve the network throughout their applications, 
considering factors such as access control, risks associated with high centrality nodes, network cost, 
and node security. These algorithms are applied to the network and overcome the associated 
limitations of local search techniques, and prevent evolvement from duplicating solutions and 
ensuring inadequate solutions die out. Meaning only superior solutions continue to be developed, 
thus, enhance the robustness, security, and structure of the SoS. These three algorithms are evaluated 
against each other in order to establish the most effective means for measuring and increasing security 






Chapter 5  
Implementation and Evaluations 
 
To positively evaluate the effectiveness of the SCRAM framework presented in this thesis, we have 
developed and implemented our solution into an operational application. This implementation ensures 
we can corroborate the theoretical principles proposed, and confirms that SCRAM conforms to the 
aims, objectives, and requirements we established. In this chapter, we convey the application of the 
principles employed by the SCRAM framework (presented in Section 4), the simulation environment, 
and the evaluation practices. 
 
5.1 SCRAM Framework 
As SCRAM is to be applied to diverse and dynamic SoS and multi-level SoS it is essential that the 
framework does not negatively impede the resources of the network, which are often restricted due to 
the types of devices that they are formed from (e.g. WSN, IoT, etc.). The complex topologies of 
multi-level SoS mean that, in order to monitor an entire infrastructure and identify associated node 
vulnerabilities, while meeting the identified objectives discussed in this thesis, we needed to 
implement SCRAM in a widely used programming language; therefore we decided to write the 
framework using Java. This programming language can be applied to most operating systems and 
platforms, is object oriented, high performance, dynamic, and designed to have minor implementation 
dependencies.  
The simulated SCRAM framework is implemented in NetBeans IDE, which provides a good, 
lightweight, open sourced, integrated development environment. As stated we developed the 
framework in Java, but other programming languages are supported, these include for example, 
C/C++ and PHP. The SCRAM framework is self-contained and is programmed to replicate networks 
comprising of different devices, each with varying software, hardware, and firmware configurations, 
and connected via a series of varying communication links. SCRAM is not designed to be applied to a 
specific operating system, this ensures that the framework is suitable and can easily be applied to 
various platforms. 
The SCRAM framework was implemented with a user interface (as illustrated in Figure 5.1) to allow 
an existing network to be imported into the framework, or for a user defined network to be selected 
and generated within the environment. The initial simulation environments did not simulate 
vulnerabilities; instead nodes were assigned with random security grades to represent the node’s risk 
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within the topology. This allowed for us to quickly develop the key principles and generate a working 
simulation environment, and provided a platform for us to evaluate the main techniques.  
 
Figure 5.1. SCRAM Screenshot 
In order to improve the accuracy of node security grades and improve the overall network security we 
evolved the simulation to assign vulnerabilities to each node based upon the type of device being 
simulated and its software, hardware, and firmware configuration. Finally, SCRAM was advanced 
further and reported vulnerabilities and their CVSS v3 risk probability scores were incorporated into 
the framework and associated principles, including the security grade. This was accomplished by 
importing numerous vulnerabilities into the SCRAM framework that were identified then analysed 
and reported via the NVD website with their associated CVSS v3 risk probability scores.  
These vulnerability scores are quantified along with the risks posed by the node’s software, firmware 
and hardware, into the node’s final security grade, establishing a more accurate scoring practice for 
the nodes and improving the accuracy of the overall network communication security. All simulated 
vulnerabilities correspond to the devices that are simulated within SCRAM. The number of 
vulnerabilities simulated is limited within the framework as the database sizes within SCRAM would 
quickly grow in size depending on the type of simulated device and the scale of the SoS. 
The security enhancement and risk mitigation algorithms that support the reconfiguration and security 
improvements of the network have the ability to manage large complex optimisation problems. The 
proposed security risk mitigation and robustness function (described in Section 4.6) has been 
implemented as part of SCRAM in order to mitigate risks within the multi-level SoS, and improve 
security without introducing additional resources into the infrastructure. This is achieved by 
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identifying vulnerabilities within nodes and data access violation, and reconfiguring network 
communication paths between nodes based on the conducted multi-level risk assessment. By means of 
this framework we have successfully conducted a series of experiments to evaluate their effectiveness 
when applied to SoS environments. 
 
5.1.1 Network Generation  
The SeCurity Risk Analysis and Mitigation Framework has the functionality to either generate a 
random network or import an existing network topology. Random networks are simulated by first 
selecting the number of nodes the network will be composed from and its initial connectivity, the 
framework then produces the SoS infrastructure and generates an SoS configuration file (see example 
Figure 5.2). Our primary test network as visualised in Figure 5.3 visualises our SoS which is 
composed of 8 static nodes with a low connectivity of 30%. The functionality of SCRAM randomly 
assigned all nodes with a security level, data grade, and connected nodes with a series of primary 
links. It then quantifies the network’s degree, betweenness, closeness, eigenvector, and bridging 
centralities, the communications security, minimum path average, and the network’s associated cost. 
The framework selected a random network data level, in this instance the data level has been assigned 
Level 4, which all nodes will be compared against, in order to replicate data access control 
requirements. 
The SoS network configuration file ensures that we can import the same networked infrastructure 
within the framework for evaluation against different security enhancement and risk mitigation 
algorithms. The network configuration file also directly supports the generation of the undirected 
graph, as it contains several key parameters including node coordinates, communication paths and 
lengths, which are used to position the nodes and generate all communication links between 
components forming the SoS infrastructure.  The file also details the assigned node identification 
number, grade which is used during risk mitigation processing, the quantified security grade used by 
both the graph generation processes and risk mitigation algorithms, the node security status which is 
used when generating undirected graphs, and the data grade used by both the graph generation 
processes and risk mitigation algorithms. 
 
 




Figure 5.2. Primary Test SoS Network Configuration File 
 
 




Figure 5.3. Primary Simulated Network Environment 
Key parameters are visualised in the graph such as node identification, security grade, data access 
level, and node status, and an initial report is constructed and visualised in the user interface 
containing centrality values and security details (Figure 5.4). The framework identifies and visualises 
nodes which are in ready status, blocked or are considered insecure. Nodes identified as ready have no 
warning markers, as these nodes have either been assigned with an equal or higher data access level 
above the assigned network data level. Table 5.1 depicts the visualised parameters used to generate 
the initial undirected graphs. 
Table 5.1 Initial Visualised Security Vulnerabilities and Parameters 
Graph Parameter  Symbol Description 




Node size represents quantified bridging centrality score, i.e. the width of the node is 
proportion to its bridging centrality value. 
Security Insecure node.  
Node encased with a solid orange 
box. 
 Blocked node.  
Node encased with a solid red box. 
 Blocked and Insecure node.  
Node encased with a solid red box 
with orange border. 
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 Ready nodes have had their security quantified as secure, meaning their security risk has been 
scored low thus have high security statuses.  
 Blocked nodes are visualised with a red box and an orange border, as these nodes have been 
assigned with a data access level lower than the allocated network data level, and data flow 
should be blocked from traversing via these nodes. Nodes with unauthorised data levels are 
also considered to not only pose risks to the data flow but also could expose the network 
topology, thus are considered to be insecure in terms of a node’s security.  
 Insecure nodes are visualised with a large orange block, these nodes have had their security 
quantified as insecure, meaning their security risk has scored high thus has a low security 
level. These nodes pose risks to the network as they leave it exposed to potential 
vulnerabilities and attack vectors. Critical data should not traverse through these nodes, but 
instead be routed through ready nodes with high security and appropriate data access. 
 Nodes quantified with higher bridging centralities are represented with wider nodes; an 
example of this is node 3 in our primary network (see Figure 5.3), the width of the node is in 
proportion to its bridging centrality value. 
 
Figure 5.4. Primary Simulated Network Environment User Interface Report 
Chapter 5 - Implementation and Evaluation  
176 
 
5.1.2 Topological Vulnerabilities Analysis 
When a network is generated or imported into the SCRAM framework, and during the security risk 
mitigation process, graphs are generated that represent the topology of the SoS and the process 
initiates the centrality methods described in Section 4.5. These centrality methods measure degree 
centrality, betweenness centrality, closeness centrality, eigenvector centrality, and bridging centrality. 
Each centrality when analysed can indicate the appropriateness of the networks communication path 
configuration identifying configurations that increase the SoS to additional risk(s), and can assist to 
indicate nodes that are more influential within the SoS, are potential SPoF, and are greatly depended 
upon by other nodes, etc., and increase risk within the SoS due to their topological vulnerabilities. 
 
Figure 5.5. Code Excerpt Showing Degree Centrality Method 
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Each centrality has been coded into the SCRAM framework, and a code expert for generating the 
degree centrality for each node is shown in Figure 5.5 as an example. Degree, betweenness, closeness, 
and bridging centrality are all scored on a scale of 0 to 1, with eigenvector being scored from 0+. 
Centralities will differ and be influenced by topological data such as the number of nodes that form 
the SoS, node locations, connectivity percentage, and communication links, etc. Consequently, we 
cannot have a predefined maximum or minimum comparative value as the network is manipulated 
into a more secure solution, i.e. if the centrality value does not fall within a set range it would be 
considered a negative impediment to the centrality. Therefore, for each experiment and reported 
evolved candidate we review the centrality score itself and the percentage difference between the 
original network and evolved reported network candidate. 
Depending on the network’s security requirements and administrators’ perceived tolerance to risk, 
centrality tolerance could be increased or decreased to reflect the organisation’s systems and needs, or 
even frequently reviewed and altered to keep up with alterations and enhancements to the SoS. For 
example, we could classify anything that increases degree centrality by over 100% is a negative 
impediment, while any increase below 100% is within a tolerable range and considered acceptable. 
For infrastructures deemed critical, the tolerance could be reduced for example to 50% or even a 
lower and stricter criteria level. Centrality values and their associated topological vulnerabilities are 
discussed throughout our undertaken experiments in the following sections. 
 
5.1.3 SCRAM Framework Cycle Analysis 
When incorporating the algorithms into the risk mitigation process, it was imperative to ascertain the 
optimum number of cycles for the length of the evolutionary process. The framework’s risk mitigation 
process deletes and replaces communication links between nodes during evolutionary stages searching 
for an optimal combination. Should the process be run for too few cycles, while potentially we could 
still find a more optimum solution, it might not have improved significantly enough to have an impact 
on the robustness and security of the network. If the evolutionary process is run for too many cycles, 
then the method’s run time will increase which could impact real time analysis, required operation 
resources, operation costs, and could directly impede distinct nodes operation and resources. There is 
no guarantee the longer the process runs the better the solution will be, i.e. due to random mutations in 
the evolutionary risk mitigation process the best robustness level could be found very early in the 
cycle. 
As evident from the network evolutionary process analysis in Figure 5.6 , without the use of a suitable 
optimisation algorithm the process to evolve the network and proposed robustness function generates 
an excessive volume of new generations that do not greatly improve the network’s security and  
robustness, visible for all generated cycles in both Assessments 1 and 2. For both assessments we 
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used the same example network (see Figure 5.3), and ran the robustness function starting with 2,000 
cycles, then 4,000 cycles, and finally for 6,000 cycles. In this instance, we have excluded all solutions 
that negatively evolved the network within the graph structure, i.e. every reported candidate with an 
increased robustness score, to reduce graph size.  
 
(a) Improved Network Security and Robustness: Assessment 1 
 
(b) Improved Network Security and Robustness: Assessment 2 
Figure 5.6. Analysis of the Network Evolutionary Process 
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We compare 10 generations for comparison in each cycle; this gives us 20,000, 40,000 and 60,000 
new randomly evolved networks respectively. While the largest concentrations of newly evolved 
networks have a lower robustness level as evidenced by Figure 5.6, it is difficult to intuitively identify 
the lowest robustness score in any of the cycles for both assessments, and there is no distinguishable 
robustness network evolution progression. 
When we critically analyse the data and filter out duplicated evolved solutions keeping the best 
robustness score in each assessment (see Table 5.2), in Assessment 1 the best robustness level 
achieved for 2,000, 4,000, and 6,000 cycles was generated within the first 2,000 cycles. When we 
analysed the second assessment data, specifically if we look at the best robustness for 6,000 cycles, 
we see different best robustness scores during its first 2,000 generations through to its final 6,000 
generations, where it finds the optimum solution at generation 51,169. In the first 2,000 cycles of 
Assessment 2, the best solutions robustness score is 230.944 which is a 67.04% decrease compared to 
the original robustness level of the network (i.e. the lower the robustness level, the more appropriate 
the individual evaluated), the best robustness for 4,000 cycles was 228.865 which is a 67.33% 
decrease, and the best solution for 6,000 cycles was 227.283 which is a decrease of 67.56%. 
Table 5.2. Comparing Improved Solutions Robustness During Evolutionary Process Cycles 





















1 - 2000 700.623 17,999 17,274 8,876 229.946 - - - - 
1 - 4000 700.623 38,489 34,489 13,953 223.597 13,953 223.597 - - 
1 - 6000 700.623 57,914 51,910 9,976 221.721 9,976 221.721 9,976 221.721 
2 - 2000 700.623 19,268 17,269 17,770 228.860 - - - - 
2 - 4000 700.623 38,510 34,506 6,355 229.440 24,585 228.854 - - 
2 - 6000 700.623 51,774 51,774 17,195 230.944 27,407 228.865 51,169 227.283 
 
Therefore, running the application for an additional 2,000 cycles provides only a 0.9% better solution 
with a robustness decrease of 2.079, and the additional 4,000 cycles only provides a 1.59% better 
solution in the second round with a robustness decrease of 3.661. When we consider the additional 
time taken to process the extra solutions and the processing requirements needed, against the actual 
result improvements, we decided that running the application for 2,000 cycles would be optimum at 
this stage to test the evolutionary risk mitigation and optimisation algorithms as proof on concept.  
This will be of vital importance when we increase the size of networks to be examined, as larger 
simulations will take considerably longer to process, and therefore it is essential that we run tests 
making use of the optimal resources available, ensuring that we don’t negatively impede memory and 
processing power which could impact simulation times and hinder future real-time analysis on 
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complex multi-level SoS. Table 5.3 demonstrates the maximum CPU time and memory used for both 
of the conducted assessments. 
Table 5.3. Resource Usage During Evolutionary Process Cycle. 




Time Taken for Security 




Memory Used  
1 2000 20,000 00:16:00 17.3% 4.83% 
1 4000 40,000 00:30:00 18.6% 7.25% 
1 6000 60,000 00:48:00 16.5% 5.51% 
2 2000 20,000 00:16:00 22.3% 5.19% 
2 4000 40,000 00:39:00 16.9% 5.16% 
2 6000 60,000 00:45:00 17.1% 8.11% 
 
 
5.1.4 Applied Network Security Risk Mitigation Principals 
Using our primary simulated environment (Figure 5.3), the network has been reimported into the 
SCRAM framework and the three different algorithms presented in Section 4.6.4 have been applied to 
the network’s security risk mitigation process, which influences the evolution stages of the process by 
searching for an optimal security solution to ensure the network’s reconfiguration did not negatively 
impede but enhanced the communication security between interconnected devices and mitigated risk 
factors, without having to introduce additional resources into the infrastructure.  
 
5.1.4.1 Genetic Algorithm Evaluation 
When the Genetic Algorithm (GA) is applied to the primary network, throughout the evolutionary 
process random evolvements are made to the new generated solutions. Evident in Figure 5.8, this 
shows every subsequent security enhanced candidate found from the original network, in a series of 
undirected graphs. The network was evolved into a set of best solutions as described in Section 
4.6.4.1, with the final reported evolvement (Figure 5.8-k) being the optimum configured solution. 
These configurations are generated from a single run of the GA, which took 21 seconds for 
completion. 
During evolution stages the SCRAM framework searches for an optimal secure network combination, 
while the security risk mitigation process removes and replaces links. Figure 5.8 Evolution a, is the 
first reported improved solution and shows an increase in the number of established links, in an 
attempt to assure communication security. We note that during the algorithm’s run time, the 
evolutions fluctuate between an increase and decrease in communication links until the last 
configuration is approached.  
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The robustness monitor in Figure 5.7 records a notable reduction in the network’s robustness score, 
meaning the evolved random solutions are more appropriate and secure. The robustness level of the 
original network was 700.6233, while the final optimal solution scores a robustness level of 224.9813, 
achieving a 67.89% improvement. We also note there is a 62.16% decrease in robustness from the 
first evolved candidate which is an immediate significant improvement at the beginning of the 
process, which only continues to positively advance throughout the security risk mitigations 
evolvement process. 
 
Figure 5.7. Robustness Monitor for the Applied Genetic Algorithm 
Through the improved robustness, we succeed in maximising communication security and mitigating 
risk, while sustaining low bridging centrality (92.22% decrease), and average minimum path length 
(19.34% decrease).  Unfortunately to achieve this, there has been a significant increase to overall 
network cost, which rose from 1821 to 3801, meaning there is a cost increase of 108.73% to assure a 
92.31% improvement for SoS communication security. 
 
  




(a) Evolution  
 
(b) Evolution  
 
(c)  Evolution 
 
(d)  Evolution 
 
(e)  Evolution 
 
(f) Evolution  
 
(g) Evolution  
 
(h) Evolution  
 
(i) Evolution  
 
(j) Evolution  
 
(k) Optimal Evolution  
 
Figure 5.8. Comparison of Genetic Algorithm Improved Security Solutions 
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5.1.4.2 Ant Colony Optimisation Combined with Local Search 
Evaluation 
When the Ant Colony Optimisation combined with Local Search (ANT) algorithm was applied to the 
primary network (Figure 5.3), random evolvements were made to the newly generated solutions. 
Evident in Figure 5.9 which shows every subsequent security enhanced candidate found from the 
original network, in a series of undirected graphs. The network was evolved into a set of best 
solutions as described in Section 4.6.4.2, with the final generated evolvement (Figure 5.9-e) being the 
reported optimum solution. These configurations are generated from a single run of the ANT 
algorithm, which took 20 seconds for completion. 
During evolution stages the SCRAM framework searched for an optimal secure network combination, 
while the security risk mitigation process removed and replaced links. Figure 5.9 Evolution a, is the 
first improved evolved solution using ANT and shows an increase in the number of established links, 
in an attempt to assure communication security. Again we note that during the algorithm’s run time, 
the evolutions fluctuate between an increase and decrease in links until the last configuration is 
approached. 
 
(a) Evolution  
 
(b) Evolution  
 
(c) Evolution  
 
(d) Evolution  
 
(e) Optimal Evolution  
 
Figure 5.9. Comparison of ANT Algorithm Improved Security Solutions 
The robustness monitor in Figure 5.10 records a notable reduction in the network’s robustness level, 
meaning the evolved random solutions are more appropriate and secure. The robustness level of the 
original network is 700.6233 while the final optimal solution scores a robustness score of 228.9274, 
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achieving a 67.33% improvement. We also note that there is a 65.07% decrease in robustness from the 
first evolved candidate, significantly improving the network’s robustness which continues to 
positively evolve throughout the rest of the security risk mitigation’s evolvement process. 
 
Figure 5.10. Robustness Monitor for the Applied ANT Algorithm 
Through the improved robustness, we succeed in maximising communication security and mitigating 
risk, while sustaining low degree centrality (87.5% decrease), bridging centrality (92% decrease), and 
average minimum path length (19.43% decrease).  Unfortunately to achieve this, there has been a 
significant increase to overall network cost, which rose from 1821 to 4389, meaning there is a cost 
increase of 141.02% to assure a 92.31% improvement for SoS communication security.  
The generations were built consecutively, and at the end of the risk mitigation process the framework 
confirmed that it had generated five improved solutions, reporting them in the SCRAM user interface 
window detailing their associated costs and key parameters (see Figure 5.11). For this single run, 
while the final solution (Candidate 5) is reported with the lowest robustness score identifying it as the 
most optimal configured secure solution, evolved Candidate 1 is the lowest costing best solution at 
only 3219, meaning there would only be a cost increase of 76.77% to assure a 92.31% improvement 
for communication security. Candidate 1 scored a robustness of 244.6947, achieving a 65.07% 
improvement. 
 




Figure 5.11. SCRAM Output Window Identifying ANT Best Solutions 
Administrators could consider this solution while not the optimum, as an appropriate cheaper 
alternative should financial restrictions be a factor. This candidate sustains low bridging centrality 
(88% decrease), and average minimum path length (13.99% decrease), noting an increase to degree 
centrality by 12.5% from 0.38 to 0.42, these scores are acceptable as evidenced by the candidate’s low 
robustness score. 
 
5.1.4.3 Tabu Search Optimisation Evaluation 
Applying the Tabu Search Optimisation algorithm (TABU) to the primary network (Figure 5.3), 
random evolvements were made against the original network which resulted in new solutions being 
generated. The network was evolved into a set of best solutions as described in Section 4.6.4.3, with 
the final generated evolvement being Figure 5.12. 
This reported candidate is the only evolved candidate measured as improved, and has been identified 
as the optimum solution found using TABU. This undirected graph is the only configuration returned 
from a single run of the TABU algorithm, which took 9 seconds for completion. No other candidates 
were retuned as the algorithm will not consider an inadequate solution and only improved solutions 
are developed further. Comparison parameters introduced, influence the tabu list after each cycle, 
preventing reverse evolvements from being considered to ensure quick and non-costly optimisation. 
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The strict tabu list which must be observed also limits the process, as, if any parameter is considered 
tabu even if it is only marginally different, this prevents the candidates from being reported and 
considered as strong secure solutions. 
 
(a) Optimal Evolution  
Figure 5.12. Comparison of Tabu Algorithms Improved Solutions 
The tool searches for an optimal secure combination, while the process removes and replaces links. 
This single reported candidate shows an increase in the number of established links, in an attempt to 
assure communication security. The robustness monitor failed entirely, as there are no other improved 
reported solutions for the robustness progression to be mapped. The robustness level of the original 
network is 700.6233 while the final optimal solution scores a robustness score of 250.4453, achieving 
a 64.25% improvement. This candidate is a more appropriate solution than the original network 
topology. 
Through the improved robustness, we succeed in maximising security, while sustaining low bridging 
centrality (92.19% decrease) and average minimum path length (11.93% decrease). This solution 
notes degree centrality is increased by 87.5 % from 0.38 to 0.71, with all centralities being identified 
as having acceptable increases and decreases as evidenced by the candidate’s low robustness score. 
However, individual centrality scores should still be analysed as they could be a major factor to 
consider, depending on the requirements of the network and the perceived accepted level of risk. To 
achieve this, there has been a significant increase to overall network cost, which rose from 1821 to 
2883, meaning there is a cost increase of 58.32% to assure a 92.31% improvement for 
communications security.  
 
5.1.4.4 Network Security Enhancement and Risk Mitigation 
Evaluation 
Using the SeCurity Risk Analysis and Mitigation Framework we have successfully conducted a series 
of simulations using the three presented evolutionary security risk mitigation and optimisation 
algorithms. While it is difficult to compare the three algorithms’ effective performance, in the sense 
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that we can run the robustness algorithm on the same network multiple times and due to the random 
evolvement of the network can be presented with different results each time, we provide a 
comparative analysis of their effectiveness in a broader sense. 
In this instance we have based the experiment on the scenario outlined in Section 4.2, and assume a 
random 30% connected network comprising of 8 static nodes. The network was established within the 
tools environment and the three different algorithms described above were applied to the SoS 
consecutively.  
All the algorithms work effectively, but it is immediately noticeable that the TABU algorithm 
generated the fewest improved solutions, in comparison to the other two algorithms. While TABU 
ensures a quick and non-costly optimisation process, completing its run in less than half the time 
when compared to GA and ANT, it fails to consider any solution unduly impacting centralities for 
example. Due to its restricted comparison parameters that must be matched or improved, even if the 
solution improves security while unduly impacting centralities then it is considered inadequate and 
discarded. The tabu list successfully influences cycles preventing reverse evolvement from being 
considered, and this directly improves the overall processing time and costs. But as we analyse results 
for the other two algorithms we note that alternative reported network configurations potentially could 
provide security managers with alternative solutions for implementation. 
The GA and ANT processes generated multiple improved candidates, and allow for us to not only see 
the optimum solution but detail multiple other evolved networks that improve the overall security and 
robustness of the network. This assists in identifying alternative solutions for example that while they 
might not be quantified as the optimum, could be applied to the network, increasing network 
communication security, mitigating risk, and improving robustness to a degree, but perhaps cost less 
to implement than the final optimum candidate. This is highly beneficial when forced to consider and 
adhere to tight financial requirements and budgets. 
The SCRAM security risk mitigation process removed and replaced links during evolution stages 
searching for an optimal combination. In all three simulations, we see a notable increase in established 
links between the original evolution and the first candidate, with the evolutions fluctuating between an 
increase and decrease in links until the last configurations are approached. While this high 
connectivity among nodes is considered secure in terms of centrality and data flow because of the 
variety of alternative paths from one node to another, the significant cost increase of the network 
reflects this increase of new links to assure communication security, i.e. highly connected networks 
typically result in higher costs. While TABU shows only a single increase in the cost, GA and ANT 
show while there is a large increase in network cost over all mutated evolvements, the optimum 
candidates for both solutions are not the most expensive to implement (see Figure 5.13-a). 
 




(a) Cost of Network Communications 
 
(b) Degree Centrality of the Graph 
 
(c) Minimum Path Average 
 
(d) Maximum Bridging Centrality 
 
(e) Communications Security 
 
(f) Populations Robustness 
Figure 5.13. Comparison of the Applied Risk Mitigation Algorithms 
Networks established with a large number of links are not necessarily establishing a higher security 
level; other configurations potentially could be more affordable (low cost) and sustain a similar 
security level. In order to reduce cost, a reduction in the number of connections and path lengths 
among the nodes inside the network would be expected. In this scenario however, a reduction in links 
is not viable as the primary network has only 52% communication security, and further link reduction 
would negatively impact security. 
All algorithms show a significant security increase from the first mutated evolvement (Figure 5.13-e), 
and all apart from GA maintain 100% communication security for each reported solution. GA does 
maintain high security and only one evolvement drops to 95% secure (Evolvement 3), which is still an 
82.69% increase comparable to the original network’s security level of 52%. 
As stated due to the random mutations of evolvement it is difficult to compare analysis, and when we 
look at degree centrality (Figure 5.13-b), for all three generations we see that TABU is the only 
algorithm that increased degree centrality by 87.5% from 0.38095 to 0.71429. The evolutions of GA 
and ANT show a significant reduction in degree centrality within each new evolvement. GA reduces 
degree centrality by 62.5% from 0.38095 to 0.14286, and ANT reduces degree centrality by 87.5% 
from 0.38095 to 0.04762. 
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Analysing minimum path average (Figure 5.13-c) and maximum bridging centrality (Figure 5.13-d), 
we note that all three algorithms report a vast reduction in both areas. Minimum path average is 
decreased 11.93% by TABU, 19.34% by GA, and 19.43% by ANT, and bridging centrality was 
decreased by 92.19% via TABU, 92.22% by GA, and 92% by ANT respectively. The overall 
robustness (Figure 5.13-f) for the reported candidates is also significantly reduced by all three 
algorithms. Reducing by 64.25% via TABU, 67.89% by GA, and 67.33% by ANT, this means that the 
optimum candidate for each algorithm is more appropriate and improved due to the significant 
robustness level decrease compared to the original network. 
When we directly analyse the undirected graphs, we see that the combined robustness function with 
each of the three algorithms, ensures that as the network has been evolved nodes identified as in a 
ready state and not blocked, have a maintained clear series of links established between them. These 
evolved links ensure that ready nodes that share the same data level access or higher, have direct 
communication links between them, rather than data being passed via a node which is considered 
insecure, i.e. data will not traverse via a node with a lower data level access which should be blocked. 
Analysis establishes  that for all three algorithms the increase in costs establishes more links, which in 
turn increases communication security, and as a direct result of the increase in links significantly 
decreases the minimum path average, while reducing maximum bridging centrality, degree centrality 
(with the exception of TABU), while vastly improving the population’s robustness levels. These 
results suggest an evolutionary approach is practical for evolving a relatively small network in a small 
number of steps, and these algorithms can be applied to improve the level of security and mitigate risk 
in a network, while considering a number of factors such as violation of access control requirements, 
high centrality node risks, and costs associated with distance between nodes. In addition, while TABU 
completes its evolutionary process in only 9 seconds and both GA and ANT execute in similar times, 
there is little difference in the maximum CPU usage and memory used for all three applied methods 
evident in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4. SCRAM Resource Usage for Applied Algorithms 
Algorithm Number of 
cycles 
Time Taken for Security 





GA  2000 00:21:00 18.3% 7.22% 
ANT 2000 00:20:00 16.4% 8.22% 
TABU 2000 00:09:00 18.3% 7.55% 
 
 
5.1.5 Evaluating Dynamic Systems-of-Systems 
To examine the effectiveness of the techniques implemented within SCRAM, we modified the 
primary network into two new different forms. First we wanted to examine the effects of altering three 
Chapter 5 - Implementation and Evaluation  
190 
 
different nodes’ data access levels and node security grades, simulating what would occur if nodes 
that have remained in situ were re-categorised replicating the dynamic nature of SoS. Secondly, we 
wanted to keep the same topology but establish the network from a different node starting point, 
replicating communication failure between nodes and network reestablishment, due to a network 
update. With nodes being re-categorised and communication links restored, i.e. as part of the update 
security and data access levels have been re-quantified, meaning several nodes have become isolated 
and cut off from previously secure communication routes within the network. 
 
(a) Network A Reconfigured Security and Data Access Levels 
 
(b) Network B Network Failure and Reconfiguration 
Figure 5.14. Modified Topologies of the Primary Network 
The first modified network as visualised in Figure 5.14-a, shows the alterations made to the network’s 
node data access levels and security grades. We have reassigned node 3 and 7 so that they have higher 
data access levels, increasing node 3 from access level 5 to 2 and node 7 from access level 6 to 1. This 
identifies that node 3 is now ready and secure and node 7 is only insecure. We also re-assigned the 
security grade for node 6, from 5 to 7, meaning that node 6 is identified as insecure, which directly 
impedes communication to node 2 making this node isolated. Simulating if node 2 now wished to 
communicate across the network it would have to transmit data via an insecure node.  
Our second network as visualised in Figure 5.14-b, shows the changes made to the network’s starting 
point and changes to several node data access levels and security grades. While we have kept the 
network’s topology the same (i.e. replicating a network configured with static nodes), we have 
swapped the assignment of node 0 and 1, this simulates that the network terminated and was re-
established by node 1, which consequently becomes node 0 (the primary node) and the new starting 
position for the network. Node 3 and 5 have been re-assigned higher data access levels, increasing 
node 3, from 5 to 3, and node 5, from 9 to 4. Node 5 also had an increase in security from grade 5 to 
4, this means both nodes are now considered ready and secure, as they have an equal or higher data 
level access than the network’s assigned data level access which is 4, and a higher security grade of 5 
or higher. Node 1 and 6 have been re-assigned with lower data access levels, decreasing node 1, from 
4 to 9, and node 6, from 3 to 5. This designates node 1 and 6 as blocked due to them having a lower 
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data access level than the network’s assigned level, and node 1 has been re-assigned with a security 
grade of 5 instead of 4. 
Due to the alterations made to these nodes, it has allowed for us to isolate parts of the network from 
each other by ensuring nodes have blocked communication paths. As visualised in Figure 5.14-b, 
nodes 2 and 3 have been completely isolated from the remaining two ready nodes (nodes 0 and 5), 
owing to the topology of the network. 
Individually the modified networks were imported into SCRAM and the three outlined algorithms 
were applied to the networks consecutively. Figure 5.15 and Figure 5.16 visualise the final optimum 
solutions for each algorithm, and demonstrate the effectiveness of the security risk mitigation 
processes. This is achieved by displaying every possible secure and vulnerable connection in which 
data with a security grade that is equal to or higher than the networks assigned data level can traverse. 
Green lines indicate no data access violations or vulnerabilities, yellow lines indicate potential 
vulnerabilities but no data access violations, and lines remaining uncoloured indicate potential data 
access violations and security vulnerabilities (i.e. communication links to blocked nodes). 
 
(a) GA Optimal Solution 
 
(b) ANT Optimal Solution 
 
(c) TABU Optimal Solution 
 
(d) Illustration of GA Data Flow 
Vulnerability 
 
(e) Illustration of ANT Data Flow 
Vulnerability 
 
(f) Illustration of TABU Data Flow 
Vulnerability 
Figure 5.15. Evaluating Modified Network A Reconfiguration 
 




(a) GA Optimal Solution 
 
(b) ANT Optimal Solution 
 
(c) TABU Optimal Solution 
 
(d) Illustration of GA Data Flow 
Vulnerability 
 
(e) Illustration of ANT Data Flow 
Vulnerability 
 
(f) Illustraion of TABU Data Flow 
Vulnerability 
Figure 5.16. Evaluating Modified Network B Failure and Reconfiguration 
After conducting this series of simulations, once again we immediately notice the lack of generated 
alternative solutions via the use of TABU. While TABU on average performed 41.77% faster than the 
other two algorithms, it failed to consider many alternative solutions that potentially could have 
increased security, mitigated risk, and improved robustness levels, regardless of altering centrality 
factors. This quick and low cost solution is failing to provide us with alternative candidates to not 
only analyse, but if applied to a real network would fail in ensuring that alternative solutions were 
reported and considered. 
For example, the TABU simulations for both networks show a significant increase in communication 
cost for the optimum candidate, decision makers could fail to implement the new alternative solution 
based on this report due to no alternatives being presented and concerns over the increasing costs. 
Should the network remain unaltered, then security would remain at 69% secure for network A 
(Figure 5.14-a) and 47% secure for network B (Figure 5.14-b). Had a cheaper alternative been 
reported, then while not being considered the optimum, it could have provided a more secure solution, 
mitigated risk, and reduced robustness scores while marginally modifying centrality factors further. 
The GA and ANT processes generated and reported the optimum solution and detailed multiple 
improved candidates. Assisting in the identification of alternative solutions, while not considered 
optimum, indicates improvements to SoS security and robustness. 
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As illustrated in Figure 5.15 and Figure 5.16, during the security risk mitigation process links were 
removed and replaced throughout the evolutionary stages. Again there is a notable increase in 
established links when we compare the original network topology to the final candidate. While this 
high connectivity among nodes is considered secure, the cost increase of both networks (Figure 5.17-a 
and Figure 5.18-a) reflects this increase of new links to assure security. In both the GA and ANT 
simulations we note while there is a significant increase in network cost for all evolved solutions, the 
optimum candidate for both solutions is not the most expensive to implement. 
While security (Figure 5.17-e and Figure 5.18-e) has increased by 44.93% for network A and 
112.77% for network B, the graphs highlight some problematic issues for both networks.  
Network A - For network A candidates Figure 5.15-d and Figure 5.15-e, secure data flow is 
highlighted with thick green lines, identifying every possible secure connection in which data with a 
security level of 4 can traverse between secure nodes. Thick yellow lines on the graph identify those 
links which have potential vulnerabilities and have the potential to cause risks to the network and data 
during transfer (i.e. communications links joining nodes identified as insecure and vulnerable). While 
unaltered white lines indicate potential data access violations (i.e. communication links joining 
blocked nodes). Figure 5.15-d shows there is a single link between secure nodes 2 and 3, whereas 
Figure 5.15-e shows a single link between secure nodes 1 and 2. In either network should the single 
link between these identified nodes fail or be removed, then communication would fail between node 
2 and the rest of the network cutting it off from the SoS. However, unlike the topology of network B, 
network A has alternative paths that would ensure that node 2 remained connected to the remainder of 
the network via the identified insecure nodes. While for security these links are not ideal, in an 
emergency it would allow for insecure nodes to be utilised to prevent network failure or interruptions 
to data communications.  
As the framework has identified numerous nodes as insecure, communications would be routed via 
the secure links, in an endeavour to assure data communication security. Then again, early 
identification of insecure nodes via the SeCurity Risk Analysis and Mitigation Framework outlining 
the vulnerabilities of nodes, would allow for early intervention to manage risks and rectify node 
insecurity. Subsequently, depending on time frames and vulnerability factors, identified insecure 
nodes potentially could be made safe and re-categorised as secure, allowing for these essential links to 
then support secure data access. 
Viewing the topology as a whole, we can identify that while there is limited secure paths, alternative 
communication links via non-blocked nodes are available despite being assigned as insecure. As 
while the nodes have been deemed insecure they do have a data access level of 4 or above. These 
alternative links exist as the network is formed with only a minority of nodes not having a sufficient 
data access grade (i.e. the network only consists of two blocked nodes). 
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Network B - In network B optimum candidates Figure 5.16-d and Figure 5.16-e demonstrates that 
there is an established secure data flow, with alternative routes between secure and ready nodes. 
Green lines indicate the secure data paths between nodes, which data with a security level of 4 or 
above can traverse. With unaltered white lines indicating potential data access violations (i.e. 
communication links joining blocked nodes). In Figure 5.16-e we do note there is a significant SPoF, 
as, if node 2 was to fail or be removed, node 5 would be cut off from the secure data route, or could 
be forced to send data via nodes in breach of data access requirements. 
Figure 5.16-f indicates there is a single path between nodes 0, 2, 3, and 5, should any individual link 
or node be removed or fail, then communication between these nodes will cease as there is no 
alternative communication paths. In addition, nodes 0, 2, 3, and 5 could be categorised as SPoF.  
When we view the topology as a whole, we quickly can identify that this issue is partly due to the fact 
that the network is formed via eight nodes and half of these are identified as insecure, due to their data 
access level being lower than the network data access level of 4. Also, the nodes’ positions and the 
topology of the network play an influential role during evolvement. Therefore, the tool is restricted 
evolving the network via the remaining four secure nodes, and attempts to balance cost with 
improvements to the network’s robustness and security, while not unduly impacting centrality factors. 
 
 
(a) Cost of Network Communications 
 
 
(b) Degree Centrality of the Graph 
 
 
(c) Minimum Path Average 
 
 
(d) Maximum Bridging Centrality 
 
 
(e) Communications Security 
 
 
(f) Populations Robustness 
Figure 5.17. Evolution Analysis of Modified Primary Network Reconfiguration 
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The combined process of the robustness and security risk mitigation algorithms, ensure that node 
status (i.e. ready, insecure, and blocked) and evolvements of the deleted and replaced links are 
considered when quantifying the robustness and security of the network. SCRAM mitigates security 
risks and evolves the network in the belief that new evolved links to secure nodes with the same data 
level access or higher will be responsible for secure communications, while insecure or blocked nodes 
will not be traversed. 
Both evolved networks A and B establish a higher security level via the development of new 
alternative links, and it must be noted other configurations potentially could be more affordable and 
sustain a similar security level compared to the optimum reported solution. In these scenarios a 
reduction in links is not viable as primary network A only has 69% communication security and 
network B has 47%. Furthermore, the original network topologies indicate nodes are isolated and cut 
off from other nodes in the network as they are currently connected via paths routed through insecure 
and blocked nodes, meaning further link reduction could result in nodes being disconnected from the 
SoS completely. Additional link reduction would negatively impact security and further impede 
network communication.  
All algorithms show a significant communication security increase from the first mutated evolvement 
(Figure 5.17-e and Figure 5.18-e), and all maintain 100% communication security for each reported 
solution, increasing communication security by 44.93% for network A and 112.77% for network B. 
Due to the random mutations during evolvement, we see different evolved security enhanced 
solutions; however, we do notice similarities during analysis. Regarding degree centrality (Figure 
5.17-b and Figure 5.18-b) for both networks A and B, analysis shows a significant reduction. GA 
reduces degree centrality by 87.5% from 0.38095 to 0.04762 for both networks, and ANT reduces 
degree centrality by 75% from 0.38095 to 0.09524 for network A and 87.5% from 0.38095 to 0.04762 
for network B.  
TABU was the only algorithm that increased degree centrality by 37.5% for network A, and due to its 
low yield of improved candidates it is difficult to determine if the algorithm’s process is not as 
adequate compared to its counter solutions or if this anomalous result is due to the randomness of the 
network’s evolvement. TABU did reduce degree centrality by 37.5% from 0.38095 to 0.238095 for 
Network B. 
  


























(f) Populations Robustness 
Figure 5.18. Evolution Analysis of Modified Primary Network Failure and Reconfiguration 
When we analyse minimum path average (Figure 5.17-c and Figure 5.18-c) and maximum bridging 
centrality (Figure 5.17-d and Figure 5.18-d) we see a vast reduction in both areas when we applied all 
three algorithms to both networks. Minimum path average is reduced by 20.56% for network A and 
16.54% for network B using GA, 17.58% for network A and 15.9% for network B using ANT, and 
12.75% for network A and 10.28% for network B using TABU. Whereas, bridging centrality 
decreased by 92.36% for network A and 89.5% for network B via GA, by 87.08% for both networks 
A and B using ANT, and by 92.13% for network A and 91.46% for network B via TABU 
respectively.  
These reductions are reflected in the decreased robustness scores (Figure 5.17-f and Figure 5.18-f) for 
the optimum candidates, which show GA improving robustness by 57.93% and 71.34% for networks 
A and B respectively, ANT improves robustness by 58.08% and 70.29% for networks A and B 
respectively, and TABU reduces robustness by 52.01% and 65.89% for networks A and B 
respectively. Ensuring that optimum candidates presented by each algorithm, are more appropriate 
and improved due to the significant robustness score decreases in comparison to the original 
networks. 
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In comparison, all algorithms generated optimum candidates with vastly increased costs (Figure 5.17-
a and Figure 5.18-a) to communications. Which can be directly attributed to the increase in 
communication links between nodes which decreased minimum path average, reduced maximum 
bridging centrality, degree centrality (with the exception of Network A when TABU was applied), 
and reduced the population robustness of the networks. The results for these simulations are similar to 
the previously reported simulation results, supporting the evolutionary method’s appropriateness for 
network security risk mitigation focusing on not only the security of the network but also its overall 
robustness, whilst considering factors such as access control violation, high centrality node risks, and 
cost. 
The principles of SCRAM that report alternative candidates when applying GA and ANT, 
demonstrate the framework’s effectiveness to report cheaper alternative network topologies that will 
significantly ensure higher security levels with a reduced robustness score, that while not identified as 
optimum could be suitable alternatives to implement and mitigate any related negative risks. An 
illustration of this is candidate 6 reported by the GA algorithm for network A. The associated costs 
with this candidate only increase the network cost by an additional 44.54% which is an increase of 
811. This improved solution enhances the network’s robustness and does not unduly impede 
centralities when compared to the original network’s parameters, while assuring security at 100%, 
meaning it would be an excellent alternative to the optimum candidate. 
 
5.1.6 Effectiveness of Simulated SCRAM Framework 
Similar to the work of Rullo et al. [232], Yan et al. [226], and Yao et al. [231], we have chosen to use 
simulation to not only generate our framework, but also our simulated environments and experiments. 
The use of simulation is an acceptable and realistic approach within the field of SoS research, to 
ensure that methods are vigorously tested and evaluated prior to their application within these 
complex and dynamic environments. Simulation can adequately imitate the behaviour and 
representation of networked infrastructures, can assist to understand the interactions and links 
between components and systems, and can support the understanding of component and system 
operations, the complexity of SoS, and interdependencies which form due to collaborative relations. 
Initial experiments validate that the SCRAM framework is an effective simulated solution which 
provides us with the capability to emulate realistic SoS, and provides us with a platform to evaluate 
the theoretical principles presented in this thesis. The use of simulation ensures that our framework 
and proposed principles will not impact or introduce additional risks into a physical real world 
infrastructure. Our review of existing methods and applied solutions for example, corroborates that 
methodologies such as risk assessment when applied directly to networks, can impact the physical 
systems and their functionality. Within SoS environments any negative effect or failing could quickly 
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escalate and cause partial or full cascading failures, which potentially could result in critical 
consequences. 
The developed framework delivers us the means to simulate and test multiple different environments, 
allowing us to generate a range of diverse and configurable distinct environments which we could not 
physically develop, and would most likely be unachievable due to access and project limitations. That 
is, the simulated framework allows us to adapt or scale a variety of distinct simulated infrastructures 
more effectively than had we established the same physical infrastructures. 
The SCRAM framework has given us the flexibility to generate and replicate SoS and multi-level 
SoS, and ensures that we produce useful and accurate statistics and characteristic configurations to 
represent diverse infrastructures, key characteristics, and system and network behaviours. SCRAM 
allows us to tailor the algorithms and proposed principles to our test requirements, ensuring their 
suitability when applied to collaborative infrastructures. Additionally, simulation provided us with the 
ability to explore and evaluate the advantages of alternative algorithms, and examine the effects of our 
design choices. Consequently, the framework’s practical ability to generate collaborative 
infrastructures means that we have the capability to establish the appropriateness of an infrastructure 
prior to its physical construction, and the means to quantify its design and efficiency via the proposed 
methods. 
When applying the proposed principles and algorithms to the simulated environments, the SCRAM 
framework allows us to vigorously test and investigate the ramifications of the algorithms and 
processes without impacting physical topologies, and can provide the means to examine identified 
issues and limitations at different levels of abstraction. Importantly, the use of simulation has given us 
a platform to effectively demonstrate and validate our concepts, and has assisted us to perform “what 
if” analysis cheaply and efficiently. 
In general, simulated results are accurate in comparison to analytical models for example. Having 
generated multiple environments and implemented multiple experiments, to confirm the accuracy of 
the SCRAM framework and principles, we manually checked and quantified all factors. For example, 
using node property aspects, identified vulnerabilities, topology data, and other factors, we can 
manually quantify node security scores, data access violations, communication security, robustness 
scores, and topological vulnerabilities, etc. These scores are then compared against the simulated 
infrastructure to determine the accuracy of the SCRAM framework’s ability to generate and represent 
SoS and multi-level SoS environments. 
When we apply the different algorithms and processes against the topologies in order to mitigate risk 
and increase communication security utilising only the existing infrastructure, we manually confirm 
the appropriateness of the reported optimised solutions and proposed principles’ results. Firstly, by 
examining the alterations made to the reconfigured communication paths, specifically analysing paths 
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for data access violations and ensuring nodes have not been disconnected from the network. Then we 
manually quantify topological vulnerabilities, robustness scores, communication security, cost, and 
minimum path average, etc. This ensures that as we analyse the appropriateness of the risk mitigation 
processes and algorithms, we not only evaluate the enhanced reported solutions but confirm their 
accuracy against the manually quantified results, validating the use of simulation, the precision of the 
simulation processes, and the generated and reported results. 
This was essential to prove that SCRAM was not just programmed to imitate results and will only 
work on a predefined and preprogramed infrastructure; instead that the proposed algorithms and 
methods are encoded to efficiently mitigate risk and secure infrastructures based upon the designs of 
the principles, and can be applied to differing distinct SoS and multi-level SoS infrastructures. Manual 
quantification and comparison of simulated results was also essential, as it allowed us to ensure the 
method’s application and processing design is sufficient, prior to its implementation and application 
to large and complex infrastructures. In these instances analysis will become less intuitive and more 
reliant on automated processing, as manual corroboration will become time consuming, impractical, 
and very likely impossible when we begin to experiment on significantly large multi-level SoS. 
 
5.2 Effectiveness of Integrating Vulnerability Identification  
For proof of concept and in order to evaluate our solution, we initially generated a random SoS 
consisting of eight static nodes and simulated security grades for each node. For node security grades 
to be accurate it is important that we identify any vulnerability that has the potential to expose the 
node to risks, which in turn can negatively impede the network’s topology which it forms part of. 
Vulnerabilities can be identified using a vulnerability scanner, allowing for vulnerability scoring and 
exploit databases to be incorporated into the network’s risk assessment methodology. Allowing for 
risks to not only be documented, but also for these vulnerabilities to be quantified and incorporated as 
part of the tools security grade assignment, thus improving the accuracy of node security grade 
scoring. 
Building upon the SCRAM framework, we have incorporated this functionality to simulate 
vulnerability identification and assign reported NVD vulnerabilities to nodes, in a random method 
based on the device’s software, firmware, and hardware. To begin with we generated a random 
network consisting of 12 static nodes which have one of three operating systems (Linux, Android or 
Windows), with a connectivity level of 30% (Figure 5.19-a). The primary simulation does not conduct 
any vulnerability scans upon the nodes within the network, as evident by nodes being visualised in 
dark red.  




(a) SoS Assigned with Security Values 
 
(b) SoS Assigned with NVD Vulnerabilities and CVSS v3 Scores 
Figure 5.19. Network Comparison of Assigned Security and Simulated Vulnerabilities 
The primary network (Figure 5.19-a) was then re-imported into the SCRAM framework (see Figure 
5.19-b), each node was then simulated with a randomly assigned vulnerability node status, and 
provided they were designated as scanned, a random number of associated vulnerabilities from the 
NVD database were assigned. Table 5.5 demonstrates the visualised graph parameters, while Table 
5.6, Table 5.7, and Table 5.8 are example excerpts of vulnerabilities reported via NVD which have 
been incorporated into the SCRAM framework.  
Table 5.5. Visualised Security Graph Vulnerabilities and Parameters 
Graph Parameter  Symbol Description 
All graphs Scanned node no vulnerabilities. 
 
Dark green node/tag. 
 Scanned node unresolved identified 
vulnerabilities.  
Blue node/tag. 
 Unscanned node. 
 
Dark red node/tag. 
 Node size represents quantified bridging centrality score, i.e. the width of the node is proportion to its 
bridging centrality value. 
Security Insecure node. 
 
Node encased with a solid orange box. 
 Blocked node. 
 
Node encased with a solid red box. 
 Blocked and insecure node. 
 
Node encased with a solid red box with 
orange border. 
 Node quantified secure and unscanned.  




Chapter 5 - Implementation and Evaluation  
201 
 
Table 5.5 depicts the visualised parameters used to generate the undirected graphs, and key 
parameters are visualised as follows: 
 Nodes that have been scanned with no found vulnerabilities will be visualised with a dark 
green node and name tag. An example of this is node 4 Figure 5.19-b. 
 Nodes that have been scanned with identified unresolved vulnerabilities will be visualised 
with a blue node and name tag. An example of this is node 1 Figure 5.19-b. 
 Nodes that have not been scanned will be visualised using a dark red node and name tag. An 
example of this is node 10 Figure 5.19-b. 
 Nodes assigned a security score of 5 or below that have had their security quantified as secure 
but have failed to run a vulnerability scan, will be visualised with a non-solid orange box 
surrounding the node. An example of this is node 10 Figure 5.19-b. 
 Insecure nodes are visualised with a solid orange box surrounding the node. An example of 
this is node 8 Figure 5.19-a. 
 Blocked Nodes are visualised with a solid red box surrounding the node. An example of this 
is node 4 Figure 5.19-b.  
 Blocked and insecure nodes are visualised with a solid red box with an orange border 
surrounding the node. An example of this is node 4 Figure 5.19-a. 
 Nodes quantified with higher bridging centralities are represented with wider nodes. An 
example of this is node 11 in the centre Figure 5.19-a. 
Each month hundreds of vulnerabilities are reported and processed via NVD, for these early 
experiments we did not feel it necessary to program every reported vulnerability that is associated 
with Windows, Linux, or Android devices into the framework, in order to prove the effectiveness of 
the principles and algorithms. Instead we captured reported and revised vulnerabilities associated with 
each of the devices for a specific time frame (3rd June 2016 and 18th June 2016). These reported 
vulnerabilities taken directly from the NVD website were then programmed into the SCRAM 
framework, utilising each of the vulnerabilities’ unique CVE reference IDs and their CVSS v3 base 
scores. Tables 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8 provide a small selection of these captured risks to demonstrate the 
different types of vulnerabilities that are being simulated within each of the generated SoS and multi-
level SoS, and the tables provide a description of the vulnerabilities, the threat level of each 
vulnerability, and their quantified impact and exploitability score as reported by NVD. These 
vulnerabilities demonstrate some of the risk vectors that we are endeavouring to mitigate and secure 
within SoS environments.  
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arch/arm64/mm/dma-mapping.c in the Linux kernel 
before 4.0.3, as used in the ION subsystem in Android 
and other products, does not initialize certain data 
structures, which allows local users to obtain sensitive 
information from kernel memory by triggering a 
dma_mmap call. 




10/10/16 10/12/16 mediaserver in Android before 2016-10-05 on Nexus 9 
and Pixel C devices allows attackers to gain privileges 
via a crafted application, aka internal bug 29421408. 




10/10/16 10/12/16 The GPS component in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x 
before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-10-01, 
and 7.0 before 2016-10-01 allows man-in-the-middle 
attackers to cause a denial of service (memory 
consumption, and device hang or reboot) via a large 
xtra.bin or xtra2.bin file on a spoofed Qualcomm 
gpsonextra.net or izatcloud.net host, aka internal bug 
29555864. 




10/10/16 10/11/16 system_server in Android before 2016-10-05 on Nexus 
devices allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted 
application, aka internal bug 30445380. 




10/10/16 10/11/16 The NVIDIA GPU driver in Android before 2016-10-
05 on Nexus 9 devices allows attackers to obtain 
sensitive information via a crafted application, aka 
internal bug 30259955. 




10/10/16 10/11/16 The kernel in Android before 2016-10-05 on Nexus 5, 
Nexus 5X, Nexus 6, Nexus 6P, Nexus 9, Nexus Player, 
and Android One devices allows attackers to obtain 
sensitive information via a crafted application, aka 
internal bug 30148243. 




10/10/16 10/11/16 The NVIDIA profiler in Android before 2016-10-05 on 
Nexus 9 devices allows attackers to obtain sensitive 
information via a crafted application, aka internal bug 
30162222. 
5.5 Med 3.6 1.8 
Source: Nvd.nist.gov [92]. 

















10/13/16 10/14/16 Microsoft Internet Explorer 9 through 11 and Microsoft 
Edge allow remote attackers to determine the existence 
of unspecified files via a crafted web site, aka 
"Microsoft Browser Information Disclosure 
Vulnerability." 




10/13/16 10/14/16 Microsoft Internet Explorer 11 and Microsoft Edge 
allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or 
cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a 
crafted web site, aka "Microsoft Browser Memory 
Corruption Vulnerability." 




10/13/16 10/14/16 The scripting engines in Microsoft Internet Explorer 9 
through 11 and Microsoft Edge allow remote attackers 
to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service 
(memory corruption) via a crafted web site, as 
demonstrated by the Chakra JavaScript engine, aka 
"Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability." 




10/13/16 10/17/16 Microsoft Internet Explorer 10 and 11 and Microsoft 
Edge allow context-dependent attackers to discover 
credentials by leveraging access to a memory dump, 
aka "Microsoft Browser Information Disclosure 
Vulnerability." 




10/13/16 10/17/16 Adobe Flash Player before 18.0.0.382 and 19.x through 
23.x before 23.0.0.185 on Windows and OS X and 
before 11.2.202.637 on Linux allows attackers to 
execute arbitrary code by leveraging an unspecified 
"type confusion." 




10/13/16 10/14/16 Integer overflow in Adobe Reader and Acrobat before 
11.0.18, Acrobat and Acrobat Reader DC Classic 
before 15.006.30243, and Acrobat and Acrobat Reader 
DC Continuous before 15.020.20039 on Windows and 
OS X allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via 
unspecified vectors. 
9.8 Critical 5.9 3.9 
Source: Nvd.nist.gov [92].  
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Untrusted search path vulnerability in IBM DB2 9.7 
through FP11, 10.1 through FP5, 10.5 before FP8, and 
11.1 GA on Linux, AIX, and HP-UX allows local users 
to gain privileges via a Trojan horse library that is 
accessed by a setuid or setgid program. 




10/13/16 10/17/16 Adobe Flash Player before 18.0.0.382 and 19.x through 
23.x before 23.0.0.185 on Windows and OS X and 
before 11.2.202.637 on Linux allows attackers to 
execute arbitrary code by leveraging an unspecified 
"type confusion." 




10/16/16 10/18/16 The IP stack in the Linux kernel through 4.8.2 allows 
remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack 
consumption and panic) or possibly have unspecified 
other impact by triggering use of the GRO path for 
large crafted packets, as demonstrated by packets that 
contain only VLAN headers, a related issue to CVE-
2016-8666. 




10/16/16 10/18/16 Stack-based buffer overflow in the 
brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap function in 
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cf
g80211.c in the Linux kernel before 4.7.5 allows local 
users to cause a denial of service (system crash) or 
possibly have unspecified other impact via a long SSID 
Information Element in a command to a Netlink socket. 




10/16/16 10/18/16 The IP stack in the Linux kernel before 4.6 allows 
remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack 
consumption and panic) or possibly have unspecified 
other impact by triggering use of the GRO path for 
packets with tunnel stacking, as demonstrated by 
interleaved IPv4 headers and GRE headers, a related 
issue to CVE-2016-7039. 
7.5 High 3.6 3.9 
Source: Nvd.nist.gov [92]. 
When we compare the networks in Figure 5.19, we notice significant differences in node statuses 
related to their quantified security grades. For example, without the simulated node scan, node 0 had a 
security level of 5. Once the vulnerability scan was simulated, the node was identified as having 
vulnerabilities that significantly altered its security grade from 5 to 7. This node is now considered 
insecure and data transfer via links connected to the node would now be restricted. Node 4 has also 
been reassigned as blocked instead of its previous assignment of blocked and insecure, after being 
identified as scanned with no vulnerabilities, and its quantified security grade decreased from 6 to 5. 
In addition, nodes 3, 5 and 10 have been identified by the tool as having a security score of 5 which is 
quantified as secure, yet ascertains these nodes have failed to run a vulnerability scan. Consequently 
these nodes have been visualised with a yellow non-solid box surrounding each node, as we can’t 
truly ascertain if these nodes contain vulnerabilities which could expose the network, nor rely on the 
accuracy of the security grade. The graph generated by SCRAM determines node 2, 9 and 11 have all 
had their security grades increased by one, and node 6 has dropped by a single  grade, these changes 
to their grades however in this simulation did not alter their node standings. Also, the graph visualises 
the changes to nodes 1, 9 and 11, these nodes have been quantified as secure and have been 
represented via blue nodes and name tags. This is due to them having vulnerabilities found during the 
simulated scan that potentially could expose them and the network to risks. 
The added functionality within the tool to identify vulnerabilities which have the potential to expose 
nodes and the network to risks ensures that we have the capability to generate more accurate security 
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grades and produce more detailed and accurate graphs. Evident via the re-categorisation of node 
security grades when we compare network Figure 5.19-a against network Figure 5.19-b. These 
accurate grades are visualised as part of the tool’s framework, allowing us to intuitively analyse the 
networks for threats, as demonstrated via the conducted simulations in Figure 5.20. 
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(a) Best Optimal Solution for Non-Scanned Network Using GA  
 
(b) Best Optimal Solution for Scanned Network Using GA 
 
(c) Best Optimal Solution for Non-Scanned Network Using ANT 
 
(d) Best Optimal Solution for Scanned Network Using ANT 
Figure 5.20. Evaluating Network Vulnerability Identification 
In addition, SCRAM not only simulates the scan and provides new quantified security scores and 
visualisation; it also generates a detailed report on all security parameters including security and 
vulnerability scores, and identified vulnerabilities with their associated CVSS v3 base scores (see 
excerpt in Table 5.9). 
Focusing upon the application of GA and ANT within our framework due to their encouraging yield 
of alternative reconfigured and security enhanced solutions, Figure 5.20 visualises the final optimum 
solutions for each algorithm applied to both the non-scanned network with assigned vulnerabilities 
and scanned network with NVD security vulnerabilities and their associated CVSS v3 scores. Both 
algorithms reported a series of optimised solutions detailing alternative improved candidates, and 
while these evolved networks are not considered optimum they demonstrate improvements to both the 
security and robustness of the SoS. 
In comparison to the original network’s topology (Figure 5.19) there is a noticeable increase in 
established links generated for all four final optimal candidates (Figure 5.20). For both the scanned 
and unscanned networks, when GA was applied to mitigate risk and evolve the network there was a 
25% increase in the number of new communication links, and when ANT was applied there was a 
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20.83% increase in the number of additional communication links. The cost increase for all networks 
(Figure 5.21-a) reflects this growth of communication paths. 
When we analyse the GA optimal solutions for both networks, it is noted that this 25% increase in 
links increases communication costs for both networks by 67.7% and security by an average 18.56%, 
while reducing robustness scores by an average of 20.48%. The ANT optimal solutions for both 
networks increases communication costs by 86.29% for the unscanned network and 93.99% for the 
scanned network supporting the 20.83% link increase for both optimal candidates, while increasing 
security by an average of 19.77% and decreasing robustness scores by an average of 17.17%. 
Comparable to previous simulations, these four reported optimal solutions are not the most expensive 
or cheapest solution to implement. It must also be noted that while these new links will support node 
connectivity and increase security, they also introduce additional risk factors.  
Viewing the topology of all four optimal candidates (Figure 5.20) we can intuitively identify that 
there is a number of prime links between secure (ready) nodes which assure secure data flow across 
the network, and recognise the paths that are linked to nodes that have the potential to cause data 
access violations or expose data, nodes, and the network to risks. It is also evident that there are 
multiple alternative links between nodes, meaning should a single node or secure link within the 
topology fail or be removed, then there is no single point of failure and communication(s) can be 
routed via alternative secure paths across the topology. In the event of link failure it is unlikely that a 
node will become isolated or cut off from the remainder of the network.  
It is essential that the security risk mitigation process when adding and removing links between nodes, 
balances connectivity with improvements to the network’s robustness and security, while unduly 
impacting centrality factors. The framework is not attempting to revise cost, simply it is attempting to 
associate the network’s cost with recommended network modifications. 
Analysing all of the enhanced reported candidates, it is evident that link reduction for this network’s 
topology would negatively impact security and impede network communication, and all reported 
candidates guarantee improved security from the first mutated evolvement. Based on the increased 
number of nodes in our current topology, the increased number of communication links, along with 
functionality changes to the framework when quantifying node security grades and vulnerability 
identification, we observe a larger volume of communication security fluctuations between 
reconfigured candidates.  
 
 









(b) Degree Centrality of the Graph 
 
 
(c) Minimum Path Average 
 
 
(d) Max Bridging Centrality 
 
 
(e) Communication Security 
 
 
(f) Populations Robustness 
Figure 5.21. Evolution Analysis of Network Vulnerability Technique Comparison 
In previous simulations, we typically saw communication security increase to 100% from the first 
evolved candidate, where it remained throughout all evolutions, seldom did we see a minor reduction 
in security. Throughout these simulations the security fluctuates from 98% to 100% (Figure 5.21-e), 
with the optimal solution for the unscanned network evolving with a 98% secure solution when GA 
was applied, while ANTs optimal solutions present a 100% secure candidate. These fluctuations are 
directly attributed to the increased number of nodes, communication links, and additional security 
grade parameters we have introduced into the framework.  
Comparing the analysis for degree centrality (Figure 5.21-b), minimum path average (Figure 5.21-c), 
and maximum bridging centrality (Figure 5.21-d), comparable to the previous simulations we note 
significant fluctuations between candidate scores. An example of this is the results documented for 
degree centrality (Figure 5.21-b) when we specifically look at the GA when applied to the network 
with a conducted vulnerability scan. Results show in comparison to previous simulations that degree 
centrality for the mutated candidates prominently fluctuated throughout the process, whereas previous 
simulations in general had minor fluctuations in degree centrality and tended to steadily increase or 
decrease throughout evolvement. In this instance however, we note that degree centrality for the 
scanned network with vulnerabilities in evolvement 4 is increased by 5.88% when compared to the 
original topology, and in the final evolvement it has decreased by 70.59%. While minor increases to 
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centralities would not necessarily impede an overall network’s robustness, when we see significant 
fluctuations these will influence the suitability of those candidates which appear to have been 
negatively impacted. 
Due to the increased number of nodes and links which form the network topology there are 
considerably more alternative network configurations which the network could evolve into, and as 
security grades are more accurate these positively influence the security risk mitigation process. All 
these factors will directly impact how large SoS will evolve, which candidates are to be considered, 
while modifying and impeding centrality factors and security. And as previously stated, the 
framework generates and reports not only the optimum candidate but alternative solutions allowing 
for us to analyse results and make informed decisions. 
 
5.3 Effectiveness of Risk Mitigation Within Secure Networks 
In an effort to determine and evaluate the proposed framework’s complete functionality, we decided 
to simulate and analyse networks that were considered as 100% secure, to establish if the risk 
mitigation process could enhance data security and improve data flow, reporting additional 
improvements, while maintaining the security of the network. Firstly, we simulated a network 
consisting of 8 static nodes with 50% connectivity and 100% communication security, using the 
simplistic version of the SCRAM framework running the GA and ANT algorithms against the test 
network visualised in Figure 5.22. 
When the ANT based risk mitigation process was applied to the network, it failed to find any 
improved solutions, which is caused by the use of comparison trails within the algorithm. As the 
network already has 100% secure communication, it will not consider any solution which does not 
match or improve this parameter. Bridging centrality and the robustness of the network are example 
constraints which are also compared, should any one of these parameters fail to be improved then the 
evolved network is simply ignored, resulting in the risk mitigation process failing to find any 
improved solutions.  
The algorithm’s trails restrict the framework from considering alternative solutions that while they 
might increase cost or impede other centralities have the overall potential to provide a more ideal 
network configuration in comparison to the original network. 
Applying the GA based risk mitigation processes to the network, the tool reports eight mutated 
networks that all have improved robustness levels and have maintained 100% security. Figure 5.22 
visualises the original network and every subsequent enhanced solution found, in a series of 
undirected graphs. 
 




(a) Original Network Topology 
 
(b) Evolution A 
 
(c) Evolution B 
 
(d) Evolution C 
 
(e) Evolution D 
 
(f) Evolution E 
 
(g) Evolution F 
 
(h) Evolution G 
 
(i) Final Evolution H 
Figure 5.22. Evaluating a Secure System-of-Systems 
When analysing the GA improved solutions we quickly ascertain that while evolution H (Figure  
5.22-i) is quantified the optimum solution and costs 3357 which is 35.32% less than the original 
network, evolution G (Figure 5.22-h) is the cheapest improved solution reducing the cost by 53.7% 
from 5190 to 2403. This reduction in cost is also reflected in the number of links each evolved 
solution is constructed with.  
The test network is formed using 8 static nodes connected via 23 communication links. As visualised 
in Figure 5.22 we can intuitively see that there has been a reduction in the number of links in each of 
the evolved reported solutions, with the optimal solution (evolution H) connecting all nodes via 19 
links which is a 17.39% link reduction, while evolution G is formed with only 15 communication 
links which is a 34.78% link reduction. We also note that in both these instances we can clearly 
identify that there are alternative communication paths between nodes, meaning should a node or link 
be removed or disabled, data flow will be maintained between all remaining nodes.  
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As the final optimum solution has additional links compared to other reported alternative solutions, it 
means we have to consider that while additional links can increase network risks there is more 
redundancy within its configuration, thus there are many alternative paths between nodes, i.e. in the 
event of multiple path failures the risk of network failure or node isolation is minimal in comparison, 
for example, to evolution G. 
As stated the framework has maintained 100% security (Figure 5.23-e) and improved the robustness 
of the network (Figure 5.23-f) by reducing its robustness value marginally. While the optimum 
solution has only reduced robustness by 7.66% from 216.6052 to 200.0033, and the cheapest 
evolution reduced robustness by 7.18% to 201.0575, when we consider the financial savings that 
could be accrued by implementing either improved solution it potentially outweighs the consequence 
of only marginally improving the network’s robustness. However, we do have to consider the 
negative impacts such as the increase to other centralities. 
Evolution g and h both increase the degree centrality of the graph (Figure 5.23-b) and the maximum 
bridging centrality (Figure 5.23-d). Evolution g is the cheapest evolution, and increases degree 
centrality by 66.67% which is 0.238095 compared to the original network which was only 0.142857, 
and increases bridging centrality by 93.65% from 0.013173 to 0.02551. The optimal solution 
(evolution h) also increases degree centrality by 66.67%, and increases bridging centrality by only 
32.27% to a value of 0.18083. At first glance the percentages appear to be high, but the values are still 
very low and in an acceptable range, and this tolerable increment is acceptable given the overall cost 
reductions. 
Minimum path average (Figure 5.23-c) is marginally increased by the optimal solution, with the 
optimal value of 229.0714 only increasing the original network path average value of 227.1071 by 
0.86%, while the cheapest evolution increases minimum path average by 8.08% to 245.4643. The 
average minimum path is slightly increased as a direct result of the loss of links, but again this would 
be considered acceptable given the reduction in network cost and risk. 
Figure 5.24 shows the centrality values degree, betweenness, closeness, eigenvector, and bridging for 
each node in the original network, optimal network (evolution H), and the lowest costing network 
(evolution G). In each line graph the optimal solution node values are characteristically centralised, in 
between the original network and cheapest alternative enhanced solution. This implies the optimal 
solution average node centralities never fluctuate above or below the original network and evolution 
G. 
For example, as an alternative to analysing the entire network, using the framework’s reports we can 
also evaluate each node within the original network and each of the reported candidates. When we 
view degree centrality (Figure 5.24-a), in the original network the average node value is 0.892857. 
After the security risk mitigation process, reports indicate that the optimal solution has reduced 
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average node degree centrality by 24% reducing the average value to 0.678571, while evolution G has 
reduced average node degree centrality by 40% to 0.535714. 
Average node centrality reductions are also evident in closeness and eigenvector, with the optimal 
solution reducing the average node closeness centrality by 0.81% and average node eigenvector 
centrality by 48.38%. Evolution G had a reduction of average node closeness centrality by 7.03% and 
average node eigenvector centrality by 70.16%. Reductions with closeness centrality are to be 
expected due to the loss of communication paths. While many of the values are significantly reduced 
and others only minimally improved the overall robustness of the network, when we consider the 
reduction in network cost, both the optimal solution and cheapest alterative would be highly 
acceptable and suitable configurations to implement. 
We do note however, that average node centrality values for betweenness (Figure 5.24-b) and 
bridging (Figure 5.24-e) centrality do increase. The optimal solution increases the average node 
bridging centrality by 224.97 % and average node betweenness centrality by 200%, while evolution G 
increases average node bridging centrality by 475.99% and average node betweenness by 366.67%. 
At first glance these average node centrality percentages appear to be excessively high, however, 
when we view the actual values we see that the average node values are in an acceptable range.  
 
 
(a) Overall Cost of Network Communications 
 
 
(b) Degree Centrality of the Graph 
 
 
(c) Minimum Path Average 
 
 
(d) Maximum Bridging Centrality 
 
 
(e) Communications Security 
 
 
(f) Populations Robustness 
Figure 5.23. Analysis of the Secure Network When GA was Applied 





(a) Node Degree Centrality Evolution 
 
 




(c) Closeness Centrality Evolution  
 
 




(e) Bridging Centrality Evolution 
 
Figure 5.24. Analysis of Node Centralities of Secure Network When GA was Applied 
For example, the original average node bridging centrality is 0.001647, with the optimal solution only 
increasing to 0.005351 and evolution G only increasing to 0.009485. The same can be seen with the 
original average node betweenness centrality which was 0.013393, with the optimal solution only 
increasing to 0.040179 and evolution G only increasing to 0.0625. All these values are in a tolerable 
range, and with the reduction of communication links and cost decrease we expect to see a direct 
correlation to the increase of these two centralities. 
 
5.3.1 Evaluating Positive Security Risk Mitigation of Secure SoS 
Using the full implemented SCRAM framework and applying both GA and ANT security risk 
mitigation techniques, we simulated four different networks which all had a communication security 
scores of 100%. Firstly, we simulated two 8 node networks, one with 30% connectivity (Figure 5.25-
a) and one with 50% connectivity (Figure 5.25-d). Secondly, we simulated two 12 node networks, one 
with 30% connectivity (Figure 5.26-a) and one with 50% connectivity (Figure 5.26-d). 
Alike to our previous simulation to enhance a 100% secure network, when we combined the risk 
mitigation algorithm with ANT optimisation algorithm and applied the technique to all four networks, 
Chapter 5 - Implementation and Evaluation  
213 
 
it failed to find any improved solutions due to its strict comparison criteria trails. When we applied the 
combined risk mitigation algorithm with GA via the framework to the same four individual networks, 
the security risk mitigation process reported a series of evolved candidates for each network, detailing 
alternative improved candidates. 
When we review the undirected graphs, we can intuitively see a reduction in links for all four 
evolvements when we compare the original networks (Figure 5.25-a, Figure 5.25-d, Figure 5.26-a, 
and Figure 5.26-d) to the first mutated evolution (Figure 5.25-b, Figure 5.25-e, Figure 5.26-b, and 
Figure 5.26-e) to the final optimum evolution (Figure 5.25-c, Figure 5.25-f, Figure 5.26-c, and Figure 
5.26-f). Table 5.10 through to Table 5.13 display each network’s reported improved candidates, 
including the number of communication links connecting static nodes within the network. 
 
(a) Network A topology  Consisting of 
8 Nodes  with 30% Connectivity 
 
(b) First Evolution of Network A 
 
(c) Final Evolution of Network A 
 
(d) Network B Topology Consisting of 
8 Nodes  with 50% Connectivity  
 
(e) First Evolution of Network B 
 
(f) Final Evolution of Network B 
Figure 5.25. Secure 8 Node Network Comparisons with Applied GA Risk Mitigation 
Table 5.10 establishes that the original network is comprised of 20 communication links; once the GA 
process was applied to the network each improved mutated network generated was comprised of a 
reduced number of data links. For example, Network A (Figure 5.23-a, 8 nodes 30% connectivity) 
sees a 20% reduction in links for the first evolution reducing communication links from 20 to 16, as 
the network is further mutated we see the number of links fluctuate down to 15 in its second improved 
candidate then increase to 17 links until its final optimum solution is reported. The final optimum 
solution also sees a reduction of links by 20%; this reduction is reflected in the decrease to 
communication costs which drops by 22.16%.  
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While network B (Figure 5.25-d, 8 nodes 50% connectivity) reduces links by 34.62% and cost by 
41.16% (Table 5.11), Network C (Figure 5.26-a, 12 nodes 30% connectivity) reduces links by 34.69% 
and costs by 32.16% (Table 5.12), and Network D (Figure 5.26-d, 12 nodes 50% connectivity) has a 
final optimum solution that reduces links by 39.29% and has a reduced cost of 43.7% (Table 5.13). 
These significant reductions to the overall cost of the network communications (Figure 5.27-a) and 
decreases to the number of data links, while they do not greatly improve population robustness 
(Figure 5.27-f) there is a notable improvement to comparison parameter scores confirming the overall 
appropriateness of the network’s improvements. 
Alike to previous simulations, these reductions to robustness, cost, and link reduction, increase each 
network’s minimum path average (Figure 5.27-c) marginally by an average of 5.27% and bridging 
centrality (Figure 5.27-d) notably by 179.74%. Again, while the percentage increases appear to be 
significantly high for the bridging centrality, when we examine the values we note they remain low 
and within a tolerable range. For example Network A only increase from 0.013812 to 0.0217, 
Network B increase from 0.0093236 to 0.0251, Network C from 0.005731 to 0.021212, and Network 
D increase its bridging centrality to 0.013492 from 0.004233. 
Table 5.10. Secure Network A Security Evolution Results 







Node Centrality Averages 
Degree Betweenness Closeness Eigenvector Bridging 
0 20 2879 183 100 169.6392 0.714286 0.035714 0.000798 477.25 0.004735 
1 16 2514 192.0357 99 166.8778 0.571429 0.053571 0.000755 323.4531 0.013947 
2 15 2321 192.25 99 163.6267 0.535714 0.058036 0.000754 277.625 0.015831 
3 17 2679 186.6071 100 163.5985 0.607143 0.053571 0.000782 371.1406 0.012117 
4 17 2629 187.2857 100 163.5147 0.607143 0.053571 0.000781 375.4531 0.008269 
5 17 2508 186.1429 100 162.6874 0.607143 0.053571 0.000785 338.3438 0.009929 
6 16 2241 188.2857 100 160.8404 0.571429 0.058036 0.000776 291.7969 0.012439 
 
Table 5.11. Secure Network B Security Evolution Results 







Node Centrality Averages 
Degree Betweenness Closeness Eigenvector Bridging 
0 26 5692 232.2143 100 222.4113 0.928571 0.008929 0.00063 1166.078 0.001155 
1 22 4707 241.6429 100 222.2639 0.785714 0.026786 0.000604 843.5156 0.003768 
2 20 4014 244.75 98 218.6872 0.714286 0.035714 0.000598 665.3281 0.005135 
3 21 4542 240.3214 100 214.7726 0.75 0.03125 0.000609 771.4063 0.004399 
4 19 3897 241.8929 100 213.3133 0.678571 0.044643 0.000606 617.375 0.006534 
5 18 3444 239.8571 98 212.0986 0.642857 0.044643 0.000609 519.2813 0.006567 
6 16 3194 247.25 100 210.9302 0.571429 0.058036 0.000589 418.125 0.010907 
7 16 3163 243.75 100 208.9639 0.571429 0.058036 0.000599 399.3125 0.011515 
8 17 3349 242.8929 100 207.945 0.607143 0.053571 0.0006 470.9063 0.010198 




(a) Network C Topology Consisting of  12 
Nodes with 30% Connectivity 
 
(b) First Evolution of Network C 
 
(c) Final Evolution of Network C 
 
(d) Network D Topology Consisting of 12 
Nodes  with 50% Connectivity 
 
(e) First Evolution of Network D 
 
 
(f) Final Evolution of Network D 
Figure 5.26. Secure 12 Node Network Comparisons with Applied GA Risk Mitigation 
The framework’s detailed reports also allow us to look closely at each node to see how their 
centralities are impacted as the network evolved. Table 5.10 through to Table 5.13, display aggregated 
node centrality scores for each node within the network, as an overview for each improved reported 
network candidate. Having an overview of nodes assists greatly when we want to establish how 
individual nodes are impacted in comparison to the network, and if we look at bridging centrality for 
Network B for example, we ascertain that while the overall network bridging centrality has increased 
by only 172.94%, the average node bridging centrality has increased by 782.94% from 0.001155 to 
0.010198 (Table 5.11). The report indicates that in this instance the value is still in an acceptable 
range, but provides a solution for quick analysis to assist with any decision making processes. 
Reviewing individual node risks is vital, especially if we have to ensure that a specific node conforms 
to strict risk limitations if it is deemed as a critical node within the infrastructure. 
Additionally, these reports help us to identify not only the values for the optimum solution, but we can 
scan for the candidate that would be the cheapest to implement and its impact on centrality values and 
security, in an attempt to identify if it would be a suitable alternative solution in comparison to the 
optimum solution for example. When we review Networks A and C, it is ascertained that there are no 
cheaper alternatives to consider, the final optimum solution has the lowest network communication 
cost to impellent and maintains 100% communication security in comparison to the original network’s 
parameters. 
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Table 5.12. Network C Security Evolution Results 







Node Centrality Averages 
Degree Betweenness Closeness Eigenvector Bridging 
0 49 6664 171.8788 100 176.6313 0.742424 0.021465 0.000544 785.0486 0.001711 
1 34 5057 199.0455 100 176.2492 0.515152 0.044192 0.000466 409.2361 0.006206 
2 35 4781 187.6061 100 167.7929 0.515152 0.044192 0.000496 391.0694 0.005718 
3 32 4521 183.0152 100 166.4406 0.5 0.051768 0.000512 368.9931 0.00768 
 
Table 5.13. Network D Security Evolution Results 







Node Centrality Averages 
Degree Betweenness Closeness Eigenvector Bridging 
0 56 12127 245.9545 100 263.0117 0.848485 0.012626 0.00038 1591.632 0.001032 
1 32 7354 285.5454 98 261.9081 0.484848 0.05303 0.000327 601.1111 0.008356 
2 42 9861 264.894 100 259.1658 0.636364 0.030303 0.000352 1010.028 0.003778 
3 37 8325 276.4243 100 254.8373 0.560606 0.037879 0.000337 729.3194 0.005114 
4 35 7217 271.6364 100 246.8471 0.530303 0.041667 0.000343 626.8819 0.005559 
5 32 6556 278.7727 99 243.5951 0.5 0.049242 0.000334 540.0694 0.006642 
6 35 7365 263.8788 100 243.2883 0.530303 0.040404 0.000354 669.8056 0.004138 
7 32 6447 268.394 98 242.0958 0.484848 0.046717 0.000347 519.125 0.005141 
8 31 6505 280.4546 100 240.349 0.469697 0.046717 0.000332 508.5556 0.006897 
9 33 6876 266.6667 100 235.155 0.484848 0.046717 0.000349 543.0278 0.00561 
10 33 6538 265.1364 100 234.749 0.5 0.045455 0.000352 545.4306 0.005891 
11 34 6827 263.4091 100 234.6132 0.515152 0.042929 0.000354 588.6528 0.005522 
 
Networks B and D both have cheaper candidates that could be alternative solutions in comparison to 
the original network and optimal candidate. Reviewing Network B we identify that candidate 7 (Table 
5.11 evolution 7) would be marginally cheaper to implement than the optimum candidate (Table 5.11 
evolution 8), with a 5.55% difference between their costs. Both candidates maintain 100% 
communication security and improve network robustness, with a 0.49% difference between their 
robustness scores. This marginal cost saving means, while this candidate would be the cheapest to 
implement, analysis suggests that the optimum solution would be ideal to implement as it still reduces 
overall network cost by 41.16%, maintains security, enhances robustness, and has a marginally lower 
minimum path average in comparison to the cheapest alternative candidate. 
Analysing Network D, we ascertain that there are four lower costing alternative candidates than the 
optimum final solution. Candidate 7 (Table 5.13 evolution 7) is the cheapest reported solution in 
comparison to all candidates, but it does not maintain 100% communication security as it reportedly 
has a security value of 98%. Immediately we dismiss this solution as our objective is to improve and 
mitigate risk within the network while maintaining its 100% communication security status. The 
second cheapest candidate to implement is candidate 8 (Table 5.13 evolution 8) which reduces 
network costs by 46.36% from 12127 to 6505, in comparison to the optimum final candidate (Table 
5.13 evolution 11) which reduces cost by 43.7% to 6827.  There is only a 4.16% difference between 
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the candidates’ costs meaning evolution 8 would save an additional 282. Furthermore, candidate 8 has 
lower node averages for degree and eigenvector centralities in comparison to the optimum solution.  
We observe that the optimum solution in comparison to candidate 8 has a marginal lower minimum 
path average and robustness, which is a minor difference of 2.44% for robustness and 6.47% for 
minimum path average. It is ascertained though that both candidates have reduced cost, robustness, 
and average node degree centrality, while maintaining 100% communication security. And the 
marginal differences between parameters is not significant enough to ascertain which would be the 
most viable to implement, as while one is considered the optimum, candidate 8 does have a cost 
saving. If an organisation had budget restrictions because the framework did not only just present the 
optimum solution but alternative candidates, these alternative evolutions can be considered for 
application in the awareness that the framework has mitigated risk and improved the overall 
robustness of the network. These evolvements and recommended improvements assure network 
security and reduce potential risks to data communications. 
 
(a) Overall Cost of Network 
Communications 
 
(b) Degree Centrality of the Graph 
 
(c) Minimum Path Average 
 
(d) Maximum Bridging Centrality 
 
(e) Communications Security 
 
(f) Populations Robustness 
Figure 5.27. Security Analysis of Secure Networks When GA is Applied to Mitigate Risks 
Comparing the analysis for communication security for all four networks, again we observe a larger 
volume of communication security fluctuations between evolved candidates when utilising the full 
framework to run simulations, as evident in Figure 5.27-b. Due to the improved functionality of the 
framework, when quantifying security grades and vulnerability identification, owing to the inclusion 
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of NVD vulnerabilities and CVSS v3 scores, we see similar characteristics to previously discussed 
simulations, where the network has been evolved and the overall robustness of the networks is 
improved, while negatively impacting the network communication security. The lowest reported 
security value for these simulations is 98%. When evolving networks, due to the accuracy of 
vulnerability scoring and reduction in communication links, we recognise that this will negatively 
impact security, closeness centrality, and impede network communication. Even so, all four 
simulations have reported their final optimal solutions have evolved and maintained 100% security. 
 
5.3.2 Evaluating Negative Security Risk Mitigation of Secure SoS 
It must be noted that not all 100% secure networks can be evolved and enhanced with a positive 
outcome. The previous four simulated networks (Section 5.3.1, Figure 5.25 and Figure 5.26) clearly 
demonstrate how 100% secure networks can be enhanced further and have their risks mitigated, 
robustness and related centralities improved, along with reducing their associated costs. During our 
simulations and analysis we modelled several 100% secure networks that could not be improved and 
the SCRAM framework reported no improved candidates, indicating that the network was optimally 
configured to meet security requirements and could not be enhanced further. 
 
(a) Network E Topology Consisting of 8 
Nodes with 30% Connectivity 
 
(b) First Evolution of Network E 
 
(c) Final Evolution of Network E 
 
(d) Network F Topology Consisting of 12 
Nodes  with 50% Connectivity 
 
(e) First Evolution of Network F 
 
(f) Final Evolution of Network F 
Figure 5.28. Comparison of Secure Networks Evolved that Negatively Impact Network Cost 
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In this section, two simulated networks (Figure 5.28) are presented that model 100% secure networks 
that when evolved negatively impact the overall cost of network communications. Network E (Figure 
5.28-a) consist of 8 static nodes with 30% connectivity and 100% security, and Network F (Figure 
5.28-d) consists of 12 static nodes with 30% connectivity and 100% security. When we view the 
candidate graphs in Figure 5.28, we cannot intuitively see a reduction in communication links 
between the original graphs, the first evolution candidates, and the final optimum solutions, instead 
we have to analyse the network reports to ascertain if there has been any link reduction. Table 5.14 
indicates that the optimum solution for Network E has no link reduction despite other reported 
candidates evolving with marginally fewer links, while Table 5.15 indicates that the optimum solution 
is reduced by 5.56% from 36 links to 34, and its other reported candidates have evolved with fewer 
links. 
Despite both networks maintaining or reducing the number of communication links, these networks, 
when processed, report an increase to the overall cost of the network (Figure 56-a). Network E has 
increased its cost by 6.73% and network F is increased by 5.49%, therefore reconfiguring the network 
when on a tight budget may not be advisable. Although it must be noted that this small increase to 
cost would assure that the network was reconfigured mitigating risk and enhancing security, as 
evidenced by the minimal improvement to the robustness score  (Figure 56-f). The robustness for 
Network E only improves by 1.91%, but Network F is improved by 9.35%. If the minimal cost 
increase was within budget then these improvements would further reduce the associated risks to the 
network and strengthen the SoS security. 
Table 5.14. Network E Security Evolution Results 






Node Centrality Averages 
Degree Betweenness Closeness Eigenvector Bridging 
0 17 2556 209.2857 100 181.0403 0.607143 0.053571 0.000712 376.1875 0.007908 
1 15 2170 210.3571 98 179.4276 0.535714 0.071429 0.000708 274.5938 0.011962 
2 16 2498 213.25 100 178.2958 0.571429 0.058036 0.000696 334.5 0.009631 
3 17 2728 210.8214 100 177.5785 0.607143 0.053571 0.000702 371.0938 0.009807 
 
Table 5.15. Network F Security Evolution Results 






Node Centrality Averages 
Degree Betweenness Closeness Eigenvector Bridging 
0 36 4443 204.0758 100 194.4821 0.545455 0.050505 0.000456 414.4375 0.00613 
1 33 4860 204.2424 100 184.7208 0.5 0.045455 0.000449 381.1319 0.007668 
2 32 4764 206.2121 100 183.6317 0.484848 0.045455 0.000448 398.1319 0.005059 
3 34 4687 196 100 176.3076 0.515152 0.04798 0.000472 403.8194 0.005865 
 
These two networks are only similar in the fact they are both fully secure networks, and when we 
review the enhanced results we note that Network E has a 0.73% increase to its minimum path 
average and 10.71% increase to its bridging centrality, whereas Network F shows a decrease to its 
minimum path average by 3.96% and has a network bridging centrality decrease of 62.3%. This is 
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expected due to the elimination and establishment of links between nodes within each network, as 
minimum path lengths alter as routes are reconfigured and security maintained. 
We also see a reduction to the network’s degree centrality (Figure 5.29-b), with Network E reducing 
by 57.14%, from 0.333333 to 0.142857, and Network F reducing by 22.22%, from 0.327273 to 
0.254545. In addition, to evaluating the network as a whole, we also analyse the node centralities for 
these networks. Reviewing Network E (Table 5.14), we note that the final enhanced solution (Table 
5.14 evolution 3) maintains the average node degree and betweenness centralities, while reducing the 
eigenvector centralities and slightly impacting closeness centralities compared to the original network 
(Table 5.14 evolution 0). 
 
(a) Overall Cost of Network Communications 
 
(b) Degree Centrality of the Graph 
 
(c) Minimum Path Average 
 
(d) Maximum Bridging Centrality 
 
(e) Communication Security 
 
(f) Populations Robustness 
Figure 5.29. Security Analysis of Secure Networks When GA is Applied with Negative Outcomes 
Table 5.14 also shows that evolution 2, while not the optimum solution should be considered as a 
suitable alternative. Evolution 2 has lower cost, robustness score, and network bridging centrality in 
comparison to the original network, and maintains 100% communication security. This candidate’s 
average node degree, closeness, and eigenvector centralities are also lower than the original networks, 
and it minimally impacts the networks minimum path average, closeness centrality, and aggregated 
node betweenness and bridging centralities. Again, having an optimum solution and second candidate 
to consider provides decision makers with alternative solutions to contemplate for implementation, 
and in this instance provides solutions that are capable of assuring security and mitigating risk, as well 
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as reporting cheaper alternatives to the optimum candidate that maintain security should financial 
restrictions be a major factor for consideration. 
Analysing Network F (Table 5.15), we ascertain that the optimum candidate (Table 5.15 evolution 3) 
is the lowest cost evolved solution, and despite this small increase we see a reduction to not only its 
minimum path average, number of links and robustness score, but to all node average centralities 
when we compare them to the original network (Table 5.15 evolution 0). The analysis for this 
reported candidate shows that its closeness centrality has only been marginally impacted.  
As previously stated, while Network F has an optimum candidate with a lower number of 
communication links, compared to its original configuration it does not mean this is the most secure 
network. In the event of communication link failure there must be adequate data links to assure that 
data communication does not fail between nodes, therefore communication must have a safe route via 
alternative paths. In this instance while fewer links has actually increased the overall cost of the 
network, this is a direct result of the removal and establishment of new links forming the network, 
which alter path lengths. 
 
5.4 Case Study 
5.4.1 Node Energy Efficiency Problem 
We consider Smart Cities to be an ideal representation of an SoS due to their dynamic nature, 
complexity, diverse composition and architecture, and dissimilar security levels. WSN within Smart 
Cities are generally formed by means of sensors which are low in cost and power, and capable of 
sensing, processing, and communicating data. Information is gathered then processed locally, the 
node then forwards the data to a sink. Characteristically, nodes have short transmission ranges, 
meaning data is generally transferred via other nodes using multi-hop paths. Sensors are typically 
powered by batteries, which are difficult or impractical to change and cannot be recharged. Often it 
can be more cost effective to replace the entire sensor than substitute the original sensor’s drained 
power source [258] [259]. 
Switching a sensor’s radio off when the node is idle can assist with energy conservation, but the node 
has to remain active in a state of idle listening in case traffic is forwarded on the channel. Remaining 
in this state can consume 50-100% of a node’s energy which is required for receiving, and data 
exchange is the most prominent function of the node compared to processing and sensing [258]. 
Other issues that impact energy efficiency include control packet overhead, collision, and 
overhearing. Control packet overhead impacts energy efficiency and bandwidth due to the regular 
delivery of updated control packets and synchronization. Collision impacts energy efficiency as data 
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in the network can be transferred by two or more nodes simultaneously; this data can then become 
corrupted resulting in it being discarded. Consequently, the data requires retransmission, resulting in 
further energy consumption along with increasing network latency. While overhearing impacts sensor 
energy as when data is transmitted from one node to another, the data can be accidently received by 
all neighbouring nodes despite the fact they were not destined to receive the date. Sensor nodes are 
also prone to failure due to environmental factors and energy consumption, which causes changes to 
the resource strained network topology and will impact the energy consumption for the remaining 
nodes [258] [259]. When considering the integration of WSN into Smart Cities, extending their life 
time is essential. We monitor energy efficiency for each node and integrate the parameter within the 
SCRAM frameworks security principles as an identified risk, to assist in enhancing the security and 
mitigating risks within the SoS, while endeavouring to extend the life of the Smart City. 
 
5.4.2 Node Energy Efficiency Comparison 
The algorithms, principal concepts, and robustness function presented in Section 4 have been 
incorporated into the SCRAM framework, and have the ability to reconfigure collaborative networks 
into optimally secure configurations. This framework additionally provides an inexpensive simulation 
model to conduct experiments within, allowing us to study the behaviour of the systems and 
techniques. To evaluate the usefulness of the applied theoretical principles, we extend this novel 
approach to monitor and incorporate node energy level status, and integrate the quantified energy 
values within the security risk mitigation process, in an attempt to extend the life of energy restricted 
devices and networks that form part of an SoS, such as WSN within Smart Cities. 
For this case study, we simulate a section of a Smart City, which is a WSN consisting of 8 static 
nodes with a low connectivity of 30%, formed using a variety of ICT devices. This includes sensor 
nodes and mobile devices, all of which are assigned the relevant node software, hardware, and 
firmware parameters such as type of operating system, energy level, data access grade, whether it 
supports encryption, Internet access, incorporates firewalls, IDS, anti-virus/security, and if the node 
has been completely updated or has vulnerabilities, depending on device type. 
 




(a) WSN A Security Graph, Including Node Security Grades, Data Levels, Node Status, and Bridging Centralities (Network A) 
 
(b) WSN B Energy Efficiency Graph, Including Energy Level, Security Grades, Data Levels, and Bridging Centralities (Network B) 
Figure 5.30. Primary Simulated Smart City WSN Environment 
SCRAM randomly assigned all nodes with a security level and connected them via a series of primary 
communication links, and assigned a random network data level, which nodes will be compared 
against replicating data access control principles. Then the framework quantified the network’s 
degree, betweenness, closeness, eigenvector, and bridging centralities, the communications security, 
minimum path average, and the network’s associated cost. 
Figure 5.30-a depicts the WSN, displaying key parameters so we can examine the graph intuitively, 
and visualises the security of the network. Figure 5.30-b visualises the same simulated Smart City 
section, however, it has been imported back into the SCRAM framework with the energy efficiency 
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principles applied and exhibits the energy levels of the nodes. Table 5.16 defines the visualised 
parameters used to generate the undirected graphs for this case study. 
  Table 5.16. Visualised Security Graph Vulnerabilities, Parameters, and Energy Levels  
Graph Parameter  Symbol Description 
All graphs Scanned node no vulnerabilities 
 
Dark green node/tag 
 Scanned nodes identified vulnerabilities  
Blue node/tag 
 Unscanned node  
Dark red node/tag 
 Node size represents quantified bridging centrality, i.e. small nodes low and large nodes equal high. 
Security Insecure node  
Node encased with a solid orange box 
 Blocked node  
Node encased with a solid red box 
 Blocked and insecure node  
Node encased with a solid red box with 
orange border 
Energy efficiency High node energy level  
Node encased with a solid green box 
 Medium node energy level  
Node encased with a solid orange box 
 Low node energy level  
Node encased with a solid red box 
 
Conducting risk assessment on a Smart City is highly problematic, great consideration must be taken 
when applying methods directly to systems which are deployed or deemed critical, as these methods 
have the capacity to impact the collaborative components and affect their ability to function and meet 
objectives. We developed SCRAM as a safe testing environment to prevent our techniques from 
impeding physical Smart Cities and from introducing new risks to the topology.  
We incorporated risk assessment into the SCRAM framework in order to simulate vulnerability 
identification within these environments, and assign relevant reported NVD vulnerabilities to nodes, 
in a random method based on the device’s hardware, software, and firmware. Simulating these 
vulnerability techniques means security scores are quantified with greater accuracy, SCRAM then 
generates detailed reports on all security parameters, centralities, and identified vulnerabilities, 
including security vulnerabilities with their associated CVSS v3 base scores. Thus, results and 
evaluations are more realistic and precise. 
 
 




(a) First Mutated Candidate Using GA 
 
(b) Final Optimum Candidate Using GA 
 
(c) First Mutated Candidate Using ANT 
 
(d) Final Optimum Candidate Using ANT 
 
(e) First and Final Optimum Candidate Using TABU 
 
Figure 5.31. Comparison of Smart City WSN Security Risk Mitigation 
 




(a) First Mutated Candidate Using GA 
 
(b) Final Optimum Candidate Using GA 
 
(c) First Mutated Candidate Using ANT 
 
(d) Final Optimum Candidate Using ANT 
 
(e) First and Final Optimum Candidate Using TABU 
 
Figure 5.32. Comparison of Smart City WSN Energy Level and Security Risk Mitigation 
As stated, the Smart City WSN section was generated within our SCRAM framework, and the 
outlined principles were applied to the network consecutively. When each algorithm is applied, it is 
integrated with the method’s security risk mitigation process. The network is evolved by each 
algorithm into a set of best solutions as described in Section 4.6.4, Figure 5.31 and Figure 5.32 
visualise the first evolved improved candidate and the final optimum solution for each of the applied 
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algorithms, as examples of how the network’s security is reconfigured and network evolved in 
comparison to the original network topology. 
 
5.4.3 Smart City WSN Robustness 
 
 
(a) Robustness Monitors for Network A Focusing on 
Security and Data Access 
 
 
(b) Robustness Monitors for Network B Focusing on Energy 
Consumption 
Figure 5.33. Comparison of Smart City WSN Robustness Graphs  
Throughout the security risk mitigation process each reported candidate is measured by means of the 
robustness function (Section 4.6.3), and quantified using the five key parameters (security grade, 
highest bridging centrality, degree centrality, minimum path average, and cost). Emphasis is placed on 
the robustness level of the network as it assists the algorithms to produce the next generation of 
improved solutions, as it utilises the key parameters of individuals being selected. Other factors are 
also reported and considered such as the degree centrality of the graph and energy efficiency, and key 
parameters are also reported and analysed as standalone risks despite assisting in the quantification of 
the robustness score.  
The robustness graphs in Figure 5.33 visualise network robustness when each of the algorithms was 
applied to both WSN states throughout all evolutionary risk mitigation processes. These graphs record 
a notable reduction in network robustness levels, for both WSNs A and B. When the algorithms were 
applied they randomly evolved new candidates in a positive method, meaning the reported improved 
solutions are more appropriate. The robustness monitor for WSN A (Figure 5.33-a) shows the original 
network had a robustness level quantified as 463.3917. When the GA based risk mitigation process 
was applied the final optimal solutions quantified robustness score was 201.5488, achieving a 56.51% 
improvement. Utilising the ANT based risk mitigation process; the final optimal solution’s quantified 
robustness score was 228.368, achieving a 50.72% improvement, compared to the TABU based risk 
mitigation process which had a final robustness score of 220.9864 improving robustness by 52.31%. 
The robustness for WSN B (Figure 5.33-b) was also quantified as 463.3917, in some simulations we 
see marginal fluctuations of difference between the original robustness scores because the framework 
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is quantifying the robustness focusing on different key parameters and incorporating energy as an 
additional risk. When the GA was applied to the network its final optimal candidate improved the 
robustness by 52.85% scoring 218.4797, ANTs optimal candidate scored 220.7172 improving 
robustness by 52.37%, while TABU reduced the robustness score of the network by only 39.52% 
scoring 280.2389. In both scenarios, robustness is improved from the first reported evolvement for 
GA and ANT, ranging between 39.52% and 52.31%. This positive development continues to advance 
throughout the evolutionary risk mitigation process. 
 
5.4.4 Smart City WSN Data Analysis 
During evolution stages the applied principles search for an optimal combination, using processes that 
remove and replace links within the Smart City WSN, to mitigate risks and strengthen the security, in 
terms of securing links between nodes and enhancing security for the entire SoS. Figures 5.31-a, 5.31-
c, 5.31-e, 5.32-a, 5.32-c and 5.32-e, visualise the first improved generations which assure 
communication security, each showing an increase of communication links. The cost increase 
(Figures 5.34-a and 5.35-a) for both scenarios reflects this growth of communication paths, with the 
applied algorithms increasing the cost of WSN A on average by 104.8% and WSN B by an average of 
104.2%. It is essential that the security risk mitigation process when adding and removing links, 
balances connectivity with improvements to the WSN robustness and overall network security, while 
not unduly impacting centrality factors. The framework is not attempting to revise cost, simply 
associate network cost in terms of distance between nodes with suggested WSN modifications. WSN 
A which prioritises security and data access, shows that GA based security risk mitigation algorithm 
has the lowest costing optimal solution (Figure 5.34-a) increasing by only 98.04%. WSN B which 
prioritises energy levels, shows that ANT based security risk mitigation algorithm has the lowest 
costing optimal solution (Figure 5.35-a) resulting in an increase of 88.59%. 
Through the improved robustness techniques, the algorithms and processes sustain low degree 
centrality (Figures 5.34-b and 5.35-b) for both scenarios. Comparing the analysis for degree centrality, 
for Network A (Figure 5.34-b) we note significant fluctuations for candidate scores for both GA and 
ANT; both optimal candidates decrease degree centrality by 62% to 0.1428. As the WSN is evolved 
WSN B (Figure 5.35-b) also exhibits fluctuations for degree centrality scores. The optimal candidate 
for GA and ANT both decrease their optimal solution’s degree centrality score by 37.52% to 0.2380, 
despite both evolving different numbers of candidates with different robustness levels.  
In both scenarios, while the network’s optimal solutions do not have the lowest degree centrality 
score, each solution with the exception of TABU, has a reported improved centrality score compared 
to the original network. While degree centrality is not a key parameter used to quantify network 
robustness, as the algorithms process network evolvements, they reject evolved candidates that 
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critically increase degree centrality, i.e. minor negative increases are acceptable and considered in 
tolerable range. 
(a) Cost of Network  (b) Degree Centrality of the Graph (c) Minimum Path Average 
(d) Maximum Bridging Centrality (e) Communications Security 
 
Figure 5.34. Network Evolution Security Results Comparison for WSN A 
There are notable fluctuations between reported candidates for minimum path average (Figures 5.34-c 
and 5.35-c). In both scenarios, the only increase to minimum path average occurred when TABU was 
applied to WSN B, which focuses on energy levels. This negative increase is reflected in TABUs 
robustness score (Figure 5.33-b) which is slightly higher compared to the other algorithms’ robustness 
scores. Minimal path average reduced by 24.25% using GA and 25.43% using ANT on WSN A, and 
by 28% using GA and by 15.29% using ANT on WSN B. These scores directly correlate to the new 
established links between nodes. 
Analysing bridging centrality (Figures 5.34-d and 5.35-d), there are significant fluctuations between 
candidate scores for both scenarios and all algorithms. WSN A (Figure 5.34-d) indicates that the final 
optimum solution when ANT was utilised has a minor increase of 4.17% in comparison to the original 
network. In contrast to GA, which decreased bridging centrality by 59.09% and TABU which 
decreased by 62.03%. Analysing WSN B (Figure 5.35-d) each of the applied algorithms generated 
final solutions with decreased bridging centrality scores, GA decreased by 58.79%, TABU decreased 
by 56.1%, while ANT had the lowest decrease of 46.15%.  Despite the single minor increase which is 
within a tolerable range, the analysis corroborates that as the WSN is evolved and algorithms applied, 
each of the methods support the security enhancement of the network, ensuring that evolvements that 
negatively impede security, robustness, and centrality factors are rejected. This is evident from not 
only sustained low centralities, but also the improvement to the robustness score. 
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(a) Cost of Network Communications  (b) Degree Centrality of the Graph (c) Minimum Path Average 
(d) Maximum Bridging Centrality (e) Communications Security 
 
Figure 5.35. Network Evolution Security Results Comparison for WSN B 
We observe for both scenarios there are significant increases to communication security from the first 
evolved candidate (Figures 5.34-e and 5.35-e), with minor fluctuations occurring from 95% to 100% 
for both networks. Each of the optimum solutions generated report 100% secure network 
communications, meaning each applied algorithm increased security by 51%. 
Alternatively, via the use of the framework’s detailed reports we can evaluate each node and analyse 
how individual centralities are impacted due to network evolvement, Tables 5.17 (WSN A) and 5.18 
(WSN B) present aggregated node centrality scores for the primary, lowest costing, and optimum 
network candidates. Evaluating individual nodes assists in determining how distinct nodes are 
impacted compared to analysing the SoS as a single entity. An excerpt from a report is shown in Table 
5.19, reporting data for Network A when GA was applied, showing in this instance the individual 
node bridging centrality scores for each enhanced reported candidate. This is vital should there be a 
requirement to monitor a specific critical node’s centrality values, and evaluate them prior to applying 
the recommended reconfiguration. 
We ascertain that bridging centrality utilising GA in both scenarios decreased by over 58%. However, 
for WSN A average node bridging centrality only improved by 49.38%, while WSN B improved by 
64.87%. In both scenarios utilising ANT, WSN A decreased bridging centrality by 63% yet the 
average node centrality only improved by 12.23%, while WSN B reported a 56.1% centrality 
improvement while its average node bridging centrality scored a 46.5% improvement. The report 
indicates that for all instances the values are in an acceptable range, but these reports provide an 
alternative means for analysing the SoS components and can be useful during any decision making 
processes. 
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Table 5.17. WSN A Security Evolution Results 
Evolution No. Links Cost Robustness Degree Betweenness Closeness Eigenvector Bridging 
0 (Primary Network) 12 1682 463.3917 0.428571 0.102679 0.000545 190.9844 0.01653 
GA Evolution 2 low-cost 14 2901 234.8343 0.5 0.066964 0.000539 374.2656 0.006398 
GA Evolution 9 optimum 17 3331 210.5488 0.607143 0.049107 0.000581 465.4844 0.008367 
ANT Evolution 3 low-cost 16 3172 239.0152 0.535714 0.0625 0.000539 401.4844 0.007346 
ANT Evolution 6 optimum 17 3595 228.368 0.607143 0.058036 0.000584 488.6406 0.014509 
TABU Evolution 1 
optimum 
20 4225 220.9864 0.714286 0.035714 0.000592 686.5938 0.005139 
 
Table 5.18. WSN B Security Evolution Results 
Evolution No. 
Links 
Cost Robustness Degree Betweenness Closeness Eigenvector Bridging 
0 (Primary Network) 12 1682 463.3917 0.428571 0.102679 0.000545 190.9844 0.01653 
GA Evolution 10 low-cost 18 3255 218.6863 0.607143 0.058036 0.000572 462.75 0.012002 
GA Evolution 11 optimum 20 3813 218.4797 0.678571 0.044643 0.000592 609.0156 0.005807 
ANT Evolution 4 low-cost 16 2998 226.5958 0.535714 0.058036 0.000568 376.9063 0.011908 
ANT Evolution 8 optimum 16 3172 220.7172 0.535714 0.066964 0.00056 433.2813 0.008844 
TABU Evolution 1 
optimum 
16 
3935 280.2389 0.571429 0.058036 0.000314 544.1094 0.009284 
 
Additionally, these reports help ascertain the values for the optimum solution, and can identify if there 
are cheaper alternative candidates to implement that don’t impact centrality values, robustness, and 
security, identifying more suitable alternatives than the reported optimum solutions. Reviewing 
TABU results, there are no cheaper alternatives to consider, due to the algorithm’s rigid methods 
failing to yield alternative enhanced solutions. When GA and ANT are applied to both WSNs, cheaper 
candidates to implement are reported, which improve both the network’s robustness and security, 
compared to the original Smart City WSN. 
Table 5.19. Network A Enhanced Candidates Bridging Centrality Scores 
 node 0 node 1 node 2 node 3 node 4 node 5 node 6 node 7 
Evolution0 0 0 0.046584 0 0 0.047619 0.03004 0.007996 
Evolution1 0 0 0.017007 0 0 0.029762 0 0.012755 
Evolution2 0 0 0.008641 0 0 0.023496 0 0.019048 
Evolution3 0 0 0.014098 0 0 0.022046 0 0.013825 
Evolution4 0 0.011905 0.02381 0 0.008818 0 0.020089 0.010933 
Evolution5 0 0.019841 0.015306 0 0.006494 0.010204 0.006494 0.021008 
Evolution6 0 0 0.015571 0 0 0.016254 0 0.006342 
Evolution7 0 0.009398 0.013255 0 0.021008 0.019133 0 0.019305 
Evolution8 0 0 0.010504 0 0 0.014006 0.010302 0.018367 
Evolution9 0 0 0.015306 0 0.011161 0.014778 0.006211 0.019481 
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However, just because cheaper alternatives are established, they should only be considered if they 
maintain a series of alternative links between secure nodes and 100% security, thus results are 
compared in conjunction with the undirected graphs. 
 
5.4.5 Smart City WSN Observations 
Analysing the undirected graphs that focus on security and data access (Figure 5.31), we intuitively 
identify  in Figure 5.31-a, that the first evolved candidate produced using GA increased the number of 
links, increasing from 12 to 17, ensuring that a safe route was established between all secure nodes. 
Figure 5.31-b shows that as the WSN evolved further, a secure route between nodes 2, 3, and 5 was 
maintained using 17 links. Analysing ANT we identify that the first candidate increased the number 
of wireless links (Figure 5.31-c) from 12 to 19, and the optimum solution (Figure 5.31-d) maintained 
a secure route between nodes and is formed using 17 links. Figure 5.31-e visualises the only candidate 
produced using TABU, this algorithm establishes a secure route between nodes using 20 links, which 
is greater than solutions generated via GA and ANT. Reviewing the undirected graphs that focus on 
energy efficiency (Figure 5.32) we see similar characteristics. 
For each final optimum solution for WSN A (Figures 5.32-b, 5.32-d, 5.32-e), we intuitively see that 
all candidates have multiple links between secure nodes, meaning if a secure link was removed, a 
single secure route will be maintained. This reduces the risk of single point of failures, and ensuring 
that nodes are unlikely to become isolated and cut off from the remainder of the WSN. Should 
multiple secure links be removed, there are alternative insecure communication paths between secure 
nodes. However, data will have to traverse via nodes which have been quantified as insecure placing 
the data at risk. Fortunately, these links have been identified and reported via the method, and 
visualised in the undirected graph, providing advanced warning and an opportunity to make changes 
to improve the security of these nodes prior to vulnerabilities being exploited or risks impacting their 
operations. 
Likewise, final optimum candidates for WSN B (Figures 5.32-b, 5.32-d) identify significant links 
maintained between high energy nodes. In Figure 5.32-d there is only a single path between secure 
nodes. Should a single node or link be removed, then there are no secure paths for data to traverse, 
and data will be transmitted across paths between insecure nodes. 
For WSN B the priority of the principles and algorithms was to quantify and enhance the security of 
the WSN prioritising node energy efficiency, as well as to maintain low centralities, high network 
security, data access violations, and node vulnerability. While this has been achieved, due to the 
method’s prioritisation of energy efficiency there is a lack of alternative paths between secure nodes 
that are present within optimum candidates of WSN A. Which is expected as the method’s priority is 
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shifted from network vulnerabilities and data access. Figure 5.32-b is the only exception, the optimum 
solution utilising GA shows there are multiple links between nodes 2, 3 and 5, therefore if a single 
node or link was removed nodes can maintain a secure path for data to be routed. We perceive that the 
applied algorithms and principles adequately support network security enhancement based on energy 
efficiency and can succeed in extending network life, evident from our initial simulation results. 
In WSN, while the data access control problem would be less likely to be a priority over energy 
efficiency, we aim to improve data flow security. Implementing the new methods to focus on energy 
efficiency we see unstructured behaviour forming for both GA and ANT. This is due to the security 
risk mitigation process focusing on the energy efficiency levels and combining security and data 
access grades into the algorithm’s process. As random evolvements occur while the algorithms are 
prioritising node energy levels ensuring that high energy nodes stay linked in case low level nodes 
fail, the algorithms still have to ensure that, as alterations occur through the network, security and data 
access control is maintained. 
While TABU ensures a quick and non-costly process, completing its run in 38 seconds compared to 
GA which completed in 1 minute and 4 seconds and ANT that completed in 45 seconds, it fails to 
report or consider any alternative solutions that are slightly inferior, and only improved solutions are 
developed further. This is due to its restricted comparison parameters that must be matched or 
improved. The tabu list influences cycles preventing reverse evolvement from being considered in 
order to improve processing time and costs, but again analysis corroborates that other configurations 
could be appropriate. 
Should organisations have financial restrictions in regards to network security, because the framework 
did not only just present the optimum solution but alternative candidates utilising GA and ANT, these 
alternative evolutions can be considered for adoption, in the awareness that the framework has 
mitigated risk, enhanced security, and improved the overall robustness of the network. These 
evolvements and recommended improvements assure network security and reduce potential risks to 
data communications and the SoS.  
While new communication links help to establish secure routes across the Smart City WSN, as well as 
supporting node connectivity, they negatively impact network security as they are the basis for 
additional risk factors. In addition, these new communication links come at a price, as in order to 
achieve improved network robustness and lower centralities, there is a significant increase to network 
communication costs. 
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5.4.6 Smart City Sectors Simulation Evaluation 
We generated six different simulations which reflect sectors within Smart Cities, each of which is 
based on WSN or IoT topology. Figure 5.36 visualises these six sections in a series of undirected 
graphs, which we have experimentally tested by applying the principles and algorithms discussed in 
Section 4. These graphs visualise each implemented and tested network’s node energy efficiency 
levels, which not only observes the data access control problem, security levels and identified 
vulnerabilities, but also focuses on reconfiguring the network during the security risk mitigation 
process considering each node’s energy efficiency level, in an effort to both extend the life of the 
network and enhance SoS security.  
These Smart City sections consist of various devices which include sensors, smart devices, mobile 
phones, and computers, with differing communication links. Each infrastructure contains 8, 10, or 12 
nodes, with a low connectivity level of either 30% or 40%. Individually, the simulated city sections 
were randomly assigned the relevant node software, hardware, and firmware parameters, comprising 
of type of device they would represent, operating system installed upon the node, if Internet access, 
encryption, firewalls, IDS, and anti-virus or security is supported, and if the node is updated or 
contains vulnerabilities, etc. The SCRAM framework also assigned nodes with a data access level, 
security grade, energy efficiency level, and then connected them via a series of primary links. Each 
scenario was then imported back into SCRAM and we applied the GA based risk mitigation algorithm 
and the ANT based risk mitigation algorithm to each scenario consecutively. 
For these investigations we did not utilise TABU as we have ascertained it does not yield adequate 
results or report alternative security enhanced candidates. In each instance, we prioritised energy 
efficiency as part of the security risk mitigation process, after initial simulation results showed great 
capacity for security enhancement, and in an attempt to extend the network life in Smart City 
scenarios. Figures 5.37-a (GA) and 5.37-c (ANT) visualise each of the network’s populations’ 
robustness during the entire evolutionary process. These graphs clearly indicate a notable reduction on 
the network robustness for all scenarios, corroborating that all final optimum solutions are more 
appropriate as their robustness levels are quantified lower. 
Similar to the above discussed case study, when we analyse the evolution results in Table 5.20 and 
Figure 5.37 we ascertain that GA produced more evolved candidates for analysis, and for all six 
scenarios GA generated enhanced evolved optimum candidates with lower robustness scores in 
contrast to ANT. 
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 (a) 8 Nodes 30% Connectivity (b) 8 Nodes 40% Connectivity  (c) 10 Nodes 30% Connectivity 
 (d) 10 Nodes 40% Connectivity  (e) 12 Nodes 30% Connectivity (f) 12 Nodes 40% Connectivity 
Figure 5.36. Simulated Smart City Networks 
When GA is applied to Smart City A (Figure 5.36-a) the network’s robustness improved by 24.97%, 
which is 0.4% more than ANT, and when GA was applied to Smart City D (Figure 5.36-d) the 
network’s robustness improved by 13.28% which is 4.13% greater than ANT. On average GA had a 
1.4% better optimal robustness score for scenarios in comparison to ANT. Each of these mutated 
optimal solutions not only increases the robustness of each scenario’s topology, but also increases the 
network’s communication security visualised in Figures 5.37-b and 5.37-c.  
While we see minor fluctuations in network security for Smart Cities B and F when both GA and 
ANT was applied, when we analyse all instances, the applied algorithms advance security from the 
first reported improved candidate and maximise communication security for each optimum evolution. 
For both applied algorithms, after the first reported candidate fluctuations in security never drop 
below 97%, and only 4 of the evolved improved network candidates report a security score that does 
not equal 100% as evidenced in Figures 5.37-b and 5.37-d. 
  




(a) Populations Robustness When GA Applied to Networks  (b) Communication Security When GA Applied to Networks 
 (c) Populations Robustness When ANT Applied to Networks  (d) Communication Security When ANT Applied to Networks 
Figure 5.37. Simulated Smart City Sector Robustness and Security Comparison 
While the replacement and removal of communication links balances connectivity with advances to 
security and robustness, these improvements again impact the overall cost of the communication 
network. In some instances we note that evolvement can decrease or cause minimal cost increases, 
while in these instances we note a considerable increase to the overall network’s cost (Table 5.20). 
When GA and ANT was applied to Smart City D (Figure 5.36-d), both processes reduced the cost of 
the network from 5153 to 3869 (GA) and 4768 (ANT), and when GA was applied to Smart City B 
(Figure 5.37-b) this instance also generated a low costing network reducing costs from 2950 to 2899, 
while ANT increased the cost of communication to 3293. Similarly, through the analysis of the 
reported evolvements for each network, there were alternative cheaper reported evolved candidates. 
Analysing the degree centrality for the simulated Smart City environments, we ascertain that the 
applied algorithms during the security risk mitigation process have evolved the networks and selected 
only configurations that lower and maintain low degree centrality with the exception of Smart City F 
(Figure 5.36-f) when GA was executed. After the GA was applied to the network, degree centrality 
had increased from 0.272727 to 0.290909, which is a 6.67% increase. While we are attempting to 
improve and maintain low centralities, this reported increase in this instance is adequately low and its 
value is in an acceptable range, as the candidates have an improved robustness score, security level, 
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minimum path average, and bridging centrality. These reports provide sufficient data and initiate 
warnings, so minor fluctuations and increases are thoroughly reported and identified to assist with all 
decision making processes. 
Table 5.20. Simulated Smart City Security Evolution Results 
Evolution Cost Robustness Degree Min Path 
Average 
Bridging Security 
8 node 30% connectivity  (Network A) 1664 212.5835 0.190476 192.8214 0.028571 75 
GA Evolution 14 Optimum 2801 159.5087 0.095238 181.7143 0.019841 100 
ANT Evolution 5 Optimum 2745 160.1424 0.095238 181.9286 0.022321 100 
8 node 40% connectivity  (Network B) 2950 274.5589 0.47619 253.25 0.02551 81 
GA Evolution 12 Optimum 2899 200.2066 0.047619 241.6429 0.030612 100 
ANT Evolution 4 Optimum 3293 202.1708 0.285714 231.5 0.017375 100 
10 node 30% connectivity  (Network C) 2317 300.4715 0.333333 296.6 0.085714 86 
GA Evolution 15 Optimum 5416 227.9408 0.111111 264.7778 0.015649 100 
ANT Evolution 12 Optimum 3628 230.7374 0.305556 269.9778 0.037037 100 
10 node 40% connectivity  (Network D) 5153 229.3223 0.361111 219.9778 0.016354 91 
GA Evolution 8 Optimum 3869 198.8707 0.194444 233.6222 0.020779 100 
ANT Evolution 1 Optimum 4758 207.4377 0.138889 231.9778 0.025641 100 
12 node 30% connectivity  (Network E) 3669 330.5918 0.4 275.106 0.023428 68 
GA Evolution 7 Optimum 6980 233.8506 0.163636 263.9394 0.015873 100 
ANT Evolution 5 Optimum 5939 237.3287 0.327273 272.394 0.017863 100 
12 node 40% connectivity  (Network F) 4783 395.7888 0.272727 271.697 0.043512 60 
GA Evolution 14 Optimum 6763 240.4815 0.290909 270.7121 0.014606 100 
ANT Evolution 4 Optimum 6113 242.2783 0.236364 283.1818 0.018939 100 
 
Minimum path length for each of the optimum solutions reported in Table 5.20; demonstrate that the 
applied processes have assisted in evolving each of the networks and ensured that only candidates that 
improve the network or maintain centralities (i.e. centralities considered with an acceptable range) are 
selected as suitable reported candidates. In all but three instances minimum path average is reduced. 
When we analyse Smart City D (Figure 5.36-d), we note that when both algorithms were applied 
minimum path average increased from 219.9778 by 6.2% using GA and by 5.46% using ANT. 
Similarly, when ANT was applied to Smart City F (Figure 5.36-f) there was a notable increase to 
minimum path average, increasing by 4.23% from 271.697 to 283.1818. Again, this small increase in 
comparison to the evolved candidate’s improved robustness, security, and other centrality scores, is in 
an acceptable range. Due to network enhancements we cannot guarantee that evolvements will not 
negatively impact centrality scores, what is evident is that the algorithms and processes are ensuring 
that only acceptable negative centralities are considered as part of the wider evolvement process and 
robustness evaluation. 
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The evolvement of the communication links within each scenario greatly influences bridging 
centrality, and throughout all evolvements for each network we noted fluctuations of bridging 
centrality scores, which is expected due to the removal and replacement of communication links. In 
all instances with the exception of Smart City B (Figure 5.36-b) when GA was applied and Smart City 
D (Figure 5.36-d) when both algorithms were utilised, we see a decrease in bridging centrality for all 
optimal evolutions. The applied algorithms and processes when establishing secure communication 
links between nodes are influenced by the security score of the node and data access control. The 
mutated networks reflect the decisions of the applied algorithms and processes, along with the 
positions of the nodes within each of the network’s topologies and the communication links which 
nodes are reliant upon for data transfer. While Smart City B (Figure 5.36-b) increased bridging 
centrality by 20% when GA was applied, and Smart City D (Figure 5.36-d) increased bridging 
centrality by 27.06% utilising GA and by 56.79% utilising ANT, the new mutated path structure 
ensures that there are an adequate number of secure links between secure nodes for data to traverse, 
and that communication security has increased and robustness levels have been positively improved, 
along with maintaining centrality values that are within acceptable ranges. 
 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter has conveyed the implementation of the SCRAM application, and the associated 
principles and techniques that have been incorporated into the framework. It also presents details 
regarding the operation of the simulated environment that is used to evaluate the applied theoretical 
principles, and discusses the vulnerability methods incorporated into SCRAM in order to better 
quantify the security of the SoS being enhanced, which directly improves the applied algorithm’s 
methods. In addition, we have presented a case study in order to demonstrate the ability of the 
implemented theoretical principles to be extended and applied to monitor and incorporate node energy 
levels into the security risk methods, in an attempt to extend the network life of SoS alongside 







Chapter 6  
Multi-Level SoS Security Analysis and 
Evaluation 
 
As discussed in Section 5, the proposed theoretical principles corroborate that an evolutionary 
approach to network security is practical. In this chapter, we extend this work further and examine the 
security challenges of connecting and reconfiguring communication links between multi-level SoS, 
and discuss the associated issues of security enhancement on individual SoS prior to integration, 
compared to mitigating risk and enhancing the security of a multi-level SoS as a single entity. 
In order to prove the effectiveness of the proposed theoretical techniques and evaluate the applied 
method’s usefulness when applied to large dynamic multi-level SoS, we evolved the SCRAM 
framework to simulate a significant number of realistic ICT devices and their associated 
vulnerabilities. Using SCRAM, accurate multi-level SoS are generated, which once constructed have 
the implemented theoretical principles presented in Section 4 applied in order to reconfigure and 
improve multi-level SoS security, along with generating realistic data.  All the experiments detailed in 
this section were generated and conducted within the SCRAM framework, representing specific 
infrastructures and their characteristics. The collated data from these scenario specific experiments is 
analysed and presented in this section. 
 
6.1 Multi-Level SoS Security Challenges 
One of the most important aspects of SCRAM is its ability to reconfigure the SoS network(s) 
searching for the optimum structure in order to strengthen and secure network communication, and 
identify vulnerabilities within the topology that have the potential to expose the entire collaborative 
infrastructure, in order to mitigate the associated risks. When we begin to connect SoS together we 
have to consider the security of the connecting nodes between the distinct networked SoS, the impact 
on its bridging centrality, and whether the node is being forced to connect with a vulnerable and 
insecure node, or a blocked node that violates data access policy principles.  
Figure 6.1 presents three differing SoS environments that will be joined to form a larger dynamic 
multi-level SoS. Each networked environment is composed of multiple device types, assigned the 
appropriate parameters, and connected via a series of primary links. Each distinct SoS was first 
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security enhanced to mitigate risks, prior to establishing collaborative communication links between 
the distinct infrastructures forming the multi-level SoS. Table 6.1 presents a comparison of the initial 
security assessment generated by the framework, compared to the new evolved results for each of the 
SoS.  
 
Figure 6.1. Reconfigured Secure Simulated Smart City Networks  
These results determine that security has been maintained or improved, centrality factors have been 
marginally reduced, the robustness levels of the networks have decreased meaning the network’s 
reconfiguration is more appropriate, minimum path average has been reduced, while these 
improvements are directly reflected by the increase to network cost. 
Establishing the communication path connection rules for collaboration is problematic, while it would 
be simple to enforce a rule that guaranteed to only connect networks together via secure nodes to 
ensure that security is not jeopardised. This simplistic process could place all of the collaborative 
networks at risk. If this rule is enforced it could lead to single nodes being responsible for the entire 
secure communication routes between collaborative SoS. In addition networks might not have secure 
nodes that meet the security thresholds. Should single nodes and links be relied upon to maintain 
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fail, then data transfer between networks would discontinue and the entire multi-level SoS could fail 
to meet objectives with varying consequences.  
Table 6.1. Simulated Smart City Networks Security Evolution Results 
SoS Number 
of Nodes 









A original 5 40% 161.95 100% 0.021 0.1667 1573 186 60% / 40% 
A optimal 5 - 150.49 100% 0 0 1859 185.9 60% / 40% 
B original 3 30% 265.67 100% 0.083 1 423 282 67% / 33% 
B optimal 3 - 170.61 100% 0 0 726 242 67% / 33% 
C original 5 30% 1038.34 58% 0.2 0.1667 1450 775.2 40% / 40% 
C optimal 5 - 300.23 100% 0 0 3707 370.7 40% / 40% 
 
It is vital to consider the risks that new communication paths pose to nodes with which they connect, 
as these new links while supporting connectivity introduce additional risk factors. Therefore, it is 
essential that we re-analyse the security grade of every node connecting to an external SoS. 
 
6.1.1 Multi-Level SoS: Calculating Connecting Node Security 
Grades 
While a collaborative relationship exists first we consider independently operated SoS that do not 
divulge their entire security risk analysis with their collaborative partners, instead share the security 
grades quantified by the principles incorporated into SCRAM. This simulates organisations that are 
reluctant and unwilling to share detailed vulnerability analysis of their SoS, in case those with 
malicious intent try to exploit them, for example, insider threats are just as problematic and as likely 
as malicious external attackers. As we know the source and reliability of each score there is no need to 
use a weighted average, however, we do see these new communication links as additional 
vulnerabilities so they are incorporated into the new quantified connecting node security score. 
To determine the connecting node security score S, assume node N has an initial quantified security 
grade of G, with c connections collated based on the network discovery process. Denote the values of 
the c connections by g1, g2, …, gc which are the assigned node security grades of the identified 
external connected nodes. Each communication path is assigned a risk probability score p, based on 




𝑆 =  (𝐺 + (
𝑔1 +  𝑔2  +  … + 𝑔𝑐   
𝑐
) + (
𝑝1 +  𝑝2  +  … + 𝑝𝑐   
𝑐
) ) / 3 (6.1) 
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In order to make the connecting node security score more accurate, we can combine this algorithm 
with the original equation presented in Section 4.6.1.4 which is used by SCRAM in order to assign the 
initial node security grade. By modifying this equation it allows us to quantify both the internal and 
external risks to the node more accurately, as these new communication paths and the nodes which 
they are linked with are significant vulnerabilities which expose them to risk. Again we assume that 
the external SoS are only sharing their security grades quantified by SCRAM and not divulging their 
entire device details and their identified vulnerabilities. 
The connecting node security will only be quantified for a node if it has been identified as having 
communication links to external SoS. To determine the connecting node security score S, assume 
node N will have n vulnerabilities collated based on its risk assessment. Denote the values of n 
vulnerabilities by v1, v2, …, vn which are the assigned values of the identified vulnerabilities [252]. 
Assume node N will have c connections collated based on the network discovery process. Denote the 
values of the c connections by g1, g2, …, gc which are the assigned node security grades of the 
identified external connected nodes. Each communication path is assigned a risk probability score p, 
based on the type of node with which it connects (i.e. secure, vulnerable, blocked, or unscanned 
node), defined as: 
 
 
𝑆 =  ((
𝑣1 +  𝑣2  +  … + 𝑣𝑛  
𝑛
) + (




𝑝1 + 𝑝2  +  … +  𝑝𝑐   
𝑐
) ) / 3 
(6.2) 
 
For complete accuracy, connecting node security scores could be quantified utilising the equation 
presented in Section 4.6.1.4 which is used by SCRAM to assign the initial node security grades. 
However, this would require the SoS with which they are externally connected to share the complete 
node vulnerability parameters and all identified vulnerabilities, for every established communication 
link. In this situation some companies might be unwilling to divulge these facts, or in crisis situations 
permission to access these details might be time consuming and depend on the type of organisations 
collaborating and their data/security levels, etc. 
 
6.1.2 Multi-Level SoS: Connecting Node Security Analysis 
Figure 6.2 represents three distinct generated example multi-level SoS graphs, which visualise the 
necessary connections between the SoS networks. Table 6.2 depicts the visualised parameters used to 
generate the multi-level SoS undirected graphs. Other combinations of communication link 
placements are possible, and for these scenarios we assume that connecting nodes must be identified 
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as secure and have the permitted data access level. In addition, to prevent SPoF each network must 
have two different external connection points to ensure data transfer and maintain collaborative 
relations. If there is no suitable secure and ready node, then the least vulnerable node with the most 
appropriate data access level will be selected as an alternative connection point, blocked nodes are 
only considered if no suitable alternative is available. 
When we apply Equation 6.1 to each of the connecting nodes, we see on the first connection 
Combination 1 (Figure 6.2-a), that 2 of the connecting node security grades have been quantified and 
identified as insecure and 1 has been re-categorised to secure. The connecting node security grade for 
node 0 in Network B has increased from 6 (insecure) to being quantified as secure with a security 
grade of 5. While connecting node 2 in Network A has been quantified as insecure with a new 
security grade of 7 compared to its original assigned grade of 5, and connecting node 0 in Network C 
has been quantified with a lower security being assigned a new score of 7 compared to its original 
security score of 5. All other connecting nodes have been re-quantified and identified as no change to 
initial assigned security grades. 
Applying the advanced scoring technique (Equation 6.2) to the same SoS environment (Figure 6.2-b) 
SCRAM produces a more complex and precise security grade for each of the connecting nodes. The 
new security grade scoring identifies that only 2 connecting nodes have had their security grades 
altered, which are node 2 Network A and node 0 Network C, with all other connecting nodes security 
grades remaining the same, despite the introduction of new vulnerabilities and access points.  
When utilising both scoring techniques we only apply the methods once, this is to prevent the scoring 
technique from entering into a loop. Combination 2 and Combination 3 show similar characteristics as 
Combination 1, with multiple nodes being identified as either more insecure or secure due to the new 
connections to external nodes. Combination 2 (Figure 6.2-c), indicates when the simplistic scoring 
technique was applied there are 2 new node security grade reassignments, and only 1 when using the 
advanced method (Figure 6.2-d). While Combination 3 (Figure 6.2-e), indicates that 3 connecting 
nodes have had their security grades reassigned, yet only 1 is reassigned when the advanced method is 
applied (Figure 6.2-f). 
While one scoring technique is more accurate than the other, these SoS examples with the applied 
scoring techniques corroborate the impact and potential exposure that new connections can have upon 
a node. Incorporating all external nodes’ security grades and by assigning connection parameters 
based on the status of the node being connected, it is possible to incorporate these parameters into the 
security grade assignment to accurately quantify the impact on security which these new connections 
will have.  
In addition, as the networks were individually reconfigured, in order to determine the impact new 
connections have had upon the security and node centralities such as bridging, the entire multi-level 
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SoS would require additional risk assessment and potentially might need to be further security 
enhanced with the risks mitigation process having to be reapplied. 
Table 6.2.  SoS Visualised Security Vulnerabilities and Parameters 
Graph Parameter  Symbol Description 
All graphs Scanned node no vulnerabilities. 
 
Dark green node/tag. 
 
Scanned node with unresolved identified 
vulnerabilities.  
Blue node/tag. 
 Unscanned node.  
Dark red node/tag. 
 Node size represents quantified bridging centrality, i.e. small nodes low and large nodes equal high. 
Security Insecure node.  
Node encased with a solid orange box. 
 Blocked node.  
Node encased with a solid red box. 
 Blocked and insecure node.  
Node encased with a solid red box with 
orange border. 
 Node quantified secure and unscanned. 
 
Node encased with a non-solid orange 
box. 
Multi-Level SoS 
External network connected to node, no 
change to connecting node security 
grade.  
Node encased with a non-solid black 
octagon border. 
 
External network connected to node, 
negative change to connecting node 
security grade.  
Node encased with a non-solid black and 
orange octagon border. 
 
External network connected to node, 
connecting node security grade remains 
secure. 
 
Node encased with a non-solid black and 
green octagon border. 
 
  




(a) Combination 1 with Simplistic Connecting Node Scoring  
 
(b) Combination 1 with Advanced Connecting Node Scoring 
 
(c) Combination 2 with Simplistic Connecting Node Scoring 
 
(d) Combination 2 with Advanced Connecting Node Scoring 
 
(e) Combination 3 with Simplistic Connecting Node Scoring 
 
(f) Combination 3 with Advanced Connecting Node Scoring 


















Chapter 6 - Multi-Level SoS Security Analysis and Evaluation  
246 
 
6.1.3 Multi-Level SoS: Calculating Connecting Node Security 
Grades 
In order for the security risk mitigation process to be effective we have to consider both the impact of 
changing security due to external communication links and their associated risks, in addition to 
reconfiguring communication paths during the entire security enhancement process, not only for one 
SoS but for the multi-level SoS. Which allows us to identify the optimum configuration for all 
external connecting nodes, while configuring the internal network of each SoS to support these new 
links between distinct SoS. This will also ensure that we can critically analyse centralities such as 
bridging centrality, and limit the effects on the entire collaborative infrastructure security, along with 
reducing the introduction of additional and avoidable vulnerabilities. 
Figure 6.3 provides an example of multiple distinct SoS which have been integrated together to form a 
multi-level SoS. This infrastructure has been generated within the SCRAM framework, and consists 
of four distinct SoS each containing four devices and has 30% connectivity. Each device has been 
assigned with the relevant node software, hardware, firmware, and vulnerability parameters, including 
being assigned a security level, data access grade, and connected to the other devices within its SoS 
via a series of communication links. In addition, each SoS is randomly connected to each other via a 
series of external communication links. 
 
Figure 6.3. A Multi-Level SoS Example 




(a) Multi-Level SoS with Applied Simplistic Connecting Node Security Scoring 
 
(b) Multi-Level SoS with Applied Advanced Connecting Node Security Scoring 
Figure 6.4.  Multi-Level SoS Primary Connecting Node Scores 
When we apply the simplistic connecting node security scoring technique (Figure 6.4-a), we can 
quickly see that all 5 connecting nodes have had their security quantified indicating that their scores 
have been negatively impacted due to the addition of external connecting SoS nodes. For example, 
Nodes 0, 5, and 15 have all increased from security grade 5 to grade 6, meaning these secure nodes 
are now deemed insecure. Nodes 2 and 10 have increased from grade 6 to security grade 7. While 
these grades were already deemed insecure, the higher grade reflects their added risk to the entire 
collaborative infrastructure. 
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Applying the more advanced connecting node security technique to the same multi-level SoS (Figure 
6.4-b) it is established that only 2 of the connecting nodes are quantified as having their security 
scores negatively impacted, with node 2 increasing from security grade 6 to 7 and node 5 increasing 
from grade 5 to 6, reflecting the accuracy of the advanced scoring technique and the impact of the 
connecting links on the initial SoS configuration. 
 
(a) Multi-Level SoS with Applied Simplistic Connecting Node Security Scoring 
 
(b)  Multi-Level SoS with Applied Advanced Connecting Node Security Scoring 
Figure 6.5.  Reconfigured Multi-Level SoS Connecting Node Scores 
Within the SCRAM framework we apply the evolutionary principals to reconfigure the network and 
improve the multi-level SoS security and mitigate the associated risks. Figure 6.5 visualises the 
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security enhanced network for both of the connecting node security score techniques, and we 
intuitively identify that new communication paths have been established in order to guarantee a series 
of secure data paths between secure nodes across all of the SoS infrastructures. This is in compliance 
with the data access policies requirements, and reduces the risk of data being transferred via insecure 
nodes in any of the collaborative infrastructures. 
The simplistic connecting node security score technique when applied (Figure 6.5–a) identifies that 8 
nodes are now considered insecure, node 3 is insecure by an additional 3 grades decreasing from 
grade 3 to 6, nodes 0, 4, and 5 have increased by 2 grades, with nodes 0 and 4 now being re-
categorised as insecure changing from grades 5 to 7 and 4 to 6 consecutively, and nodes 2, 6, 10, and 
15 have all increased security grades by a single grade, with node 15 while being a blocked node is 
now considered insecure changing from security grade 5 to 6. In addition, nodes 8 and 12 have been 
re-categorised as secure, with node 8 being quantified as having a security grade of 5 from 7, and 
node 12 being quantified as scoring 5 decreasing from 6. In this instance, no connecting node has 
maintained their original assigned security grade. 
Analysing the security grades when the advanced connecting node security score technique is applied 
(Figure 6.5–b), only 3 out of 10 connecting nodes have been quantified as having different security 
grades. Both nodes 2 and 8 have been increased by one grade and remain insecure, and node 3 has 
decreased by one grade but is still quantified as secure changing from grade 3 to 4. When we compare 
node 8 for both scoring techniques we note that the simplistic technique re-categorises the node as 
secure, while the advanced scoring method quantifies the node as insecure due to the method’s 
accuracy. Demonstrating the need for not only reassessing connecting nodes’ security when joined to 
a collaborative network, but also the requirement for a precise and in depth scoring technique, i.e. the 
more details and vulnerability parameters, along with the accuracy of risk scoring of those parameters 
means scores are more precise and reliable giving an insight into the true security standing of the 
network, ensuring that risks are not underestimated and overlooked due to poor scoring and 
identification. 
 
6.1.4 Multi-Level SoS: Security Evaluation 
The SCRAM framework, like the single infrastructure security assessment, produces in addition to the 
undirected graphs, reports on the multi-level SoS security and node centralities, network cost, 
minimum path average, and robustness of the entire multi-level SoS. For example, in Table 6.3 we 
can see that the reported degree centrality for the graph has reduced by 33.33% from 0.14285716 to 
0.09523809, while communication security for the entire multi-level SoS has increased by 182.14% 
from 28% to 79%. Due to the large number of insecure nodes and blocked nodes forming the SoS, 
this is directly reflected in the overall score for network security.  
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Table 6.3. Multi-Level SoS Evolution Results 


















6.4 4 4 30% 0.14285716 28% 2927 687.48334 50% / 50% 
6.5 4 4   - 0.09523809 79% 6685 355.075 50% / 50% 
 
As stated while it is ideal to only have connections between secure nodes, the security status and 
topology of the network are going to influence the optimum configuration for connecting 
communication links together. Likewise, to ensure there is enough built-in redundancy to limit nodes 
becoming isolated and data transfer failing within networked infrastructures and between distinct SoS 
due to node and link failures, collaborative links may have to be formed between insecure or blocked 
nodes. The addition of communication links is reflected in the increase to network cost, which has 
increased by 128.39%. Enhancing the network security has also resulted in minimum path average 
reducing by 48.35%. 
 
 




(b) Betweenness Centrality Indicator of 
Shortest Path Vulnerability 
 
 
(c) Closeness Centrality Indicates 
Susceptibility to SPoF 
 
 
(d) Eigenvector Centrality Indicates 
Weighted High Connectivity 
 
 




(f) Populations Robustness 
Figure 6.6.  Multi-Level SoS Topological Security Vulnerabilities and Robustness Comparison 
In this instance, when we applied the evolutionary risk mitigation method to evolve the entire multi-
level SoS and enhance the security of the collaborative infrastructure, the optimum solution was 
generated within the first round of the process. In Figure 6.6 when we view the robustness graph 
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(Figure 6.6-f), we see that the robustness level for the multi-level SoS reduced by 31% from 
23626.94388 to 16180.0003, meaning the reconfiguration is more appropriate.  
When we analyse the centralities of the SoS, we can view both the aggregated node centrality score 
for the multi-level SoS, or evaluate the impact that network reconfiguration has upon each of the 
distinct nodes’ centrality factors. Analysing degree centrality (Figure 6.6-a), we note that the 
aggregated node centrality has increased by 76.47% from the original configuration of 0.142 to the 
reported optimum evolved candidate which scored 0.25, in contrast to the overall degree centrality of 
the graph which actually decreased.  
SCRAM reports the degree centrality for each of the nodes for both the original collaborative 
infrastructure and the evolved multi-level SoS topology. These results allow us to compare the 
changes to centrality values that occurred to the evolvement, and we can compare the increase or 
decrease to the centrality score against the aggregated node centrality score in order to establish if 
there is a significant difference between the two values. For example, node 3 in the original network 
configuration scores is 52% lower than the aggregated degree centrality score, and after evolvement 
scores 6.67% more than the new aggregated degree centrality score, demonstrating the changes and 
impacts caused due to multi-level SoS security evolvement, and we can intuitively see in the graph 
that no node has adversely been negatively impacted, with degree centrality scores remaining within 
tolerable ranges. 
Reviewing the betweenness centrality (Figure 6.6-b), we see that the evolved SoS has reduced the 
aggregated betweenness centrality score by 32.08% from 0.25 to 0.16979. In addition, when we 
evaluate nodes 0 and 15 for example, it is noted that both of the node centrality scores have 
significantly reduced. The reconfigured optimum evolved candidate has reduced the betweenness 
centrality for node 0 by 81.82% and it is only 33.33% above the evolved aggregate node betweenness 
centrality score, compared to the original network configuration where node 0 was 223.93% above the 
aggregated node betweenness centrality. This graph conveys that the additional communication paths 
have reduced this centrality, meaning there has been a reduction of dominant nodes which were 
previously relied upon to maintain communications across the SoS and were high risk and potential 
SPoF. 
The optimum candidate reports that closeness centrality has increased by 40.44% (Figure 6.6-c), with 
results indicating the nodes with the shortest paths, while eigenvector centrality (Figure 6.6-d) has 
increased by 281.1% with the results identifying the influential nodes within the network. 
Interestingly, bridging centrality (Figure 6.6-e) has decreased by 78.21%, and when we review the 
graph we can intuitively see that there are considerably fewer fluctuations between node scores and 
aggregated centrality score in the evolved candidate in comparison to the original network’s 
configuration. For example, node 10 is quantified as being 267.3% higher than the aggregated node 
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bridging centrality score, compared to only being 53% above aggregated bridging centrality in the 
reported evolved candidate. As a result, this corroborates that single nodes are less relied upon for 
secure data flow to be maintained within the entire multi-level SoS, and with densely connected nodes 
being reduced this decreases the risk of potential SPoF. 
 
6.1.5 Multi-Level SoS: Case Study 
The case study simulates a multi-level SoS. In this scenario there are 5 SoS each consisting of 5 
devices.  Several different types of devices are simulated each with their own specific parameters, 
including software, hardware, firmware, and vulnerabilities based on the device type and applications. 
These are connected via a series of internal communication links to form their respective unique SoS. 
Each distinct SoS is then connected to the other SoS forming a collaborative relation with them in 
order to meet specific objectives; connections are made via a series of primary external 
communication links between SoS connecting nodes. The overall multi-level SoS is generated with a 
primary 30% connectivity rating, with 60% of the nodes being quantified as insecure and 28% being 
identified as violating data access requirements and therefore should be blocked. 
 
Figure 6.7. Simulated Multi-Level SoS 
Figure 6.7 depicts the simulated multi-level SoS displaying the key node security status, assigned data 
level access grade, quantified security grade, identified vulnerability scan status, and visualises the 
bridging centrality for each node, along with all communication links. While Figure 6.8 clearly 
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identifies all external connecting nodes and their re-quantified security grades using the SCRAM 
simplistic and advanced connecting node security score methods. 
 
(a) Multi-Level SoS with Applied Simplistic Connecting Node Security Scoring 
 
(b) Multi-Level SoS with Applied Advanced Connecting Node Security Scoring 
Figure 6.8. Simulated Multi-Level SoS Primary Connecting Node Scores 
When each scoring method is applied, firstly using the simplistic method (Figure 6.8-a) we see that 3 
of the connecting nodes are quantified as having their grades altered due to the external connections 
and the risks that they introduce, with node 13 having been originally quantified as secure, but being 
quantified as insecure due to its external data link to another SoS, while nodes 15 and 19 remain 
categorised as insecure but have had their security grades increased, demonstrating their increased 
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risk to the entire multi-level SoS. When we compare the advanced scoring method for connecting 
nodes (Figure 6.8-b) only a single node has been quantified as insecure. Moreover, node 19 is 
identified as increasing its grade by 1 when the advanced method is applied, compared to advancing 
by two grades using the simplistic scoring technique.  
 
(a) Multi-Level SoS with Applied Simplistic Connecting Node Security Scoring 
 
(b) Multi-Level SoS with Applied Advanced Connecting Node Security Scoring 
Figure 6.9. Security Enhanced Simulated Multi-Level SoS Connecting Node Scores 
Similarly, when we apply the evolutionary principles to evolve the collaborative infrastructure and 
reconfigure the communication links in order to mitigate risks, enhance the security of network 
communications, improve network robustness, and limit SPoF, the simplistic scoring method (Figure 
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6.9-a) re-categorises 8 of the 13 established connecting nodes, while the advanced method (Figure 
6.9-b) re- categorises only 3. This corroborates that the advanced scoring technique presented in 
Section 6.1.1 is not only more accurate and reliable, but a necessary technique to be used as part of 
the risk assessment of the SoS. Should grades be over or under quantified, then risks could remain 
unidentified exposing infrastructures, or resources could be wasted to improve the security of a node 
that is not required. 
Throughout our experiments, we have placed emphasis on the SCRAM robustness function which 
combines five key parameters, to assist the evolutionary security risk mitigation algorithm to produce 
new improved solutions, and provides a numerical number that can be used as a quick indicator to 
assess the overall appropriateness of the evolved SoS candidates. Analysing the robustness of the 
multi-level SoS (Figure 6.10-f), we see a notable reduction in the robustness score as security 
evolvement is conducted, with the final optimum candidate reporting a reduction of 40.66%. 
The improved robustness is reflected in the 125% increase in the multi-level SoS communication 
security, which increased from only 24% to 54%. As previously stated, we are forcing external 
connections between independent and distinct SoS environments, and SCRAM evolves the entire 
multi-level SoS reconfiguring communication paths, in order to ensure that there is enough built-in 
redundancy while assuring there are secure data routes between the collaborative infrastructures. 
Therefore, we determine that the accuracy of the security analysis method is a true reflection of the 
overall security, as it does not report an overly high security level (i.e. does not achieve 100% secure). 
As this level of security would not be attainable for this infrastructure, for instance we know this 
particular multi-level SoS is constructed of 60% insecure nodes, with only 5 nodes throughout the 
SoS being quantified as secure and not in breach of data access policies. 
Table 6.4. Simulated Multi-Level SoS Evolution Results 

















6.8 5 5 30% 0.1286232 24% 4784 924.86 60% / 28% 
6.9 5 5 - 0.9963767 54% 13552 363.79666  60% / 28% 
 
The reported optimum evolved candidate demonstrates that the SCRAM framework generated and 
selected a security configuration that reduces the minimum path average between nodes, and reduces 
both betweenness and bridging centrality. Minimum path average (Table 6.4) is reduced by 60.66% 
corroborating that the network configuration has increased in efficiency as the average number of 
steps along the shortest paths has been notably reduced. Aggregated betweenness centrality (Figure 
6.10-b) decreased by 68.03% reducing the number of dominant nodes relied upon to maintain 
communications, while aggregated bridging centrality (Figure 60-e) decreased by 87.75% reducing 
the reliance upon single nodes for data transfer. 
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Similar to the previous experiment the aggregated centrality scores for degree, closeness, and 
eigenvector all marginally increased. Aggregated degree centrality (Figure 6.10-a) increased by 
122.22%, closeness (Figure 6.10-c) increased by 94.66%, and eigenvector (Figure 6.10-d) increased 
by 424.3%, identifying the increase of neighbouring nodes, the nodes with the shortest paths, and the 
influence nodes have within the new configured multi-level SoS topology. 
 
(a) Degree Centrality Indicator of High 
Node Connectivity 
 
(b) Betweenness Centrality Indicator of 
Shortest Path Vulnerability 
 
(c) Closeness Centrality Indicates 
Susceptibility to SPoF 
 
(d) Eigenvector Centrality Indicates 
Weighted High Connectivity 
 
(e) Bridging Centrality Indicator of 
Dependent Communicate 
 
(f) Populations Robustness 
Figure 6.10.  Multi-Level SoS Topological Security Vulnerabilities and Robustness Comparison 
 
6.2 Multi-Level SoS Evaluation 
To overcome the limitations of existing techniques, the theoretical proposed solutions were 
implemented as part of the SCRAM framework. In the previous sections, we have validated the 
usefulness of applying these principles against SoS. To validate the applied principles that attempt to 
increase SoS security, identify and reduce vulnerabilities, and limit potential SPoF, in this chapter we 
conduct a series of experiments to corroborate the SCRAM framework and implemented techniques 
against a series of differing complex multi-level SoS. The results will assist us to evaluate the 
SCRAM framework further, and will objectively assist to determine if our research aims and objects 
have been achieved.  
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6.2.1 Multi-level SoS: SCRAM Evaluation  
A fundamental question is whether we can reconfigure multiple distinct SoS, evolving their 
networked communication paths (both internal and external) in unison to ensure the entire multi-level 
SoS security is assured and robust. As we force new connections between distinct SoS we have 
proven the impact that can occur to the connecting nodes and wider repercussions to security, network 
centralities, cost in terms of distance between nodes, etc. Analysing the multi-level SoS together 
means there is no need to enhance security and reconfigure and search for the optimum solution for 
each distinct SoS prior to their integration into the multi-level SoS, meaning that we do not have to 
run security risk mitigations methods more than once.  
Analysing the entire multi-level SoS as a single entity using the principles outlined in this thesis, 
means we can monitor connections as they are reconfigured and removed. For example, if vital 
connections are removed or there are too few connections between collaborative infrastructures, then 
the overall robustness of the network will decrease. However, to increase robustness we can’t simply 
just add new connections to strengthen the SoS, we have to consider that the introduction of new data 
paths will introduce new vulnerabilities and attack points that previously did not exist, connections 
between external connecting nodes will impact the security grades of each connecting node, and we 
have to consider the status of nodes that connections are formed between as we have to prioritise 
secure nodes and those that do not breach data access requirements.  
While priority is given to meet these demands, in some instances providing there is a single secure 
route between nodes, alternative node connections are considered and presented as optimum 
solutions. This is due to the applied techniques within SCRAM analysing the network cost, minimum 
path average, and the impact on centralities. In these rare instances however, the visualised undirected 
graphs highlight the connections between insecure nodes and provide a detailed report, which in turn 
would allow decision makers to consider applying methods to secure the nodes prior to the suggested 
reported optimum solution being implemented. 
To evaluate the applied principles we generated a series of random multi-level SoS within the 
SCRAM framework with varying SoS sizes, communication connections, varying vulnerabilities, 
security grades, and data access levels. In the following sections we analyse the results of these 
experiments conducted on varying multi-level SoS topologies, which we have grouped into four 
different collections. 
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6.2.1.1 SCRAM Positive Multi-Level SoS Vulnerability 
Performance 
The first collection we present focuses on multi-level SoS topologies that only consider vulnerabilities 
within the topology and do not apply the data access policy. These types of multi-level SoS 
characterise WSN and IoT topologies, where data exchange between components and devices is 
essential and a fundamental part of their purpose.  
Figures 6.11, 6.12, and 6.13 visualise each of the nine conducted experiments for this collection. In 
these instances we have omitted connecting node indicators and the individual identifiable network 
colours, as seen in Figure 6.9, as while these pointers can be easily seen on a computer screen they 
fail to translate into small printed diagrams and produce too much indeterminate visual disturbance, 
especially as we increase the scale of the multi-level SoS being tested. 
These graphs visualise the diverse topology structures being assessed and their enhanced security 
reconfiguration, in the first graph (example Figure 6.11-a) for each multi-level SoS we present the 
collaborative infrastructure with all identified vulnerable nodes, in the second graph example 
(example Figure 6.11-b) we have stripped away node status to allow us to visualise clearly the 
communication links between nodes and nodes with significant bridging centralities, the final graph 
(example Figure 6.11-c) visualises the security enhanced solution’s new structure and clearly shows 
the increase and decrease to the number of communication paths and alterations to node bridging 
centralities.  
Table 6.5 presents the original multi-level SoS properties for each experiment and Table 6.6 reports 
the evolved security assessment results for the optimum reported candidate. Figures 6.14, 6.15, and 
6.16 present a comparison of the aggregated centrality and robustness scores for each infrastructure. 
Table 6.5. Multi-level SoS Unevolved Vulnerability Performance Properties Comparison 
















6.11-a 8 8 30% 0.061955966 18% 13445 718.02875 47% / 0% 
6.11-d 8 8 40% 0.08038917 28% 25969 608.01886 48% / 0% 
6.11-g 8 8 50% 0.060931906 31% 36697 514.435 66% / 0% 
6.12-a 10 10 30% 0.050711192 18% 25308 772.0301 53% / 0% 
6.12-d 10 10 40% 0.048855904 23% 51621 642.13654 54% / 0% 
6.12-g 10 10 50% 0.039167188 25% 77221 526.33594 58% / 0% 
6.13-a 12 12 30% 0.035260525 14% 44753 741.0788 61% / 0% 
6.13-d 12 12 40% 0.03171478 35% 84209 542.64014 60% / 0% 
6.13-g 12 12 50% 0.039167188 25% 77221 526.33594 58% / 0% 
 
Table 6.6. Multi-level SoS Evolved Vulnerability Performance Comparison 







Security of Graph 
Cost Minimum Path 
Average 
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6.11-c 8 8 0.059907857 27% 23828 566.9797 
6.11-f 8 8 0.04147466 28% 25178 559.05206 
6.11-i 8 8 0.045570917 37% 23296 556.87994 
6.12-c 10 10 0.023088017 33% 39339 608.5289 
6.12-f 10 10 0.03133374 23% 42377 632.9644 
6.12-i 10 10 0.0206143 26% 43412 584.5719 
6.13-c 12 12 0.026593126 24% 61189 629.63983 
6.13-f 12 12 0.03013882 49% 67573 595.8983 
6.13-i 12 12 0.0206143 26% 43412 584.5719 
 
From these figures we can see that in every instance the security and robustness level of the multi-
level SoS has improved to varying degrees or been maintained, when the evolutionary security risk 
mitigation methods are applied to the entire collaborative infrastructure. When we analyse Multi-SoS 
E (Figure 6.12-d) in Table 6.6, while security has been maintained at 23%, secure communication 
alterations to the infrastructure has resulted in other positive outcomes. Firstly, there is a reduction to 
network cost reducing communication by 17.91% from 51621 to 42377, a minor 1.43% decrease to 
minimum path average, and a 35.86% decrease to the degree centrality of the graph.  
Analysing the aggregated centralities (Figure 6.15) we also continue to see improvements to the 
multi-level SoS in Set B, with aggregated node degree, eigenvector and bridging centrality all 
indicating reductions to their scores. This demonstrates that the removal of the redundant 
communication paths has not unduly impacted the security of the distinct SoS forming the multi-level 
SoS, and the multi-SoS remains robust and secure, having mitigated associated risk. With the 
SCRAM framework quantifying and visualising vulnerable nodes and risks associated with 
centralities within the multi-level SoS topology, as these issues can expose the entire collective 
infrastructure to various risks, zero-day attacks, and if left unidentified, vulnerabilities could be 
exploited or cause cascading failure within the networked systems. Detecting these issues allows for 
actions to be taken prior to them being exploited or failing, assuring that the multi-level SoS can be 
further strengthened by early risk identification. In addition, the improvements and maintenance of 
low centrality scores means that SCRAM has maintained an adequate number of neighbouring nodes, 
maintained short paths, and has not overtly increased bridging centrality, meaning nodes are not 
excessively relied upon for the transfer of data or maintaining the structure of the communication 
network. 
  




(a) Multi-Level SoS A with Node Status 
 
(b) Multi-Level SoS A Topology 
 
(c) Multi-Level SoS A Optimum Candidate 
 
(d) Multi-Level SoS B with Node Status 
 
(e) Multi-Level SoS B Topology 
 
(f) Multi-Level SoS B Optimum Candidate 
 
(g) Multi-Level SoS C with Node Status 
 
(h) Multi-Level SoS C Topology 
 
(i) Multi-Level SoS C Optimum Candidate 
Figure 6.11.  Set A of Multi-Level SoS Used in the Experiments (see Appendix A) 
  




(a) Multi-Level SoS D with Node Status 
 
(b) Multi-Level SoS D Topology 
 
(c) Multi-Level SoS D Optimum Candidate 
 
(d) Multi-Level SoS E with Node Status 
 
(e) Multi-Level SoS E Topology 
 
(f) Multi-Level SoS E Optimum Candidate 
 
(g) Multi-Level SoS F with Node Status 
 
(h) Multi-Level SoS F Topology 
 
(i) Multi-Level SoS F Optimum Candidate 
Figure 6.12.  Set B of Multi-Level SoS Used in the Experiments (see Appendix A) 




(a) Multi-Level SoS G with Node Status 
 
(b) Multi-Level SoS G Topology 
 
(c) Multi-Level SoS G Optimum Candidate 
 
(d) Multi-Level SoS H with Node Status 
 
(e) Multi-Level SoS H Topology 
 
(f) Multi-Level SoS H Optimum Candidate 
 
(g) Multi-Level SoS I with Node Status 
 
(h) Multi-Level SoS I Topology 
 
(i) Multi-Level SoS I Optimum Candidate 
Figure 6.13.  Set C of Multi-Level SoS Used in the Experiments (see Appendix A) 
 
  




(a) Aggregated Degree Centrality 
Indicator of High Node Connectivity 
 
(b) Aggregated Betweenness Centrality 
Indicator of Shortest Path Vulnerability 
 
 
(c) Aggregated Closeness Centrality 
Indicates Susceptibility to SPoF 
 
(d) Aggregated Eigenvector Centrality 
Indicates Weighted High Connectivity 
 
(e) Aggregated Bridging Centrality   
Indicator of Dependent Communication 
 
 
(f) Populations Robustness 
Figure 6.14.  Set A Multi-Level SoS Security Vulnerabilities and Robustness Comparison 
When we critically review multi-level SoS  H (Figure 6.13-d) in Table 6.6, in this instance we see a 
40% increase in the overall communication security for the entire collaborative infrastructure. While 
the degree centrality for the graph has marginally decreased by 4.97%, and the cost of 
communications has reduced by 19.79%. This reduction to network cost and significant reduction to 
the number of connecting data paths is evidenced by the minor increase of 9.81% to the minimum 
path average, which can be considered acceptable considering the positive increase to network 
robustness and security, and the reduction to communication costs, especially should decision makers 
be forced to consider security enhancement when having to comply with financial constraints and 
savings. 
 




(a) Aggregated Degree Centrality 
Indicator of High Node Connectivity 
 
(b) Aggregated Betweenness Centrality 
Indicator of Shortest Path Vulnerability 
 
 
(c) Aggregated Closeness Centrality 
Indicates Susceptibility to SPoF 
 
(d) Aggregated Eigenvector Centrality 
Indicates Weighted High Connectivity 
 
(e) Aggregated Bridging Centrality   
Indicator of Dependent Communication 
 
 
(f) Populations Robustness 
Figure 6.15.  Set B Multi-SoS Topological Security Vulnerabilities and Robustness Comparison 
Analysing the aggregated centralities (Figure 6.16) positive improvements continue to be seen, with 
aggregated node degree, and eigenvector centrality all indicating positive scores, with minor 
reductions to closeness centrality. Similar to multi-level SoS E, this supports the evolutionary process 
being used in this type of topology to mitigate risk and secure multi-level SoS in an attempt to assure 
security and data flow, and that the removal of communication paths and the addition of new paths 
have not unduly impacted the overall appropriateness and security of the collaborative infrastructure. 
We are presented with an increase to the betweenness centrality which increases marginally from 
0.021 to 0.028, and bridging centrality which increases from 0.0027 to 0.0047. However, these 
parameters fall within the threshold limits and while parameter scores have increased, the SCRAM 
evolutionary security risk mitigation process has ensured that security evolvement does not 
excessively increase the burden on single nodes or cause nodes to have more influence within the 
network. Ensuring that these potentially influential nodes are monitored and identified, as their 
removal or failure would have significant impact within the entire multi-level SoS infrastructure. 




(a) Aggregated Degree Centrality 
Indicator of High Node Connectivity 
 
(b) Aggregated Betweenness Centrality 
Indicator of Shortest Path Vulnerability 
 
 
(c) Aggregated Closeness Centrality 
Indicates Susceptibility to SPoF 
 
(d) Aggregated Eigenvector Centrality 
Indicates Weighted High Connectivity 
 
(e) Aggregated Bridging Centrality   
Indicator of Dependent Communications 
 
 
(f) Populations Robustness 
Figure 6.16.  Set C Multi-SoS Topological Security Vulnerabilities and Robustness Comparison 
 
6.2.1.2 SCRAM Positive Multi-Level SoS Vulnerability and Data 
Access Performance 
This second collection of multi-level SoS topologies presented in this section considers both the 
vulnerabilities and data access grades, i.e. both parameters are incorporated into the evolutionary 
security risk mitigation algorithm.  These types of SoS characterise not only WSN and IoT but other 
ICT infrastructures including critical infrastructures and Smart Cities for example, where it is vital 
that data exchange only occurs between components and devices that uphold the data access policy 
requirements, in order to assure data security and prevent unauthorised access and exposure to 
sensitive data as it traverses across the insecure and unencrypted collaborative infrastructure.  
Figures 6.17, 6.18, and 6.19 visualise each of the nine conducted experiments within this section. 
These undirected graphs have had the connecting node indicators and individual identifiable network 
colours omitted, to ensure communication paths and nodes are identifiable in this thesis. Each 
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network is represented via three graphs, the first graph visualising the quantified insecure nodes, and 
the nodes that will be blocked as they are in breach of data access policies. 
The second graph is stripped bare so we can intuitively examine the communication paths and node 
bridging centrality, with the third graph representing the security enhanced optimum candidate 
visualising the increased/decreased communication paths and alterations to the topology of the 
complete multi-level SoS. Table 6.7 presents the original multi-level SoS properties and Table 6.8 
provides the evolved security assessment results for the optimum candidate. Figures 6.20, 6.21, and 
6.22 provide a comparison for the aggregated centrality and robustness scores for each collaborative 
infrastructure. 
Table 6.7. Multi-Level SoS Unevolved Vulnerability and Data Access Performance Comparison 
















6.17-a 8 8 30% 0.06554021 16% 16433 677.57043 55% / 36% 
6.17-d 8 8 40% 0.120839745 19% 21774 523.48267 48% / 44% 
6.17-g 8 8 50% 0.0701485 28% 38297 456.69592 50% / 47% 
6.18-a 10 10 30% 0.05483405 17% 30166 639.54224 68% / 51% 
6.18-d 10 10 40% 0.052566476 30% 47479 605.318 45% / 47% 
6.18-g 10 10 50% 0.02411873 25% 79029 548.8606 51% / 48% 
6.19-a 12 12 30% 0.03791983 15% 50657 578.7408 55% / 49% 
6.19-d 12 12 40% 0.032601204 18% 85986 673.7375 56% / 46% 
6.19-g 12 12 50% 0.038904767 19% 131533 506.0106 56% / 53% 
 
Table 6.8. Multi-Level SoS Evolved Vulnerability and Data Access Performance Comparison 







Security of Graph 
Cost Minimum Path 
Average 
6.17-c 8 8 0.057347693 23% 21892 515.13245 
6.17-f 8 8 0.06093192 24% 23719 545.2525 
6.17-i 8 8 0.0870456 30% 24023 517.1161 
6.18-c 10 10 0.03236446 18% 38119 599.359 
6.18-f 10 10 0.032982886 30% 41343 639.1073 
6.18-i 10 10 0.030096881 25% 39649 594.9689 
6.19-c 12 12 0.039791193 16% 55356 569.92065 
6.19-f 12 12 0.039003253 19% 66202 666.18134 
6.19-i 12 12 0.025509696 20% 70383 637.1491 




(a) Multi-Level SoS J with Node Status 
 
(b) Multi-Level SoS J Topology 
 
(c) Multi-Level SoS J Optimum Candidate  
 
(d) Multi-Level SoS K with Node Status 
 
(e) Multi-Level SoS K Topology 
 
(f) Multi-Level SoS  K Optimum Candidate 
 
(g) Multi-Level SoS L with Node Status 
 
(h) Multi-Level SoS L Topology 
 
(i) Multi-Level SoS L Optimum Candidate 
Figure 6.17.  Set D of Multi-Level SoS Used in the Experiments (see Appendix B) 
 




(a) Multi-Level SoS M with Node Status 
 
(b) Multi-Level SoS M Topology 
 
(c) Multi-Level SoS M Optimum Candidate 
 
(d) Multi-Level SoS N with Node Status 
 
(e) Multi-Level SoS N Topology 
 
(f) Multi-Level SoS N Optimum Candidate 
 
(g) Multi-Level SoS O with Node Status 
 
(h) Multi-Level SoS O Topology 
 
(i) Multi-Level SoS O Optimum Candidate 
Figure 6.18.  Set E of Multi-Level SoS Used in the Experiments (see Appendix B) 
 
 





(a) Multi-Level SoS P with Node Status 
 
(b) Multi-Level SoS P  Topology 
 
(c) Multi-Level SoS P Optimum Candidate 
 
(d) Multi-Level SoS Q with Node Status 
 
(e) Multi-Level SoS Q Topology 
 
(f) Multi-Level SoS Q Optimum Candidate 
 
(g) Multi-Level SoS R with Node Status 
 
(h) Multi-Level SoS R Topology 
 
(i) Multi-Level SoS R Optimum Candidate 
Figure 6.19.  Set F of Multi-Level SoS Used in the Experiments (see Appendix B) 
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Analysing these results, we ascertained that in all instances the security enhancement and risk 
mitigation process either improved or maintained the overall level of network communication security 
for the entire multi-level SoS, this is the reason these graphs have been grouped together in this set.  
Due to the diverse complex topologies and utilising an evolutionary security risk mitigation approach 
to evolving the network’s communication paths to increase security, there is no guarantee that 
significant improvements will be achievable, i.e. not every SoS topology can be improved. In these 
instances we do see a range of improvements, an excellent example of this is when we review the 
evolved multi-level SoS O (Figure 6.18-g).  This is compiled from 10 SoS each of which contains 10 
nodes, with an initial network connectivity of 50%, and has been quantified as being comprised of 
51% insecure nodes and 48% blocked nodes which violate the data access policy requirements.  
 
(a) Aggregated Degree Centrality 
Indicator of High Node Connectivity 
 
(b) Aggregated Betweenness Centrality   
Indicator of Shortest Path Vulnerability 
 
 
(c) Aggregated Closeness Centrality 
Indicates Susceptibility to SPoF 
 
(d) Aggregated Eigenvector Centrality 
Indicates Weighted High Connectivity 
 
(e) Aggregated Bridging Centrality 
Indicator of Dependent Communication 
 
(f) Populations Robustness 
Figure 6.20.  Set D Multi-SoS Topological Security Vulnerabilities and Robustness Comparison 
While in this instance we do not see an improvement in the network’s security instead it is maintained 
at 25%, SCRAM is able to quantify and identify all nodes that are insecure and require securing in 
order to mitigate the risk that they pose to the entire SoS. The multi-level SoS is also evolved to 
ensure that a secure data path is established between all nodes and SoS, to ensure that data is not 
forced to traverse via insecure or blocked nodes. In addition, the reported optimum candidate reduces 
the overall cost (Table 6.8) of the SoS by 49.83% from 79029 to 39649, with a number of irrelevant 
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and redundant communication paths being removed while establishing and maintaining the necessary 
links to secure the multi-level SoS.  
While there has been a significant reduction in communication links reflected by the network cost, we 
do see a minor increase of 8.4% to minimum path average and an increase to degree centrality for the 
graph increasing to 0.030 from 0.024 (Tables 6.7 and 6.8). These values while marginally increased 
are within an acceptable range, bearing in mind security level has been maintained while reducing the 
overall associated costs. 
 
(a) Aggregated Degree Centrality 
Indicator of High Node Connectivity 
 
(b) Aggregated Betweenness Centrality  
Indicator of Shortest Path Vulnerability 
 
 
(c) Aggregated Closeness Centrality 
Indicates Susceptibility to SPoF 
 
(d) Aggregated Eigenvector Centrality 
Indicates High Connectivity 
 
(e) Aggregated Bridging Centrality   
Indicator of Dependent Communication 
 
(f) Populations Robustness 
Figure 6.21.  Set E Multi-SoS Topological Security Vulnerabilities and Robustness Comparison 
Figure 6.21 validates the appropriateness of the proposed optimum candidate for multi-level SoS O, 
identifying that the network’s robustness (Figure 6.21-f) has reduced by 14.28%. There are also 
reductions to aggregated degree, and eigenvector centralities, with a minor decrease to closeness 
centrality, with aggregated degree centrality (Figure 6.21-a) reducing by 41.34%, closeness centrality 
(Figure 6.21-c) decreasing by 9.13%, and eigenvector centrality (Figure 6.21-d) reducing by 69.16%. 
The reduction to the number of communication links is reflected in the reduction of degree centrality, 
however it must be noted that the multi-SoS maintains a strong communication network and adequate 
number of links, i.e. only excessive redundant links have been removed so the lower centrality score 
is to be expected.  The reduction of eigenvector centrality also reflects the strengthening and 
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appropriateness of the network, as it validates that the number of influential nodes that have the 
potential to expose the collaborative infrastructures should the nodes be removed or fail, have been 
significantly reduced. 
It is reported though that both aggregated betweenness and bridging centrality has increased for multi-
level SoS O, with betweenness centrality increasing from 0.025 to 0.37, and bridging centrality 
increasing by 148.4% from 0.0024 to 0.0059. In this case we have seen a number of communication 
links removed from the entire SoS, and the optimum reported candidate has been evolved and selected 
based on the communication paths between secure and unblocked nodes. With the network consisting 
of a large quantity of inappropriate nodes for data to traverse across, the security risk mitigation 
process is limited in how the network can be evolved. In addition, the size, complexity and physical 
location of the nodes within the topology will also influence how the network is advanced. The 
SCRAM framework attempts to apply the principles and consider all of these aspects while balancing 
security priority and risk mitigation, without unduly impacting centrality values, minimum path 
average, and the overall robustness of the infrastructure, evolving the collaborative environment using 
only the resources available, in an attempt to enhance the security and robustness of the entire multi-
level SoS.  
 
(a) Aggregated Degree Centrality 
Indicator of High Node Connectivity 
 
(b) Aggregated Betweenness Centrality 
Indicator of Shortest Path Vulnerability 
 
 
(c) Aggregated Closeness Centrality 
Indicates Susceptibility of SPoF 
 
(d) Aggregated Eigenvector Centrality 
Indicates Weighted High Connectivity 
 
(e) Aggregated Bridging Centrality   
Indicator of Dependent Communication 
 
(f) Populations Robustness 
Figure 6.22.  Set F Multi-SoS Topological Security Vulnerabilities and Robustness Comparison 
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6.2.1.3 SCRAM Negative Multi-Level SoS Vulnerability 
Performance 
This third presented collection of multi-level SoS topologies considers only the vulnerabilities within 
the topology of the entire multi-level SoS and does not apply the data access policy, characterising 
topologies such as SoS devised from WSN and IoT. The multi-level SoS contains a minimum of eight 
and a maximum of twelve distinct SoS, and each has an initial network connection of 40% or 50%. 
Figures 6.23, 6.24, and 6.25 visualise each of the six conducted experiments that have been 
categorised under this section.  
 
(a) Multi-Level SoS S with Node Status 
 
(b) Multi-Level SoS S Topology 
 
(c) Multi-Level SoS S Optimum Candidate 
 
(d) Multi-Level SoS T with Node Status 
 
(e) Multi-Level SoS T Topology 
 
(f) Multi-Level SoS T Optimum Candidate 
Figure 6.23.  Set G of Multi-Level SoS Used in the Experiments (see Appendix C) 
These undirected graphs do not visualise the connecting node indicators or individual network colours 
to allow for network paths and nodes to be imaged clearly and the topology of the SoS to be 
identifiable. Once more, the first graph visualises the topology and quantified insecure nodes, the 
second graph clearly presents all nodes (proportional to their computed bridging centrality) and 
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communication paths, and the third undirected graph presents the optimum evolved candidate 
topology. 
The original multi-level SoS properties for each infrastructure is presented in Table 6.9, with the 
enhanced security assessment results for the optimum candidate presented in Table 6.10. Figure 6.26 
provides a comparison for the aggregated multi-level SoS centrality scores, and Figure 6.27 visualises 
the population robustness scores for each multi-level SoS.  
 
(a) Multi-Level SoS U with Node Status 
 
(b) Multi-Level SoS U Topology 
 
(c) Multi-Level SoS U Optimum Candidate 
 
(d) Multi-Level SoS V with Node Status 
 
(e) Multi-Level SoS V Topology 
 
(f) Multi-Level SoS V Optimum Candidate 
Figure 6.24.  Set H of Multi-level SoS Used in the Experiments (see Appendix C) 
When we analysed each of these multi-level SoS we quickly ascertained that all of the instances 
reported a decrease in the overall SoS communication security to varying degrees, hence the reason 
for being grouped together in this set. 
The reason for the decrease in security is due to the evolvement process, while redundant 
communication links are removed to assist with decreasing network costs and in order to reduce 
vulnerabilities. We are forcing new connections between collaborative infrastructures in order to 
increase the connectivity. As previously stated we can’t rely upon a single node or communication 
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path as they increase the potential for SPoF. These single connections to nodes would also increase a 
node’s influence within the network and increase the node’s bridging centrality. Should these 
vulnerable nodes be removed or fail within the SoS, then data transfer would also fail. Potentially this 
could cause cascading failures to ripple across the infrastructures as objectives fail to be met. 
 
(a) Multi-Level SoS W with Node Status 
 
(b) Multi-Level SoS W Topology 
 
(c) Multi-Level SoS W Optimum Candidate 
 
(d) Multi-Level SoS X with Node Status 
 
(e) Multi-Level SoS X Topology 
 
(f) Multi-Level SoS X Optimum Candidate 
Figure 6.25.  Set I of Multi-Level SoS Used in the Experiments (see Appendix C) 
Forcing these new connections between SoS in order to establish a robust multi-level SoS, ensures 
that SoS have an increased robustness against single nodes failing, but in these instances each of the 
multi-level SoS consisted of infrastructures formed with over 50% of their nodes being quantified as 
insecure. Therefore, when new connections are established to insecure networks it will immediately 
impact the overall communication security for the entire multi-level SoS. In these instances the 
SCRAM framework accurately identifies and reports these issues, including identifying the nodes and 
connections which are insecure and require immediate attention, as visualised in the undirected graphs 
(Figures 6.23 - 6.25). 
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The physical topology of the collaborative infrastructures, i.e. static node location, can also impact 
security enhancement reconfiguration and the placement of communication paths, as the SCRAM 
framework attempts to balance risk mitigation, security and node vulnerabilities, while trying to not 
unduly impact centrality factors and minimum path average, for example. While these multi-level SoS 
have been categorised as negative as when the evolutionary security risk mitigation principals were 
applied the security was quantified as insecure, the SCRAM framework reconfiguration of the SoS 
does result in several positive outcomes, validating the accuracy and corroborating the usefulness of 
the applied methods and the SCRAM framework. 
Table 6.9. Multi-Level SoS Sets G-I Unevolved Infrastructure Properties Comparison 

















6.23-a 8 8 40% 0.07629292 59% 26120 465.45438 56% / 0% 
6.23-d 8 8 50% 0.04454687 32% 37299 551.18005 53% / 0% 
6.24-a 10 10 40% 0.05751392 48% 51040 524.9497 64% / 0% 
6.24-d 10 10 50% 0.053597197 33% 76226 535.05634 62% / 0% 
6.25-a 12 12 40% 0.04225352 32% 90461 482.6998 60% / 0% 
6.25-d 12 12 50% 0.030040385 31% 134069 488.31506 58% / 0% 
 
Table 6.10. Multi-Level SoS Sets G-I Evolved Infrastructure Properties Comparison 







Security of Graph 
Cost Minimum Path 
Average 
6.23-c 8 8 0.057859723 39% 23065 503.7738 
6.23-f 8 8 0.03993855 31% 25531 594.5109 
6.24-c 10 10 0.042053193 31% 40136 589.0148 
6.24-f 10 10 0.052154213 29% 44348 603.9772 
6.25-c 12 12 0.030532854 23% 65822 538.7511 
6.25-f 12 12 0.025805186 24% 69480 614.1758 
 
In all instances we see improvements to the multi-level SoS overall robustness score, which is 
quantified using the five key parameters (security grade, highest bridging centrality, degree centrality, 
minimum path average, and cost) as discussed in Section 4.6.3. This decrease in the robustness scores 
corroborates that each of the evolved multi-level SoS is more appropriate. For example, each of the 
networks in this set has a reduced eigenvector centrality score, meaning there has been a reduction in 
influential nodes in the network that cause dependencies within the SoS topology. While we do see 
notable increases in the aggregated betweenness and bridging centralities, these are not excessively 
high and remain within tolerable boundaries. With the removal of excessive and wasteful redundant 
communication paths the moderate increase to these values is to be expected. Furthermore, these 
minor increases will not unduly impact the functionality of the network or excessively increase the 
risk to particular nodes. 
 




(a) Aggregated Degree Centrality 
Indicator of High Node Connectivity 
 
(b) Aggregated Betweenness Centrality 
Indicator of Shortest Path Vulnerability 
 
 
(c) Aggregated Closeness Centrality 
Indicates Susceptibility to SPoF 
 
(d) Aggregated Eigenvector Centrality 
Indicates Weighted High Connectivity 
 
(e) Aggregated Bridging Centrality     
Indicator of Dependent Communication 
  
 
Figure 6.26.  Set G-I Multi-Level SoS Topological Security Vulnerabilities Comparison 
 
(a) Figures 6.23-a, 6.24-a, and 6.25-a 
 
 
(b) Figures 6.23-d, 6.24-d, and 6.25-d 
Figure 6.27.  Sets G-I Populations Robustness Comparison 
Due to the random nature of the evolutionary network evolvement along with the dynamic nature of 
the SoS, potentially we could re-run the security risk mitigation process against the same set of multi-
level SoS which could potentially result in positive outcomes, where security is either maintained or 
improved. Additionally, the SCRAM framework has also quantified and identified all nodes within 
the multi-level SoS that are insecure. By taking action and rectifying the vulnerabilities of insecure 
nodes, they would no longer pose a risk to the infrastructure or the data which is to traverse across the 
Chapter 6 - Multi-Level SoS Security Analysis and Evaluation  
278 
 
distinct SoS. Therefore in theory, these nodes would be quantified as secure, the security level of the 
collaborative infrastructure would be increased due to the risks being mitigated, and then these nodes 
could be considered during the multi-level SoS security enhancement configuration when the security 
risk mitigation process is applied.  
 
6.2.1.4 SCRAM Negative Multi-Level SoS Vulnerability and Data 
Access Performance 
The final presented collection of multi-level SoS topologies considers both the vulnerabilities and data 
access problem, with both of these elements being prioritised in the security risk mitigation technique. 
These multi-level SoS characterise topologies formed from varying ICT networks, with each multi-
level SoS being formed from various sizes of SoS and nodes, with different initial network 
connections percentages. Figures 6.28, 6.29, and 6.30 visualise each of the six conducted experiments 
which have been categorised under this section. These undirected graphs again do not visualise the 
connecting node indicators or individual identifiable network colours, with the first graph visualising 
the topology of the infrastructure including vulnerable nodes and those which violate the data access 
policy, the second graph presenting clear unobstructed communication paths and node bridging 
centralities, and the final graph visualising the reported optimum candidate. 
When the multi-level SoS are first generated the SCRAM techniques quantify the properties of the 
multi-level SoS, these results are presented in Table 6.11. In Table 6.12 we present the security 
enhanced results generated via the security risk mitigation process, and Figures 6.31 and 6.32 present 
the aggregated multi-level SoS centrality scores and the robustness for each infrastructure 
consecutively. 
Like the negative simulations in Section 6.2.1.3, the reported optimum candidates for all multi-level 
SoS in these experiments negatively impact the infrastructure’s communication security in each 
instance to varying degrees, thus are grouped together in this set of experiments. For each multi-level 
SoS the optimum reported candidate reports a decrease in security and an increase in minimum 
average path length, due to the removal of excessive and redundant communication paths, and the 
forced establishment of new connections between nodes in distinct SoS. Each of the experimental 
collaborative infrastructures shows that over 50% of the collaborative devices are quantified as 
insecure, and report that over 47% of the nodes in the infrastructure violate data access policies. 
These highly complex and insecure SoS are then forced to establish new data links between each 
other in order to not only guarantee a secure communication route across the entire multi-level SoS 
between secure nodes and those which do not breach data access, but also must establish connections 
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between SoS via connecting nodes which are deemed insecure or inappropriate due to them being the 
only secondary option available. 
 
(a) Multi-Level SoS Y with Node Status 
 
(b) Multi-Level SoS Y Topology  
 
(c) Multi-Level SoS  Y Optimum Candidate 
 
(d) Multi-Level SoS  Z with Node Status 
 
(e) Multi-Level SoS Z Topology 
 
(f) Multi-Level SoS Z Optimum Candidate 
Figure 6.28.  Set J of Multi-Level SoS Used in the Experiments (see Appendix D) 
The objectives of the SCRAM framework is to ensure that alternative data paths exist between 
infrastructures to prevent single nodes being relied upon, and to reduce dependencies and potential 
SPoF within the collaborative infrastructure, to mitigate risks and increase SoS robustness, and 
prevent cascading failures from rippling across the entire collaborative infrastructure. Therefore, 
establishing secondary connections between distinct SoS is essential. 
When attempting to enhance the security of an SoS configured of a large number of insecure and 
inappropriate nodes, it is not surprising that the security risk mitigation process negatively impacts the 
security of both the distinct SoS and the entire multi-level SoS. Likewise, due to the evolutionary risk 
mitigation process randomly generating candidates, we could potentially run the same experiments on 
each of the multi-level SoS and the collaborative infrastructure could be enhanced and reconfigured 
into a different set of solutions with dissimilar end results.  




(a) Multi-Level SoS AA with Node Status 
 
(b) Multi-Level SoS AA Topology 
 
(c) Multi-Level SoS AA Optimum Candidate 
 
(d) Multi-Level SoS BB with Node Status 
 
(e) Multi-Level SoS BB Topology 
 
(f) Multi-Level SoS BB Optimum Candidate 
Figure 6.29.  Set K of Multi-Level SoS Used in the Experiments (see Appendix D) 
We know the reconfigured reported candidates are more appropriate due to the reported decrease in 
the robustness scores and by analysing centrality factors, for example. These experiments corroborate 
the functionality of the SCRAM framework and demonstrate its usefulness to identify and visualise 
vulnerabilities within the SoS topology and report issues.  
Analysing the topology of multi-level SoS AA (Figure 6.29-a) for example, Node 60 at the bottom of 
the graph, after the security enhanced candidate is reported (Figure 6.29-c) this node remains isolated 
with no secure connection being established between the other secure nodes within the multi-level 
SoS. SCRAM upholds the principles that all nodes within a network must not be cut off from its own 
infrastructure. Viewing the topology of the multi-level SoS, Node 60 is primarily surrounded by 
insecure and blocked nodes, with 51% of the nodes within the collaborative infrastructure quantified 
as insecure and 55% identified as violating the data access policy. SCRAM during the security 
reconfiguration of the infrastructure has attempted to assure that the applied techniques did not unduly 
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impact network centralities and minimum path average etc., and when we review aggregated 
centrality scores (Figure 6.31) and robustness level (Figure 6.32) this is corroborated. 
 
(a) Multi-Level SoS CC with Node Status 
 
(b) Multi-Level SoS CC Topology 
 
(c) Multi-Level SoS CC Optimum Candidate 
 
(d) Multi-Level SoS DD with Node Status 
 
(e) Multi-Level SoS DD Topology 
 
(f) Multi-Level SoS DD Optimum Candidate 
Figure 6.30.  Set L of Multi-Level SoS Used in the Experiments 
Table 6.11. Multi-Level SoS Sets J-L Unevolved Infrastructure Properties Comparison 
















6.28-a 8 8 40% 0.06502819 46% 23961 503.27878 55% / 47% 
6.28-d 8 8 50% 0.056835655 35% 39648 525.0496 65% / 50% 
6.29-a 10 10 40% 0.043496177 45% 52487 485.4875 51% / 55% 
6.29-d 10 10 50% 0.060606036 26% 77185 526.11694 52% / 49% 
6.30-a 12 12 40% 0.040874634 40% 93165 486.76895 51% / 65% 
6.30-d 12 12 50% 0.04136708 25% 136466 449.02203 53% / 49% 
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Table 6.12. Multi-Level SoS Sets J-L Evolved Infrastructures Properties Comparison 







Security of Graph 
Cost Minimum Path 
Average 
6.28-c 8 8 0.047107022 23% 21486 529.6607 
6.28-f 8 8 0.045058876 32% 22045 562.04565 
6.29-c 10 10 0.051535763 21% 39528 555.4374 
6.29-f 10 10 0.052772615 24% 42666 616.7204 
6.30-c 12 12 0.031123796 20% 65657 540.9086 
6.30-f 12 12 0.032502703 19% 67818 589.45776 
 
As the framework has identified that Node 60 is isolated, as stated we could run the risk mitigation 
process again and force additional reconfiguration to consider alternative solutions. We also have an 
opportunity to rectify the identified issues of vulnerable nodes, and mitigate their associated risks to 
assure their security. This would immediately enhance the overall security of the entire collaborative 
infrastructure, and would reduce the number of insecure nodes in the SoS, therefore, increasing the 
number of secure nodes for security reconfiguration and construction of secure communication routes 
across the SoS topology. 
 
(a) Degree Centrality  
Indicator of High Node Connectivity 
 
(b) Betweenness Centrality 
Indicator of Shortest Path Vulnerability 
 
 
(c) Closeness Centrality 
Indicates Susceptibility to SPoF 
 
(d) Eigenvector Centrality 
Indicates Weighted High Connectivity 
 
(e) Bridging Centrality 
Indicator of Dependent Communications 
  
 
Figure 6.31.  Set J-L Multi-Level SoS Topological Security Vulnerabilities Comparison 
 





(a) Multi-SoS  Figures 6.28-a, 6.29-a, and 6.30-a 
 
(b) Multi-SoS Figures 6.28-d, 6.29-d, and 6.30-d 
Figure 6.32.  Sets J-L Multi-Level SoS Robustness Comparison 
 
6.3 Summary 
The simulations used in these experiments are the closest representations of real world multi-level 
SoS we can use to evaluate the theoretical principles proposed. The complexity and dynamic nature of 
SoS means applying new assessment methods directly to the physical SoS could result in serious 
consequences and failings. We can’t simply turn off a deployed SoS environment in order to conduct 
vigorous testing. This verifies the most effective means to ensure issues within the proposed SCRAM 
framework do not arise, is by vigorously testing and evaluating the techniques, prior to investing 
considerable time and resources into applying the methodology to a large physical multi-level SoS. 
This chapter presented evidence corroborating the usefulness of the applied theoretical techniques, 
demonstrating the benefits in regards to the framework’s accuracy and capabilities when applied to 
multi-level SoS. Although we must note that similar to the above chapter, while analysing and 
evaluating these experiments we see encouraging results, the framework has not been fully distributed 
against a larger physical multi-level SoS and truly only reflects the fixed set of vulnerabilities and 
simulated multi-level SoS configured environments. Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain if the results 







Chapter 7  
Conclusion and Future Work 
 
The dynamic nature, complexity, and size of SoS, makes it extremely difficult to identify risks and 
assure the security of these heterogeneous multi-level SoS. As organisations and cities continue to see 
the financial gains of collaborating and integrating external ICT with their systems in order to take 
advantage of the many benefits it affords, the size and complexity of these types of collaborative 
infrastructure will continue to increase. For this reason, monitoring these large complex multi-level 
SoS will pose additional challenges, and increases to the associated risks will need to be considered 
such as those attributed to operational independence, managerial independence, evolutionary 
development, emergent behaviour, and geographic behaviour. If left unresolved and new solutions are 
not researched and developed, then we will see additional failings to deployed SoS such as those that 
are directly attributed to unidentified vulnerabilities, interdependency, complexity, and cascading 
failures. 
Similarly, as those with malicious intent continue to recognise the true value of data and its 
disruption, and as callous attacks continue to evolve and malicious attackers take advantage of the 
weakness and associated vulnerabilities of SoS, it is vital that novel solutions are developed in order 
to assure the security of system components and the data which traverses and is stored within SoS 
environments, and methods that increase the overall robustness of the collaborative infrastructures are 
advanced. 
Existing techniques are in general highly theoretical or have failed to be applied to such a large scale 
dynamic decentralised environment that consists of a large number of diverse and distinct 
infrastructures. This thesis has presented a SeCurity Risk Analysis and Mitigation (SCRAM) 
framework, along with evolutionary techniques and security risk mitigation methods, and discussed 
how these principles can be applied to dynamic complex SoS and multi-level SoS in order to 
overcome the limitations of existing solutions that attempt to identify and mitigate risks within SoS 
environments.  
The presented experiments in this thesis consider specific SoS types and configurations, and quantify 
risks into security rankings based on a collection of identified real world vulnerabilities. We 
acknowledge that further work must be undertaken to both corroborate initial results and assess the 
true effectiveness of the framework and principles on physical dispersed complex multi-level SoS, 
and to establish the accuracy of the evaluated methods presented. 
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In this chapter we discuss this thesis and present an overview of the novel contributions developed in 
order to overcome the limitations of existing methodologies, corroborating the constructive gains of 
this proposed work. The limitations of our proposed framework and principles are also summarised in 
the section, along with future research and developments that could be conducted in order to advance 
our work and debate other areas in which the principles could be applied. Finally, our concluding 
observations are conferred, highlighting the accomplishments of the work presented in this thesis. 
 
7.1 Thesis Summary 
Chapter 1 of this thesis provides a brief overview of SoS, introducing the concept and providing an 
insight into the risks that expose these infrastructures and the challenges that impede present security 
and risk solutions used to secure and mitigate risks within their topologies. In this chapter, we also 
present the aims and objectives of this thesis, and discuss the motivation for our conducted research. 
Additionally, the novel contributions achieved in order to overcome the limitations of current research 
and developments, and our research findings are outlined. 
Chapter 2 of this thesis focuses on providing sufficient background for the reader in order for them to 
comprehend the research area. This chapter describes the rewards and challenges associated with SoS, 
and the inadequacies that currently exist within this area of research. This chapter also outlines the 
associated risks and assessment methods that attempt to identify and quantify the risks associated with 
large dynamic multi-level SoS. Including methodologies that endeavour to model vulnerabilities and 
the SoS architecture, such as attack graph generation techniques. 
Chapter 3 of this thesis provides a critical review of conducted research associated with SoS security, 
and SoS risk analysis, assessment, and modelling. Reviewing how these techniques and 
methodologies are applied in regards to assuring SoS security, their effectiveness in identifying 
vulnerabilities, and how they can be improved to provide effective solutions to the challenges 
outlined. 
Chapter 4 of this thesis presents an outline and justification of the research methodology and our 
novel principles and framework, which have been researched and developed in order to overcome the 
limitations of existing techniques and the associated challenges. Firstly, a detailed outline of the 
SCRAM framework is provided, which includes a comprehensive overview of the structure and 
design of the proposed SCRAM framework, including a detailed description of the framework’s 
processing stages. In addition, the principal algorithms and methods which are implemented into the 
framework in order to meet our aims and objectives are discussed. This includes summarising the 
importance of the principles and how their operation will assist to meet our objectives. 
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Chapter 5 of this thesis defines how the theoretical principals and the proposed SCRAM framework 
were implemented, discussing the configuration of the essential methods and simulation environment. 
This section also provides initial evaluation of the proposed framework against the fundamental 
design requirements. In order to corroborate the effectiveness of the framework and principles, and 
ensure that the aims and objectives established in the thesis are achieved. The chapter concludes by 
providing a case study that validates the appropriateness of the SCRAM framework and applied 
techniques.  
Chapter 6 of this thesis presents the experiments generated in order to evaluate the framework and 
integrated theoretical techniques. These simulated environments are generated and allow us to 
develop a rich topological environment formed from multiple distinct networks with varying devices 
and their associated vulnerabilities, and generate good data sets for analysis and evaluation. From 
these more detailed and complex environments, we can therefore determine that the SCRAM 
framework and principles are an adequate solution for identifying and mitigating risk within multi-
level SoS. 
 
7.2 Aims and Objectives Evaluation 
Our primary objective was to conduct detailed research into the challenges, risks, and methodologies 
that expose SoS. This objective was met, and provided great insight into the inadequacies and 
inflexibility of existing methods, that fail to identify risks and which leave SoS exposed to attack and 
risk vectors. By identifying the weaknesses of techniques that have been researched and developed 
within multiple fields which include cyber security, risk analysis and management, optimisation, and 
attack graph generation, etc., we were able to ascertain methods that could be developed to support 
the identification and analyses of multiple risk vectors within SoS environments. Developing 
innovative methods that could utilise identified risks to accurately measure the security of distinct 
devices, the robustness of the infrastructure, and the security of the entire collaborative environment, 
which allowed for us to develop a solution to enhance security and mitigate risks utilising the 
infrastructure’s existing resources only. 
The development of the security risk analysis solution assisted greatly in meeting our second 
objective, evaluation of our experiments corroborate that we can analyse identified risks and calculate 
the security level for the entire SoS using vulnerability analysis, node property aspects, topology data, 
and other factors. The improved accuracy of security grades and risk identification allows for us to 
mitigate risks without introducing additional resources into the SoS infrastructure, and for those risks 
that cannot be mitigated provides us the means to accurately report them. Meaning risks that are not 
able to be mitigated could be managed more effectively prior to their exploitation or failure. 
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Our objective to develop a solution capable of analysing and quantifying the robustness of the SoS 
based on the relevant data captured from the security risk analysis solution was successfully 
implemented within our framework and evaluation of our experiments validates the usefulness of this 
method. This method quantifies a numerical score which represents the overall robustness or 
appropriateness of the entire collaborative infrastructure and can be used as a comparative variable 
during risk mitigation processes and used during decision making processes. 
In order to successfully mitigate risk it was important to conduct a detailed investigation into 
optimisation techniques and algorithms, to establish which solutions are both capable of being applied 
to SoS and multi-level SoS, and that they are capable of mitigating risks effectively. Through critical 
analysis of existing methods and the application of three different optimisation techniques within the 
security enhancement and risk mitigation process, we were able to analyse solutions and determine 
their effectiveness. The accomplishment of this objective is corroborated by the results evaluated 
within our conducted experiments presented in this thesis. 
Through the completion of a case study on WSN and the expansion of our framework to encompass a 
different risk vector, it establishes that our solution is expandable and overcomes the limitations of 
existing solutions that are rigid and cannot be easily adapted to encompass additional risk vectors. By 
meeting this objective we were able to establish the effectiveness of the proposed solution’s ability to 
incorporate and identify dissimilar risk factors, and its capability to be forward compatible. 
Our final objective was to validate the solution’s ability for identifying and mitigating risks within 
multi-level SoS, while we were able to successfully meet this objective we had to further consider the 
implications of connecting SoS to external SoS under independent management, and the new risks 
that are introduced and have the potential to expose the multi-level infrastructure. While evaluating 
the framework’s methods, we were able to measure security for every distinct device and the entire 
collaborative infrastructure, and evaluation of the experiments corroborated the effectiveness of the 
method’s application to mitigate risks and enhance or maintain communication security for large 
complex multi-level SoS. 
Fulfilment of these objectives heavily contributed to solving the problematic challenges associated 
with measuring security between interconnected ‘things’, the identification and mitigation of risks and 
interdependencies, and data security in insecure and unencrypted networks. Evaluation of the applied 
methods and experiments, established that we have accomplished the objectives we presented and that 
they assisted us in adhering to the established aims of the research. While evaluation of our methods 
established limitations with our solution (outlined in Section 7.4), the execution of our aims and 
objectives contribute to identifying and mitigating security risks in multi-level SoS environments. 
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7.3 Novel Contributions and Publications 
Research presented in this thesis offers significant contributions in the field of SoS risk analysis and 
security. 
 An evolutionary SeCurity Risk Analysis and Mitigation Framework, which overcomes the 
inadequacies and limitations of existing solutions and the challenges of monitoring complex 
SoS environments. The framework quantifies security scores for the distinct nodes that form 
the collaborative infrastructure and for the entire SoS. This is achieved by combining the use 
of established vulnerability scoring techniques and databases into the SCRAM framework. 
However, to ensure that we generate an accurate security grade for each node, based on the 
network discovery process, the SCRAM framework assigns every node with further risks 
probability scores based on the device’s software, hardware, firmware, data access level, and, 
when relevant, external connections between collaborative networks,  incorporating these 
multiple risks scores into a single security grade for each node, and considering centrality 
factors that further expose the entire SoS to risk, adding extra dimensions to SoS security. The 
framework can accurately identify, report, and visualise the nodes that pose the biggest threats 
to the infrastructure, including those which if removed or fail will have the greatest impact on 
network communication and security. This framework is considered novel as the literature 
review has not identified existing methods that use such extensive analysis, instead focusing 
on more specific vulnerabilities and risks. This novel framework considers not only 
vulnerabilities that expose the infrastructure to attack, but risks associated with the physical 
network that can impede data communication between collaborative devices, risks associated 
with dependencies that can result in full and partial cascade failings, the associated risks of 
high centralities, risks and vulnerabilities that can endanger SoS due to their physical 
structure and configuration, and risks that are introduced into multi-level SoS when distinct 
SoS are forced into collaborative relations. 
 A statistical robustness algorithm that combines five distinct parameters to quantify the 
appropriateness of the SoS environment, and assists to determine the optimal network when 
combined with the evolutionary security risk mitigation algorithm. As emphasis is placed on 
the robustness level of the network, this value which represents the appropriateness in 
security and network security configuration can assist security risk mitigation evolutionary 
algorithms to produce the next generation of improved solutions. This individual score 
becomes a representative factor which establishes the suitability of the entire SoS topology, 
and can be used alongside the security level of the network during decision making. This 
technique is considered novel, as the literature survey did not identify other security methods 
that can overcome the associated challenges of complexity, the dynamic nature of SoS 
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topologies, and solutions that utilise such a large number of parameters, risks, and identified 
vulnerabilities, which when analysed are combined into a single representative robustness 
score demonstrating the appropriateness of the entire SoS or multi-level SoS topology. 
Instead existing solutions typically focus upon a specific type of attack or vulnerability, and 
generally do not analyse such large diverse collaborative topologies and apply their methods 
to such diverse collaborative infrastructure topologies. 
 An evolutionary security risk mitigation algorithm that when applied to a SoS, searches for an 
optimal combination of communication connections in an attempt to assure data as it traverses 
across an unencrypted collaborative infrastructure. The applied algorithm overcomes many of 
the limitations associated with local search techniques, and the basis of the algorithm is to 
evolve the network via an evolutionary process till an end criterion is met. Ensuring as 
random mutations are made the older or inadequate solutions die out based on the robustness 
level of the network quantified using the novel robustness technique, security grade process, 
data access principles, and centrality values.  The algorithm is capable of reconfiguring 
communication links searching for the optimal secure configuration of network paths for both 
the internal connections between distinct SoS and their associated devices. In addition the 
method configures the communication paths between collaborative infrastructures, 
reconfiguring the entire collaborative infrastructure and individual SoS as a single entity, and 
reports the optimum secure configuration via the framework to the end user. This algorithm is 
considered novel as the literature review has shown no existing approach that utilises such an 
extensive number of metrics for comparison and evaluation during security risk mitigation, 
nor do they apply their techniques to both single SoS and multi-level SoS. 
 A multi-level SoS SeCurity Risk Analysis and Mitigation Framework that adopts a hybrid and 
scalable approach to secure and mitigate risks in multi-level SoS. This technique overcomes 
the limitations associated with complex SoS, providing an accurate means to measure, 
identify, and visualise security and vulnerabilities, to identify and quantify vulnerabilities and 
mitigate risks, and to measure the robustness of the entire multi-level SoS. This limits the 
multi-level SoS exposure to failures and attack vectors, with analysis undertaken on multi-
level SoS that consist of up to twelve unique heterogeneous SoS. Early identification of high 
bridging nodes and those nodes with high eigenvector centrality scores, for example, means 
actions can be taken to reduce these dependencies and reduce potential SPoF, or the 
consequences that would be caused in the event these nodes failed or were removed from the 
SoS (i.e. potential repercussions and cascade failings). Additionally, to overcome the 
inaccuracies of security as new connections are made between connecting nodes, the method 
is capable of quantifying a new security grade based on the additional risks the new 
connections pose to devices. The technique is considered novel as the literature review has 
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shown no existing approach that provides a comparable level of analysis and visualisation 
when applying attack graph generation methods and combatting the data access control 
problem in a single solution. In addition, the solution does not only provide a single reported 
optimal solution, but reports alternative improved candidates for consideration to assist 
decision makers when having to consider improving security without unduly impacting 
budgeting restrictions, etc., without impacting upon the system resources on which the 
SCRAM solution operates. 
Aspects of the research undertaken and presented in this thesis have been published in eight academic 
research journals and conferences, with a comprehensive list of publications being provided at the 
beginning of the thesis.  
 
7.4 Limitations 
The proposed solutions are impacted by several limitations, as discussed in this section.  
 Vulnerability Identification – While the SCRAM framework can be programmed with 
adequate network discovery methods, the framework relies upon standardised vulnerability 
scoring metrics and databases, such as CVSS and NVD. Therefore, the algorithms that rely 
upon the accuracy of vulnerability identification, vulnerability scoring, node security grades, 
and network communication security level are vulnerable and limited by the associated issues 
of these external techniques. CVSS scoring can be inconsistent due to the principles being too 
theoretical and difficult to apply to real world identified vulnerabilities that rely on human 
administration to assign scores. With scores being assigned too high as administration is 
overly cautious or too low as they do not fully comprehend the threat severity. Discrepancies 
have increased among analysts over recent years, resulting in inconsistent scores. This scoring 
technique also fails to address misconfigurations for example, and the framework focuses 
upon software based vulnerabilities. NVD is synchronised to automatically update when new 
vulnerabilities are identified and published by CVE, however, it cannot be categorised as a 
real-time vulnerability and reporting mechanism. Often it can take as long as two full working 
days for NVD analysts to analyse the vulnerabilities and augment the vulnerability attributes. 
Additionally, NVD does not perform any vulnerability testing to identify new vulnerabilities, 
and relies upon CVE and other third-parties, thus is limited and vulnerable to their associated 
strengths and failings. Meaning the systems we are analysing potentially could be exposed to 
zero-day attacks, due to the slow confirmation of identified issues and assignment of risk 
probability scores. SoS communication levels and node security scores generated and 
visualised via the SCRAM framework may also be inaccurate due to identified vulnerabilities 
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initially being incorrectly analysed and reported. Hence, there is potential for devices to be 
inaccurately identified as insecure or secure, and this could result in a high rate of false 
security classifications. 
 Robustness Function Constants – As previously stated in Section 4.6.2, the robustness 
function relies upon constants whose values are determined by analysis of an organisation’s 
network, and would be assigned by their security experts and administration. Therefore, the 
assignments of scores to these constants are reliant upon the skills and knowledge of the 
administrators, their perception of risk, and removing their own personal bias. There is a 
possibly for constants to be over or under estimated, and while the main factor of the 
robustness function is the security level achieved, these constants which represent highest 
bridging centrality, centrality degree, minimum path average, and associated network cost are 
vital elements within the robustness function to establish an accurate robustness level and 
determine the optimal network. For SCRAM to be effective and report the most viable 
alternative secure configurations of SoS to enhance SoS and multi-level SoS security and 
robustness, this is something that could result in false negative reporting of candidates and 
impact the evolutionary process of security risk mitigation. 
 Identifying Behavioural Consequences – Unfortunately, as we evolve the network and 
reconfigure connections between distinct devices and infrastructures, we do not have any 
means to identify the consequences or resulting negative behaviours that could arise due to 
the newly formed connections. Depending upon the type of infrastructure being evolved, 
dependencies could have formed between systems and when data communication paths are 
removed and replaced throughout the SoS, full or partial cascading failures could occur as a 
direct result. Similarly, as new connections are formed between devices, emergent behaviours 
could arise either immediately or in the future. Therefore, it is essential that this issue is 
seriously considered, with further research and development required in order to ensure the 
SCRAM framework is viable and can be applied to physical multi-level SoS without 
recommending erroneous network configurations that impede the SoS functionality or 
introduce failings. 
 Failure Tolerance – The framework attempts to reconfigure and enhance an SoS topology, 
specifically communication paths between nodes and external SoS based on security grades, 
quantified vulnerability status, and data access levels, for example, while not unduly 
impacting network and node centralities, cost, and minimum path average, etc. Despite the 
fact the framework clearly will not tolerate a node being disconnected from its own SoS, and 
attempts to conform to strict parameters to ensure that there is a minimum of one secure route 
between all nodes, to guarantee that data does not traverse via insecure nodes or those that 
violate data access, on occasions SCRAM identifies nodes that while remaining connected 
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within their SoS, fail to be connected across the entire multi-level SoS infrastructure to any 
other secure nodes. This limitation is particularly prevalent in complex dynamic multi-level 
SoS that are composed of great numbers of quantified insecure nodes and nodes that violate 
data access policies. Hence, while the framework reports this issue further development is 
required in order to rectify this limitation, without unduly impacting SoS security and 
centralities by perhaps generating and reporting a solution that while it is not evaluated and 
considered the optimum, assures node security and secure communication routes between 
nodes as an alternative solution that in addition quantifies the impacts that will occur due to 
the forced essential connection(s). 
 Deployment Strategy – Currently the SCRAM framework application is executed upon a 
single device, which is responsible for network discovery, vulnerability analysis, security risk 
mitigation process, and for generating undirected graphs and reports. These processes and 
reports are visualised and presented in a single SCRAM interface. In addition, the framework 
itself could be a SPoF or should the thresholds be targeted for example, the SCRAM 
framework would generate inaccurate results and leave systems exposed. To be effective in 
complex distributed multi-level SoS environments and in order to limit the impact on 
resources used for processing, this issue needs to be addressed. The complex distributed 
environments are formed using a variety of SoS, configured from diverse components. When 
deploying the framework it is vital that the responsibility for the SCRAM processing is 
assigned to devices with adequate resources, to ensure that we limit the impact of resources 
and in order to accurately determine the framework’s true footprint. If the SCRAM 
framework is to be deployed within physical SoS which are managerially independent, we 
also need to address the issues associated with collaborative analysis and report production. 
For SoS to be able to understand the risks posed to them from their collaborative relations 
with other SoS, the framework will be required to distribute the results of the analysis and 
evaluation, to ensure all collaborative infrastructures are informed and have access to the 
same generated results and warnings. This limitation is particularly prevalent in large 
dynamic complex topologies, as it is difficult to ascertain how the framework will uphold 
when applying both vulnerability assessment methods and security risk mitigation techniques 
on such large distributed environments. 
 
7.5 Future Work 
This thesis has presented work that is relevant and could be applied to numerous differing areas. 
There are various means by which the work could be extended and developed further in order to 
address other challenges. 
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 The SCRAM framework could be further enhanced by researching deployment strategies in 
order to distribute the framework across multiple environments. Presently the framework is 
executed upon a single device, which is responsible for network discovery, analysis, risk 
mitigation, and evaluation. However, by deploying the application multiple devices would 
assist with the method’s processing and prevent device resources from being strained. In order 
to achieve this, associated issues with deployment would need to be examined, along with 
connectivity, collaborative analysis reports and warning systems, securing globalised network 
view, accessibility between collaborating organisations, congestion avoidance and control, 
and limiting the impact of resources used for processing and issues with parallel processing. 
 The conducted experiments have been programmed with particular assumptions, thus 
allowing us to conduct experiments on the SoS and evaluate their results. One such 
assumption was how much information was shared with SCRAM in order to reconfigure the 
network, and which for example, influences the removal and replacement of connections to 
external SoS during the risk mitigation process based on the shared security grades. The 
framework would be enhanced by establishing how topological information and security risks 
can be securely shared between unencrypted networked infrastructures. Further analysis 
would be required in order to determine the impact and potential risk that full disclosure 
would provide when compared against partial disclosure, along with establishing 
improvements to quantifying security risks and security grades between distinct SoS. 
 The SCRAM framework could be enhanced by conducting research into vulnerability 
assessment and remediation. SCRAM has the functionality to quantify a node’s security score 
and report the associated vulnerabilities, when nodes are identified as vulnerable it impacts 
the number of nodes within the SoS that can be utilised for secure communication. However, 
if low level vulnerabilities were identified and could be simply secured without unduly 
impacting the functionality of the node or increasing risks to the network, then by having an 
automated process that applies actions that secure the nodes, it will increase the number of 
secure nodes within the network, reduce vulnerabilities, directly increase security, and 
provide additional nodes for selection during the security risk mitigation process. 
 The SCRAM framework could be further enhanced by conducting research into 
authentication, to ensure that the SoS that form collaborative relations do not contain 
unauthorised devices. The scale and complexity of SoS makes network discovery problematic 
in itself, as SoS are often managerially independent and have the ability to add and remove 
devices without informing or seeking permission, for its collaborative associates it can be 
difficult to establish the legitimacy of devices. Introducing an authentication method would 
ensure that only authorised devices could access the SCRAM data, and in turn SCRAM 
would have the functionality to identify unauthorised devices and report them. 
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 The constants used as part of the robustness function are based on the analysis of the SoS; 
however, these constants might be different for each SoS within the multi-level SoS. As 
administrators would be forced to prioritise their individual security based on their individual 
needs over that of the multi-level SoS. An enhancement to the framework would be to see if 
we can implement a multi-layered robustness function, which takes into account and reflects 
the distinct SoS environments. This would also assist to evaluate the use of a single set of 
constants agreed upon as part of a collaborative agreement, and prevent inaccurate 
assessments of the topologies. 
 The SCRAM framework could be further enhanced by automating the monitoring tool. 
Currently the network is imported and analysed, with a detailed undirected graph and report 
being generated and presented, this then allows for the network to be further analysed by 
conducting the security risk mitigation process. Due to the dynamic nature of SoS, by 
automating SCRAM to continually monitor a network it would allow the framework to 
identify changes to the network as devices are removed and added to the network in real-time. 
This would allow the addition and removal of devices to be analysed and reported, 
quantifying the changes to security and identifying vulnerabilities that have been introduced 
or removed from the environment. 
 As more organisations transition to the Cloud and take advantage of the many benefits it 
affords, and as more organisations outsource operations to third parties, monitoring these 
complex dynamic and geographically dispersed environments will become increasingly 
problematic.  The SCRAM framework will need to be able to understand these complex 
systems and facilitate the visualisation of such topologies after it conducts the relevant 
network discovery, but will also have to factor in the additional risks that these third party 
infrastructures pose to the entire collaborative infrastructure. 
 The SCRAM framework is able to generate and simulate a distinct SoS and multi-level SoS. 
The experiments conducted via the framework were designed to evaluate the success of the 
applied theoretical solutions proposed in the thesis against the simulated environments and 
their specific topological configurations, device types, and vulnerabilities. Additional analysis 
is required to evaluate the framework on larger physical multi-level SoS, to corroborate the 
appropriateness of the proposed solutions and evaluate the extent of the framework’s 
limitations and benefits. 
 
7.6 Concluding Remarks 
Multi-level SoS are gaining prevalence as organisations, governments, and cities take advantage of 
the many benefits and automated processes ICT delivers, merging their physical assets and cyber 
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services forming vast complex and geographically dispersed collaborative infrastructures. Despite 
great investment, development, and research, SoS continue to fail with dire consequences, and as 
attacks against these types of infrastructure gain prevalence, finding new means of securing and 
mitigating associated risks becomes more urgent.  As tightly coupled bonds form between systems 
and components, dependencies are generated; these interdependencies contribute to increases with 
system complexity, and in addition can introduce SPoF and be responsible for additional failings 
rippling across the SoS causing both partial and full cascade failure. 
The proposed SeCurity Risk Analysis and Mitigation Framework endeavours to overcome the 
associated issues and challenges that impede SoS security and risk analysis. Applying the presented 
algorithms and techniques within the framework, we can identify and examine all vulnerabilities 
identified during the risk assessment and quantify a security score for each node, thus, quantifying the 
communication security level for the entire multi-level SoS, and using the robustness function 
measure the overall appropriateness of the collaborative infrastructure.  
Identified vulnerabilities, security scores, data access levels, and robustness scores support the 
framework’s security risk mitigation process, to enhance the overall multi-level SoS communication 
security and robustness, without introducing additional security resources into the collaborative 
infrastructure. Additionally, its quantification of network centralities allows us to consider the 
problematic relational states between nodes, and identifies nodes that have the ability to expose the 
entire multi-level SoS to risks. Including, for example, nodes that are influential and can cause 
dependencies within the infrastructure to form, which increase the risks of cascading failure, and 
nodes with high bridging centralities that are relied upon to maintain communications across the SoS 
between nodes. 
The SCRAM framework generates detailed reports and graphs, allowing for the multi-level SoS 
topologies to be visualised in a series of undirected graphs. The use of evolutionary evolvement 
combined with the robustness algorithm, means the security risk mitigation process produces a series 
of alternative security enhanced solutions for consideration. Meaning the framework provides a 
diverse number of recommend solutions that all mitigate risk and enhance security, and that support 
decision making processes when having to balance cyber security, risk levels, identification of 
topological vulnerabilities (centrality scores), and financial restrictions. 
Analysis of the conducted experiments, corroborate that the framework and proposed techniques can 
succeed in enhancing multi-level SoS security and mitigate risks, and that they can overcome the 
challenges and issues associated with SoS and assuring their security. The SCRAM framework 
provides a practical means for individual networked components and the entire multi-level SoS to be 
monitored, using vulnerability analysis, node property aspects, topology data, and consider other 
factors including risks associated with high-centrality nodes, and the likelihood of violating access 
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control requirements, in order to identify risks, vulnerabilities, and interdependent links, thus, 
providing a means to prevent security issues with future multi-level SoS developments and 
infrastructures, and enhance SoS security by providing the means to improve security and mitigate 
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SCRAM Positive Multi-Level SoS Vulnerability 
Performance 
 
The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.11-a, 6.11-b, and 6.11-c. 
 





Appendix A Figure 2. Multi-Level SoS A Topology 
 





The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.11-d, 6.11-e, and 6.11-f. 
 





Appendix A Figure 5. Multi-Level SoS B Topology 
 






The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.11-g, 6.11-h, and 6.11-i. 
 





Appendix A Figure 8. Multi-Level SoS C Topology 
 




The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.12-a, 6.12-b, and 6.12-c. 
 






Appendix A Figure 11. Multi-Level SoS D Topology 
 




The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.12-d, 6.12-e, and 6.12-f. 
 






Appendix A Figure 14. Multi-Level SoS E Topology 
 




The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.12-g, 6.12-h, and 6.12-i. 
 






Appendix A Figure 17. Multi-Level SoS F Topology 
 




The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.13-a, 6.13-b, and 6.13-c. 
 







Appendix A Figure 20. Multi-Level SoS G Topology 
 




The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.13-d, 6.13-e, and 6.13-f. 
 







Appendix A Figure 23. Multi-Level SoS H Topology 
 





The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.13-g, 6.13-h, and 6.13-i. 
 







Appendix A Figure 26. Multi-Level SoS I Topology 
 





SCRAM Positive Multi-Level SoS Vulnerability 
and Data Access Performance 
 
The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.17-a, 6.17-b, and 6.17-c. 
 





Appendix B Figure 2. Multi-Level SoS J Topology 
 





The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.17-d, 6.17-e, and 6.17-f. 
 





Appendix B Figure 5. Multi-Level SoS K Topology 
 




The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.17-g, 6.17-h, and 6.17-i. 
 





Appendix B Figure 8. Multi-Level SoS L Topology 
 




The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.18-a, 6.18-b, and 6.18-c. 
 






Appendix B Figure 11. Multi-Level SoS M Topology 
 




The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.18-d, 6.18-e, and 6.18-f. 
 






Appendix B Figure 14. Multi-Level SoS N Topology 
 




The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.18-g, 6.18-h, and 6.18-i. 
 






Appendix B Figure 17. Multi-Level SoS O Topology 
 




The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.19-a, 6.19-b, and 6.19-c. 
 







Appendix B Figure 20. Multi-Level SoS P Topology 
 




The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.19-d, 6.19-e, and 6.19-f. 
 







Appendix B Figure 23. Multi-Level SoS Q Topology 
 





The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.19-g, 6.19-h, and 6.19-i. 
 







Appendix B Figure 26. Multi-Level SoS R Topology 
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The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.23-a, 6.23-b, and 6.23-c. 
 





Appendix C Figure 2. Multi-Level SoS S Topology 
 





The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.23-d, 6.23-e, and 6.23-f. 
 





Appendix C Figure 5. Multi-Level SoS T Topology 
 




The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.24-a, 6.24-b, and 6.24-c. 
 





Appendix C Figure 8. Multi-Level SoS U Topology 
 




The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.24-d, 6.24-e, and 6.24-f. 
 






Appendix C Figure 11. Multi-Level SoS V Topology 
 




The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.25-a, 6.25-b, and 6.25-c. 
 






Appendix C Figure 14. Multi-Level SoS W Topology 
 




The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.25-d, 6.25-e, and 6.25-f. 
 






Appendix C Figure 17. Multi-Level SoS X Topology 
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The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.28-a, 6.28-b, and 6.28-c. 
 





Appendix D Figure 2. Multi-Level SoS Y Topology 
 





The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.28-d, 6.28-e, and 6.28-f 
 





Appendix D Figure 5. Multi-Level SoS Z Topology 
 




The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.29-a, 6.29-b, and 6.29-c. 
 





Appendix D Figure 8. Multi-Level SoS AA Topology 
 




The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.29-d, 6.29-e, and 6.29-f. 
 






Appendix D Figure 11. Multi-Level SoS BB Topology 
 




The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.30-a, 6.30-b, and 6.30-c. 
 






Appendix D Figure 14. Multi-Level SoS CC Topology 
 




The following figures provide detailed visualisation of the multi-level SoS experiment presented in 
Figures 6.30-d, 6.30-e, and 6.30-f. 
 






Appendix D Figure 17. Multi-Level SoS DD Topology 
 
Appendix D Figure 18. Multi-Level SoS DD Optimum Candidate 
